Q68. The gifts

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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q68. The gifts

Source context

Theme: the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit as infused habits perfecting the soul's receptivity to divine motion
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

GA 188, 1919-01-04Steiner distinguishes two kinds of gifts recognized by orthodox Catholic teaching — a distinction structurally parallel to Aquinas's separation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit from natural virtues and charisms.

Cross-tradition

Hebrew scripture / prophetic traditionThe sevenfold enumeration of gifts in Isaiah 11:2–3 is the scriptural source Aquinas inherits; Aquinas systematizes these gifts as distinct from the cardinal and theological virtues by assigning them specifically to the soul's docility under the Holy Spirit's instinct.
Neoplatonic Christian theology (Pseudo-Dionysius)The Dionysian hierarchy of illuminations descending from divine source to soul provides structural cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's account of gifts as channels of higher divine motion surpassing the soul's own operative capacity.

Article 1

[I-II.q.68.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, "There were born to him seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of Isaiah 11:2-3: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod dona non distinguantur a virtutibus. Gregorius enim, in I Moral., c. xxvii, § 38, col. 544, t. 1, exponens illud Job, 1: Nati sunt ei septem filii, dicit: « Septem nobis filii nascuntur, cum per conceptionem bonæ cogitationis sancti Spiritus septem in nobis virtutes oriuntur; » et inducit illud quod habetur Isa., xi, 2: Requiescet super eum spiritus... intellectus, etc., ubi enumerantur septem Spiritus sancti dona. Ergo septem dona Spiritus sancti sunt virtutes.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.arg.2] Further, Augustine commenting on Matthew 12:45, "Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus, in lib. I De quæstion. evangel., quæst. viii, col. 1325, t. 3, exponens illud quod habetur Matth., xii, Tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios spiritus, etc., dicit: « Septem vitia sunt contraria septem virtutibus Spiritus sancti, » id est, septem donis. Sunt autem septem vitia contraria virtutibus communiter dictis. Ergo dona non distinguuntur a virtutibus communiter dictis.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.arg.3] Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [Cf. 55, 4]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one another.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quorum est definitio eadem, ipsa quoque sunt eadem. Sed definitio virtutis convenit donis; unumquodque enim donum est « bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, etc. » Similiter definitio doni convenit virtutibus infusis: est enim donum « datio irreddibilis, » secundum Philosophum, lib. IV Topic., cap. iv, loc. 50. Ergo virtutes et dona non distinguuntur.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.arg.4] Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above (Question 57, Article 2), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, plures eorum quæ numeratur inter dona, sunt virtutes; nam, sicut supra dictum est, sapientia, et intellectus, et scientia sunt virtutes intellectuales; consilium ad prudentiam pertinet; pietas autem species est justitiæ; fortitudo autem quædam virtus est moralis. Ergo videtur quod 1 virtutes non distinguantur a donis.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.sc] Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.sc] Sed contra est, quod Gregorius, in I Moral., ubi supra, distinguit septem dona, quæ dicit significari per septem filios Job, a tribus virtutibus theologicis, quas dicit significari per tres filias Job; et in II Moral., cap. xlx, § 76, col. 592, t. 1, distinguit eadem septem dona a quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus quas dicit significari per quatuor angulos domus.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.co] If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated (63, 3) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.

Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections. If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.

Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written (Canticles 8:7): "Many waters cannot quench charity."

Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to Isaiah 11:2-3, said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in humility and meekness, according to Matthew 11:29: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to John 15:12: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion.

Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For thus it is written (Isaiah 11:2-3): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above (9, A4,6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8).

Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according to Isaiah 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts of virtue.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si loquamur de dono et virtute secundum nominis rationem, sic nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem. Nam ratio virtutis sumitur, secundum quod perficit hominem ad bene agendum, ut supra dictum est. Ratio autem doni sumitur secundum comparisonem ad causam a qua est. Nihil autem prohibet, illud quod est ab alio, ut donum, esse perfectivum alicujus ad bene operandum; præsertim cum supra dixerimus, quod virtutes quædam nobis sunt infusæ a Deo. Unde secundum hoc donum a virtute distinguui non potest. Et ideo quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a virtutibus distinguenda. Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, ut scilicet rationem assignent quare quædam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et quare aliquæ computentur inter dona, quæ non computantur inter virtutes, ut patet de timore. Unde alii dixerunt dona a virtutibus esse distinguenda; sed non assignaverunt convenientem distinctionis causam, quæ scilicet ita communis esset virtutibus, quod nullo modo donis, aut e converso. Considerantes enim aliqui quod inter septem dona quatuor pertinent ad rationem, scilicet « sapientia, scientia, intellectus et consilium, » et tria ad vim appetitivam, scilicet « fortitudo, pietas et timor, » posuerunt quod dona perficiebant liberum arbitrium, secundum quod est facultas rationis; virtutes vero, secundum quod est facultas voluntatis: quia invenerunt duas solas virtutes in ratione vel intellectu, scilicet fidem et prudentiam; alias vero in vi appetitiva, vel affectiva. 1 Ita codd.; ed.: « quod dona et virtutes non distinguantur. » In Speculo morali Vincentii Bellovacensis Oporteret autem, si hæc distinctio esset conveniens, quod omnes virtutes essent in vi appetitiva, et omnia dona in ratione. Quidam vero, considerantes quod Gregorius dicit in II Moral., cap. xlix, § 77, col. 592, t. 4, quod « donum Spiritus sancti quod in mente sibi subjecta format prudentiam, temperantiam, justitiam et fortitudinem, eamdem mentem munit contra singula tentamenta per septem dona, » dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur ad bene operandum, dona vero ad resistendum tentationibus. Sed nec ista distinctio sufficit, quia etiam virtutes tentationibus resistunt inducentibus ad peccata, quæ contrariantur virtutibus; unumquodque enim resistit naturaliter suo contrario; quod præcipue patet de charitate, de qua dicitur Cant., viii, 7: Aquæ multæ non potuerunt extinguere charitatem. Alii vero, considerantes quod ista dona traduntur in Scriptura secundum quod fuerunt in Christo, ut patet Isa., xi, dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur simpliciter ad bene operandum; sed dona ordinantur ad hoc ut per ea conformemur Christo, præcipue quantum ad ea que passus est, quia in passione ejus præcipue hujusmodi dona resplenduerunt. Sed hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens: quia ipse Dominus præcipue nos inducit ad sui conformitatem, secundum humilitatem et mansuetudinem, Matth., xi, 29: Discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, et secundum charitatem, Joan., xiii, 34: Diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos. Et hæ etiam virtutes præcipue in passione Christi refulserunt. Et ideo ad distinguendum dona a virtutibus debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturæ, in qua nobis traduntur, non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine spirituum. Sic enim dicitur Isa., xi, 2: Requiescet super eum spiritus sapientiæ et intellectus, etc. Ex quibus verbis manifeste datur intelligi quod ista septem enumerantur ibi, secundum quod sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. Inspiratio autem significat quamdam motionem ab exteriori. Est enim considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens: unum quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam Philosophus dicit hoc in cap. « De bona fortuna, » cap. viii lib. VII Magn. moral., a princ. Manifestum est autem, quod omne quod movetur, necesse est proportionatum esse motori; et hæc est perfectio mobilis, inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur; sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositionum ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam capiat a docente. Manifestum est autem, quod virtutes humanæ perficiunt hominem, secundum quod homo natus est moveri per rationem in his quæ interius vel exterius agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones secundum quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur; et istæ perfectiones vocantur dona, non solum quia infunduntur a Deo, sed quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompe mobilis ab inspiratione divina, sicut dicitur Isa., L, 5: Dominus aperuit mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico, retrorsum non abii; et Philosophus etiam dicit in cap. « De bona fortuna, » loc. sup. cit., quod « his qui moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum, quia moventur a meliori principio » quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est quod quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutum.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.ad.1] Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [arete heroike kai theia]," in respect of which some men are called "divine."

[I-II.q.68.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hujusmodi dona nominantur quando virtutes secundum communem rationem virtutis; habent tamen aliquid supereminens rationi communi virtutis, inquantum sunt quædam divinæ virtutes perficientes hominem inquantum est a Deo motus. Unde et Philosophus in VII Ethic., cap. I, supra virtutem communem ponit quamdam virtutem heroicam vel divinam, secundum quam dicuntur aliqui viri divini. Plenius in textu D. Gregorii. — — — Ita codd.; Scotus tenet virtutes et dona gradibus solum, non habitibus differre. Differunt secundum diversos habitus virtutes et dona juxta S. Thomam,

[I-II.q.68.a.1.ad.2] The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light flows from God.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vitia, in-quantum sunt contra bonum rationis, contrariantur virtutibus; inquantum autem sunt contra divinum instinctum, contrariantur donis; idem enim contrariatur Deo et rationi, cujus lumen a Deo derivatur.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.ad.3] This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the promptings of God.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod definitio illa datur de virtute secundum communem modum virtutis. Unde si volumus definitionem restringere ad virtutes prout distinguuntur a donis, dicemus, quod hoc quod dicitur: «Qua recte vivitur, » intelligendum est de rectitudine vitæ quæ accipitur secundum regulam rationis. Similiter autem donum, prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius, quia scilicet facit hominem bene sequentem suos instinctus.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.ad.4] Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues.

[I-II.q.68.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod sapientia dicitur intellectualis virtus, secundum quod procedit ex judicio rationis; dicitur autem donum, secundum quod operatur ex instinctu divino. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis.

Article 2

[I-II.q.68.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod dona non sint necessaria homini ad salutem. Dona enim ordinantur ad quam- Donum est in adjutorium virtutum, ut dicit Gregorius; donum enim adjuvat virtutes ut attingant præmium. Licet dona sint septem, una tamen est ratio adjutorii virtutum. Donum adjuvans virtutes est ut chrysopassus, passionem auri primi sustinens et igniti, quia in ipso micant virtutes sicut in adjutorio suo. Hæc Albertus, Sup. Luc. — Ut autem intelligatur quæ dicit de comparatione doni et chrysopassi, notanda sunt quæ referuntur in Speculo naturali de chrysopasso vel chrysopraso, seu chrysoprasio: «Isidorus: chrysoprasus indicus est lapis colore porri succum referens, aureis intervenientibus guttis. — Solinus: chrysoprasos ex auro et purpura mixtam lucem habentes, beryllorum generi adjudicaverunt renitentes aureis guttis; virtus est quod visum clarificat, avaritiam quoque pellit, et in omnibus bonis perseverantiam dat. — Ex libro De natura rerum, chrysoprasus inventur dam perfectionem ultra communem perfectionem virtutis. Non autem est homini necessarium ad salutem ut hujusmodi perfectionem consequatur quæ est ultra communem statum virtutis: quia hujusmodi perfectio non cadit sub præcepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini ad salutem.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.arg.2] Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad salutem hominis sufficit quod homo se bene habeat et circa divina, et circa humana. Sed per virtutes theologicas homo se habet bene circa divina, per virtutes autem morales circa humana. Ergo dona non sunt homini necessaria ad salutem.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.arg.3] Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Gregorius dicit in II Moral., cap. xlix, § 77, col. 592, t. 4, quod «Spiritus sanctus dat sapientiam contra stultitiam, intellectum contra hebetudinem, consilium contra præcipitationem, fortitudinem contra timorem, scientiam contra ignorantiam, pietatem contra duritiam, contra superbiam timorem. » Sed sufficiens remedium potest adhiberi ad omnia ista tollenda per virtutes. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini ad salutem.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.sc] Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of wisdom it is written (Wisdom 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (Sirach 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary for salvation.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.sc] Sed contra, inter dona summum videtur esse sapientia, infimum autem timor. Utrumque autem horum necessarium est ad salutatem; quia de sapientia dicitur Sap. vii, 28: Neminem diligit Deus, nisi eum qui cum sapientia inhabitat; et de timore dicitur Eccli., 1, 28: Qui sine timore est, non poterit justificari. Ergo etiam alia dona media sunt necessaria ad salutem.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is, in consequence, need for a gift.

Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above (Question 62, Article 1). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from him.

Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to Romans 8:14-17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and Psalm 142:10: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quædam hominis perfectiones quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur instinctum divinum. Unde in his in India, sed hic quoque rarissime, ut dicitur; unde et inventus carior habetur. Est autem ex duobus coloribus, aureolis scilicet guttis micans, et porri succo colore permixtus. — Isidorus: chrysoprasius est lapis aethiopicus, quem lux celat, prodit obscuritas; nocte siquidem est igneus, die au-reus. » In textu Alberti Magni manifeste agitur de chrysoprasio isto. Juxta Hugonem a S. Charo, Sup. psal. xxviii: «Differunt virtutes et dona, quia dona proprie dantur ad cognoscendum, virtutes vero ad operandum: unde sicut ars et scientia, sic differunt et dona. » Ex eodem Hugone, Sup. Epist. I ad Cor., c. xii: «Donum quandoque sumitur prout differt a dato, et sic idem est quod donabile: sic est Spiritus sanctus donum ab aeterno. Vel donum pro dato; sic ex tempore datur, et hoc modo sumitur hic. in quibus non sufficit instinctus rationis, sed est necessarius Spiritus sancti instinctus, per consequens est necessarium donum. Ratio autem hominis est perfecta dupliciter a Deo; primo quidem naturali perfectione, secundum scilicet lumen naturale rationis; alio autem modo quadam supernaturali perfectione per virtutes theologicas, ut dictum est supra. Et quamvis hæc secunda perfectio sit major quam prima, tamen prima perfectio perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda; nam prima habetur ab homine quasi plena possessio, secunda autem habetur quasi imperfecta; imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum. Manifestum est autem, quod unumquodque quod perfecte habet naturam vel formam aliquam, aut virtutem, potest per se secundum illam operari, non tamen exclusa operatione Dei, qui in omni natura et voluntate interius operatur; sed id quod imperfecte habet naturam aliquam, vel formam, aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab altero moveatur; sicut sol, quia est perfecte lucidus, per seipsum potest illuminare; luna autem, in qua est imperfecte natura lucis, non illuminat nisi illuminata. Medicus etiam qui perfecte novit artem medicinæ, potest per se operari; sed discipulus ejus, qui non-dum est plene instructus, non potest per se operari, nisi ab eo instruatur. Sic igitur quantum ad ea quæ subsunt humanæ rationi, in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini, homo potest operari per judicium rationis; si tamen etiam in hoc homo adjuvetur a Deo per specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis bonitatis. Unde secundum philosophos, non quicum-que habebant 1 virtutes morales acquisitas, habebant 2 virtutes heroicas vel divinas. Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet, secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte informata per virtutes theologicas, non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus sancti, secundum illud Rom., viii, 14 et 16: Qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt*... et heredes; et in Psalm. cxlii, 10, dicitur: Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam; quia, scilicet in hereditatem illius terræ beatorum, nullus potest pervenire nisi moveatur et deducatur a Spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum necessarium est homini habere donum Spiritus sancti.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.ad.1] The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dona excedunt communem perfectionem virtutum, non quantum ad genus operum, eo modo quo consilia præcedunt præcepta, sed quantum ad modum operandi, secundum quod movetur homo ab altiori principio.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.ad.2] By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita perficietur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin semper indigeat moveri quodam superiori instinctu Spiritus sancti, ratione jam dicta.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.ad.3] Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects.

[I-II.q.68.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod rationi humanæ non sunt omnia cognita neque omnia possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta perfectione naturali, sive accipiatur ut perfecta theologicis virtutibus; unde non potest quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam et alia hujusmodi, de quibus ibi fit mentio. Sed ille cujus scientiæ et potestati omnia subsunt, sua motione ab omni stultitia et ignorantia et hebetudine et duritia et cæteris hujusmodi nos tutos reddit. Et ideo dona Spiritus sancti, quæ faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ipsius, dicuntur contra hujusmodi defectus dari.

