Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q49. Habits in general, as to their substance
Source context
- Theme
- Ontological status and substance of habit (habitus) as a stable quality inhering in a subject's potency
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethics (hexis)Aquinas's analysis of habitus as a stable disposition inhering in a faculty's potency draws directly on Aristotle's concept of hexis in the Nicomachean Ethics and Categories, where habits are qualities that make a thing act or be acted upon well or ill.
- Vedanta (samskara)Cross-tradition congruence is observable between Aquinas's habitus as a persistent qualifying form in the soul's potency and the Vedantic samskara, understood as latent impressions that modify the quality of mental and volitional faculties without constituting the faculty itself.
Q49. Habits in general, as to their substance
Article 1
[I-II.q.49.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod habitus non sit qualitas. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quæstionum, q. Lxxiii, col. 84, t. 6, quod « hoc nomen habitus ductum est ab illo verbo habere. » Sed habere non solum pertinet ad qualitatem, sed et ad alia genera; dicimur enim habere et quantitatem et pecuniam, et alia hujusmodi. Ergo habitus non est qualitas.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.arg.2] Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, habitus ponitur unum prædicamentum, ut patet in lib. Prædicam., cap. « Habere. » Sed unum prædicamentum non continetur sub alio. Ergo habitus non est qualitas.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.arg.3] Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a quality.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis habitus est dispositio, ut dicitur in Prædicam., cap. « De qualit. » Sed « dispositio est ordo habentis partes, » ut dicitur in V Metaph., text. 24. Hoc autem pertinet ad prædicamentum situs. Ergo habitus non est qualitas.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change."
[I-II.q.49.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in Prædicam., loc. cit., quod « habitus est qualitas de difficili mobilis. »
[I-II.q.49.a.1.co] This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed."
But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say that habit is a quality.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum; a quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur: uno quidem modo secundum quod homo vel quæcumque alia res dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo habet se in seipsa, vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem considerandum est, quod « habere, » secundum quod dicitur respectu cujuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde Philosophus inter Postprædicamenta « habere » ponit, quæ scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur, sicut sunt « opposita, et prius, et posterius, » et alia hujusmodi. Sed inter ea quæ habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quædam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subjectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium; quædam vero sunt in quibus non est aliquod medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum; quædam vero sunt inter quæ est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel regens, et aliud ornatum aut rectum. Unde Philosophus dicit in V Metaph., text. 25, quod « habitus dicitur tanquam actio quædam habentis et habiti; » sicut est in illis quæ circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur « prædicamentum habitus; » de quo dicit Philosophus in V Metaph., ibid., quod « inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius. » Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodammodo se habere in se ipsa vel ad aliquid aliud, cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quædam qualitas est; de qua Philosophus in V Metaph., loc. sup. cit., dicit quod « habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se aut ad aliud; » ut sanitas habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu; unde dicendum est quod habitus est qualitas.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.ad.1] This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de habere communiter sumpto: sic enim est commune ad multa genera, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.ad.2] This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur; sic enim est quoddam prædicamentum, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.ad.3] Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
[I-II.q.49.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicujus habentis partes; sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem Philosophus subdit: scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem; in quo, ut Simplicius dicit in Comment. Prædicament., in cap. « De qual., » comprehendit omnes dispositiones; corporales quidem in eo quod dicit « secundum locum; » et hoc pertinet ad prædicamentum « situs, » qui est ordo partium in loco; quod autem dicit « secundum potentiam » includit illas dispositiones quæ sunt in præparatione et idoneitate, nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et virtus inchoata; quod autem dicit « secundum speciem » includit perfectas dispositiones, quæ dicuntur « habitus, » sicut scientia et virtus complete.
Article 3
[I-II.q.49.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod habitus non importet ordinem ad actum. « Unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est actu. » Sed Philosophus dicit in III De anima, text. 8, quod « cum aliquis sit sciens secundum habitum, est etiam tunc in potentia, aliter tamen quam ante addiscere. » Ergo habitus non importat habitudinem principii ad actum.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.arg.2] Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of quality.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod ponitur in definitione alicujus, per se convenit illi. Sed « esse principium actionis » ponitur in definitione potentiæ, ut patet in V Metaph., text. 17. Ergo esse principium actus per se convenit potentiæ. Quod autem est per se, est principium in unoquoque genere. Si ergo etiam habitus sit principium actus, sequitur quod sit posterior quam potentia, et sic non erit prima species qualitatis habitus vel dispositio.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.arg.3] Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sanitas quando est habitus, et similiter macies et pulchritudo. Sed ista non dicuntur per ordinem ad actum. Non est ergo de ratione habitus quod sit principium actus.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will."
[I-II.q.49.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De bono conjugali, cap. xxI, col. 390, t. 6, quod « habitus est quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; » et Commentator dicit in III De anima, comment. xvIII, quod « habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit. »
[I-II.q.49.a.3.co] To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else, that is to the end.
