Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q67. The duration of virtues after this life
Source context
- Theme
- persistence or cessation of moral virtues in the soul after bodily death
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Platonic traditionPlato's account in the Phaedo holds that genuine virtues — particularly wisdom and justice — belong to the immortal soul and persist beyond death, a structural parallel to Aquinas's argument that intellectual and theological virtues endure in a perfected mode after this life.
- Vedanta (moksha doctrine)Advaita Vedanta distinguishes between virtues cultivated for liberation and those oriented toward worldly action; at moksha the former are fulfilled and the latter dissolved, showing a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's distinction between virtues perfected in glory and those that lapse with the conditions requiring them.
Q67. The duration of virtues after this life
Article 2
[I-II.q.67.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:8-9) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non maneant post hanc vitam. Dicit enim Apostolus I ad Cor., xiii, 8, quod scientia destruetur; et ratio est quia ex parte cognoscimus. Sed sicut cognitio scientia est ex parte, id est, imperfecta, ita etiam cognitio aliarum virtutum intellectualium quamdiu hæc vita durat. Ergo omnes virtutes intellectuales post hanc vitam cessabunt.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in Prædiçamentis, cap. « De qualit., » circa prine., quod scientia, cum sit habitus, est qualitas difficile mobilis: non enim de facili amittitur nisi ex aliqua forti transmutatione vel aegritudine. Sed nulla est tanta transmutatio corporis humani, sicut per mortem. Ergo scientia et aliæ virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc vitam.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.arg.3] Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtutes intellectuales perficiunt intellectum ad bene operandum proprium actum. Sed actus intellectus non videtur esse post hanc vitam, eo quod « nihil intelligit anima sine phantasmate, » ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 30; phantasmata autem post hanc vitam non manent, cum non sint nisi in organis corporeis. Ergo virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc vitam.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.sc] The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to Luke 16:25: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.sc] Sed contra est, quod firmior est cognitio universalium et necessariorum quam particularium et contingentium. Sed in homine remanet post hanc vitam cognitio particularium et contingentium, puta eorum quæ quis fecit vel passus est, secundum illud Luc., xvi, 25: Recordare quia recipisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala. Ergo multo magis remanet cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quæ pertinet ad scientiam et ad alias virtutes intellectuales.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.co] As stated in the I, 79, 6 some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands; and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted.
But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually." It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima iii) because it preserves the intelligible species.
And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the I, 84, 7; I, 85, 1, ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (1).
[I-II.q.67.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut in primo dictum est, quidam posuerunt quod species intelligibiles non permanent in intellectu possibili, nisi quamdiu actu intelligit; nec est aliqua conservatio specierum, cessante consideratione actuali, nisi in viribus sensitivis, quæ sunt actus corporalium organorum, scilicet imaginativa et memorativa. Hujusmodi autem vires corrumpuntur corrupto corpore; et ideo secundum hoc scientia nullo modo post hanc vitam remanebit corpore corrupto, neque aliqua alia intellectu virtus. Sed hæc opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui in III De anima, text. 8, dicit quod « intellectus possibilis est in actu, cum fit singula, sicut sciens; cum tamen sit in potentia ad considerandum in actu. » Est etiam contra rationem, quia species intelligibiles recipiuntur in intellectu possibili immobiliter secundum modum recipientis; unde et intellectus possibilis dicitur « locus specierum, » quasi species intelligibiles conservans. Sed phantasmata, ad quæ respiciendo homo intelligit in hac vita, applicando ad ipsa species intelligibiles, ut in primo dictum est, corrupto corpore corrumpuntur. Unde quantum ad ipsa phantasmata quæ sunt quasi materialia in virtutibus intellectubus, virtutes intellectuales destruuntur destructo corpore; sed quantum ad species intelligibiles, quæ sunt in intellectu possibili, virtutes intellectuales manent. Species autem se habent in virtutibus intellectualibus sicut formales. Unde intellectuales virtutes manent post hanc vitam quantum ad id quod est formale in eis, non autem quantum ad id quod est materiale, sicut et de moralibus dictum est.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.ad.1] The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the phantasms.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Apostoli est intelligendum quantum ad id quod est materiale in scientia, et quantum ad modum intelligendi, quia scilicet neque phantasmata remanebunt destructo corpore, neque erit usus scientiæ per conversionem ad phantasmata.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.ad.2] Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod per ægritudinem corrumpitur habitus scientiæ quantum ad id quod est materiale in eo, scilicet quantum ad phantasmata; non autem quantum ad species intelligibiles, quæ sunt in intellectu possibili.
[I-II.q.67.a.2.ad.3] As stated in the I, 89, 1 the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (1).
[I-II.q.67.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima separata post mortem habet alium modum inteligendi quam per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut in primo dictum est, et sic scientia manet; non tamen secundum eumdem modum operandi, sicut et de virtutibus moralibus dictum est.
