Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q74. The subject of sin
Source context
- Theme
- location of sin in the powers of the soul — will, reason, and sensuality as subjects of moral disorder
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian moral psychologyAristotle's analysis of akrasia (weakness of will) in Nicomachean Ethics VII locates moral failure in the appetitive part of the soul overriding rational judgment, a structural parallel to Aquinas's location of sin in will and sensuality as distinct soul-powers.
- Augustinian theology of sinAugustine's account in De Libero Arbitrio identifies the will (voluntas) as the proximate subject of sin, a formulation Aquinas inherits and refines by distinguishing will, intellect, and lower appetite as distinct but related loci of moral disorder.
- Vedantic analysis of antahkaranaAdvaita Vedanta's fourfold inner instrument (antahkarana) — manas, buddhi, chitta, ahamkara — distributes cognitive and volitional functions across distinct inner faculties, showing cross-tradition congruence with scholastic inquiry into which faculty is the proper subject of sin.
Q74. The subject of sin
Article 1
[I-II.q.74.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas non possit esse subjectum peccati. Dicit enim Dionysius in iv cap. De div. nom., § 32, col. 731, t. 1, quod « malum est praeter voluntatem et intentionem. » Sed peccatum habet rationem mali. Ergo peccatum non potest esse in voluntate.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.arg.2] Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, voluntas est boni, vel apparentis boni. Ex hoc autem quod voluntas vult bonum, non peccat; hoc autem quod vult apparens bonum, quod non est vere bonum, magis pertinere videtur ad defectum virtutis apprehensivæ quam ad defectum voluntatis. Ergo peccatum nullo modo est in voluntate.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.arg.3] Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, non potest esse idem subjectum peccati et causa efficiens; quia « causa efficiens et materialis non incidunt in idem, » ut dicitur in II Physic., text. 70 et seq. Sed voluntas est causa efficiens peccati; prima enim causa peccandi est voluntas, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De duabus animabus, c. x et xi, col. 103, etc., t. 8. Ergo non est subjectum peccati.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.sc] Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously."
[I-II.q.74.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I Retract., cap. 1x, § 4, col. 596, t. 1, quod « voluntas est qua peccatur, et recte vivitur. »
[I-II.q.74.a.1.co] Sin is an act, as stated above (71, A1,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. "to desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated above (1, 1 ; 18, 6), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it follows that sin is in the will as its subject.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccatum quidam actus est, sicut supra dictum est. Actuum autem quidam transeunt in exteriorem materiam, ut urere et secare; et hujusmodi actus habent pro materia et subjecto id in quod transit actio: sicut Philosophus dicit in III Physic., text. 18, quod « motus est actus mobilis a movente. » Quidam vero actus sunt non transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut appetere et cognoscere; et tales actus sunt omnes actus morales, sive sint actus virtutum, sive peccatorum. Unde oportet quod proprium subjectum actus peccati sit potentia quæ est principium actus. Cum autem proprium sit actuum moralium quod sint voluntarii, ut supra habitum est, sequitur quod voluntas, quæ est principium actuum voluntariorum sive bonorum sive malorum, quæ sunt peccata, sit principium peccatorum. Et ideo sequitur quod peccatum sit in voluntate sicut in subjecto.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.ad.1] Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod malum dicitur esse praeter voluntatem, quia voluntas non tendit in ipsum sub ratione mali. Sed quia aliquod malum est apparens bonum, ideo voluntas aliquando appetit aliquod malum; et secundum hoc peccatum est in voluntate.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.ad.2] If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si defectus apprehensivæ virtutis nullo modo subjaceret voluntati, non esset peccatum nec in voluntate, nec in apprehensiva virtute; sicut patet in his qui habent ignorantiam invincibilem. Et ideo relinquitur quod etiam defectus apprehensivæ virtutis subjacens voluntati reputetur in peccatum.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.ad.3] This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.
[I-II.q.74.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit in causis efficientibus quarum actiones transeunt in materiam exteriorem, et quæ non movent se, sed alia; cujus contrarium est in voluntate; unde ratio non sequitur.
