Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q36. The causes of sorrow or pain
Source context
- Theme
- causes and conditions of sorrow or pain as passions of the sensitive appetite
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 59, 1910-03-03Steiner identifies pleasure, pain, joy, and sorrow as experiences of the astral body, distinguishing their occurrence in animals from the human capacity to transform such states through higher soul activity.
- GA 95, 1906-08-24Steiner notes that human beings, consciously or unconsciously, cause pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, to animals and other humans, situating the causal dimension of sorrow within karmic and social contexts.
- GA 55, 1906-11-08Steiner examines the origin of suffering and its connection with sin, drawing on the figure of Job to illuminate how suffering arises from conditions beyond simple external causation.
- GA 13, l05Steiner teaches that the initiate must cultivate the capacity to rejoice with the joyful and feel pain with the sorrowful while simultaneously gaining mastery over the outward expression of those states.
- GA 56, 1908-04-09Steiner locates pleasure, pain, joy, sorrow, urges, and desires in the astral body, which withdraws from the physical and etheric bodies during dreamless sleep, underscoring their non-physical causal basis.
- GA 143, 1912-02-25Steiner describes how forgotten experiences of sorrow and joy, submerged below consciousness, continue to act causally on a person's general condition, paralleling Aquinas's analysis of interior causes of sorrow.
Cross-tradition
- Stoic philosophyStoic analysis of lupē (grief) identifies false judgment about external goods as the primary cause of sorrow, structurally parallel to Aquinas's treatment of absence of fitting good as the formal cause of pain.
- Buddhist AbhidharmaThe Abhidharma tradition analyzes dukkha (suffering) through its conditions—craving, contact, and wrong perception—offering a systematic causal taxonomy showing cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's four causes of sorrow.
Q36. The causes of sorrow or pain
Article 1
[I-II.q.36.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some good.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod bonum amissum sit magis causa doloris quam malum conjunctum. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De octo quæstionibus Dulcitii, q. I, § 6, col. 153, t. 6, dolorem esse de amissione bonorum temporalium. Eadem ergo ratione quilibet dolor ex amissione ali-cujus boni contingit.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.arg.2] Further, it was said above (Question 35, Article 4) that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above (23, 4; 31, 1; 35, 3). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, supra dictum est, quod dolor qui delectationi contrariatur, est de eodem de quo est de delectatio. Sed delectatio est de bono, sicut supra dictum est. Ergo dolor est principaliter de amissione boni.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.arg.3] Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, XIV De civitate Dei, cap. VII, § 2, col. 410, t. 7, amor est causa tristitiæ, sicut et aliarum affectionum animæ. Sed objectum amoris est bonum. Ergo dolor vel tristitia magis respicit bonum amissum quam malum conjunctum.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow."
[I-II.q.36.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in II lib. Orth. fid., c. xII, col. 930, t. 4, quod « expectatum malum timorem constituit, præsens vero tristitiam. »
[I-II.q.36.a.1.co] If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. For, as stated in the I, 14, 10 and I, 48, 3, evil is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary." Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.
Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place, and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its downward tendency.
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or pain, than the good which is lost.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si hoc modo se haberent privationes in apprehensione animæ, sicut se habent in ipsis rebus, ista quæstio nullius momenti esse videretur. Ma- « Malum dum expectatur, timorem afferre; » Ex vers. Mich. Lequien. lum enim, ut in I habitum est, « est privatio boni. » Privatio autem in rerum natura nihil est aliud quam carentia oppositi habitus. Secundum hoc ergo idem esset tristari de bono amisso, et de malo habito. Sed tristitia est motus appetitus apprehensionem sequentis; in apprehensione autem ipsa privatio habet rationem cujusdam entis, unde dicitur ens rationis; et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo quantum ad motum appetitivum differt, utrum respiciat principalius malum conjunctum vel bonum amissum. Et quia motus appetitus animalis hoc modo se habet in operibus animæ, sicut motus naturalis in rebus naturalibus, ex consideratione naturalium motuum veritas accipi potest. Si enim accipiamus in motibus naturalibus accessum et recessum, accessus per se respicit id quod est conveniens naturae, recessus autem per se respicit id quod est contrarium; sicut grave per se recedit a loco superiori, accedit autem naturaliter ad locum inferiorem. Sed si accipiamus causam utriusque motus, scilicet gravitatem, ipsa gravitas per prius inclinat ad locum deorsum quam trahat a loco sursum, a quo recedit, ut deorsum tendat. Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugæ vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum quasi proprium objectum, ita tristitia respicit malum conjunctum; sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo objectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum conjunctum quam bonum amissum.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.ad.1] The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ipsa amissio boni apprehenditur sub ratione mali, sicut et amissio mali apprehenditur sub ratione boni; et ideo Augustinus dicit dolorem provenire ex amissione temporalium bonorum.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.ad.2] Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing under a contrary aspect.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod delectatio et dolor ei contrarius respiciunt idem, sed sub contraria ratione. Nam si delectatio est de præsentia alicujus, tristitia est de absentia ejusdem. In uno autem contrariorum includitur privatio alterius, ut patet in X Metaph., text. 15. Et inde est quod tristitia, quæ est de contrario, est quodammodo de eodem sub contraria ratione.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.ad.3] When many movements arise from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
[I-II.q.36.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quando ex una causa provenient multi motus, non oportet quod omnes principalius respiciant illud quod principalius respicit causa, sed primus tantum; unusquisque autem aliorum principalius respiciant illud quod est ei conveniens secundum propriam rationem.