Article 3

[I-II.q.68.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in Isaiah 11:2-3: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator." Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.arg.2] Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above (1,2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dona Spiritus sancti perfi-lus. Sed inde non sequitur dona homini non esse necessaria ad salutem, ut patet. ciunt hominem, secundum quod agitur a Spiritu Dei, sicut dictum est. Sed inquantum homo agitur a Spiritu Dei, se habet quod dammodo ut instrumentum respectu ejus; non autem convenit ut instrumentum perficiatur per habitum, sed principale agens. Ergo dona Spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.arg.3] Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut dona Spiritus sancti sunt ex inspiratione divina, ita donum prophetiæ. Sed prophetia non est habitus; non enim spiritus prophetiæ adest prophetis semper, ut Gregorius dicit in Homil. i sup. Ezech., § 4, col. 788, t. 2. Ergo neque etiam dona Spiritus sancti sunt habitus.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.sc] Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples (John 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.sc] Sed contra est id quod Dominus dicit discipulis de Spiritu sancto loquens, Joan., xiv, 17: Apud vos manebit, et in vobis erit. Spiritus autem sanctus non est in hominibus absque donis ejus. Ergo dona ejus manent in hominibus. Ergo non solum sunt actus vel passiones, sed etiam habitus permanentes.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 1), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said (56, 4; 58, 2), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quædam perfectiones hominis, quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur instinctum Spiritus sancti. Manifestum est autem ex supra dictis, quod virtutes morales perficiunt vim appetitivam, secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri per imperium rationis. Hoc igitur modo dona Spiritus sancti se habent ad hominem in comparisone ad Spiritum sanctum, sicut virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparisone ad rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires appetitivæ disponuntur ad prompe obediendum rationi. Unde et dona Spiritus sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad prompe obediendum Spiritui sancto.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.ad.1] Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Gregorius, ibid., § 91, solvit dicens quod « in illis donis sine quibus ad vitam perveniri non potest, Spiritus sanctus in electis omnibus semper manet, sed in aliis non semper manet 1. » Septem autem dona sunt necessaria ad salutem, ut dictum est. Unde quantum ad ea Spiritus sanctus semper manet in sanctis.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.ad.2] This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de instrumento, cujus non est agere, sed solum agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo, sed sic agitur a Spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi arbitrii; unde indiget habitu.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.ad.3] Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the comparison fails.

[I-II.q.68.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod prophetia est de donis quæ sunt ad manifestationem Spiritus, non autem ad necessitatem salutis. Unde non est simile.

Article 4

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter septem dona Spiritus sancti enumerentur. In illa enim enumeratione ponuntur quatuor pertinentia ad virtutes intellectuales, scilicet « sapientia, intellectus, scientia, et consilium, » quod pertinet ad prudentiam; nihil autem ibi ponitur quod pertineat ad artem, quæ est quinta virtus intellectualis; similiter etiam ponitur aliquid pertinens ad justitiam, scilicet « pietas, » et aliquid pertinens ad fortitudinem, scilicet « fortitudinis donum; » nihil autem ponitur ibi pertinens ad temperantiam. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur dona.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.2] Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pietas est pars justitiae. Sed circa fortitudinem non ponitur aliqua pars ejus, sed ipsa fortitudo. Ergo non debuit poni pietas, sed ipsa justitia.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.3] Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtutes theologicæ maxime ordinant nos ad Deum. Cum ergo dona perficiant hominem, secundum quod movetur a Deo, videtur quod debuissent poni aliqua dona pertinentia ad theologicas virtutes.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.4] Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut Deus timetur, ita etiam amatur, et in ipsum aliquis sperat, et de eo delectatur. Amor autem, spes et delectatio sunt passiones condivisæ timori. Ergo sicut timor ponitur donum, ita et alia tria debent poni dona.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.5] Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.arg.5] 5. Præterea, intellectui adjungitur sapientia, quæ regit ipsum; fortitudini autem consilium; pietati vero scientia. Ergo et timori debuit addi aliquod donum directivum. Inconvenienter ergo septem dona Spiritus sancti enumerentur. Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae, Isaiæ, xi.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.sc] stands the authority of Holy Writ (Isaiah 11:2-3).

[I-II.q.68.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 3), the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite.

Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by "knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to Proverbs 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," and Psalm 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quidam habitus perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompe sequatur instinctum Spiritus sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires appetitivas ad obedientum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivæ natæ sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanæ natæ sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis, quæ possunt esse principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt dona, scilicet in ratione et in vi appetitiva. Ratio autem est speculativa et practica; et in utraque consideratur apprehensio veritatis, quæ pertinet ad inventionem et judicium de veritate. Ad apprehensionem igitur veritatis perficitur speculativa ratio per intellectum, practica vero per consilium. Ad recte autem judicandum speculativa quidem per sapientiam, practica vero per scientiam, perficitur. Appetitiva autem virtus in his quidem quæ sunt ad alterum, perficitur per pietatem; in his autem quæ sunt ad seipsum, perficitur per fortitudinem contra timorem periculorum; contra concupiscentiam vero inordinatam delectabilium per timorem, secundum illud Prov., xv, 27: In timore* Domini declinat omnis a malo; et in psal. cxviii, 120, Confige timore tuo carnes meas, a judiciis enim tuis timui. Et sic patet quod hæc dona extendunt se ad omnia ad quæ se extendunt virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.1] The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made (Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dona Spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem in his quæ pertinent ad bene vivendum, ad quæ non ordinatur ars, sed ad exteriora factibilia; est enim ars ratio recta non agibilium, sed factibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., c. iv. Potest tamen etiam dici, quod quantum ad infusionem donorum, ars pertinet ad Spiritum sanctum, qui est principaliter movens; non autem ad homines, qui sunt quædam organa ejus, dum ab eo moventur. Temperantiæ autem respondet quodammodo donum timoris; sicut enim ad virtutem temperantiæ pertinet secundum ejus propriam rationem ut aliquis recedat a delectationibus pravis propter bonum rationis, ita ad donum timoris pertinet quod aliquis recedat a delectationibus pravis propter Dei timorem.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.2] Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nomen justitiae imponitur a rectitudine rationis; et ideo nomen virtutis est convenientius quam nomen doni. Sed nomen pietatis importat reverentiam quam habemus ad patrem et ad patriam. Et quia pater omnium Deus est, etiam cultus Dei pietas nominatur, ut Augustinus dicit in X De civ. Dei, c. 1, col. 279, t. 7. Et ideo convenienter donum, quo aliquis propter reverentiam Dei bonum operatur ad omnes, pietas nominatur.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.3] The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod animus hominis non movetur a Spiritu sancto, nisi ei secundum aliquem modum uniatur; sicut instrumentum non movetur ab artifice nisi per contactum aut per aliquam aliam unionem. Prima autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et charitatem. Unde istæ virtutes præsupponuntur ad dona, sicut radices quædam donorum. Unde omnia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, sicut quædam derivationes prædictarum virtutum.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.4] Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod amor, spes et delectatio habent bonum pro objecto. Summum autem bonum Deus est. Unde nomina harum passionum transferuntur ad virtutes theologicas quibus anima conjungitur Deo. Timoris autem objectum est malum, quod Deo nullo modo competit; unde non importat conjunctionem ad Deum, sed magis recessum ab aliquibus rebus propter reverentiam Dei; et ideo non est nomen virtutis theologicæ, sed doni, quod eminentius retrahit a malis quam virtus moralis.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.5] Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.