Article 2
[I-II.q.74.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sola voluntas sit subjectum peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus in libro De duabus animabus, cap. x, § 14, col. 104, t. 8, quod « nonnisi voluntate peccatur. » Sed peccatum est sicut in subjecto in potentia qua peccatur. Ergo sola voluntas est subjectum peccati.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.arg.2] Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum est quoddam malum contra rationem. Sed bonum et malum ad rationem pertinens est objectum solius voluntatis. Ergo sola voluntas est subjectum peccati.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.arg.3] Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne peccatum est actus voluntarius: quia, ut dicit Augustinus in lib. III De lib. arbitr., cap. xvii, col. 1294, t. 1, « peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non sit voluntarium, non est peccatum. » Sed actus aliarum virium non sunt voluntarii, nisi inquantum illæ vires moventur a voluntate; hoc autem non sufficit ad hoc quod sint subjectum peccati; quia secundum hoc etiam membra exteriora, quæ moventur a voluntate, essent subjectum peccati; quod patet esse falsum. Ergo sola voluntas est subjectum peccati.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.sc] Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are the subject of virtues, as stated above (Article 56). Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.sc] Sed contra, peccatum virtuti contrariatur: contraria autem sunt circa idem. Sed aliæ etiam vires animæ præter voluntatem sunt subjecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non sola voluntas est subjectum peccati.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.co] As was shown above (Article 1), whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Question 6, Article 4) in treating of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex prædictis patet, omne quod est principium voluntarii actus, est subjectum peccati. Actus autem voluntarii dicuntur non solum illi qui eliciuntur a voluntate, sed etiam illi qui a voluntate imperantur, ut supra dictum est, cum de voluntario ageretur. Unde non solum voluntas potest esse subjectum peccati, sed omnes illæ potentiæ quæ possunt moveri ad suos actus, vel ab eis reprimi per voluntatem; et eædem etiam potentiæ sunt subjecta habituum moralium bonorum vel malorum: quia ejusdem est actus et habitus.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.ad.1] We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non peccatur nisi voluntate sicut primo movente; aliis autem potentiis peccatur sicut ab ea motis.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.ad.2] Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum et malum pertinent ad voluntatem, sicut per se objecta ipsius; sed aliæ potentiæ habent aliquod determinatum bonum et malum, ratione cujus potest in eis esse et virtus, et vitium, et peccatum, secundum quod participant voluntate et ratione.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.ad.3] The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
[I-II.q.74.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod membra corporis non sunt principia actuum, sed solum organa; unde et comparantur ad animam moventem sicut servus, qui agitur et non agit. Potentiæ autem appetitivæ interiores comparantur ad rationem quasi liberæ, quia agunt quodammodo et aguntur, ut patet per id quod dicitur I Polit., cap. iii, a med. Et præterea actus exteriorum membrorum sunt actiones in exteriorem materiam transeutes, sicut patet de percussione in peccato homicidii. Et propter hoc non est similis ratio.
Article 3
[I-II.q.74.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in sensualitate non possit esse peccatum. Peccatum enim est proprium homini, qui ex suis actibus laudatur vel vituperatur. Sed sensualitas est communis nobis et brutis. Ergo in sensualitate non potest esse peccatum.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.arg.2] Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest, » sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. III De lib. arbitr., c. xviii, col. 1295, t. 1. Sed homo non potest vitare quin actus sensualitatis sit inordinatus; est enim sensualitas perpetuæ corruptionis quamdiu in hac mortali vita vivimus; unde per serpen-tem significatur, ut Augustinus dicit XII De Trinit., cap. xii et xiii, col. 1007, t. 8. Ergo inordinatio motus sensualitatis non est peccatum.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.arg.3] Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod homo ipsè non facit, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed « hoc solum videmur nos ipsi facere, quod cum deliberatione rationis facimus, » ut Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., cap. viii, circa med. Ergo motus sensualitatis, qui est sine deliberatione rationis, non imputatur homini ad peccatum.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.sc] It is written (Romans 7:19): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., vii, 19: Non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio*; quod exponit Augustinus, lib. III Cont. Julian., c. xxvi, § 62, col. 733, t. 10, de malo concupiscentiae, quam constat esse motum quemdam sensualitatis. Ergo in sensualitate est aliquod peccatum.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.co] As stated above (2,3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum potest inveniri in qualibet potentia cujus actus potest esse voluntarius et inordinatus, in quo consistit ratio peccati. Manifestum est autem, quod actus sensualitatis potest esse voluntarius, inquantum sensualitas, id est appetitus sensitivus, nata est a voluntate moveri. Unde relinquitur quod in sensualitate possit esse peccatum. appetitum sensitivum, independenter a libertate sibi per actum voluntatis imperantis communicata,
[I-II.q.74.a.3.ad.1] Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the I, 78, 4. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.ad.2] The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.