Article 2
[I-II.q.36.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above (Article 1): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.arg.2] Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dolor, secundum Damascenum, lib. II Orth. fid., cap. xii, col. 930, t. 1, est de præsenti, concupiscentia autem est de futuro. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.arg.3] Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, id quod per se est delectabile, non est causa doloris. Sed concupiscentia est secundum seipsam delectabilis, ut Philosophus dicit in I Rhet., cap. xi, circa princ. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris seu tristitiae.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in Enchirid., cap. xxiv, col. 244, t. 6: « Subintrantibus ignorantia agendarum rerum et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites subinferuntur error et dolor. » Sed ignorantia est causa erroris. Ergo concupiscentia est causa doloris.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.co] Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above (Article 1), the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (Article 1) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Question 32, Article 6); hence it is that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (30, 2, ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tristitia est motus quidam appetitus animalis. Motus autem appetitivus habet, sicut dictum est, similitudinem appetitus naturalis. Cujus duplex causa assignari potest: una per modum finis; alia sicut unde est principium motus; sicut descensionis corporis gravis causa, sicut finis, est locus deorsum; principium autem motus est inclinatio naturalis, quæ est ex gravitate. Causa autem motus appetitivi per modum finis est ejus objectum; et sic supra dictum est, quod causa doloris seu tristitiae est malum conjunctum. Causa autem sicut unde est principium talis motus, est interior inclinatio appetitus; qui quidem per prius inclinatur ad bonum, et ex consequenti ad repudiandum malum contrarium. Et ideo hujusmodi motus appetitivi principium est amor, qui est prima inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum; secundum autem principium est odium; quod est inclinatio prima appetitus ad malum fugiendum. Sed quia concupiscentia vel cupiditas est primus effectus amoris, quo maxime delectatur, ut supra dictum est, ideo frequenter Augustinus cupiditatem vel concupiscentiam pro amore ponit, ut supra dictum est, et hoc modo concupiscentiam dicit esse universalelem causam doloris. Sed ipsa concupiscentia secundum propriam rationem considerata est interdum causa doloris. Omne enim quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium motui; illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus est contristans; et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa tristitiæ, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali ablatione tristamur. Universalis autem causa doloris esse non potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum præsentium, in quibus jam delectamur, quam futurorum, quæ concupiscimus.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.ad.1] The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard evil.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum est causa inclinationis appetitus ad malum fugiendum, sicut dictum est, et ex hoc contingit quod motus appetitus qui respiciunt bonum, ponuntur causa motuum appetitus qui respiciunt malum.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.ad.2] That which is desired, though really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod concupiscitur, etsi realiter sit futurum, est tamen quodammodo præsens, inquantum speratur. Vel potest dici, quod, licet bonum concupitum sit futurum, tamen impedimentum præsentialiter apponitur, quod dolorem causat.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.ad.3] Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod concupiscentia est delectabilis, quamdiu manet spes adipiscendi quod concupiscitur; sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.
