Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q50. The subject of habits
Source context
- Theme
- Ontological substrate of habitual dispositions in the human composite of soul and body
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 96, 1906-10-15Steiner identifies the ether body as the carrier of cultivated character traits, sound habits, and inclinations, which then pass into the physical body in subsequent incarnations — a structural parallel to Aquinas's inquiry into which bodily-psychic powers serve as subjects for habit.
- GA 69e, 1911-11-29Steiner asks whether thinking habits can be developed into epistemically justified dispositions, engaging the question of which cognitive faculties are proper subjects of acquired habit.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian hylomorphismAristotle's account of hexis in De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics locates stable dispositions in the composite of form and matter, establishing the structural framework Aquinas inherits for assigning habits to specific soul-powers and bodily organs.
- Yogācāra Buddhism (vāsanā / bīja)The Yogācāra doctrine of vāsanā (latent impressions stored in the ālaya-vijñāna) presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's analysis of habits as real qualities inhering in powers of the soul, both traditions locating dispositions in a specific psychic substrate rather than in a disembodied will.
Q50. The subject of habits
Article 1
[I-II.q.50.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in corpore non sit aliquis habitus. Ut enim Commentator dicit in III De anima, comm. xviii, « habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit. » Sed actiones corporales non subjacent voluntati, cum sint naturales. Ergo in corpore non potest esse aliquis habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.arg.2] Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition can be a habit.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnes dispositiones corporales sunt facile mobiles. Sed habitus est qualitas difficile mobilis. Ergo nulla disposition corporalis potest esse habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.arg.3] Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnes dispositiones corporales subjacent alterationi. Sed alteratio non est nisi in tertia specie qualitatis, quæ dividitur contra habitum. Ergo nullus habitus est in corpore.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called habits.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus, in Prædicamentis, cap. « De qual., » sanitatem corporis, vel infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.co] As we have said above (49, A2 seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said (49, 4) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.
If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.
On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus est quædam disposition alicujus subjecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in corpore sicut in subjecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a naturali qualitaté corporis, aut est ab anima movente corpus. Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quæ sunt a natura, non disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt determinatæ ad unum. Dictum est autem, quod habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subjectum est in potentia ad multa. Operationes vero quæ sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius animæ, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem proportionantur operationibus; unde « ex similibus actibus similes habitus causantur, » ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. 1 et 11. Et ideo dispositiones ad tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima; in corpore vero possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et habilitatur ad prompe deserviendum operationibus animæ. Si vero loquamur de dispositione subjecti ad formam, sic habitualis dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut subjectum ad formam; et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et hujusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur; non tamen perfecte habent rationem habituum, quia causæ eorum ex sua natura de facili transmutabiles sunt. Alexander vero posuit nullo modo habitum vel dispositionem primæ speciei esse in corpore, ut Simplicius refert in Comm. Præd., in cap. « De qual., » sed dicebat primam speciem qualitatis pertinere tantum ad animam; et quod Aristoteles inducit in Præd. de sanitate et aegritudine, non inducit quasi hæc pertineant ad primam speciem qualitatis, sed per modum exempli; ut sit sensus quod sicut aegritudo et sanitas possunt esse facile vel difficile mobiles, ita etiam qualitates primæ speciei, quæ dicuntur habitus et dispositio. Sed hoc patet esse contra intentionem Aristotelis, tum quia eodem modo loquendi utitur amplificando de sanitate, et aegritudine, et de virtute, et de scientia; tum quia in VII Physic., text. 17, ponit expresse inter habitus pulchritudinem et sanitatem.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.ad.1] This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod est dispositio ad operationem; et de actibus corporis qui sunt a natura, non autem de his qui sunt ab anima, quorum principium est voluntas.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.ad.2] Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read in the Greek [isos hexin (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod dispositiones corporales non sunt simpliciter difficile mobiles propter mutabilitatem corporalium Ita codd.; « hæc » deest in edit. causarum; possunt tamen esse difficile mobiles per comparationem ad tale subjectum, quia scilicet tali subjecto durante, amoveri non possunt, vel quia sunt difficile mobiles per comparationem ad alias dispositiones. Sed qualitates animæ sunt simpliciter difficile mobiles propter immobilitatem subjecti. Et ideo non dicit quod sanitas difficile mobiliis simpliciter sit habitus, sed quod est « ut habitus, » sicut in græco habetur. Qualitates autem animæ dicuntur simpliciter habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.ad.3] Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third.
Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say otherwise that, as was explained above (49, 2, ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves.
[I-II.q.50.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod dispositiones corporales quæ sunt in prima specie qualitatis, ut quidam posuerunt, differunt a qualitatibus tertiæ speciei in hoc quod qualitates tertiæ speciei sunt ut in fieri et ut in motu, unde dicuntur passiones vel passibiles qualitates; quando autem jam perveneint ad perfectum quasi ad speciem, tunc jam sunt in prima specie qualitatis. Sed hoc improbat Simplicius in Comm. Præd., cap. « De qual., » quia secundum hoc calefactio esset in tertia specie qualitatis, calor autem in prima; Aristoteles autem ponit calorem in tertia. Unde Porphyrius dicit, sicut Simplicius ibidem refert, quod passio vel passibilis qualitas, et dispositio et habitus differunt in corporibus secundum intensionem et remissionem. Quando enim aliquid recipit caliditatem secundum calefieri tantum, non autem ut calefacere possit, tunc est passio, si sit cito transiens, vel passibilis qualitas, si sit manens. Quando autem jam ad hoc perducitur quod potest etiam alterum calefacere, tunc est dispositio. Si autem ulterius in tantum confirmetur, quod sit difficile mobilis, tunc erit habitus; ut sic dispositio sit quædam intensio seu perfectio passionis vel passibilis qualitatis, habitus autem dispositionis. Sed hoc improbat Simplicius, quia talis intensio et remissio non important diversitatem ex parte ipsius formæ, sed ex diversa participatione ipsius subjecti; et ita non diversificarentur per hoc species qualitatis. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, sicut supra dictum est, commensuratio ipsarum qualitatum passibilium, secundum convenientiam ad naturam, habet rationem dispositionis; et ideo facta alteratione circa ipsas qualitates passibilies, quæ sunt « calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, » fit ex consequenti alteratio secundum ægritudinem et sanitatem. Primo autem et per se non est alteratio secundum hujusmodi habitus et dispositiones.
Article 2
[I-II.q.50.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (Question 49, Article 2). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod habitus sint in anima magis secundum essentiam quam secundum potentiam. Dispositiones enim et habitus dicuntur in ordine ad naturam, ut dictum est. Sed natura magis attenditur secundum essentiam animæ quam secundum potentias, quia anima secundum suam essentiam est natura corporis talis, et forma ejus. Ergo habitus sunt in anima secundum ejus essentiam, et non secundum potentiam.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.arg.2] Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of accident, as we have said in the I, 77, 1, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, accidentis non est accidens; habitus autem est quoddam accidens. Sed potentiæ animæ sunt de genere accidentium, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo habitus non est in anima ratione suæ potentiae.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.arg.3] Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, subjectum est prius eo quod est in subjecto. Sed habitus, cum pertineat ad primam speciem qualitatis, est prior quam potentia, quæ pertinet ad secundam speciem. Ergo habitus non est in potentia animæ sicut in subjecto.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.sc] The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus, in I Ethic., cap. ult., ponit diversos habitus in diversis partibus animæ.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.co] As we have said above (49, A2,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Peter 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (110, 4).