[I-II.q.74.a.3.ad.3] Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.
Article 4
[I-II.q.74.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in sensualitate possit esse peccatum mortale. Actus enim ex objecto cognoscitur. Sed circa objecta sensualitatis contingit peccare mortaliter, sicut circa delectabilia carnis. Ergo actus sensualitatis potest esse peccatum mortale; et ita in sensualitate peccatum mortale inventur.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.arg.2] Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum mortale contrariatur virtuti. Sed virtus potest esse in sensualitate: temperantia enim et fortitudo sunt virtutes irrationabilium partium, ut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. x, in princ. Ergo in sensualitate potest esse peccatum mortale, cum contraria sint nata fieri circa idem.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.arg.3] Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (3, ad 3), mortal sin can be there also.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, veniale peccatum est dispositio ad mortale. Sed dispositio et habitus sunt in eodem. Cum igitur veniale peccatum sit in sensualitate, ut dictum est, etiam mortale peccatum esse poterit in eadem.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.sc] Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a mortal sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I Retract., cap. xxiii, § 1, col. 620, t. 1. « Inordinatus concupiscentiæ motus, qui est peccatum sensualitatis, potest etiam esse in his qui sunt in gratia, » in quibus tamen peccatum mortale non inventur. Ergo inordinatus motus sensualitatis non est peccatum mortale.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.co] Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above (Question 72, Article 5). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut inordinatio corrumpens principium vitæ corporalis causat corporalem mortem, ita etiam inordinatio corrumpens principium spiritualis vitæ, quod est finis ultimus, causat mortem spiritualem peccati mortalis, ut supra dictum est. Ordinare autem aliquid in finem non est sensualitatis, sed solum rationis. Inordinatio autem a fine non est nisi ejus cujus est ordinare in finem. Unde peccatum mortale non potest esse in sensualitate, sed solum in ratione.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.ad.1] The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actus posse fieri peccati venialis subjectum. Hoc negant Alvares, Medina, Sylvius, Contenson, Henno, Billuart propter rationem illam fundamentalem: peccatum etiam veniale in appetitu sensitivo esse non potest, nisi motum possit impedire voluntas; sic expresse S. Thomas cum ipsis adversariis; atqui voluntas interpretative influit et consentit, eo ipso quod potest impedire et non impedit; ergo. Habetur et in Glossa ord. Strabi, Rom., v. 14, col. 492, t. 2. Sic interpretare hunc articulum: peccatum mortale potest quidem esse in appetitu sensitivo; sed hoc ex ratione, non ex sensualitate habet. Motus sensualitatis sunt vel deliberati, vel primo primi. Ultimorum sæculorum hæretici motus omnes concupiscentiæ pravos, etiam primo primos, esse sensualitatis potest concurrere ad peccatum mortale; sed tamen actus peccati mortalis non habet quod sit peccatum mortale ex eo quod est sensualitatis, sed ex eo quod est rationis, cujus est ordinare in finem. Et ideo peccatum mortale non attribuitur sensualitati, sed rationi.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.ad.2] An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).
[I-II.q.74.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod actus virtutis non perficitur per id quod est sensualitatis tantum, sed magis per id quod est rationis et voluntatis, cujus est eligere; nam actus virtutis moralis non est sine electione; unde semper cum actu virtutis moralis, quæ perficit vim appetitivam, est etiam actus prudentiæ, quæ perficit vim rationalem; et idem est etiam de peccato mortali, sicut dictum est.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.ad.3] A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod dispositio tripliciter se habet ad id ad quod disponit: quando enim est idem et in eodem, sicut scientia inchoata dicitur esse dispositio ad scientiam perfectam; quando que autem est in eodem, sed non idem, sicut calor est dispositio ad formam ignis; quando vero nec idem, nec in eodem, sicuti in his quæ habent ordinem ad invicem, ut ex uno perveniatur in aliud; sicut bonitas imaginationis est dispositio ad scientiam, quæ est in intellectu. Et hoc modo veniale peccatum, quod est in sensualitate, potest esse dispositio ad peccatum mortale, quod est in ratione.
