Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q62. The theological virtues
Source context
- Theme
- infused virtues of faith, hope, and charity as supernaturally ordered capacities directing the rational soul toward beatitude
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonic virtue-hierarchy (Plotinus, Porphyry)Neoplatonic ethics distinguishes civic, purificatory, and contemplative virtues in an ascending order; Aquinas's theological virtues occupy a structurally analogous summit-tier, though their source is infused grace rather than philosophical ascent.
- Pauline triad (1 Corinthians 13)Paul's identification of faith, hope, and love as abiding gifts provides the scriptural basis Aquinas systematizes; the cross-tradition congruence is between apostolic charismatic enumeration and scholastic categorization of the same three terms.
- Sufi maqamat (stations of the heart)Sufi developmental psychology maps tawakkul (trust/faith), raja (hope), and mahabba (love) as interior stations; this presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's three theological virtues as ordered movements of the soul toward the divine.
Q62. The theological virtues
Article 1
[I-II.q.62.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sint aliquæ virtutes theologicæ; ut enim dicitur in VII Physic., text. 17, « virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfectum quod est dispositum secundum naturam. » Sed id quod est divinum est supra naturam hominis. Ergo virtutes theologicæ non sunt virtutes hominis.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.arg.2] Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Question 61, Article 5), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtutes theologicæ dicuntur quasi virtutes divinæ. Sed virtutes divinæ sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quæ qui dem non sunt in nobis, sed in Deo. Ergo virtutes theologicæ non sunt virtutes hominis.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.arg.3] Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtutes theologicæ dicuntur quibus ordinamur in Deum, qui est primum principium et ultimus finis rerum 1. Sed homo ex ipsa natura rationis et voluntatis habet ordinem ad primum principium et ad ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in Deum.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.sc] The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (Sirach 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.sc] Sed contra est, quod præcepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de actibus fidei, qui divini capax est, solumque animum ejus expediunt qui decrevit se a corporis contagione purgare, et quadam humanorum fuga solis se divinis inserere; hæ sunt otiosorum qui a rerum publica-rum actionibus se sequestrant. Tertiae sunt purgati jam defæcatique animi, et ab omni hujus mundi aspergine pressi, pureque detersi; illic prudentia est divina non quasi in electione præferre, sed sola nosse, et hæc tanquam nihil aliud intueri; temperantiæ, terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; fortitudinis, passiones ignorare, non vincere, ut irasci nesciat, nihil cupiat; justitia, ita cum superna et divina mente sociari, ut servet cum ea perpetuum fædus imitando. Quartæ sunt, quæ in ipsa divina mente consistunt spei et charitatis dantur præcepta in lege divina; dicitur enim Eccli., 11, 8: Qui timetis Deum*, credite illi; item: Sperate in illum; item: Diligite illum; ergo fides, spes et charitas sunt virtutes in Deum ordinantes. Sunt ergo theologicæ.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.co] Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Question 5, Article 7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Question 5, Article 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Peter 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur; ut ex supra dictis patet. Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem proportionata humanæ naturæ, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suæ naturæ. Alia autem est beatitudinem hominis exceedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest secundum quamdam divinitatis participationem, secundum quod dicitur II Petr., 1, 4, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinæ* naturæ. Et quia hujusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanæ naturæ excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem prædictam; unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia per quæ ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinator ad finem connaturalem; non tamen absque adjutorio divino: et hujusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicæ, tum quia habent Deum pro objecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione in sacra Scriptura hujusmodi virtutes traduntur.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.ad.1] A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei dupliciter: uno modo essentialiter, et sic hujusmodi virtutes theologicæ excedunt hominis naturam; alio modo participative, sicut lignum quæ vocatur vóóς, a quarum exemplo reliquæ omnes per ordinem defluunt. Nam si rerum aliarum, multo magis virtutum ideas esse in mente divina credendum; illic prudentia est mens divina, temperantia quod in se perpetua intentione conversa est, fortitudo quod semper idem est nec aliquando mutatur, justitia quod perenni lege a sempiterna operis sui continuatione non flectitur. Hæc quatuor genera quaternarum virtutum, in passionibus quibus homines metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, maximam habent sui differentiam: has primæ molliunt, secundæ auferunt, tertiæ obliviscuntur; in quartis nefas est nominari. deest in Parm. ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo fit homo particeps divinæ naturæ, ut dictum est. Et sic istæ virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.ad.2] These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod istæ virtutes non dicuntur divinæ, sicut quibus Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a Deo, et in ordine ad Deum; unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatæ.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.ad.3] The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.
[I-II.q.62.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur, prout est naturæ principium et finis; secundum tamen proportionem naturæ. Sed ad ipsum, secundum quod est objectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non ordinantur sufficienter.
