Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q26. The passions of the soul in particular: and first, of love
Source context
- Theme
- love as the first and foundational passion of the soul, its nature, causes, and effects
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Platonic Eros (Symposium, Phaedrus)Plato's account of Eros as the soul's fundamental movement toward the Good and the Beautiful runs structurally parallel to Aquinas's identification of love as the first and root passion from which all other passions proceed.
- Vedantic bhakti (devotional love)In Vedantic tradition, love (bhakti) toward the divine is treated as the primary orientation of the subtle body (sukshma sharira), a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's location of love as the foundational movement of the sensitive appetite toward its proper object.
- Sufi doctrine of mahabbah (divine love)Sufi theorists such as Ibn Arabi treat mahabbah as the ontological ground of all creaturely motion toward God, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that love is the origin of all other passional movements in Q26.
Q26. The passions of the soul in particular: and first, of love
Article 1
[I-II.q.26.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written (Wisdom 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible power.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod amor non sit in concupiscibilis. Dicitur enim Sap., viii, 2: Hanc, scilicet sapientiam, amavi, et exquisivi a juventute mea. Sed concupiscibilis, cum sit pars appetitus sensitivi, non potest tendere in sapientiam, quæ non comprehenditur sensu. Ergo amor non est in concupiscibilis.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.arg.2] Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, amor videtur esse idem cui-libet passioni: dicit enim Augustinus in XIV De civitate Dei, cap. vii, § 2, col. 410, t. 7: « Amor inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia; et fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est; idque, si acciderit, sentiens, tristitia est. » Sed non omnis passio est in concupiscibili; sed timor etiam hic enumeratus est in irascibili. Ergo non est simpliciter dicendum quod amor sit in concupiscibili.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.arg.3] Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Dionysius, in cap. iv De div. nomin., § 15, col. 714, t. 1, ponit quemdam amorem naturalem. Sed amor naturalis magis videtur pertinere ad vires naturales, quæ sunt animæ vegetabilis. Ergo amor non simpliciter est in concupiscibili.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power."
[I-II.q.26.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Topic., cap. iii, in loco 25, quod « amor est in concupiscibili. »
[I-II.q.26.a.1.co] Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other: and this is called the "natural appetite." Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the I, 6, 1, ad 2; I, 103, 1, ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will."
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called "natural love." In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod amor est ali-quid ad appetitum pertinens, cum utriusque objectum sit bonum; unde secundum differentiam appetitus est differentia amoris. Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius; et hujusmodi dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam, sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam, ut in primo libro dictum est. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex judicio libero, et talis est appetitus sensitivus in brutis, qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, in quantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum judicium; et talis est appetitus rationalis, sive intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas. In unoquoque autem horum appetituum amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali principium hujusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quæ dici potest amor naturalis; sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis; et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi vel voluntatis ad aliquod bonum, id est, ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in intellectivo appetitu; et pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum; quod est objectum irascibilis.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.ad.1] The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa loquitur de amore intellectivo vel rationali.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.ad.2] Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod amor dicitur esse timor, gaudium, cupiditas et tristitia, non quidem essentialiter, sed causaliter.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.ad.3] Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it.
[I-II.q.26.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animæ vegetativæ, sed in omnibus potentiis animæ, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus: quia, ut Dionysius dicit, c. iv De div. nom., § 10, col. 707, t. 1, « omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile, » cum unaquæque res habeat con-naturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.
Article 2
[I-II.q.26.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a passion.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus passio est. Sed omnis amor est « virtus quæ-dam. » ut dicit Dionysius cap. iv De div. nomin., § 15, col. 714, t. 1. Ergo amor non est passio.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.arg.2] Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, amor est « unio quæ-dam vel nexus, » secundum Augustinum, in lib. VIII De Trinit., cap. x, § 14, col. 960, t. 8. Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo amor non est passio.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.arg.3] Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Damascenus dicit in lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xxii, col. 939, t. 1, quod passio est « motus quidam. » Amor autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium, sed principium hujusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion."
[I-II.q.26.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. v, circa med., quod « amor est passio. » Corder.: « vim quamdam sive potestatem. » Quid est ergo amor nisi quæ-dam vita duo aliqua copulans vel copulare appetens. » Secundum Richardum a Mediavilla, amor generalissime dictus quamlibet inclinationem in bonum comprehendit.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.co] Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens; nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam; et ipsa connaturalitas, quæ est principium motus ad locum connaturalem, propter gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui primo quidem quamdam coaptationem ad ipsum, quæ est quædam complacentia appetibilis, ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. Nam « appetitivus motus circulo agitur, » ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 55. Appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens quodammodo in ejus intentione, et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus ubi fuit principium. Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quæ est gaudium. Sic ergo cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor est passio, proprie quidem secundum quod est in concupiscibili, communiter autem et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.ad.1] Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement in the appetite.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia virtus significat principium motus vel actionnis; ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a Dionysio vocatur virtus.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.ad.2] Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit, cap. iv De divin. nom., § 15, col. 714, t. 4, quod « amor est virtus unitiva, » et Philosophus dicit in II Polit., cap. 11, a med., quod « unio est opus amoris. »
[I-II.q.26.a.2.ad.3] Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein.
[I-II.q.26.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus, quo immutatur ab appetibili, ut ei appetibile complaceat.
Article 3
[I-II.q.26.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection denote the same thing.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius enim, iv cap. De divin. nom., § 11, col. 707, t. 4, dicit quod « hoc modo se habent amor et dilectio, sicut quatuor et bis duo; rectilineum et rectas habens lineas. » Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio significant idem.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.arg.2] Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. Therefore these are the same.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si dilectio et amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre videntur quod dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo, ut quidam dixerunt, secundum quod Augustinus narrat in XIV De civ. Dei, c. vii, § 2, col. 410, t. 7. Sed hoc modo non differunt; quia, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit, in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo amor et dilectio non differunt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem concludit quod non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem dicere.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.arg.3] Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection."
[I-II.q.26.a.3.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does."
[I-II.q.26.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, iv cap. De divin. nomin., § 12, col. 710, t. 4, quod « quibusdam sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen dilectionnis. »
[I-II.q.26.a.3.co] We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however, in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either way.
Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].
[I-II.q.26.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, charitas et amicitia. Differunt tamen in hoc quod amicitia, secundum Philosophum, iu VIII Ethic., c. v, parum a med., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis; charitas autem utroque modo accipi potest. Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam amor communius inter ea est; omnis enim dilectio vel charitas est amor, sed non e converso; addit enim dilectio supra amorem electionem præcedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat; unde dilectio non est in con- 1 Ita cod. et edit. Rom.; sed — 3 Ita cod. cupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura; charitas autem addit supra amorem perfectionem quamdam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur, magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.ad.1] Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same as dilection.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo; sic enim amor idem est quod dilectio.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.ad.2] The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated above.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod objectum amoris est communius quam objectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut dictum est.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.ad.3] Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that "a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference spoken of.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est. In parte tamen intellectiva idem est amor et dilectio; et sic loquitur ibi Augustinus; unde parum post subdit, quod « recta voluntas est amor bonus, » et quod « perversa voluntas est malus amor. » Quia tamen amor, qui est passio concupiscibilis, plurimos inclinat ad malum, inde habuerunt occasionem qui prædictam differentiam assignaverunt.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.ad.4] The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
[I-II.q.26.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ideo aliqui posuerunt etiam in ipsa voluntate nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quamdam passionem, præcipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem præsupponit judicium rationis; magis autem in Deum homo potest tendere per amorem passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio possit ducere; quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est, et propter hoc divinius est amor quam dilectio.
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