Article 6
[I-II.q.74.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (Question 31, Article 1). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not in the reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum morosæ delectationis non sit in ratione. Delectatio enim importat motum appetitivæ virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Sed vis appetitiva distinguitur a ratione, quæ est vis apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio morosa non est in ratione.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.arg.2] Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ex objectis cognosci potest ad quam potentiam actus pertineat, per quem potentia ordinatur ad objectum. Sed delectatio quando est morosa circa bona sensibilia, et non circa bona rationis. Ergo peccatum delectationis morosæ non est in ratione.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.arg.3] Further, a thing is said to be morose [From the Latin 'mora'--delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, morosum dicitur aliquid propter diuturnitatem temporis. Sed diuturnitas temporis non est ratio quod aliquis actus pertineat ad aliquam potentiam. Ergo delectatio morosa non pertinet ad rationem.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in XII De Trinit., cap. xii, col. 1007, t. 8, quod « consensus illecebræ si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est sic habendum existimo, velut cibum vetitum mulier sola comederit. » Per mulierem autem intelligitur ratio inferior, sicut ibidem ipse exponit. Ergo peccatum morosæ delectationis est in ratione.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.co] As stated (5), sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, peccatum contingit esse in ratione, quando quidem inquantum est directiva humanorum actuum. Manifestum est autem, quod ratio non solum est directiva exteriorum actuum, sed etiam interiorum passionum. Et ideo quando deficit ratio in directione interiorum passionum, dicitur esse peccatum in ratione, sicut etiam quando deficit in directione exteriorum actuum. Deficit autem in directione passionum interiorum dupliciter: uno modo, quando imperat illicitas passiones, sicut quando homo ex deliberatione provocat sibi motum iræ vel concupiscentiae; alio modo, quando non reprimit illicitum passionis motum; sicut cum aliquis, postquam deliberavit quod motus passionis insurgens est inordinatus, nihilominus circa ipsum immoratur, et ipsum non expellit. Et secundum hoc dicitur peccatum delectationis morosæ esse in ratione.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.ad.1] Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been stated above (Article 1), viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod delectatio quidem est in vi appetitiva sicut in proximo principio; sed in ratione est sicut in primo motivo, secundum hoc quod supra dictum est, quod actiones quæ non transunt in exteriorem materiam, sunt sicut in subjecto in suis principiis.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.ad.2] Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio actum proprium elicitum habet circa proprium objectum; sed directionem habet circa omnia objecta inferiorum virium, quæ per rationem dirigi possunt; et secundum hoc etiam delectatio circa sensibilia objecta pertinet ad rationem.
[I-II.q.74.a.6.ad.3] Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
[I-II.q.74.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod delectatio diitur morosa non ex mora temporis, sed ex eo quod ratio deliberans, circa eam immoratur: nec tamen eam repellit, « tenens et volens libenter, quæ statim ut attigerunt animum, respui debuerunt, » ut Augustinus dicit XII De Trinit., ubi supra, § 18.