[I-II.q.68.a.4.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod per sapientiam dirigitur et hominis intellectus, et hominis affectus; et ideo ponuntur duo correspondentia sapientiae, tanquam directivo; ex parte quidem intellectus donum intellectus; ex parte autem affectus donum timoris. Ratio enim timendi Deum præcipue sumitur ex consideratione excellentiæ divinæ, quam considerat sapientia.

Article 5

[I-II.q.68.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod dona non sint connexa. Dicit enim Apostolus, I Cor., xii, 8: Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiæ, alii sermo scientiæ secundum eumdem Spiritum. Sed sapientia et scientia inter dona Spiritus sancti computantur. Ergo dona Spiritus sancti dantur diversis; et non connectuntur sibi invicem in eodem.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the same man.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in XIV De Trinit., cap. I, § 3, col. 1037, t. 8, quod « scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quam vis polleant ipsa fide. » Sed fidem concomitatur aliquod de donis, ad minus donum timoris. Ergo videtur quod dona non sint de necessitate connexa in uno et eodem.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.arg.3] Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Gregorius in I Mor., c. xxxii, § 45, col. 547, t. 1, dicit quod « minor est sapientia, si intellectu careat; et valde inutilis est intellectus, si ex sapientia non subsistat; vile est consilium cui robur fortitudinis deest; et valde fortitudo destruitur, nisi per consilium fulciatur; nulla est scientia, si utilitatem pietatis non habet; et valde inutilis est pietas, si scientia discretione careat; timor quoque ipse, nisi has virtutes habuerit, ad nullum opus bonæ actionis surgit. » Ex quibus videtur quod unum donum possit sine alio haberi. Non ergo dona Spiritus sancti sunt connexa.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.sc] Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod ibidem Gregorius præmittit dicens: « Illud in Job filiorum convivio perscrutandum videtur, quod semetipsos invicem pascunt. » Per filios autem Job, de quibus loquitur, significantur dona Spiritus sancti. Ergo dona Spiritus sancti sunt connexa per hoc quod se invicem reficiunt.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.co] The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated (3) that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Romans 5:5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hujus quæstionis veritas de facili ex præmissis potest haberi. Dictum est enim supra, quod sicut vires appetitivæ disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione ad regimen rationis, ita omnes vires animæ disponuntur per dona in comparatione ad Spiritum sanctum moventem. Spiritus autem sanctus habibat in nobis per charitatem, secundum illud Rom., v, 5: Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis; sicut et ratio nostra perficietur per prudentiam. Unde sicut virtutes morales connectuntur sibi invicem in prudentia, ita dona Spiritus sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in charitate; ita scilicet quod qui charitatem habet, omnia dona Spiritus sancti habet, quorum nullum sine charitate haberi potest.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.ad.1] Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sapientia et scientia uno modo possunt considerari secundum quod sunt gratiæ gratis datæ, prout scilicet aliquis abundat intantum in cognitione rerum divinarum et humanarum, ut possit etiam fideles instruere et adversarios confutare; et sic loquitur ibi Apostolus de sapientia et scientia; unde signanter fit mentio de sermone sapientia et scientia. Alio modo possunt accipi, prout sunt dona Spiritus sancti: et sic sapientia et scientia nihil aliud sunt quam quædam perfectiones humanæ mentis, secundum quas disponitur ad sequendum instinctum Spiritus sancti in cognitione divinorum et humanorum. Et sic patet quod hujusmodi dona sunt in omnibus habentibus charitatem.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.ad.2] Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (Objection 1): hence he is referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge."

[I-II.q.68.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de scientia, exponens prædictam auctoritatem Apostoli; unde loquitur de scientia prædicto modo accepta, secundum quod est gratia gratis data; quod patet ex hoc quod subdit: « Aliud enim est scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quæ nonnisi æterna est; aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur, et contra impios defendatur; quam proprio appellare vocabulo scientiam videtur Apostolus. »

[I-II.q.68.a.5.ad.3] Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as stated above (Question 65, Article 1); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend its support to another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.

