Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q61. The cardinal virtues
Source context
- Theme
- Prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance as the four cardinal virtues structuring moral life
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 221, 1923-02-16Steiner discusses Nietzsche's reformulation of four cardinal virtues — led by honesty toward oneself and others — as a modern counterpart to the classical fourfold scheme, noting that the remaining three virtues tend toward this first as their organizing principle.
- GA 221, 1923-02-17Steiner observes that the grouping of virtues into fourfold schemes depends on how one categorizes the underlying human impulses, referencing Nietzsche's four cardinal virtues as one such contemporary arrangement.
- GA 223, 1923-04-04Steiner treats sophrosyne (temperance/moderation), the third of the classical Platonic cardinal virtues, characterizing it as the filling of one's impulses with inner measure.
Cross-tradition
- Platonic philosophyPlato's Republic identifies the same four virtues — wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance — as constitutive of both the well-ordered soul and the just city, providing the classical source Aquinas systematizes through Aristotelian analysis.
- Stoic ethicsStoic moral philosophy likewise organized virtue around a fourfold schema of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance, treating them as interdependent expressions of a single rational capacity aligned with nature.
Q61. The cardinal virtues
Article 1
[I-II.q.61.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtutes morales non debeant dici cardinales seu principales. « Quæ » enim « ex opposito dividuntur, sunt simul natura, » ut dicitur in Prædicam., cap. « De simul, » et sic unum non est altero principalius. Sed omnes virtutes ex opposito dividunt genus virtutis. Ergo nullæ earum debent dici principales.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.arg.2] Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, finis principalior est his quæ sunt ad finem. Sed virtutes theologicæ sunt circa finem, virtutes autem morales sunt circa ea quæ sunt ad finem. Ergo virtutes morales non debent dici principales, seu cardinales, sed magis theologicæ.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.arg.3] Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated above (58, 3). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, principalius est quod est per essentiam, quam quod est per participationem. Sed virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationale per essentiam, virtutes autem morales pertinent ad rationale per participationem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt principales, sed magis virtutes intellectuales.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.sc] Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" (Luke 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit lib. V Super Lucam, § 62, col. 1738, t. 2, exponens illud, Beati pauperes spiritu, c. vi: « Scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet temperantiam, justitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem. » Hæ autem sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.co] When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (Question 56, Article 3), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (Question 57, Article 4). Consequently, those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum simplici ter de virtute loquimur, intelligimur loqui de virtute humana. Virtus autem humana, ut supra dictum est, secundum perfectam rationem virtutis dicitur, quæ requirit rectitudinem appetitus: hujusmodi enim virtus non solum facit facultatem bene agendi, sed ipsum etiam usum boni operis causat. Sed secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis dicitur virtus quæ non requirit rectitudinem appetitus; quia solum facit facultatem bene agendi, non autem causat boni operis usum. Constat autem quod perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quæ continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur « principales. » Hujusmodi autem sunt virtutes morales, et inter intellectuales sola prudentia, quæ etiam quodam modo moralis est secundum materiam, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde convenienter inter virtutes morales ponuntur illæ quæ dicuntur principales seu cardinales.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.ad.1] When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando genus univocum dividitur in suas species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum rationem generis, licet secundum naturam rei una species sit principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed quando est divisio alicujus analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius, tunc nihil prohibet unum esse principalius altero etiam secundum communem rationem, sicut substantia principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est divisio virtutum in diversa genera virtutum, eo quod bonum rationis non secundum eum-dem ordinem invenitur in omnibus.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.ad.2] The theological virtues are above man, as stated above (58, 3, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod virtutes theologicæ sunt supra hominem, ut supra dictum est. Unde non proprie dicuntur virtutes humanæ, sed superhumanæ, vel divinæ.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.ad.3] Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.
[I-II.q.61.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliæ virtutes intellectuales a prudentia, etsi sint principiales quam morales quantum ad subjectum, non tamen sunt principaliores quantum ad rationem virtutis, quæ respicit bonum, quod est objectum appetitus.
