Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q27. The cause of love
Source context
- Theme
- the ontological cause of love as elicited by the good in the beloved object
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 147, 1913-08-25Steiner distinguishes a form of love whose cause lies not in the lover but in the object of love, treating this object-rooted love as structurally significant for understanding love in the sense world.
- GA 71b, 1918-06-14Steiner observes that immersion in merely ordinary cognition can cause the capacity for love to diminish in the human being, implying that the activating cause of love is not reducible to intellectual apprehension alone.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian teleologyAristotle's account of the good as that toward which all things tend (Nicomachean Ethics I.1) provides a structural parallel to Aquinas's thesis that the apprehended good is the formal cause that elicits love in the appetite.
- Neoplatonic emanation (Plotinus, Enneads III.5)Plotinus locates the cause of Eros in the soul's apprehension of the Beautiful-Good proceeding from the One, offering a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that love is causally dependent on perceived goodness and beauty.
- Sufi doctrine of divine attraction (jadhb)In Ibn Arabi's metaphysics, the lover is drawn by the manifestation of divine names in the beloved, a structural parallel to Aquinas's position that love is caused by the good as apprehended rather than by an act of will alone.
Q27. The cause of love
Article 1
[I-II.q.27.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens that evil also is loved, according to Psalm 10:6: "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non solum bonum sit causa amoris. Bonum enim non est causa amoris, nisi quia amatur. Sed contingit etiam malum amari, secundum illud psal. x, 6 : Qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam ; alioquin omnis amor esset bonus. Ergo non solum bonum est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil is the cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. iv, a med., quod « eos qui mala sua dicunt, amamus. » Ergo videtur quod malum sit causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.arg.3] Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all."
[I-II.q.27.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Dionysius dicit, cap. iv De div. nom., § 10, col. 707, t. 1, quod « non solum bonum, sed etiam pulchrum est omnibus amabile. »
[I-II.q.27.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII De Trinit., cap. 11, § 4, col. 949, t. 8 : « Non amatur certe nisi bonum solum. » Ergo bonum est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 26, Article 1), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as stated above (26, 1,2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quæ est vis passiva. Unde objectum ejus comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris objectum. Amoris autem proprium objectum est bonum : quia, ut dictum est, amor importat quamdam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum : unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum. Unde re-linquitur quod bonum sit propria causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.ad.1] Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such like.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum ; et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum. Et per hunc modum homo diligit iniquitatem, inquantum per iniquitatem adipiscitur aliquod bonum, puta delectationem vel pecuniam, vel aliquid hujusmodi.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.ad.2] Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illi qui mala sua dicunt, non propter mala amantur, sed propter hoc quod dicunt mala; hoc enim quod est dicere mala sua, habet rationem boni, inquantum excludit fictionem seu simulationem.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.ad.3] The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend.
[I-II.q.27.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit « quod omnia appetunt, » de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur apprehensio; unde et illi sensus præcipue respiciunt pulchrum qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes; dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam; ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cujus ipsa apprehensio placet.
Article 2
[I-II.q.27.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (Q83, qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod cognitio non sit causa amoris. Quod enim aliquid quæratur, hoc contingit ex amore. Sed aliqua quæruntur quæ nesciuntur, sicut scientiæ; cum enim in his « idem sit eas habere quod eas noscere, » ut Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., quæst. xxxv, § 1, col. 24, t. 6, si cognoscerentur, haberentur, et non quærerentur. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.arg.2] Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ejusdem rationis videtur esse quod aliquid incognitum ametur, et quod aliquid ametur plus quam cognoscatur. Sed aliqua amantur plus quam cognoscuntur, sicut Deus, qui in hac vita potest per seipsum amari, non autem per seipsum cognosci. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.arg.3] Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si cognitio esset causa amoris, non posset inveniri amor ubi non est cognitio. Sed in omnibus rebus invenitur amor, ut dicit Dionysius iv cap. De divin. nom., § 10, col. 707, t. 1; non autem in omnibus invenitur cognitio. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.sc] Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."
[I-II.q.27.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus probat in X De Trin., cap. 1, § 1, col. 971, t. 8, quod « nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum. »
[I-II.q.27.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, bonum est causa amoris per modum objecti. Bonum autem non est objectum appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum; et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod amatur. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit IX Ethic., cap. v et xii, in princ., quod « visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi; » et similiter contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis est principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.ad.1] He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ille qui quærit scientiam, non omnino ignorat; sed secundum aliquid eam præcognoscit, vel in universali, vel in aliquo ejus effectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari, ut Augustinus dicit, X De Trin., cap. 1, etc., ut supra. Sic autem eam cognoscere non est eam habere, sed cognoscere eam perfecte.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.ad.2] Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love of God.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem pertinet, cujus est distinguere inter ea quæ secundum rem sunt conjuncta, et componere quodammodo ea quæ sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat sigillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes, et virtutes, et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quæ respicit rem secundum quod in se est; unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res, prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus ametur quam cognoscatur: quia potest perfecte amari, etiamsi non perfecte cognoscatur; sicut maxime patet in scientiis, quas aliqui amant propter solam summariam cognitionem quam de eis habent, puta quod sciunt rhetoricam esse scientiam per quam homo potest persuadere; et hoc in rhetorica amant. Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei.
[I-II.q.27.a.2.ad.3] Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (26, 1; cf. I, 6, 1, ad 2).
[I-II.q.27.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus, causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus natnralibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit, ut supra dictum est.