[I-II.q.68.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut uno modo connexio virtutum cardinalium probatur per hoc quod una earum perficitur quojuxta differentias nominum, sed unus et idem est fons cunctarum virtutum. Unde I Cor., xii: Divisions gratiarum sunt, idem autem Spiritus. Hinc infert Hieronymus: « Sine Christo ergo nec sapiens quis est, nec intelligens, nec consiliarius, nec fortis, nec eruditus, nec pius, nec timore Domini plenus. » Hi sunt septem oculi in lapide uno, Zachar., III. Hæ sunt septem mulieres quæ apprehendammodo per aliam, ut supra dictum est, ita Gregorius eodem modo vult probare connexionem donorum per hoc quod unum sine alio non potest esse perfectum. Unde pra-mittit dicens: « Valde singula quælibet destituitur, si non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur. » Non ergo datur intelligi quod unum donum possit esse sine alio; sed quod intellectus, si esset sine sapientia, non esset donum; sicut temperantia, si esset sine justitia, non esset virtus.

Article 6

[I-II.q.68.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to Isaiah 11:9: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in heaven.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod dona Spiritus sancti non maneant in patria. Dicit enim Gregorius in II Moral., cap. xlix, § 77, col. 592, t. 4, quod « Spiritus sanctus contra singula tentamenta septem donis erudit mentem. » Sed in patria non erunt aliqua tentamenta, secundum illud Isa., xi, 9: Non nocebunt, et non occident in universo monte sancto meo. Ergo dona Spiritus sancti non erunt in patria.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.arg.2] Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above (Article 3). But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dona Spiritus sancti sunt habitus quidam, ut supra dictum est. Frustra autem essent habitus, ubi actus esse non possent. Actus autem quorumdam donorum in patria esse non possunt; dicit enim Gregorius in I Mor., cap. xxxii, § 44, col. 547, t. 1, quod « intellectus facit audita penetrare, et consilium prohibet esse præcipitem et fortitudo facit non metuere adversa, et pietas replet cordis viscera operibus misericordiæ. » Hæc autem non competunt statui patriæ. Ergo hujusmodi dona non erunt in statu gloriæ.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.arg.3] Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, donorum quædam perficiunt hominem in vita contemplativa, ut sapientia et intellectus; quædam in vita activa, ut pietas et fortitudo. Sed activa vita cum hac vita terminatur, ut Gregorius dicit in VI Moral., cap. xxxvii, § 64, col. 764, t. 1. Ergo in statu gloriæ non erunt omnia dona Spiritus sancti.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.sc] Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue."

[I-II.q.68.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit in lib. I De Spiritu sancto, cap. xvi, § 158, col. 770, t. 3: « Civitas Dei illa Hierusalem cælestis non meatu alicujus fluvii terrestris abluitur, sed ille ex vitæ fonte procedens Spiritus sanctus, cujus nos brevi satiamur haustu, in illis cælestibus spiritibus redundantius vide-tur effluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens meatu. »

[I-II.q.68.a.6.co] We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all" (1 Corinthians 15:28), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues (67, 1).

[I-II.q.68.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod de donis dupliciter possumus loqui: uno modo, quantum ad essentiam donorum; et sic perfectissime erunt in patria, sicut patet per auctoritatem Ambrosii inductam. Cujus ratio est, quia dona Spiritus sancti perficiunt mentem humanam ad sequendam motionem Spiritus sancti; quod præcipue erit in patria, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur I ad Cor., xv, 28, et quando homo erit totaliter subditus Deo. Alio modo possunt considerari quantum ad materiam circa quam operantur; et sic in præsenti habent operationem circa aliquam materiam, circa quam non habebunt operationem in statu gloriæ; et secundum hoc non manebunt in patria, sicut supra de virtutibus cardinalibus dictum est.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.ad.1] Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Gregorius loquitur ibi de donis secundum quod competunt statui præsenti; sic enim donis protegimur contra tentamenta malorum; sed in statu gloriæ cessantibus malis, per dona Spiritus sancti perficiemur in bono.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.ad.2] Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness," of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every man . . . his brother" (Jeremiah 31:3-4); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of confidence," which remains also in the future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Gregorius in singulis donis ponit aliquid quod transit cum statu præsenti, et aliquid quod permanet etiam in futuro; dicit enim, loco cit. in arg., quod « sapientia mentem de æternorum spe et certitudine reficit; » quorum duorum spes transit, sed certitudo remanet; et de intellectu dicit quod « in eo quod audita penetrat, reficiendo cor tenebras ejus illustrat; » quorum auditus transit, quia non docebit vir fratrem suum, ut dicitur Jerem., xxxi, 34; sed illustratio mentis manebit. De consilio Qualiter inter se different hæc septem dona, vel conveniant, dicit Gregorius, Super Job, 1, ubi agit de septem filiis ejus hoc modo: « Sapientia de æternorum spe mentem reficit, intellectus de auditis cor illustrat, consilium ratione animum implet prohibens esse præcipitem, fortitudo confidenautem dicit, quod « prohibet esse præcipitem, » quod est necessarium in præsenti; et iterum quod « ratione animum replet, » quod est necessarium etiam in futuro. De fortitudine vero dicit quod « adversa non metuit, » quod est necessarium in præsenti; et iterum quod « confidentiæ cibos apponit, » quod permanet etiam in futuro. De scientia vero unum tantum ponit, scilicet quod « ignorantiæ jejunium superat, » quod pertinet ad statum præsentem; sed quod addit: « In ventre mentis, » potest figuraliter intelligi repletio cognitionis, quæ pertinet etiam ad statum futurum. De pietate vero dicit quod « cordis viscera misericordiæ operibus replet, » quod quidem secundum verba pertinet tantum ad statum præsentem; sed ipse intimus affectus proximorum per viscera designatus, pertinet etiam ad futurum statum, in quo pietas non exhibebit misericordiæ opera, sed congratulationis affectum. De timore vero dicit quod « premit mentem ne de præsentibus superbiat, » quod pertinet ad statum præsentem; et quod « de futuris cibo spei confortat, » quod etiam pertinet ad statum præsentem, quantum ad spem; sed potest etiam ad statum futurum pertinere, quantum ad confortationem de rebus hic speratis et ibi obtentis.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.ad.3] This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss.