On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (Question 49, Article 4). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat dispositionem quamdam in ordine ad naturam vel ad operationem. Si ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur; quia ipsa anima est forma completiva humanæ naturæ. Unde secundum hoc magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel disposition in corpore per ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus. Sed si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cujus homo potest esse particeps, secundum illud II Petr., 1, 4: Ut simus consortes naturæ divinæ, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur. Si vero accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc habitus sunt in anima secundum suas potentias.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.ad.1] The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod essentia animæ pertinet ad naturam humanam, non sicut subjectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.ad.2] Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod accidens per se non potest esse subjectum accidentis. Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subjectum, secundum quod est sub uno accidente, intelligitur esse subjectum alterius; et sic dicitur unum accidens esse subjectum alterius, ut superficies est subjectum coloris; et hoc modo potest potentia esse subjectum habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.ad.3] Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
[I-II.q.50.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod habitus præmittitur potentiæ, secundum quod importat dispositionem ad naturam; potentia autem semper importat ordinem ad operationem, quæ est posterior, cum natura sit operationnis principium. Sed habitus, cujus potentia est subjectum, non importat ordinem ad naturam, sed ad operationem; unde est posterior potentia. Vel potest dici quod habitus præponitur potentiæ sicut completum incompleto, et actus potentiæ; actus enim naturaliter est prior, quamvis potentia sit prior ordine generationis et temporis, ut dicitur in VII et IX Metaph., text. 13, ac deinceps, ut et lib. VII, text. 17.
Article 3
[I-II.q.50.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod in potentiis sensitivæ partis non possit esse aliquis habitus. Sicut enim potentia nutri-tiva pars est irrationalis, ita et sensitiva. Sed in potentiis nutritivæ partis non ponitur aliquis habitus. Ergo nec in potentiis sensitivæ partis aliquis habitus debet poni.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.arg.2] Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (Question 49, Article 3). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sensitivæ partes sunt communes nobis et brutis. Sed in brutis non sunt aliqui habitus, quia non est in eis voluntas, quæ in definitione habitus ponitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in potentiis sensitivis non sunt aliqui habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.arg.3] Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, habitus animæ sunt scientiæ et virtutes; et sicut scientia refertur ad vim apprehensivam, ita virtus ad vim appetiti-vam. Sed in potentiis sensitivis non sunt aliquæ scientiæ, cum scientia sit universa-lium, quæ vires sensitivæ apprehendere non possunt. Ergo etiam nec habitus virtutum in partibus sensitivis esse possunt.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part."
[I-II.q.50.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. x, in princ., quod « aliquæ virtutes, » scilicet temperantia et fortitudo, « sunt irrationabilium partium. »
[I-II.q.50.a.3.co] The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod vires sensitivæ dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo secundum quod operantur ex instinctu naturæ; alio modo secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod operantur ex instinctu naturæ, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et natura; et ideo, sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus, ita etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex instinctu naturæ operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt; et sic possunt in eis esse aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.ad.1] The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vires nutritivæ partis non sunt natæ obedire imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus; sed vires sensitivæ natæ sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus; nam secundum quod obediunt rationi, quodammodo « rationales » dicuntur, ut in I Ethic., cap. ult., dicitur.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.ad.2] The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no habits in them.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vires sensitivæ in brutis animalibus non operantur ex imperio rationis; sed si sibi relinquantur bruta animalia, operantur ex instinctu naturæ; et sic in brutis animalibus non sunt aliqui habitus ordinati ad operationes; sunt tamen in eis aliquæ dispositiones in ordine ad naturam, ut sanitas et pulchritudo. Sed quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quamdam consuetudinem disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic vel aliter, hoc modo in brutis animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xxxvi, col. 25, t. 6, quod « videmus immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri dolorum metu; quod cum in earum consuetudinem verterit, domitæ et mansuetæ vocantur. » Deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum voluntatis, quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi, quod videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, in eis habitus esse non possunt.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.ad.3] The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.
On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.
[I-II.q.50.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod « appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu rationali, » ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 57; sed vires rationales apprehensivæ natæ sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis; cum in viribus sensitivis appetitivis non sint habitus, nisi secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possunt poni aliqui habitus secundum quos homo sit bene memorativus, vel cogitativus, vel imaginativus. Unde etiam Philosophus dicit, cap. II De memoria et reminisc., a med., quod « consuetudo multum operatur ad bene memorandum; » quia etiam istæ vires moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis. Vires autem apprehensivæ exteriores, ut visus et auditus, et hujusmodi, non sunt susceptivæ aliquorum habituum; sed secundum dispositionem suæ naturæ ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus imperantibus motum ipsorum.