Article 7
[I-II.q.74.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (Question 15, Article 1): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum consensus in actum non sit in ratione superiori. Consentire enim est actus appetitivæ virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Sed ratio est vis apprehensiva. Ergo prium ipsius actum, sed quando inquantum. » peccatum consensus in actum non est in ratione superiori.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.arg.2] Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7). ['Rationes aeternae,' cf. I, 15, A2,[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law, (cf. 8, Objection 1; 9)]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « ratio superior intendit rationibus æternis conspiciendis et consulendis, » ut Augustinus dicit, XII De Trin., cap. vii, col. 1005, t. 8. Sed quandoque consentitur in actum non consultis rationibus æternis; non enim semper homo cogitat de rebus divinis, quando consentit in aliquem actum. Ergo peccatum consensus in actum non semper est in ratione superiori.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.arg.3] Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut per rationes æternas potest homo regulare actus exteriores, ita etiam interiores delectationes, vel alias passiones. Sed consensus in delectationem absque hoc quod opere statuatur implendum, est rationis inferioris, ut dicit Augustinus, XII De Trin., cap. xii, col. 1007, t. 8. Ergo etiam consensus in actum peccati debet interdum attribui rationi inferiori.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.arg.4] Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut ratio superior excedit inferiorem, ita ratio excedit vim imaginativam. Sed quandoque procedit homo in actum per apprehensionem virtutis imaginativæ absque omni deliberatione rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex impræmeditato movet manum aut pedem. Ergo etiam quandoque potest ratio inferior consentire in actum peccati absque ratione superiori.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden fruit to her husband."
[I-II.q.74.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit XII De Trinit., cap. xii, § 17, col. 1008, t. 8: « Si in consensione male utendi rebus, quæ per sensum corporis sentiuntur, ita decernitur quodcumque peccatum, ut si potestas sit, etiam corpore compleatur, intelligenda est mulier cibum illicitum viro dedisse; » per quem superior ratio significatur. Ergo ad rationem superiorem pertinet consentire in actum peccati.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.co] Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (Question 19, Article 4). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod consensus importat judicium quoddam de eo in quod consentitur. Sicut enim ratio speculativa judicat et sententiat de rebus intelligibilibus, ita ratio practica judicat et sententiat de agendis. Est autem considerandum, quod in omni judicio ultima sententia pertinet ad supremum judicatorium: sicut videmus in speculativis, quod ultima sententia de aliqua propositione datur per resolutionem ad prima principia: quamdiu enim remanet aliquod principium altius, adhuc per ipsum potest examinari id de quo quæritur: unde adhuc est suspensum judicium, quasi non-dum data finali sententia. Manifestum est autem, quod actus humani regulari possunt ex regula rationis humanæ, quæ sumitur ex rebus creatis, quas naturaliter homo cognoscit; et ulterius ex regula legis divinæ, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum regula legis divinæ sit superior, consequens est ut ultima sententia, per quam judicium finaliter terminatur, pertineat ad rationem superiorem, quæ intendit rationibus æternis. Cum autem de pluribus occurrit judicandum, finale judicium est de eo quod ultimo occurrit. In actibus autem humanis ultimo occurrit ipse actus; præambulum autem est ipsa delectatio quæ inducit ad actum. Et ideo ad rationem superiorem propriet pertinet consensus in actum; ad rationem vero inferiorem, quia habet inferius judicium, pertinet judicium præambulum, quod est de delectatione; quamvis etiam et de delectatione superior ratio judicare possit; quia quidquid judicio subditur inferioris, subditur etiam judicio superioris, sed non convertitur.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.ad.1] Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above (Question 15, Article 3). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod consentire est actus appetitivæ virtutis non absolute, sed consequens ad actum rationis deliberantis et judicantis, ut supra dictum est. In hoc enim terminatur consensus, quia voluntas tendit in id quod est jam ratione judicatum. Unde consensus potest attribui et voluntati et rationi.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.ad.2] The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed."
[I-II.q.74.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod ratio superior non dirigit actus humanos secundum legem divinam, impediens actum peccati, dicitur ipsa consentire, sive cogitet de lege æterna, sive non. Cum enim cogitat de lege Dei, actu eam contemnit; cum vero non cogitat, eam negligit per modum omissionis cujusdam. Unde omnibus modis consensus in actum peccati procedit ex superiori ratione; quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII De Trin., cap. xii, § 17, col. 1008, t. 8, « non potest peccatum efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio, penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi, vel ab opere cohibendi, malæ actioni cedat, aut serviat. »
[I-II.q.74.a.7.ad.3] The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio superior per considerationem legis æternæ sicut potest dirigere vel cohibere actum exteriorem, ita etiam delectationem interiorem; sed tamen, antequam ad judicium superioris rationis deveniatur, statim ut sensualitas proponit delectationem, inferior ratio per rationes temporales deliberans quando hujusmodi delectationem acceptat; et tunc consensus in delectationem pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Si vero etiam consideratis rationibus aternis, homo in eodem consensu perseveret, jam talis consensus ad superiorem rationem pertinebit.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.ad.4] The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly by imputed to it.