[I-II.q.68.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de donis quantum ad materiam. Opera enim activæ vitæ non erunt materia donorum, sed omnia habebunt actus suos circa ea quæ pertinent ad vitam contemplativam, quæ est vita beata.

Article 7

[I-II.q.68.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Deuteronomy 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a master, where is My fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod dignitas donorum non attendatur secundum enumerationem qua enumerantur Isa., xi. Illud enim videtur esse potissimum in donis quod maxime Deus ab homine requirit. Sed maxime requirit Deus ab homine timorem; dicitur enim Deuter., x, 12: Et nunc, Israel, quid Dominus Deus tuus petit a te nisi ut timeas Dominum Deum tuum? et Malach., 1, 6, dicitur: Si Dominus sum ego, ubi timor meus? Ergo videtur quod timor, qui enumeratur ultimo, non sit infimum donorum, sed maximum.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.arg.2] Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says (1 Timothy 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pietas videtur esse quoddam bonum universale; dicit enim Apostolus, I ad Timoth., iv, 8, quod pietas ad omnia utilis est. Sed bonum universale præfertur particularibus bonis. Ergo pietas, quæ penultimo enumeratur, videtur esse potissimum donorum.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.arg.3] Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, scientia perficit judicium hominis: consilium autem ad inquisitionem pertinet. Sed judicium præeminet inquisitioni. Ergo scientia est potius donorum quam consilium, cum tamen post enumeretur.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.arg.4] Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, fortitudo pertinet ad vim appetitivam, scientia autem ad rationem. Sed ratio est eminentior quam vis appetitiva. Ergo et scientia est eminentius donum quam fortitudo, quæ tamen primo enumeratur. Non ergo dignitas donorum attenditur secundum ordinem enumerationis eorum.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.sc] Augustine says [De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4: "It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in Matthew 5:3: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts."

[I-II.q.68.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I De serm. Dom. in monte, c. iv, col. 1234, t. 3: « Videtur mihi septiformis operatio Spiritus sancti, de qua Isaias loquitur, his gradibus sententiisque congruere, » de quibus fit mentio Matth., v; « sed interest ordinis; nam ibi, » scilicet in Isaia, « numeratio ab excelsioribus cæpit, hic vero ab inferioribus. »

[I-II.q.68.a.7.co] The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above (Article 4). Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their matter.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dignitas donorum dupliciter potest attendi: uno modo simpliciter, scilicet per comparisonem ad proprios actus, prout procedunt a suis principiis; alio modo secundum quid, scilicet per comparisonem ad materiam. Simpliciter autem loquendo de dignitate donorum, eadem est ratio comparisonis in ipsis et in virtutibus; quia dona ad omnes actus potentiarum animæ perficiunt hominem, ad quos perficiunt virtutes, ut supra dictum est. Unde, sicut virtutes intellectuales præferuntur virtutibus moralibus, et in ipsis virtutibus intellectualibus contemplativæ præferuntur activis, ut sapientia, et intellectus, et scientia, prudentiæ et arti, ita tamen quod sapientia præfertur intellectui, et intellectus scientia, sicut prudentia et synesis eubuliæ; ita etiam in donis sapientia et intellectus, scientia et consilium præferuntur pietati, et fortitudini, et timori, in quibus etiam pietas præfertur fortitudini, et fortitudo timori, sicut justitia fortitudini, et fortitudo temperantiæ. Sed quantum ad materiam fortitudo et consilium præferuntur scientiæ et pietati, quia scilicet fortitudo et consilium habent in arduis locum, scientia autem et pietas etiam in communibus. Sic igitur donorum dignitas ordini enumerationis respondet, partim quidem simpliciter, secundum quod sapientia et intellectus omnibus præferuntur, partim autem secundum ordinem materiæ, secundum quod consilium et fortitudo præferuntur scientiæ et pietati.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.ad.1] Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Psalm 110:10; Sirach 1:16), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Proverbs 16:16), before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod timor maxime requiritur, quasi primordium quoddam perfectionis donorum, quia initium sapientiæ timor Domini, ps. cx, 10, non propter hoc quod sit cæteris dignius; prius enim est secundum ordinem generationis ut aliquis recedat a malo, quod fit per timorem, ut dicitur Prov., xvi, 6, quam quod operetur bonum, quod fit per alia dona.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.ad.2] In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which he had said it "is profitable to little."

[I-II.q.68.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pietas non comparatur in verbis Apostoli omnibus donis Dei, sed soli corporali exercitationi, de qua præmittit quod ad modicum utilis est.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.ad.3] Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientia etsi præferatur consilio ratione judicii, tamen consilium præfertur ratione materiæ: nam consilium non habet locum nisi in arduis, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. 111, sed judicium scientiæ in omnibus locum habet.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.ad.4] The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety.