Article 3
[I-II.q.36.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion," which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [Aristotle wrote endeian, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod appetitus unitatis non sit causa doloris. Dicit enim Philosophus in X Ethic., c. 111, in med., quod « hæc opinio quæ posuit repletionem esse causam delectationis, et incisionem causam tristitiæ, videtur esse facta ex delectationibus et tristitiis quæ sunt circa cibum. » Sed non omnis delectatio vel tristitia est hujusmodi. Ergo appetitus unitatis non est causa universalis doloris; cum repletio ad unitatem pertineat, incisio vero multitudinem inducat.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.arg.2] Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quælibet separatio unitati opponitur. Si ergo dolor causaretur ex appetitus unitatis, nulla separatio esset delectabilis; quod patet esse falsum in separatione omnium superfluorum.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.arg.3] Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving for separation, as causing sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, eadem ratione appetimus conjunctionem boni et remotionem mali. Sed sicut conjunctio pertinet ad unitatem, cum sit unio quædam, ita separatio est contraria unitati. Ergo appetitus unitatis non magis debet poni causa doloris quam appetitus separationis.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?"
[I-II.q.36.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. III De lib. arbitr., cap. xxiii, § 69, col. 4305, t. 4, quod « ex dolore quem bestiæ sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animæ appetentes unitatis. Quid est enim aliud dolor nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens? »
[I-II.q.36.a.3.co] Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis vel amor causa doloris ponendus est. Bonum enim uniuscujusque rei in qua-dam unitate consistit, prout scilicet una-quæque res habet in se unita illa ex quibus consistit ejus perfectio; unde et Platonici posuerunt unum esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc sicut amor vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus unitatis.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.ad.1] Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam non cujuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiæ, ut quidam opinabantur; quorum opinionem ibi Philosophus excludit per hoc quod quædam repletiones non sunt delectabiles, sicut repleti cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio sive unio magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum constitueret. Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cujuslibet unitatis, sed ejus in qua consistit perfectio naturæ.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.ad.2] Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod separatio potest esse delectabilis, vel inquantum removetur illud quod est contrarium perfectioni rei, vel inquantum separatio habet aliquam unionem adjunctam, puta sensibilis ad sensum.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.ad.3] Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is.
[I-II.q.36.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem; unde appetitus hujusmodi separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus unitatis.
Article 4
[I-II.q.36.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod potestas major non debet poni causa doloris. Quod enim est in potestate agentis, nondum est præsens, sed futurum. Dolor autem est de malo præsenti. Ergo potestas major non est causa doloris.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.arg.2] Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nocumentum illatum est causa doloris. Sed nocumentum potest inferri etiam a potestate minore. Ergo potestas major non debet poni causa doloris.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.arg.3] Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, causæ appetitivorum motuum sunt interiores inclinationes animæ. Potestas autem major est aliquid exterius. Ergo non debet poni causa doloris.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.sc] Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."
[I-II.q.36.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De nat. boni, cap. xx, col. 557, t. 8: « In animo dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati majori, in corpore dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori. »
[I-II.q.36.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 1), a present evil, is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow.
But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.
Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power": for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, malum conjunctum est causa doloris vel tristitiæ per modum objecti. Id ergo quod est causa conjunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiæ. Manifestum est autem hoc esse contra inclinationem appetitus, ut malum præsentialiter inhæreat. Quod autem est contra inclinationem alicujus, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicujus fortioris; et ideo potestas major ponitur esse causa doloris ab Augustino. Sed sciendum est, quod si potestas fortior in tantum invalescat quod mutet contrariam inclinationem in inclinationem propriam, jam non erit aliqua repugnantia vel violentia; sicut quando agens fortius, corrumpendo corpus grave, aufert ei inclinationem qua tendit deorsum; et tunc ferri sursum non est ei violentum, sed naturale. Sic igitur si aliqua potestas major intantum invalescat, quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia; sed tunc solum sequitur quando remanet inclination appetitus in contrarium. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit ubi supra, quod « voluntas resistens potestati fortiori causat dolorem; » si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.ad.1] A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod major potestas dolorem causat non secundum quod est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu, dum scilicet facit conjunctionem mali corruptivi.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.ad.2] Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquam potestatem quæ non est major simpliciter, esse majorem quantum ad aliquid; et secundum hoc aliquod nocumentum inferre potest. Si autem nullo modo major esset, nullo modo posset nocere; unde non posset causam doloris inferre.
[I-II.q.36.a.4.ad.3] External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.36.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum appetitivorum, inquantum causant præsentiam objecti; et hoc modo potestas major ponitur causa doloris.
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