Article 2
[I-II.q.61.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above (Question 58, Article 4). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sint quatuor virtutes cardinales. Prudentia enim est directiva aliarum virtutum moralium, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed id quod est directivum aliorum, principalius est. Ergo prudentia sola est virtus principalis.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.arg.2] Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtutes principales sunt aliquo modo morales. Sed ad operationes morales ordinamur per rationem practicam et appetitum rectum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., c. 11. Ergo solæ duæ virtutes cardinales sunt.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.arg.3] Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter alias etiam virtutes una est principalior altera. Sed ad hoc quod virtus dicatur principalis, non requiritur quod sit principalis respectu omnium, sed respectu quarumdam. Ergo videtur quod sint multo plures principales virtutes.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.sc] Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues."
[I-II.q.61.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit in II Moral., cap. xlix, § 76, col. 592, t. 1, quod « in quatuor virtutibus tota boni operis struc-tura consurgit. »
[I-II.q.61.a.2.co] Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude."
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude."
[I-II.q.61.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod numerus ali-quorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia, aut secundum subjecta; et utroque modo inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes. Principium enim formale virtutis, de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis bonum. Quod Ita codd. et editi passim. edit. Rom.: « et prudentia. » Virtutes cardinales vocantur etiam consuetudinales et politicæ: — consuetudinales quidem ratione sui principii originalis secundum quod ex quidem dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum quod in ipsa consideratione rationis consistit; et sic erit una virtus principalis, quæ dicitur prudentia. Alio modo secundum quod circa aliquid ponitur rationis ordo; et hoc vel circa operationes, et sic est justitia; vel circa passiones, et sic necesse est esse duas virtutes. Ordinem enim rationis necesse est ponere circa passiones, considerata repugnantia ipsarum ad rationem. Quæ quidem potest esse dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod passio impellit ad aliquid contrarium rationi; et sic necesse est quod passio reprimatur, et ab hoc denominatur temperantia; alio modo secundum quod passio retrahit ab eo quod ratio dictat, sicut timor periculorum vel laborum; et sic necesse est quod homo firmetur in eo quod est rationis, ne recedat; et ab hoc denominatur fortitudo. Et similiter secundum subjecta idem numerus invenitur. Quadruplex enim invenitur subjectum hujus virtutis, de qua nunc loquimur; scilicet rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per participationem, quod dividitur in tria, id est, in voluntatem, quæ est subjectum justitiae, et in concupiscibilem, quæ est subjectum temperantiæ, et in irascibilem, quæ est subjectum fortitudinis.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.ad.1] Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus; sed aliæ ponuntur principales, unaquæque in suo genere.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.ad.2] That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod rationale per participationem dividitur in tria, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.ad.3] All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.
[I-II.q.61.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnes ali-quorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia, aut secundum subjecta; et utroque modo inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes. Principium enim formale virtutis, de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis bonum. Quod frequenti bene agere acquiruntur; — politicæ vero ratione operationis et exercitii sibi debiti, quia redunt hominem bene ordinatum ad vivendum inter homines.
Article 5
[I-II.q.61.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter hujusmodi quatuor virtutes dividantur in virtutes « exemplares, purgati animi, purgatorias et politicas. » Ut enim Macrobius dicit in I Super somnium Scipionis, cap. vIII, versus fin., « virtutes exemplares sunt quæ in ipsa divina mente consistunt. » Sed Philosophus in X Ethic., cap. vIII, circa med., dicit, quod « ridiculum est Deo justitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et prudentiam attribuere. » Ergo virtutes hujusmodi non possunt esse exemplares.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.arg.2] Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above (Question 59, Article 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtutes purgati animi dicuntur quæ sunt absque passionibus. Dicit enim ibidem Macrobius, loco cit., quod « temperantia purgati animi est terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; fortitudinis autem passiones ignorare, non vincere. » Dictum est autem supra, quod hujusmodi virtutes sine passionibus esse non possunt. Ergo hujusmodi virtutes purgati animi esse non possunt.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.arg.3] Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtutes « purgatorias » dicit esse eorum « qui quadam humanorum fuga solis se inserunt divinis. » Sed hoc videtur esse vitiosum: dicit enim Tullius in I De offic.: « Qui despicere se dicunt ea quæ plerique mirantur, » scilicet imperia et magistratus, « his non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto. » Ergo non sunt aliquæ virtutes « purgatoriæ. »
[I-II.q.61.a.5.arg.4] Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social."