[I-II.q.74.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod apprehensio virtutis imaginativæ est subita et sine deliberatione; et ideo potest aliquem actum causare, antequam superior vel inferior ratio etiam habeat tempus deliberandi. Sed judicium rationis inferioris est cum deliberatione, quæ indiget tempore, in quo etiam ratio superior deliberare potest; unde si non cohibeat ab actu peccati per suam deliberationem, merito illi imputatur.
Article 8
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (Question 71, Article 6). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consensus in delectationem non sit peccatum mortale. Consentire enim in delectationem pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, cujus non est intendere rationibus aternis, vel legi divinæ, et per consequens nec ab eis averti. Sed omne peccatum mortale est per aversionem a lege divina, ut patet per definitionem Augustini de peccato mortali datam, quæ supra posita est. Ergo consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.2] Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, consentire in aliquid non est malum, nisi quia illud est malum in quod consentitur. Sed « propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, » vel saltem non minus. Non ergo illud in quod consentitur potest esse minus malum quam consensus. Sed delectatio sine opere non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum. Ergo nec consensus in delectationem est peccatum mortale.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.3] Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, delectationes differunt in bonitate et malitia secundum differentiam operationum, ut dicit Philosophus in X Ethic., cap. iv et v. Sed alia operatio est interior cogitatio, et alia actus exterior, puta fornicationis. Ergo delectatio consequens actum interioris cogitationis, tantum differt a delectatione fornicationis in bonitate vel malitia, quantum differt cogitatio interior ab actu exteriori; et per consequens etiam eodem modo differt consentire in utrumque. Sed cogitatio interior non est peccatum mortale, nec etiam consensus in cogitationem. Ergo per consequens nec consensus in delectationem.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.4] Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.4] 4. Præterea, exterior actus fornicationis vel adulterii non est peccatum mortale ratione delectationis, quæ etiam invenitur in actu matrimoniali, sed ratione inordinationis ipsius actus. Sed ille qui consentit in delectationem, non propter hoc consentit in deordinationem actus. Ergo non videtur mortaliter peccare.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.5] Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of fornication.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.5] 5. Præterea, peccatum homicidii est gravius quam simplicis fornicationis. Sed consentire in delectationem quæ consequitur cogitationem de homicidio, non est peccatum mortale. Ergo multo minus consentire in delectationem quæ consequitur cogitationem de fornicatione, est peccatum mortale.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.6] Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.arg.6] 6. Præterea, oratio dominica quotidie dicitur pro remissione venialium, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchir., cap. lxxviii, col. 270, t. 6. Sed consensus in delectationem Augustinus docet esse abolendum per orationem dominicam; dicit enim in XII De Trinit., cap. xii, § 18, col. 1008, t. 8, quod « hoc est longe minus peccatum quam si opere statuatur implendum; et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda est, pectusque percutiendum, atque dicendum: Dimitte nobis debita nostra: » Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum veniale.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.sc] Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them." But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus post pauca subdit: « Totus homo damnabitur, nisi hæc quæ sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate animum talibus oblecandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata, per Mediatoris gratiam remittantur. » Sed nullus damnatur nisi pro peccatum mortali. Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum mortale.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.co] There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true.