Article 4
[I-II.q.50.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (Article 1). But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in intellectu non sint aliqui habitus. Habitus enim operationibus conformantur, ut dictum est. Sed operationes hominis sunt communes animæ et corpori, ut dicitur in I De anima, text. 64 et seq. Ergo et habitus. Sed intellectus non est actus corporis; ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 6. Ergo intellectus non est subjectum alicujus habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.arg.2] Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which is composed of soul and body.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum ejus in quo est. Sed id quod est forma sine materia, est actus tantum; quod autem est compositum ex forma et materia, habet potentiam et actum simul. Ergo in eo quod est forma tantum, non potest esse aliquid quod sit simul in potentia et actu, sed solum in eo quod est compositum ex materia et forma. Sed intellectus est forma sine materia. Ergo habitus, qui habet potentiam simul cum actu, quasi medium inter utrumque existens, non potest esse in intellectu, sed solum in conjuncto, quod est compositum ex anima et corpore.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.arg.3] Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of the body.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, habitus est « dispositio secundum quam aliquis bene vel male disponitur ad aliquid, » ut dicitur in V Metaph., text. 25. Sed quod aliquis bene vel male sit dispositus ad actum intellectus, provenit ex aliqua corporis dispositione; unde etiam in II De anima, text. 94, dicitur quod « molles carne bene aptos mente videmus. » Ergo habitus cognoscitivi non sunt in intellectu, qui est separatus, sed in aliqua potentia quae est actus alicujus partis corporis.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.sc] The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus, in VI Ethic., cap. II, III et x, ponit scientiam et sapientiam, et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva parte animæ.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.co] concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [I, 79, 2, ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in various men.
Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect itself.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa habitus cognoscitivos diversimode sunt aliqui opinati. Quidam enim ponentes intellectum possibilem esse unum in omnibus hominibus, coacti sunt ponere quod habitus cognoscitivi non sunt in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus interioribus sensitivis. Manifestum est enim, quod homines in habitibus diversificantur; unde non possunt habitus cognoscitivi directe poni in eo quod unum numero existens est omnibus hominibus commune. Unde, si intellectus possibilis est unus numero omnium hominum, habitus scientiarum, secundum quos homines diversificantur, non poterunt esse in intellectu possibili sicut in subjecto; sed erunt in viribus interioribus sensitivis, quæ sunt diversæ in diversis. Averroes scilicet et ipsius asseclæ. Sed ista positio primo quidem est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Manifestum est enim, quod vires sensitivæ non sunt rationales per essentiam, sed solum per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. ult. Philosophus autem ponit intellectuales virtutes, quæ sunt sapientia, scientia et intellectus, in eo quod est rationale per essentiam. Unde non sunt in viribus sensitivis, sed in ipso intellectu. Expresse etiam dicit in III De anima, text. 8 et 18, quod « intellectus possibilis, cum sic fiat singula, » id est, cum reducatur in actum singulorum per species intelligibles, « tunc fit secundum actum, » eo modo quo sciens dicitur esse in actu; quod quidem accidit cum aliquis potest operari per seipsum, scilicet considerando. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo, non tamen simpliciter ut ante addiscere aut invenire. Ipse ergo intellectus possibilis est in quo est habitus scientiæ, quo potest considerare etiam cum non considerat. Secundo etiam hæc positio est contra rei veritatem. Sicut enim ejus est potentia cujus est operatio, ita etiam ejus est habitus cujus est operatio. Intelligere autem et considerare est proprius actus intellectus. Ergo et habitus, quo consideratur, est proprie in ipso intellectu.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.ad.1] Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object.
Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt, ut Simplicius refert in Comment. Prædicam., cap. « De qualit., » quod quia « omnis operatio hominis est quodammodo conjuncti, » ut Philosophus dicit in I De anima, text. 64 et seq., ideo nullus habitus est animæ tantum, sed conjuncti; et per hoc sequitur quod nullus habitus sit in intellectu cum intellectus sit separatus, ut ratio proposita procedebat. Sed ista ratio non cogit. Habitus enim non est dispositio objecti ad potentiam, sed magis dispositio potentiæ ad objectum. Unde habitus oportet quod sit in ipsa potentia, quæ est principium actus, non autem in eo quod comparatur ad potentiam sicut objectum. Ipsum autem intelligere non dicitur commune esse animæ et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, ut dicitur in I De anima, text. 66. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad intellectum possibilem ut objectum, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 3 et 39. Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est commune animæ et corpori. Et ideo dicendum est, quod intellectus possibilis est subjectum habitus. Illi enim competit esse subjectum habitus quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subjectum habituum intellectualium.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.ad.2] As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.ad.3] Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect.
[I-II.q.50.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia vires apprehensivæ interius præparant intellectui possibili proprium objectum, ideo ex bona dispositione harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositionio corporis, redditur homo habilis ad intelligendum; et sic habitus intellectivus secundario potest esse in istis viribus; principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili.
Article 5
[I-II.q.50.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in voluntate non sit aliquis habitus. Habitus enim qui in intellectu sunt, sunt species intelligibles, quibus intelligit actu. Sed voluntas non operatur per aliquas species. Ergo voluntas non est subjectum aliquus habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.arg.2] Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1). Therefore there is no habit in the will.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in intellectu agente non ponitur aliquis habitus, sicut in intellectu possibili, quia est potentia activa. Sed voluntas est maxime potentia activa, quia movet omnes potentias ad suos actus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in ipsa non est aliquis habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.arg.3] Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in potentiis naturalibus non est aliquis habitus, quia ex sua natura sunt ad aliquid determinatæ. Sed voluntas ex sua natura ordinatur ad hoc quod tendat in bo num ordinatum ratione. Ergo in voluntate non est aliquis habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.sc] Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.sc] Sed contra est, quod justitia est habitus quidam. Sed justitia est in voluntate; est enim « justitia habitus quidam secundum quem aliqui volunt et operantur justa, » ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. 1, in princ. Ergo voluntas est subjectum alicujus habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.co] Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above (Article 1).
[I-II.q.50.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnis potentia quæ diversimode potest ordinari ad agendum, indiget habitu, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Voluntas autem, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari; et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus apparet quod habet quem-dam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout habitus est « quo quis utitur, cum voluerit, » ut supra dictum est.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.ad.1] Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above (6, 4; 22, 2). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quæ est similitudo objecti, ita oportet in voluntate et in qualibet vi appetitiva esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum objectum, cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivæ virtutis quam inclinatio quædam, ut supra dictum est. Ad ea ergo ad quæ sufficienter inclinatur per naturam ipsius potentiæ, non indiget aliqua qualitate inclinante. Sed quia necessarium est ad finem humanæ vitæ quod vis appetitiva inclinetur ad aliquid determinatum, ad quod non inclinatur ex natura potentiæ, quæ se habet ad multa et diversa, ideo necesse est quod in voluntate et in aliis viribus appetitivis sint quædam qualitates inclinantes, quæ dicuntur habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.ad.2] The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in potentiality.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus agens est agens tantum, et nullo modo patiens; sed voluntas et quælibet vis appetitiva est movens et motum, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 54. Et ideo non est similis ratio de utroque; nam esse susceptivum habitus convenit ei quod est quodammodo in potentia.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.ad.3] The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more promptly.
[I-II.q.50.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiæ inclinatur in bonum rationis. Sed quia hoc bonum multipliciter diversificatur, necessarium est ut ad aliquod determinatum bonum rationis voluntas per aliquem habitum inclinetur, ad hoc quod sequatur promptior operatio.
