Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q39. The goodness and malice of sorrow or pain
Source context
- Theme
- moral evaluation of sorrow and pain as passions of the soul
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Stoic philosophyStoic ethics treats pain (lupē) as a false judgment about an indifferent, making it intrinsically bad; Aquinas by contrast holds that sorrow can be good when directed at genuine evil, marking a cross-tradition congruence on the evaluative structure of suffering while diverging on its moral valence.
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle's account in the Nicomachean Ethics of pleasure and pain as indices of moral character provides the philosophical substrate Aquinas inherits for distinguishing well-ordered from disordered sorrow.
- Buddhist psychology (Abhidharma)Abhidharma analysis classifies dukkha as a pervasive feature of conditioned existence requiring diagnosis and cessation, offering a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's concern for ordered response to pain while diverging on whether any sorrow can be morally meritorious.
Q39. The goodness and malice of sorrow or pain
Article 2
[I-II.q.39.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod tristitia non habeat rationem boni honesti. Quod enim ad inferos deducit, contrariatur honesto. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xxxiii: « Jacob hoc timuisse videtur, ne nimia tristitia sic perturbaretur, ut non ad requiem beatorum iret, sed ad inferos peccatorum. » Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni honesti.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.arg.2] Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 9:7): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, bonum honestum habet rationem laudabilis et meritorii. Sed tristitia diminuit rationem laudis et meriti; dicit enim Apostolus, II ad Cor., ix, 7: Unusquisque, prout destinavit in corde suo, non ex tristitia aut ex necessitate. Ergo tristitia non est bonum honestum.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.arg.3] Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will." But not to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above (Question 19, Article 9), it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV De civ. Dei, cap. xv, col. 424, t. 7, « tristitia est de his quæ nobis nolentibus accidunt. » Sed non velle ea quæ præsentialiter fiunt, est habere voluntatem repugnantem ordinationi divinæ, cujus providentiæ subjacent omnia quæ aguntur. Ergo cum conformitas humanæ voluntatis ad divinam pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, videtur quod tristitia contrarietur rectitudini voluntatis, et sic non habet rationem honesti.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.sc] Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from Matthew 5:5: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.sc] Sed contra, omne quod meretur præmium vitæ æternæ, habet rationem honesti. Sed tristitia est hujusmodi, ut patet per id quod dicitur Matth., v, 5: Beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur. Ergo tristitia est bonum honestum.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.co] In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. For it has been said above (Article 1) that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, potest esse bonum honestum. Dictum est enim, quod tristitia est bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali; quæ qui dem duo in dolore corporali attestantur bonitati naturæ, ex qua provenit quod sensus sentit et natura refugit læsivum, quod causat dolorem. In interiori vero tristitia cognitio mali quandoque quidem est per rectum judicium rationis, et recusatio mali est per voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum. Omne autem bonum honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis. Unde manifestum est quod tristitia potest habere rationem boni honesti.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.ad.1] All the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good; but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnes passiones animæ regulari debent secundum regulam rationis, quæ est radix boni honesti, quam transcendit immoderata tristitia, de qua loquitur Augustinus; et ideo recedit a ratione honesti.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.ad.2] Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et ratione recta, quæ detestatur malum, ita tristitia de bono procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quæ detestatur bonum, et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti, sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam.
[I-II.q.39.a.2.ad.3] Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen--such as sins. Consequently a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves: but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated above (Question 19, Article 10).
[I-II.q.39.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliqua præsentialiter eveniunt, quæ non fiunt Deo volente, sed Deo permittente, sicut peccata; unde voluntas repugnans peccato existenti vel in se vel in alio, non discordat a voluntate Dei. Mala vero pænalia præsentialiter contingunt etiam Deo volente. Non tamen exigitur ad rectitudinem voluntatis quod ea secundum se homo velit, sed solum quod non contrariatur ordini divinæ justitiæ, ut supra dictum est.
Article 3
[I-II.q.39.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written (Sirach 30:25): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it."
[I-II.q.39.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod tristitia non possit esse bonum utile. Dicitur enim Eccli., xxx, 25: Multos occidit tristitia, et non est utilitas in illa.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.arg.2] Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, electio est de eo quod est utile ad finem aliquem. Sed tristitia non est eligibilis; quinimo idem sine tristitia, quam cum tristitia magis est eligendum, ut dicitur in III Topic., cap. ii, loc. 23 et 24. Ergo tristitia non est bonum utile.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.arg.3] Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis res est propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II De cælo, text. 17. Sed tristitia impedit operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic., c. v, circa med. Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni utilis.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.sc] The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to Ecclesiastes 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow is useful.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.sc] Sed contra, sapiens non quærit nisi utilia. Sed, sicut dicitur Eccle., vii, 5: Cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi lætitia. Ergo tristitia est utilis.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.co] A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 7:9): "I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to Ecclesiastes 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all."
Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ex malo præsenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus: unus quidem est, quo appetitus contrariatur malo præsenti; et ex ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est præsens, non potest non esse præsens. Secundus motus consurgit in appetitu ad fugiendum et repellendum malum contristans; et quantum ad hoc tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter: uno modo propter seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum, sicut peccatum; et ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat peccatum, sicut Apostolus dicit II ad Cor., vii, 9: Gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad pænitiam. Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali: dum vel homo nimis inhæret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc quod præcipitatur in aliquod malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus; et secundum hoc tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur Eccle., vii, 3: Melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum convivii; in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum. Ideo autem tristitia in omni malo fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur fugiendi causa; non ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est; ipsam autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono facit ut bonum avidius quæratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut malum vehementius fugiatur.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.ad.1] This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Question 37, Article 2).
[I-II.q.39.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa intelligitur de immoderata tristitia, quæ animum absorbet; hujusmodi enim tristitia immobilitat animum, et impedit fugam mali, ut supra dictum est.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.ad.2] Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut quod-libet eligibile fit minus eligibile propter tristitiam, ita quodlibet fugiendum redditur magis fugiendum propter tristitiam; et quantum ad hoc tristitia est utilis.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.ad.3] Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.
[I-II.q.39.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod tristitia de operatione aliqua impedit operationem, sed tristitia de cessatione operationis facit avidius operari.
Article 4
[I-II.q.39.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod tristitia sit summum malum. « Optimo » enim « opponitur pessimum, » ut dicitur in VIII Ethic., c. x, a princ. Sed quædam delectatio est optimum, quæ scilicet pertinet ad felicitatem. Ergo aliqua tristitia est summum malum.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.arg.2] Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever he will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above (3, 4, Objection 5; 5, 8, Objection 3). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain is man's greatest evil.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus sic argumentatur in Soliloq., I, c. xii, col. 881, t. 4: « Ex duabus partibus compositi sumus, ex animo scilicet et corpore; quarum pars deterior est corpus. Summum autem bonum est melioris partis optimum; summum autem malum pessimum deterioris. Est autem optimum in animo sapientia, est in corpore pessimum dolor. Summum igitur bonum hominis est sapere; summum malum dolere. »
[I-II.q.39.a.4.arg.3] Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body is the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's greatest good is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain."
[I-II.q.39.a.4.sc] Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated in the I, 48, 6. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.sc] Sed contra, culpa est magis malum quam pœna, ut in I habitum est. Sed tristitia, seu dolor pertinet ad pœnam peccati, sicut frui rebus mutabilibus est malum culpæ; dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De vera religione, cap. xii, col. 132, t. 3: « Quid est dolor qui dicitur animi, nisi carere mutabilibus rebus, quibus fruebatur, aut frui se posse speraverat? et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum, id est peccatum, et pœna peccati. » Ergo tristitia seu dolor non est summum malum hominis.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.co] It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod imposibile est aliquam tristitiam seu dolorem esse summum hominis malum. Omnis enim tristitia seu dolor aut est de hoc quod est vere malum, aut est de aliquo apparenti malo, quod est vere bonum. Dolor autem seu tristitia quæ est de vere malo, non potest esse summum malum; est enim aliquid eo pejus, scilicet vel non judicare esse malum illud quod vere est malum, vel etiam non refutare illud. Tristitia autem vel dolor qui est de apparenti malo, quod est vere bonum, non potest esse summum malum, quia pejus esset omnino alienari a vero bono. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua tristitia vel dolor sit summum hominis malum.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.ad.1] Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better. Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated (34, 3): whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et tristitiae, scilicet judicium verum de bono et malo, et ordo debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum, et recusantis malum. Et sic patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cujus privationem potest fieri deterius, sed non in omni delectatione est aliquod malum, per cujus remotionem possit fieri melius. Unde delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum eo modo quo supra dictum est; tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis malum.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.ad.2] The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; because it has an admixture of good.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc ipsum quod est voluntatem repugnare malo, est quoddam bonum; et propter hoc tristitia vel dolor non potest esse summum malum, quia habet aliquam permixionem boni.
[I-II.q.39.a.4.ad.3] That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [Cornelius Celsus].
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.39.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pejus est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet pejori. Malum autem dicitur, quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchir., cap. xii, col. 237, t. 6; unde majus malum est quod est malum animæ, quam quod est malum corporis. Unde non est efficax ratio quam Augustinus inducit, non ex sensu suo, sed ex sensu alterius.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-secundae/q039.json