Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q25. The order of the passions to one another
Source context
- Theme
- hierarchical ordering of the passions relative to one another within the sensitive appetite
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian psychology (De Anima / Nicomachean Ethics)Aristotle distinguishes affective movements of the sensitive part of the soul by object, contrariety, and priority of act, providing the structural framework Aquinas systematizes in Q25.
- Stoic passiologyThe Stoic fourfold classification of passions (pleasure, desire, distress, fear) by temporal relation to apparent good or evil offers a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's ordering by concupiscible and irascible genera.
Q25. The order of the passions to one another
Article 2
[I-II.q.25.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.arg.2] Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, amor unionem quamdam importat: est enim « vis unitiva et concretiva, » ut Dionysius dicit, in iv cap. De div. nom., § 15, col. 714, t. 4. Sed concupiscentia vel desiderium est motus ad unionem rei concupitæ vel desideratæ. Ergo concupiscentia est prior amore.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.arg.3] Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, causa est prior effectu. Sed Ita codd. —; in delectatio est quandoque causa amoris; qui dam enim propter delectationem amant, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic., cap. 11 et 13. Ergo delectatio est prior amore; non ergo prima inter passiones concupiscibilis est amor.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.sc] Sed contra est, quod Augustinus dicit in XIV De civ. Dei, cap. VII, § 2, col. 410, t. 7, quod « omnes passiones ex amore causantur; amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, lætitia est. » Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.co] Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (11, 3, ad 3).
[I-II.q.25.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod objecta concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem bonum est prius malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni; unde et omnes passiones quarum objectum est bonum, naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum objectum est malum, unaquæque scilicet sua passione opposita; quia enim bonum quæritur, ideo refutatur oppositum malum. Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in executione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem consecutionem illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem. Manifestum est autem, quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo movetur ad finem; tertio quiescit in fine post ejus consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportion appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem amor præcedit desiderium, et desiderium præcedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis est e converso; nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem; delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quæ quodammodo est finis, sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.ad.1] We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit. « Voces » enim « sunt signa intellectuum, » secundum Philosophum, I Perih., in princ. Nos autem ut plurimum per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio; quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit in X De Trinit., cap. XII, § 19, col. 984, t. 8, « amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia.» Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis magis est sensibilis concupiscentia; et propter hoc ab ea denominatur potentia.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.ad.2] The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis, secundum scilicet conjunctionem ad rem ipsam; et talis unio pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quæ sequitur desiderium. Alia autem est unio affectiva, secundum scilicet quod aliquid habet aptitudinem vel proportionem; prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem ad alterum et inclinationem, jam participat aliquid ejus; et sic amor unionem importat; quæ quidem unio præcedit motum desiderii.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.ad.3] Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.
[I-II.q.25.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod delectatio causat amorem, secundum quod est prior in intentione.
Article 3
[I-II.q.25.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. 02, Objection 1), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod spes non sit prima inter passiones irascibilis. Vis enim irascibilis ab ira denominatur. Cum ergo denominatio fiat a potiori, videur quod ira sit potior et prior quam spes.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.arg.2] Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, arduum est objectum irascibilis. Sed magis videtur esse arduum quod aliquis conetur superare malum contrarium quod imminet ut futurum, quod pertinet ad audaciam, vel quod injacet jam ut præsens, quod pertinet ad iram, quam quod conetur acquirere simpliciter aliquod bonum; et similiter magis videtur esse arduum quod conetur vincere malum præsens quam malum futurum. Ergo ira videtur esse potior passio quam audacia, et audacia quam spes; et sic spes non videtur esse prior.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.arg.3] Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prius occurrit in motu ad finem recessus a termino, quam accessus ad terminum. Sed timor et desperatio important recessum ab aliquo; audacia autem et spes important accessum ad aliquid. Ergo timor et desperatio praecedunt spem et audacia.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.sc] The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.sc] Sed contra, quanto aliquid est propinquius primo, tanto est prius. Sed spes est propinquior amori, qui est prima passionum. Ergo spes est prior inter omnes passiones irascibilis.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 1) all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (23, 3,4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis important motum in aliquid. Motus autem ad aliquid in irascibili potest causari ex duobus: uno modo ex sola aptitudine seu proportione ad finem, quae pertinet ad amorem vel odium: alio modo ex praesentia ipsius boni vel mali, quae pertinet ad tristitiam vel gaudium. Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio iræ. Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis, inde est quod ira inter omnes passiones irascibilis est ultima ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali; oportet quod passiones quarum objectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum objectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore; ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione; quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem boni, quod de sua ratione est attractivum; et ideo est motus in bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non competit bono, secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud; unde est quasi per accidens. Et eadem ratione timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audacia; nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi, ira autem consequitur audacia: « Nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare, » secundum quod Avicenna dicit in VI De naturalibus. Sic ergo patet quod spes est prima inter omnes passiones irascibilis. Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis scire velimus, primo occurrunt amor et odium; secundo desiderium et fuga; tertio spes et desperatio; quarto timor et audacia; quinto ira; sexto et ultimo gaudium et tristitia, quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. v: ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium quam tristitia, ut ex praedictis colligi potest.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.ad.1] Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea tanquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.ad.2] It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod arduum non est ratio accedendi vel appetendi, sed potius bonum; et ideo spes, quae directius respicit bonum, est prior; quamvis audacia aliquando sit in magis arduum, vel etiam ira.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.ad.3] The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end.