But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc aliqui diversimode opinati sunt: quidam enim dixerunt quod consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum; alii vero dixerunt quod est peccatum mortale; et hæc opinio est communior et verisimilior. Est enim considerandum, quod cum omnis delectatio consequatur aliquam operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic., cap. iv, a med., et iterum cum omnis delectatio habet aliquod objectum, delectatio quælibet potest comparari ad duo, scilicet ad operationem quam consequitur, et ad objectum in quo quis delectatur. Contingit autem quod aliqua operatio sit objectum delectationis, sicut et aliqua alia res; quia ipsa operatio potest accipi ut bonum et finis, in quo quis delectatus requiescit. Et quandoque quidem ipsamet operatio quam consequitur delectatio, est objectum delectationis; in quantum scilicet vis appetitiva, cujus est delectari, reflectitur in ipsam operationem sicut in quoddam bonum: puta cum aliquis cogitat et delectatur de hoc ipso quod cogitat, inquantum sua cogitat ei placet; quandoque vero delectatio consequens unam operationem, puta cogitationem aliquam, habet pro objecto aliam operationem quasi rem cogitatam; et tunc talis delectatio procedit ex inclinatione appetitus, non quidem in cogitationem, sed in operationem cogitatam. Sic igitur aliquis de fornicatione cogitans, de duobus potest delectari: uno modo de ipsa cogitatione, alio modo de ipsa fornicatione cogitata. Delectatio autem de cogitatione ipsa sequitur inclinationem affectus in cogitationem ipsam; cogitatio autem ipsa secundum se non est peccatum mortale, imo quandoque est veniale tantum, puta cum aliquis inutiliter cogitat; quandoque autem sine peccato omnino, puta cum aliquis utiliter de ea cogitat, sicut cum vult de ea prædicare vel disputare; et ideo per consequens affectio et delectatio quæ sic est de cogitatione fornicationis, non est de genere peccati mortalis, sed quandoque est peccatum veniale, quandoque nullum; unde nec consensus in talem delectationem est peccatum mortale. Et secundum hoc prima opinio habet veritatem. Quod autem aliquis cogitans de fornicatione delectetur de ipso actu cogitato, hoc contingit ex hoc quod affectio ejus inclinata est in hunc actum. Unde quod aliquis consentiat in talem delectationem, hoc nihil aliud est quam quod ipse consentiat in hoc quod affectus suus sit inclinatus in fornicationem; nullus enim delectatur nisi in eo quod est conforme appetitui ejus. Quod autem aliquis ex deliberatione eligat quod affectus suus conformetur his quæ secundum se sunt peccata mortalia, est peccatum mortale. Unde talis consensus in delectationem peccati mortalis est peccatum mortale, ut secunda opinio ponit.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.1] Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above (Article 7). Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason fails in directing them according to the eternal types.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod consensus in delectationem potest esse non solum rationis inferioris sed etiam superioris, ut dictum est. Et tamen ipsa ratio inferior potest averti a rationibus æternis; quia etsi non intendit eis, ut secundum eas regulans, quod est proprium superioris, intendit tamen eis, ut secundum eas regulata; et hoc modo ab eis se avertens potest peccare mortaliter: nam et actus inferiorum virium et etiam exteriorum membrorum possunt esse peccata mortalia, secundum quod deficit ordinatio superioris rationis regulantis eos secundum rationes æternas.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.2] Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod consensus in peccatum, quod est veniale ex genere, est veniale peccatum: et secundum hoc potest concludi, quod consensus in delectationem quæ est de ipsa vana cogitatione fornicationis, est peccatum veniale. Sed delectatio quæ est in ipso actu fornicationis, de genere suo est peccatum mortale; sed quod ante consensus sit veniale peccatum tantum, hoc est per accidens, scilicet propter imperfectionem actus; quæ quidem imperfectio tollitur per consensus deliberatum supervenientem; unde ex hoc adducitur in suam naturam, ut sit peccatum mortale.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.3] This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de delectatione quæ habet cogitationem pro objecto.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.4] The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod delectatio quæ habet actum exteriorem pro objecto, non potest esse absque complacentia exterioris actus secundum se, etiamsi non statuatur implendum propter prohibitionem alicujus superioris; unde actus fit inordinatus, et per consequens delectatio erit inordinata.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.5] The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod etiam consensus in delectationem quæ procedit ex complacentia actus homicidii, est peccatum mortale; non autem consensus in delectationem quæ procedit ex complacentia cogitationis de homicidio.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.6] The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.
[I-II.q.74.a.8.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod oratio dominica non solum contra peccata venialia dicenda est, sed etiam contra mortalia.