Article 2
[I-II.q.62.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtutés theologicæ non distinguatur a moralibus et intellectualibus. Virtutes enim theologicæ si sunt in anima humana, oportet quod perficiant ipsam vel secundum partem intellectivam, vel secundum partem appetitivam. Sed virtutes quæ perficiunt partem intellectivam, dicuntur intellectuales; virtutes autem quæ perficiunt partem appetitivam, sunt morales. Ergo virtutes theologicæ non distinguatur a virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.arg.2] Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtutes theologicæ dicuntur quæ ordinant nos ad Deum. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes est aliqua quæ ordinat nos ad Deum, scilicet sapientia, quæ est de divinis, utpote causam altissimam considerans. Ergo virtutes theologicæ ab intellectualibus virtutibus non distinguatur.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.arg.3] Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus in lib. De mor. Eccles., cap. xv, col. 1322, t. 1, manifestat in quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, quod sunt « ordo amoris. » Sed amor est charitas, quæ ponitur virtus theologica. Ergo virtutes morales non distinguuntur a theologicis.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.sc] That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (Question 58, Article 3). Therefore they are distinct from one another.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.sc] Sed contra, id quod est supra naturam hominis distinguitur ab eo quod est secundum naturam hominis. Sed virtutes theologicæ sunt super naturam hominis, cui secundum naturam conveniunt virtutes intellectuales et morales, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo distinguuntur ab invicem.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.co] As stated above (54, 2, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur secundum formalem differentiam objectorum. Objectum autem theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus qui est ultimus rerum finis, prout nostræ rationis cognitionem excedit. Objectum autem virtutum intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione comprehendi potest. Unde virtutes theologicæ specie distinguuntur a moralibus et intellectualibus.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.ad.1] The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt intellectualum et appetitum hominis secundum partionem naturæ humanæ; sed theologicæ supernaturaliter.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.ad.2] The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sapientia, quæ a Philosopho, lib. VI Ethic., c. Ⅲ et vⅡ, ponitur « intellectualis virtus, » considerat divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione humana; sed theologica virtus est circa ea secundum quod rationem humanam excedunt.
[I-II.q.62.a.2.ad.3] Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (27, 4; 28, 6, ad 2; 41, 2, ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (65, A2,5; II-II, 23, 7).
[I-II.q.62.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, licet charitas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est charitas. Cum ergo dicitur quod « omnis virtus est ordo amoris, » potest intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto, vel de amore charitatis. Si de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quælibet virtus esse « ordo amoris, » inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est amor, ut supra dictum est. Si autem intelligatur de amore charitatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quælibet alia virtus essentialiter sit charitas, sed quod omnes aliæ virtutes aliqualiter a charitate dependeant, ut infra patebit.
Article 3
[I-II.q.62.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one theological virtue.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur tres virtutes theologicæ, fides, spes et charitas. Virtutes enim theologicæ se habent in ordine ad beatitudinem divinam sicut inclinatio naturae ad finem connaturalem. Sed inter virtutes ordinatas ad finem connaturalem ponitur una sola virtus naturalis, scilicet « intellectus principiorum. » Ergo debet poni una sola virtus theologica.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.arg.2] Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, theologicæ virtutes sunt perfectiores virtutibus intellectualibus et moralibus. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes fides non ponitur, sed est aliquid minus virtute 1; similiter etiam inter virtutes morales non ponitur spes, sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit passio. Ergo multo minus debent poni virtutes theologicæ.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.arg.3] Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtutes theologicæ ordinant animam hominis ad Deum. Sed ad Deum non potest anima hominis ordinari nisi per intellectivam partem, in qua est intellectus et voluntas. Ergo non debent esse nisi duæ virtutes theologicæ, una quæ perficiat intellectum, alia quæ perficiat voluntatem.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.sc] The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:13): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three."
[I-II.q.62.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit I ad Corinth., xiii, 13: Nunc autem manent fides, spes, charitas, tria hæc.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 1), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason.
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to 1 Corinthians 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as something attainable--and this pertains to hope--and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end--and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes theologicæ hoc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem. Hoc autem contingit secundum duo: primo quidem secundum rationem vel intellectum, in quantum continet prima principia universalia cognita nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit ratio tam in speculandis, quam in agendis; secundo per rectitudinem voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis. Sed hæc duo deficiunt ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis, secundum illud I ad Corinth., 11, 9: Oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quæ preparavit Deus diligentibus se*. Undeoportuit quod quantum ad utrumque aliquid homini supernaturaliter adderetur ad ordinandum ipsum in finem supernaturalem. Et primo quidem quantum ad intellectum adduntur homini quædam principia supernaturalia, quæ divino lumine capiuntur; et hæc sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides. Secundo vero est voluntas, quæ ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum intentionis in ipsum tendentem, sicut in id quod est possibile consequi, quod pertinet ad spem; et quantum ad unionem quamdam spiritualem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem, quod fit per charitatem. Appetitus enim uniuscujusque rei naturaliter movetur et tendit in finem sibi connaturalem; et iste motus provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.ad.1] The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectus indiget specibus intelligibilibus, per quas intelligat; et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa natura voluntatis sufficit ad naturalem ordinem in finem, sive quantum ad intentionem finis, sive quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum. Sed in ordine ad ea quæ supra naturam sunt, ad nihil horum sufficit natura potentiae; et ideo oportet fieri superadditionem habitus supernaturalis quantum ad utrumque.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.ad.2] Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to 1 Corinthians 1:25: "The weakness of God is stronger than men."
[I-II.q.62.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fides et spes imperfectionem quamdam important; quia fides est de his quæ non videntur, et spes de his quæ non habentur. Unde habere fidem et spem de his quæ subduntur humanæ potestati, deficit a ratione virtutis. Sed habere fidem et spem de his quæ sunt supra facultatem naturæ humanæ, excedit omnem virtutem homini proportionatam, secundum illud I ad Corinth., 1, 25: Quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.ad.3] Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity.
[I-II.q.62.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad appetitum duo pertinent, scilicet motus in finem, et conformatio ad finem per amorem; et sic oportet quod in appetitu humano duæ virtutes theologicæ ponantur, scilicet spes et charitas.
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