But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod habere ordinem ad actum potest competere habitui et secundum rationem habitus, et secundum rationem subjecti in quo est habitus. Secundum quidem rationem habitus convenit omni habitui aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum; est enim de ratione habitus ut importet habitudinem quamdam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum quod convenit vel non convenit. Sed natura rei, quæ est finis generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem. Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturæ, vel perducens ad finem. Unde et in V Metaph., text. 25, dicitur in definitione habitus, quod « est dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, aut secundum se, » id est secundum suam naturam, « aut ad aliud, » id est in ordine ad finem. Sed sunt quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subjecti in quo sunt primo et principaliter important ordinem ad actum; quia, ut dictum est, habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei. Si igitur natura rei, in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad actum. Manifestum est autem, quod natura et ratio potentiæ est ut sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus qui est alicujus potentiae ut subjecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.ad.1] Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est qualitas; et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis; sed est in potentia per respectum ad operationem: unde habitus dicitur « actus primus, » et operatio « actus secundus, » ut patet in II De anima, text. 5.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.ad.2] It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura præcedit actionem, quam respiciat potentia, ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus quam potentia.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.ad.3] Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies to other habits.
[I-II.q.49.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sanitas dicitur habitus vel habitualis dispositio in ordine ad naturam, sicut dictum est; inquantum tamen natura est principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum. Unde Philosophus dicit in X De historia animalium, cap. 1, circa princ., quod « homo dicitur esse sanus, vel membrum aliquod, quando potest facere operationem sani; » et est simile in aliis.
Article 4
[I-II.q.49.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity for habits.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit necessarium esse habitum. Habitus enim sunt quibus aliquid disponitur bene vel male ad aliquid, sicut dictum est. Sed per suam formam aliquid bene vel male disponitur; nam secundum formam aliquid est bonum, sicut et ens. Ergo nulla necessitas est habituum.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.arg.2] Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, habitus importat ordinem ad actum. Sed potentia importat principium actus sufficienter; nam et potentiæ absque habitibus sunt principia actuum. Ergo non fuit necessarium habitus esse.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.arg.3] Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut potentia se habet ad bonum et ad malum, ita et habitus; et sicut potentia non semper agit, ita nec habitus. Existentibus igitur potentiis, superfluum fuit habitum esse.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.sc] Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod « habitus sunt perfectiones quædam, » ut dicitur in VII Physic., text. 17. Sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat rationem finis; ergo necessarium fuit habitus esse.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.co] As we have said above (2,3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God.
The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the I, 56, 2, there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.
The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (1, ad 3). Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat dispositionem quamdam in ordine ad naturam rei, et operationem vel finem ejus, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc disponitur. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid indigeat disponi ad alterum, tria requiruntur: primo quidem ut id quod disponitur sit alterum ab eo ad quod disponitur, et sic se habeat ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum. Unde, si aliquid sit cujus natura non sit composita ex potentia et actu, et cujus substantia sit sua operatio, et ipsum sit propter seipsum, ibi habitus vel dispositio locum non habet, sicut patet in Deo. Secundo requiritur quod id quod est in potentia ad alterum, possit pluribus modis determinari, et ad diversa. Unde si aliquid sit in potentia ad alterum, ita tamen quod non sit in potentia nisi ad ipsum, ibi dispositio et habitus locum non habet, quia tale subjectum ex sua natura habet debitam habitudinem ad talem actum. Unde, si corpus cæleste sit compositum ex materia et forma, cum illa materia non sit in potentia ad aliam formam, ut in I dictum est, non habet ibi locum dispositio vel habitus ad formam aut etiam ad operationem, quia natura cælestis corporis non est in potentia nisi ad unum motum determinatum. Tertio requiritur quod plura concurrant ad disponendum subjectum ad unum eorum ad quæ est in potentia, quæ diversis modis commensurari possunt; ut sic disponatur bene vel male ad formam vel ad operationem. Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quæ secundum unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus dispositiones vel habitus, sed simplices qualitates. Dicimus autem dispositiones vel habitus, sanitatem, pulchritudinem, et alia hujusmodi, quæ important quamdam commensurationem plurium, quæ diversis modis commensurari possunt. Propter quod Philosophus dicit in V Metaph., text. 24 et 25, quod « habitus est dispositio; » et dispositio est « ordo habentis partes vel secundum locum, vel secundum potentiam, vel secundum speciem, » ut supra dictum est. Quia igitur multa sunt entium, ad quorum naturas et operationes necesse est plura concurrere, quæ diversis modis commensurari possunt, ideo necesse est habitus esse.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.ad.1] By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per formam perficitur natura rei, sed oportet quod in ordine ad ipsam formam disponatur subjectum aliqua dispositione: ipsa tamen forma ordinatur ulterius ad operationem, quæ est vel finis vel via in finem. Et siquidem habeat forma determinate unam tantum operationem determinatam, nulla alia dispositio requiritur ad operationem præter ipsam formam. Si autem sit talis forma quæ possit diversimode operari sicut est anima, oportet quod disponatur ad suas operationes per aliquos habitus.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.ad.2] Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia quando se habet ad multa, et ideo oportet quod aliquo alio determinetur. Si vero sit aliqua potentia quæ non se habeat ad multa, non indiget habitu determinante, ut dictum est; et propter hoc vires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatæ ad unum.
[I-II.q.49.a.4.ad.3] The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (54, 3): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined to good.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.49.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut infra patebit, eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum vel malum; et ideo necessarii sunt habitus, ut potentiæ determinentur ad bonum.
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