Article 10
[I-II.q.74.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam, id est, secundum quod inspicit rationes æternas. Actus enim potentiæ non inventur esse deficiens, nisi per hoc quod inordinate se habet circa suum objectum. Sed objectum superioris rationis sunt æternæ rationes, a quibus deordinari non est sine peccato mortali. Ergo in superiori ratione non potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.arg.2] Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, cum ratio sit vis deliberativa, actus rationis semper est cum deliberatione. Sed omnis inordinatus motus in his quæ Dei sunt, si sit cum deliberatione, est peccatum mortale. Ergo in ratione superiori secundum seipsam nunquam est peccatum veniale.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.arg.3] Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, contingit quando quod peccatum ex subreptione est peccatum veniale; peccatum autem ex deliberatione est peccatum mortale per hoc quod ratio deliberans recurrit ad aliquod majus bonum, contra quod homo agens gravius peccat: sicut cum de actu delectabili inordinato ratio deliberat quod est contra legem Dei, gravius peccat consentiendo, quam si solum consideraret quod est contra virtutem moralem. Sed ratio superior non potest recurrere ad aliquod altius quam sit suum objectum. Ergo, si motus ex subreptione non sit peccatum mortale, neque etiam deliberatio superveniens faciet ipsum esse peccatum mortale; quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo in ratione superiori secundum seipsam potest esse peccatum veniale.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.sc] A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as such.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.sc] Sed contra, motus subreptitius infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. Sed pertinet ad superiorem rationem secundum seipsam. Ergo in ratione superiori potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.co] The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple "intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ratio superior aliter fertur in suum objectum, atque aliter in objecta inferiorum virium, quæ per ipsam diriguntur. In objecta enim inferiorum virium non fertur, nisi inquantum de eis consulit rationes æternas. Unde non fertur in ea nisi per modum deliberationis. Deliberatus autem consensus in his quæ ex genere suo sunt mortalia, est mortale peccatum. Et ideo ratio superior semper mortaliter peccat, si actus inferiorum virium in quos consentit, sint peccata mortalia. Sed circa proprium objectum habet duos actus, scilicet simplicem intuitum, et deliberationem, secundum quod etiam de proprio objecto consulit rationes æternas. Secundum autem simplicem intuitum, potest aliquem inordinatum motum habere circa divina, puta cum quis patitur subitum infidelitatis motum. Et quamvis infidelitas secundum suum genus sit peccatum mortale, tamen subitus motus infidelitatis est peccatum veniale; quia peccatum mortale non est nisi contra legem Dei. Potest autem aliquid horum quæ pertinent ad fidem subito rationi occurrere sub quadam alia ratione, antequam super hoc consulatur vel consulti possit ratio æterna, id est, lex Dei: puta cum quis resurrectionem mortuorum subito apprehendit ut impossibilem secundum naturam, et simul apprehendendo renititur, ante quam tempus habeat deliberandi, quod hoc est nobis traditum ut credendum secundum legem divinam. Si vero post hanc deliberationem motus infidelitatis maneat, est peccatum mortale. Et ideo circa pro- II. prium objectum, etsi sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest ratio superior peccare venialiter in subitis motibus, vel etiam mortaliter per deliberatum consensus: in his autem, quæ pertinent ad inferiores vires, semper peccat mortaliter in his quæ sunt peccata mortalia ex suo genere, non autem in his quæ secundum suum genus sunt venialia peccata.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.ad.1] A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod peccatum quod est contra rationes æternas, etsi sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest tamen esse peccatum veniale propter imperfectionem actus subiti, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.ad.2] In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in operativis, ad rationem, ad quam pertinet deliberatio, pertinet etiam simplex intuitus eorum ex quibus deliberatio procedit; sicut etiam in speculativis ad rationem pertinet et syllogizare, et propositiones formare; et ideo etiam ratio potest habere subitum motum.
[I-II.q.74.a.10.ad.3] One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.74.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod una et eadem res potest diversas considerationes habere, quarum una est altera altior; sicut Deum esse potest considerari, vel inquantum est cognoscibile ratione humana, vel inquantum traditur revelatione divina, quæ est consideratio altior. Et ideo quamvis objectum rationis superioris sit quiddam secundum naturam rei altissimum, tamen potest etiam reduci in quamdam altiorem considerationem: et hac ratione quod in motu subito non erat peccatum mortale, per deliberationem reducentem in altiorem considerationem fit peccatum mortale, sicut expositum est.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-secundae/q074.json