Article 6
[I-II.q.50.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in angelis non sint habitus. Dicit enim Maximus, commentator Dionysii, in vii cap. De cæl. hier., col. 66, t. 2: « Non convenit arbitrari virtutes intellectuales, » id est spirituales « more accidentium, quemadmodum et in nobis sunt, in divinis intellectibus, » scilicet angelis, « esse, ut aliud in alio sit sicut in subjecto; accidens enim omne illinc repulsum est. » Sed omnis habitus est accidens. Ergo in angelis non sunt habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.arg.2] Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of itself."
[I-II.q.50.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Dionysius dicit in c. iv De cæl. hier., § 2, col. 179, t. 1, « sanctæ cælestium essentiarum dispositiones super omnia alia Dei bonitatem participant. » Sed semper quod est per se, est prius et potius eo quod est per aliud. Ergo angelorum essentiæ per seipsas perficiuntur ad conformitatem Dei. Non ergo per aliquos habitus. Et hæc videtur esse ratio Maximi, qui ibidem subdit: « Si enim hoc esset, non utique maneret in semetipsa harum essentia, nec deificari per se, quantum foret possibile, valuisset. »
[I-II.q.50.a.6.arg.3] Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, habitus est dispositio quædam, ut dicitur in V Metaph., text. 25. Sed dispositio, ut ibidem dicitur, « est ordo habentis partes. » Cum ergo angeli sint simplices substantiae, videtur quod in eis non sint dispositiones et habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.sc] Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits."
[I-II.q.50.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, vii cap. Cæl. hier., § 1, col. 206, t. 1, quod « angeli primæ hierarchiæ nominantur calefacientes, et throni, et effusio sapientia, manifestativo deiformium ipsorum habituum nomine. »
[I-II.q.50.a.6.co] Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said (49, 4) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in itself."
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the I, 55, 1, so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them they are made like to God.
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt in angelis non esse habitus, sed quod quæcumque dicuntur de eis, essentialiter dicuntur. Unde Maximus, post prædicta verba quæ induximus, dicit: « Habitus eorum, atque virtutes quæ in eis sunt, essentiales sunt propter immaterialitatem. » Et hoc etiam Simplicius dicit in Comm. Prædicam., cap. De qual.: « Sapientia quæ est in anima, habitus est, quæ autem in intellectu, substantia; omnia enim quæ sunt divina, et per se sufficientia sunt, et in seipsis existentia. » Quæ quidem positio partim habet veritatem, et partim continet falsitatem. Manifestum est enim ex præmissis, quod subjectum habitus non est nisi ens in potentia. Considerantes igitur prædicti commentatores quod angeli sunt immateriales, et quod non est in illis potentia materiæ, secundum hoc ab eis habitum excluserunt et omne accidens. Sed quia licet in angelis non sit potentia materiæ, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia: esse enim actum purum est proprium Dei; ideo, inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri. Sed quia potentia materiæ et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit in Comment. Prædicam., loc. sup. cit., quod « habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui sunt hic habitibus; sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et immaterialibus speciebus, quas continet in seipsa. » Circa hujusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum sensibilium; et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu. Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam; non autem sicut actus purus, hoc enim solius Dei est, sed cum permixtione alicujus potentiæ; et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est superior. Et ideo, ut in I dictum est, inquantum est in potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species intelligibiles ad operationem propriam; sed inquantum est actu, per essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere, ad minus seipsum, et alia secundum modum suæ substantiae, ut dicitur in libro De causis, prop. 8 et 13, et tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior. Sed, quia nullus angelus pertingit ad perfectionem Dei sed in infinitum distat, propter hoc ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, indiget aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existens respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur. Habitus autem qui sunt dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in angelis, cum sint immateriales.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.ad.1] This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Maximi intelligendum est de habitibus et accidentibus materialibus.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.ad.2] As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quantum ad hoc quod convenit angelis per suam essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam, ideo in quantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, in tantum necesse est in eis ponere habitus.
[I-II.q.50.a.6.ad.3] In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.50.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in angelis non sunt partes essentiae; sed sunt partes secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.
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