Article 4
[I-II.q.67.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more then does hope remain.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod spes maneat post mortem in statu gloriæ. Spes enim nobiliori modo perficit appetitum humanum quam virtutes morales. Sed virtutes morales manent post hanc vitam, ut patet per Augustinum in XIV De Trinit., cap. 1x, col. 1045, t. 8. Ergo multo magis spes.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.arg.2] Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever--in the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, spei opponitur timor. Sed timor manet post hanc vitam: et in beatis quidem timor filialis, qui manet in sæculum; et in damnatis timor pœnarum. Ergo spes pari ratione potest permanere.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.arg.3] Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to Sirach 24:29: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and 1 Peter 1:12: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut spes est futuri boni, ita et desiderium. Sed in beatis est desiderium futuri boni et quantum ad gloriam corporis, quam animæ beatorum desiderant, ut dicit Augustinus, XII Super Genes. ad litt., cap. xxxv, col. 483, t. 3, et etiam quantum ad gloriam animæ, secundum illud Eccli., xxiv, 29: Qui edunt me, adhuc esuient; et qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient: et I Petr., 1, 42, dicitur: In quem desiderant angeli prospicere. Ergo videtur quod possit esse spes post hanc vitam in beatis.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 8:24): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit Rom., viii, 24: Quod videt quis, quid sperat? Sed beati vident id quod est objectum spei, scilicet Deum. Ergo non sperant.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 3), that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope (40, A1,2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, id quod de ratione sui importat imperfectionem subjecti, non potest simul stare cum subjecto opposita perfectione perfecto; sicut patet quod motus in ratione sui importat imperfectionem subjecti; est enim « actus existentis in potentia, inquantum hujusmodi; » unde quando illa potentia reducitur ad actum, jam cessat motus; non enim adhuc albatur, postquam jam aliquid factum est album. Spes autem importat motum quemdam in id quod non habetur, ut patet ex his quæ supra de passione spei diximus. Et ideo, quando habetur id quod speratur, scilicet divina fruitio, jam spes esse non poterit.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.ad.1] Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is in our actual possession.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod spes est nobilior virtutibus moralibus quantum ad objectum, quod est Deus; sed actus virtutum moralium non repugnant perfectioni beatitudinis, sicut actus spei, nisi forte ratione materiæ, secundum quam non manent. Non enim virtus moralis perficit appetitum solum in id quod nondum habetur, sed etiam circa id quod præsentialiter habetur.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.ad.2] Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on (II-II, 19, 2). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to Proverbs 1:33: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated above (23, 2; 40, 1), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Question 42, Article 2), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex est timor: servilis et filialis, ut infra dicetur. Servilis quidem est timor pœnæ, qui non poterit esse in gloria, nulla possibilitate ad pœnam remanente. Timor vero filialis habet duos actus, scilicet revereri Deum, et quantum ad hunc actum manet; et timere separationem ab ipso, et quantum ad hunc actum non manet. Separari enim a Deo habet rationem mali; nullum autem malum ibi timebitur, secundum illud Prov., 1, 33: Abundantia perfruetur, timore malorum sublato. Timor autem opponitur spei per oppositionem boni et mali, ut supra dictum est; et ideo timor qui remanet in gloria, non opponitur spei. In damnatis autem magis potest esse timor pœnæ quam in beatis spes gloriæ; quia in damnatis erit successio pœnarum; et sic remanet ibi ratio futuri, quod est objectum timoris. Sed gloria sanctorum est absque successione secundum quamdam æternitatis participationem, in qua non est præteritum et futurum, sed solum præsens. Et tamen nec etiam in damnatis est propriet timor; nam, sicut supra dictum est, timor nunquam est sine aliqua spe evasionis; quæ omnino in damnatis non erit; unde nec in illis etiam erit timor, nisi communiter loquendo, secundum quod quæ-libet expectatio mali futuri dicitur timor.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.ad.3] As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated above (Question 40, Article 1): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it.
[I-II.q.67.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quantum ad gloriam animæ non potest esse in beatis desiderium, secundum quod respicit futurum, ratione jam dicta. Dicitur autem ibi esse esuries et sitis per remotionem fastidii; et eadem ratione dicitur esse desiderium in angelis. Respectu autem gloriæ corporis in animabus sanctorum potest quidem esse desiderium, non tamen spes, proprie loquendo; neque secundum quod spes est virtus theologica, sic enim ejus objectum est Deus, non autem aliquod bonum creatum; neque secundum quod communiter sumitur; quia objectum spei est arduum, ut supra dictum est. Bonum autem, cujus jam inevitabilem causam habemus, non comparatur ad nos in ratione ardui; unde non proprie dicitur aliquis qui habet argentum, sperare se habiturum aliquid quod statim in potestate ejus est ut emat; et similiter illi qui habent gloriam animæ, non proprie dicuntur sperare gloriam corporis, sed solum desiderare.