[I-II.q.25.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod appetitus primo et per se movetur in bonum sicut in proprium objectum; et ex hoc causatur quod recedat a malo. Proportionatur enim motus appetitivæ partis, non quidem motui naturali, sed intentioni naturæ, quae per prius intendit finem quam remotionem contrarii, quae non quæritur nisi propter adeptionem finis.
Article 4
[I-II.q.25.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7 sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non sint istæ quatuor principales passiones, « gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor. » Augustinus enim, in XIV De civ. Dei, cap. vii, § 2, col. 410, t. 7, non ponit spem, sed cupiditatem loco ejus.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.arg.2] Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four principal passions.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in passionibus animæ est duplex ordo, scilicet intentionis, et consecutionis, seu generationis. Aut ergo principales passiones accipiuntur secundum ordinem intentionis, et sic tantum gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt finales, erunt principales passiones; aut secundum ordinem consecutionis seu generationis; et sic erit amor principalis passio. Nullo ergo modo debent dici qua-tuor passiones istæ principales, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.arg.3] Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut audacia causatur ex spe, ita timor ex desperatione. Aut ergo spes et desperatio debent poni principales passiones, tanquam causæ; aut spes et audacia, tanquam sibi ipsis affines.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.sc] Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says: "Banish joys: banish fears: Away with hope: away with tears."
[I-II.q.25.a.4.sc] Sed contra est illud quod Boetius, in lib. I De consolat., metr. vii, col. 657, t. 4, enumerans quatuor principales passiones dicit: « Gaudia pelle, Pelle timorem, Spemque fugato, Nec dolor adsit. »
[I-II.q.25.a.4.co] These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hæ quatuor passiones communiter principales esse dicuntur. Quarum duæ, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivæ et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum; unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. v. Timor autem et spes sunt principales, non quidem quasi completivæ simplici ter, sed quia sunt completivæ in genere motus appetitivi ad aliquid. Nam respectu boni incipit motus in amore, et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero mali incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in timore. Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi secundum differentiam præsentis et futuri; motus enim respicit futurum, sed quies est in aliquo præsenti. De bono igitur præsenti est gaudium, de malo præsenti est tristitia; de bono futuro est spes, de malo futuro est timor. Omnes autem aliæ passiones, quæ sunt de bono vel de malo præsenti vel futuro, ad has completive reducuntur. Unde etiam a quibusdam dicuntur principales hæ prædictæ quatuor passiones, quia sunt generales: quod quidem verum est, si spes et timor designant motum appetitus communiter tendentem in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.ad.1] Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, id est, ad bonum futurum.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.ad.2] These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply to Objection 3).
[I-II.q.25.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod passiones istæ dicuntur principales secundum ordinem intentionis et complementi. Et quamvis timor et spes non sint ultimæ passiones simpliciter, tamen sunt ultimæ in genere passionum tendentium in aliud quasi in futurum. Nec potest esse instantia nisi de ira, quæ tamen non potest poni principalis passio, quia est quidam effectus audaciæ, quæ non potest esse passio principalis, ut infra dicetur.
[I-II.q.25.a.4.ad.3] Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.25.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens; et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Ideo hæ passiones non possunt esse principales; quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale: et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quæ consequitur audaciam.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-secundae/q025.json