Article 3
[I-II.q.27.a.3.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the cause of hatred; for it is written (Proverbs 13:10) that "among the proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa amoris. Idem non est causa contrariorum. Sed similitudo est causa odii; dicitur enim Proverb., xiii, 10, quod inter superbos semper sunt jurgia*; et Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. 1, a med., quod « figuli corrixantur ad invicem. » Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in IV Confess., cap. xiv, § 22, col. 702, t. 1, quod « aliquis amat in alio quod esse non vellet, » sicut homo amat histrionem, qui non vellet esse histrio. Hoc autem non contingeret, si similitudo esset propria causa amoris; sic enim homo amaret in altero quod ipse haberet vel vellet habere. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quilibet homo amat id quo indiget, etiamsi illud non habeat; sicut infirmus amat sanitatem, et pauper divitias. Sed in quantum indiget et caret eis, habet dissimilitudinem ad ipsa. Ergo non solum « Neque ullam disciplinam aliud sit habere quam nosse. » II. Ita codd.; in Parm. : « aliquam. » similitudo, sed dissimilitudo est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.arg.4] Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in II Rhetor., cap. iv, post princ., quod « beneficos in pecunias et salutem amamus, » et « similiter eos qui circa mortuos servant amicitiam, omnes diligunt. » Non autem omnes sunt tales. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.sc] On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like."
[I-II.q.27.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., xiii, 19: Omne animal diligit simile sibi.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.co] I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.
Now it has been stated above (Question 26, Article 4), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod similitudo, propriie loquendo, est causa amoris. Sed considerandum est, quod similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu, sicut duo habentes albedinem dicuntur similes; alio modo ex hoc quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione illud quod aliud habet in actu; sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens extra suum locum habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo loco existenti; vel etiam secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad actum ipsum; nam in ipsa potentia quod dammodo est actus. Primus ergo similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiæ, seu benevolentiæ; ex hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa; sicut duo homines sunt unum in specie humanitatis, et duo albi in albedine; et ideo affectus unius tendit in alterum sicut in unum sibi, et vult ei bonum sicut et sibi. Sed secundus modus similitudinis causat amorem concupiscentiæ vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis: quia unicuique existenti in potentia, inquantum hujusmodi, inest appetitus sui actus, et in ejus consecutione delectatur, si sit sentiens et cognoscens. Dictum est autem supra, quod in amore concupiscentiæ amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum quod concupiscit. Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium; quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicujus formæ. Et ideo, si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participatione formæ, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat, efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus. Et propter hoc figuli corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro; et inter superbos sunt jurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio excellentia, quam concupiscunt. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in hoc etiam quod aliquis in altero amat quod in se non amat, invenitur ratio similitudinis secundum proportionalitatem. Nam sicut se habet alius ad hoc quod in eo amatur, ita ipse se habet ad hoc quod in se amat: puta si bonus cantor bonum amet scriptorem, attenditur ibi similitudo proportionis, secundum quod uterque habet quod convenit ei secundum suam artem.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad id quod amat, sicut quod est potentia ad actum, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.ad.4] Reply to Objection 4. According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with his own natural reason.
[I-II.q.27.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum eamdem similitudinem potentiæ ad actum ille qui non est liberalis, amat eum qui est liberalis, inquantum expectat ab eo aliquid quod desiderat, et eadem ratio est de perseverante in amicitia ad eum qui non perseverat: utrobique enim videtur esse amicitia propter utilitatem. Vel dicendum, quod, licet non omnes homines habeant hujusmodi virtutes secundum habitum completum, habent tamen eas secundum quædam seminalia rationis, secundum quæ qui non habet virtutem, diligit virtuosum, tanquam suæ naturali rationi conformem.
Article 4
[I-II.q.27.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliqua alia passio possit esse causa amoris. Dicit enim Philosophus in VIII Ethic., cap. iii, quod « aliqui amantur propter delectationem. » Sed delectatio est passio quædam. Ergo aliqua alia passio est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.arg.2] Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, desiderium quædam passio est. Sed aliquos amamus propter desiderium alicujus quod ab eis expectamus, sicut apparet in omni amicitia quæ est propter utilitatem. Ergo aliqua alia passio est causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all, even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of love.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in X De Trinit., cap. 1, § 2, col. 973, t. 8: « Cujus rei adipiscendæ spem quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat, aut omnino non amat, quamvis quam pulchra sit videat. » Ergo spes est etiam causa amoris.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.sc] All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
[I-II.q.27.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod « omnes aliæ affectiones animæ ex amore causantur, » ut Augustinus dicit, XIV De civ. Dei, cap. VII, § 2, col. 410, t. 7.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.co] There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nulla alia passio est quæ non præsupponat aliquem amorem. Cujus ratio est, quia omnis alia passio animæ importat motum ad aliquid vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus ad aliquid vel quies in aliquo ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit, quæ pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animæ sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicujus, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.ad.1] When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore præcedente; nullus enim delectatur nisi in re aliquo modo amata.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.ad.2] Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod desiderium rei alicujus semper præsupponit amorem illius rei; et sic desiderium alicujus rei potest esse causa ut res alia ametur; sicut qui desiderat pecuniam amat propter hoc eum a quo pecuniam recipit.
[I-II.q.27.a.4.ad.3] Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is loved.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.27.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod spes causat vel auget amorem et ratione delectationis, quia delectationem causat; et etiam ratione desiderii, quia spes desiderium fortificat; non enim ita intense desideramus quæ non speramus; sed tamen et ipsa spes est alicujus boni amati.
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