Article 5
[I-II.q.67.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you remove living, there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquid fidei vel spei remaneat in gloria. Remoto enim quod est proprium, remanet id quod est commune, sicut dicitur in lib. De causis, propos. 1, quod, « remoto rationali, remanet vivum, et, remoto vivo, remanet ens. » Sed in fide est aliquid quod habet commune cum beatitudine, scilicet ipsa cognitio; aliquid autem quod est sibi proprium, scilicet ænigma, est enim fides cognitio ænigmatica. Ergo, remoto ænigmate fidei, adhuc remanet ipsa cognitio fidei.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.arg.2] Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to Ephesians 1:17-18: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light of glory, of which it is written (Psalm 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fides est quoddam spirituale lumen animæ secundum illud Eph., 1, 48: Illuminatos oculos cordis vestri in agnitio- *In agnitione Dei illuminatos oculos cordis vestri. vero ab utroque; sicut in homine sensitiva natura materialiter se habet ad intellectivam; animal autem dicitur, quod habet naturam sensitivam; rationale, quod habet intellectivam; homo vero, quod habet utrumque: et sic idem totum significatur per hæc tria, sed non ab eodem. Unde patet, quod cum differentia non sit nisi designativa generis, remota differentia, non potest substantia generis eadem remanere; non enim remanet eadem animalitas, si sit alia anima constituens animal. Unde non potest esse quod eadem numero cognitio quæ prius fuit ænigmatica, postea fiat visio aperta. Et sic patet, quod nihil idem numero vel specie, quod est in fide, remanet in patria, sed solum idem genere.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.arg.3] Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.sc] Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above (Article 3), it seems that it is withdrawn entirely.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.co] Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement.
But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect.
It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the same, but only generically.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.ad.1] If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, remoto rationali, non remanet vivum idem numero, sed idem genere, ut ex dictis patet.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.ad.2] The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod imperfectio luminis candelæ non opponitur perfectioni solaris luminis, quia non respiciunt idem subjectum; sed imperfectio fidei et perfectio gloriæ opponuntur ad invicem, et respiciunt idem subjectum: unde non possunt esse simul, sicut nec claritas aeris cum obscuritate ejus.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.ad.3] He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose.
[I-II.q.67.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui amittit pecuniam, non amittit possibilitatem habendi pecuniam; et ideo convenienter remanet habitus liberalitatis. Sed in statu gloriæ non solum actu tollitur objectum fidei, quod est non visum, sed etiam secundum possibilitatem, propter beatitudinis stabilitatem; et ideo frustra talis habitus remaneret.
Article 6
[I-II.q.67.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to 1 Corinthians 13:10, "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod charitas non maneat post hanc vitam in gloria: quia, ut dicitur I ad Corinth., xiii, 40, cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est, id est, quod est imperfectum. Sed charitas viæ est imperfecta. Ergo evacuabitur, adveniente perfectione gloriæ.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.arg.2] Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, habitus et actus distinguuntur secundum objecta. Sed objectum amoris est bonum apprehensum. Cum ergo alia sit apprehensio præsentis vitæ, et alia apprehensio futuræ vitæ, videtur quod non maneat eadem charitas utrobique.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.arg.3] Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, eorum quæ sunt unius rationis, imperfectum potest venire ad æqualitatem perfectionis per continuum augmentum. Sed charitas viæ nunquam potest pervenire ad æqualitatem charitatis patriæ, quantum-cumque augeatur. Ergo videtur quod charitas viæ non remaneat in patria.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.sc] The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:8): "Charity never falleth away."
[I-II.q.67.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit I ad Cor., xiii, 8: Charitas nunquam excidit.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.co] As stated above (Article 3), when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando imperfectio alicujus rei non est de ratione speciei ipsius, nihil prohibet idem numero quod prius fuit imperfectum, postea perfectum esse, sicut homo per augmentum perficitur et albedo per intensionem. Charitas autem est amor, de cujus ratione non est aliqua imperfectio; potest enim esse et habiti et non habiti, et visi et non visi. Unde charitas non evacuatur per gloriæ perfectionem, sed eadem numero manet.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.ad.1] The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, charity itself is not done away.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod imperfectio charitatis per accidens se habet ad ipsam, quia non est de ratione amoris imperfectio. Remoto autem eo quod est per accidens, nihilominus remanet substantia rei. Unde, evacuata imperfectione charitatis, non evacuatur ipsa charitas.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.ad.2] The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod charitas non habet pro objecto ipsam cognitionem; sic enim non esset eadem in via et in patria; sed habet pro objecto ipsam rem cognitam, quæ est eadem, scilicet ipsum Deum.
[I-II.q.67.a.6.ad.3] The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.67.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod charitas viæ per augmentum non potest pervenire ad æqualitatem charitatis patriæ, propter differentiam quæ est ex parte causæ. Visio enim est quædam causa amoris, ut dicitur in IX Ethic., cap. v, a princ.; Deus autem quanto perfectius cognoscitur, tanto perfectius amatur.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-secundae/q067.json