[I-II.q.68.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod dona directiva quæ pertinent ad rationem, donis exequentibus digniora sunt, si considerentur per comparisonem ad actus, prout egredientur a potentiis: ratio enim appetitivæ præeminet, sicut regulans regulato. Sed ratione materiæ adjungitur consilium fortitudini, sicut directivum exequenti, et similiter scientia pietati; quia scilicet consilium et fortitudo in arduis locum habent, scientia autem et pietas etiam in communibus. Et ideo consilium simul cum fortitudine ratione materiæ numeratur ante scientiam et pietatem.

Article 8

[I-II.q.68.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing." But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtutes sint præferendæ donis. Dicit enim Augustinus in XV De Trinit., cap. xviii, col. 1082, t. 8, de charitate loquens: « Nulium est isto Dei dono excellentius; solum est quod dividit inter filios regni æterni, et filios perditionis æternæ. Dantur et alia per Spiritum sanctum munera, sed sine charitate nihil prosunt. » Sed charitas est virtus. Ergo virtus est potior donis Spiritus sancti.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.arg.2] Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ sunt priora naturaliter videntur esse potiora. Sed virtutes sunt priores donis Spiritus sancti; dicit enim Gregorius in II Moral., cap. xlix, § 77, col. 592, t. 4, quod « donum Spiritus sancti in subjecta mente ante alia prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, justitiam, format; et sic eamdem mentem septem mox virtutibus, » idest donis, « temperat, ut contra stultitiam, sapientiam; contra habetudinem, intellectum; contra præcipitationem, consilium; contra timorem, fortitudinem; contra ignorantiam, scientiam; contra duritiam, pietatem; contra superbiam det timorem. » Ergo virtutes sunt potiores donis.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « virtutibus nullus male uti potest, » ut Augustinus dicit, lib. II De lib. arbitr., cap. xix, col. 1268, t. 4. Donis autem potest aliquis male uti: dicit enim Gregorius in I Moral., cap. xxxv, § 48, col. 549, t. 4, quod « hostiam nostræ precis immolamus, ne sapientia elevet; ne intellectus dum subtiliter currit oberret; ne consilium, dum se multiplicat, confundat; ne fortitudo, dum fiduciam præbet, præcipitet; ne scientia, dum novit et non diligit, inflet; ne pietas, dum se extra rectitudinem inclinat, intorqueat; ne timor, dum plus justo trepidat, in desperationis foveam mergat. » Ergo virtutes sunt digniores donis Spiritus sancti.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.sc] The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (Objection 2), so that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.sc] Sed contra est, quod dona dantur in adjutorium virtutum contra defectus, ut patet in auctoritate inducta, et sic videtur quod perficiant illud quod virtutes perficere non possunt. Sunt ergo dona potiora virtutibus.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.co] As was shown above (58, 3; 62, 1), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.

Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in faith, hope, and charity."

But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect than the virtues.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra 1 dictis patet, virtutes in tria genera distinguentur: sunt enim quædam virtutes theologicæ, quædam intellectuales, quædam morales. Virtutes quidem theologicæ sunt quibus mens humana Deo conjungitur; virtutes autem intellectuales sunt quibus ratio ipsa perficitur; virtutes autem morales sunt quibus vires appetitivæ perficiuntur ad obediendum rationi. Dona autem Spiritus sancti sunt quibus omnes vires animæ disponuntur ad hoc quod subdantur motioni divinæ. Sic ergo eadem videtur esse comparatio donorum ad virtutes theologicas, per quas homo unitur Spiritui sancto moventi, sicut virtutum moralium ad virtutes intellectuales, per quas perficitur ratio quæ est virtutum moralium motiva. Unde, sicut virtutes intellectuales præferuntur virtutibus moralibus, et regulant eas; ita virtutes theologicæ præferuntur donis Spiritus sancti, et regulant ea. Unde Gregorius dicit in I Moral., cap. xxvii, § 38, col. 544, t. 1, quod « neque ad denarii perfectionem septem filii, » id est, septem dona, « perveniunt, nisi in fide, spe et charitate fuerit omne quod agunt. » Sed si comparemus dona ad alias virtutes intellectuales vel morales, dona præferuntur virtutibus, quia dona perficiunt vires animæ in comparatione ad Spiritum sanctum moventem; virtutes autem perficiunt vel ipsam rationem, vel alias vires in ordine ad rationem. Manifestum est autem, quod ad altiorem motorem oportet majori perfectione mobile esse dispositum. Unde perfectiora sunt dona virtutibus.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.ad.1] Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod charitas est virtus theologica, de qua concedimus quod sit potior donis.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.ad.2] There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquid est prius altero dupliciter: uno modo ordine perfectionis et dignitatis, sicut dilectio Dei est prior dilectione proximi; et hoc modo dona sunt priora virtutibus intellectualibus et moralibus, posteriora vero virtutibus theologicis. Alio modo ordine generationis seu dispositionis, sicut dilectio proximi præcedit dilectionem Dei quantum ad actum; et sic virtutes morales et intellectuales præcedunt dona; quia per hoc quod homo bene se habet circa rationem propriam, disponitur ad hoc quod se bene habeat in ordine ad Deum.

[I-II.q.68.a.8.ad.3] Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth not perversely" (1 Corinthians 13:4). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[I-II.q.68.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sapientia et intellectus, et alia hujusmodi, sunt dona Spiritus sancti, secundum quod per charitatem informantur, quæ non agit perperam, ut dicitur I ad Corinth., xiii, 4. Et ideo sapientia et intellectu, et aliis hujusmodi nullus male utitur, secundum quod sunt dona Spiritus sancti. Sed ad hoc quod a charitatis perfectione non recedant, unum ab altero adjuvatur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius intendit dicere.

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