[I-II.q.61.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, virtutes « politicas » esse dicit, « quibus boni viri reipublicæ consulunt, urbesque tuentur. » Sed ad bonum commune sola justitia legalis ordinatur, ut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. 1. Ergo aliæ virtutes non debent dici « politicæ. »
[I-II.q.61.a.5.sc] Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues Virtutes purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues; thirdly, there are perfect Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" Cf. Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal."
[I-II.q.61.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Macrobius ibidem dicit, loc. cit.: « Plotinus inter philosophiæ professores cum Platone princeps: quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum. Ex his primæ politicæ vocantur, secundæ purgatoriæ, tertiae autem jam purgati animi, quartæ exemplares. »
[I-II.q.61.a.5.co] As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Again, since man by his nature is a social [See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. De moribus Ecclesiæ, cap. vi, § 9, col. 1314, t. 4, « oportet ut aliquid sequatur anima, ut ei virtus possit innasci; et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene vivimus. » Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanæ virtutis in Deo præexistat, sicut et in eo præexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic igitur virtus potest considerari, vel prout est exemplariter in Deo; et sic dicuntur virtutes « exemplares; » ita scilicet quod ipsa divina mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero conversio divinæ intentionis ad seipsum; sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc quod concupisibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est ejus immutabilitas; justitia vero Dei est observatio legis æternæ in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit. Et quia homo secundum suam naturam tes animal politicum, virtutes hujusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum condi- Circa medium, in tit.: Vera magnanimitas in duobus sita. — Ibid. tionem suæ naturæ, « politicæ » vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis; secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus locuti sumus. Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat, quantum potest, ut etiam Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. vii, non longe a fin., et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura commendatur multipliciter, ut est illud Matth., v, 48: Estote perfecti, sicut et Pater vester cælestis perfectus est, necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter « politicas » quæ sunt virtutes humanæ, et « exemplares, » quæ sunt virtutes divinæ; quæ quidem virtutes distinguentur secundum diversitatem motus et termini, ita scilicet quod quædam sunt virtutes transcendentium, et in divinam similitudinem tendentium; et hæ vocantur virtutes « purgatoriæ; » ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despi-ciat, omnemque animæ cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relin-quat, inquantum natura patitur, quæ corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter recessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; justitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad hujus-modi propositi viam. Quædam vero sunt virtutes jam assequentium divinam similitudinem, quæ vocantur virtutes « jam purgati animi; » ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; justitia cum divina mente perpetuo fœdere societur, eam scilicet imitando; quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.ad.1] The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus, secundum quod sunt circa res humanas; puta justitia circa emptiones vel venditiones; fortitudo autem circa timores, temperantia circa concupiscentias: sic enim ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.ad.2] Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod virtutes humanæ sunt circa passiones, scilicet virtutes hominum in hoc mundo conversantium; sed virtutes eorum qui plenam beatitudinem assequuntur sunt absque passionibus. Unde Plotinus dicit, quod « passiones politicæ virtutes molliunt, » id est, ad medium reducunt; « secundæ, » scilicet purgatoriæ, « auferunt; tertiae, » quæ sunt purgati animi, « obliviscuntur; » in « quartis, » scilicet exemplaribus, « nefas est nominari. » Quamvis dici possit quod loquitur hic de passionibus secundum quod significant ali-quos inordinatos motus.
[I-II.q.61.a.5.ad.3] To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity."
[I-II.q.61.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, vitiosum est; alias est virtuosum. Unde Tullius pra-mittit: « His forsitan concedendum est rem-publicam non capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinæ se dediderunt: et his qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua graviori causa impediti a republica recesserunt, cum ejus administrandæ potestatem aliis laudemque concederent. » Quod consonat ei quod Augustinus dicit XIX De civ. Dei, cap. xix, col. 647, t. 7: « Otium sanctum quærit charitas veritatis; negotium justum suscipit necessitas charitatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendæ atque intuendæ vacandum est veritati: si autem imponitur, suscipienda est propter charitatis necessitatem. »
[I-II.q.61.a.5.ad.4] Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or even towards one individual.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.61.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod sola justitia legalis directe respicit bonum commune; sed per imperium omnes alias virtutes ad bonum commune trahit, ut in V Ethic., cap. 1, post med., dicit Philosophus. Est enim considerandum, quod ad politicas virtutes, secundum quod hic dicuntur, pertinet non solum bene operari ad commune, sed etiam bene operari ad partes communis, scilicet ad domum, vel aliquam singularem personam.
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