Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q82. Original sin, as to its essence
Source context
- Theme
- habitual disorder of the will transmitted through generation as the formal essence of original sin
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Augustinian theologyAugustine's account of concupiscence as a disordered appetite inherited from Adam provides the patristic foundation that Aquinas systematizes in Q82 as a habitual privation of original justice.
- Vedāntic anthropologyCross-tradition congruence exists between Aquinas's notion of a transmitted disorder in the will and the Vedāntic concept of inherited saṃskāra-tendencies obscuring the ātman, though the ontological frameworks differ substantially.
Q82. Original sin, as to its essence
Article 1
[I-II.q.82.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod originale peccatum non sit habitus. Originale enim peccatum est carentia originalis justitiae, ut Anselmus dicit in libro De conceptu virginali, cap. II, III, xxvi, col. 434, t. 1, et sic originale peccatum est quædam privatio. Sed privatio opponitur habitui. Ergo originale peccatum non est habitus.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.arg.2] Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit has the nature of a fault.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, actuale peccatum habet plus de ratione culpæ quam originale, inquantum habet plus de ratione voluntarii. Sed habitus actualis peccati non habet rationem culpæ; alioquin sequeretur quod homo dormiens culpabiliter peccaret. Ergo nullus habitus originalis habet rationem culpæ.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.arg.3] Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in malis actus semper præcedit habitum; nullus enim habitus malus est infusus, sed acquisitus. Sed originale peccatum non præcedit aliquis actus. Ergo originale peccatum non est habitus.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.sc] Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original sin is a habit.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De baptismo parv., seu De peccat. mer. et remis., lib. I, cap. xxxix, col. 150, t. 10, quod secundum peccatum originale parvuli Adamo non habuisset, nisi ipsi Deus damnationem et mortem remisisset; vel Deus aliam Adæ dedisset uxorem propter multiplicationem generis humani in paradiso; Eva autem ejecta fuisset. Sed quid si, Adamo non peccante, Caïn filius ejus peccasset? Filii Caïn originale peccatum contraxissent. (Scotus.) Non contraxissent, quia Caïn non fuit constitutus caput morale generis humani quoad transfusionem justitiae aut peccati: ita Medina, Bellarminus, Valentia, Becanus, Tannerus, Sylvius, Salmanticenses, Gonet, Serra, Thomistæ communiter, Henno, Scotista, et alii: opinionem D. Thomæ discutiemus in quæstione v De malo, art. 4, ad 8. sunt concupiscibiles, etsi non sint actu concupiscentes. Sed habilitas dicitur secundum aliquem habitum. Ergo peccatum originale est habitus.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.co] As stated above (49, 4; 50, 1), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the "languor of nature" [Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii].
[I-II.q.82.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est habitus: unus qui dem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum, sicut scientiæ et virtutes dicuntur habitus; et hoc modo peccatum originale non est habitus. Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicujus naturæ ex multis compositæ secundum quod bene se habet vel male ad aliquid; et praecipue cum talis dispositio fuerit quasi in naturam versa, ut patet de ægritudine et sanitate; et hoc modo peccatum originale est habitus. Est enim quædam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniæ in qua consistebat ratio originalis justitiæ; sicut etiam ægrituduo corporalis est quædam inordinata dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur æqualitas, in qua consistit ratio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale languor naturæ dicitur.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.ad.1] As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut ægrituduo corporalis habet aliquid de privatione inquantum tollitur æqualitas sanitatis, et aliquid habet positive, scilicet ipsos humores inordinate dispositos, ita etiam peccatum originale habet privationem originalis justitiæ, et cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animæ. Unde non est privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.ad.2] Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above (Question 81, Article 1). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod actuale Gregorius Ariminensis, Richardus, Henricus, Gabriel et Guillermus Parisiensis, quorum sententia inolevit, peccatum originale volunt esse animæ qualitatem morbidam ex morbida alia qualitate subjectata in carne derivatam. — Lutherani, Calvinistæ et alii volunt peccatum originale esse formaliter concupiscentiam habitualem: hæc positio est hæretica. — Mathias Illyricus, lutheranus, docet peccatum originale esse substantiam animæ rationalis ex peccato Adæ corruptam. Sic Manichæi peccatum esse quamdam substantiam somniabant. Sed Deus, creator animæ, tunc esset auctor peccati. — Pighius et Catharinus peccatum originale esse Adæ actuale peccatum finxerunt, et ex hoc asseruerunt unum numero peccatum originale esse in omnibus, non eis intrinsece inhærens, sed extrinsece tantum faciens eos peccatores. Sed concilium tridentinum peccatum originale definivit omnibus inesse, et unicuique proprium, sess. v, can. 3. — Roffensis, Altissiodorensis et Durandus peccatum originale in reatu pœnæ consistere voluerunt. Sed reatus pœnæ culpam supponit. Juxta Martinez, Nunno, Herrera et quosdam alios Thomistas, in habitu hominem inclinante tanquam in peccatum est inordinatio quædam actus; originale vero, cum sit peccatum naturæ, est quædam inordinata dispositio ipsius naturæ, quæ habet rationem culpæ, inquantum derivatur ex primo parente, ut dictum est. Hujusmodi autem dispositio naturæ inordinata habet rationem habitus; sed inordinata dispositio actus non habet rationem habitus; et propter hoc peccatum originale potest esse habitus, non autem peccatum actuale.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.ad.3] This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
[I-II.q.82.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de habitu quo potentia inclinatur in actum. Talis autem habitus non est peccatum originale; quamvis etiam ex peccato originali sequatur aliqua inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, id est, originalis justitiæ, quæ prohibebat inordinatos motus: sicut etiam ex ægritudine corporali indirecte sequitur inclinatio ad motus corporales inordinatos. Nec debet dici quod peccatum originale sit habitus infusus aut acquisitus per actum, nisi primi parentis non autem hujus personæ, sed per vitiatam originem innatus.
Article 2
[I-II.q.82.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written (Psalm 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in uno homine sint multa originalia peccata. Dicitur enim in psal. L, 7: Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in peccatis concepit me mater mea. Sed peccatum in quo homo concipitur est originale. Ergo plura peccata originalia sunt in uno homine.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.arg.2] Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one habit; but several.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unus et idem habitus non inclinat ad contraria; habitus enim inclinat per modum naturæ, quæ tendit in unum. Sed peccatum originale etiam in uno homine inclinat ad diversa peccata etiam contraria. Ergo peccatum originale non est unus habitus, sed plures.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.arg.3] Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown above (Article 74). Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum originale inficit omnes animæ partes. Sed diversæ partes animæ sunt diversa subjecta peccati, ut ex præmissis patet. Cum igitur unum peccatum non possit esse in diversis subjectis, videtur quod peccatum originale non sit unum, sed multa.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.sc] It is written (John 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., I, 29: Ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi: quod singulariter dicitur, quia peccatum mundi, quod est peccatum originale est unum, ut Glossa ordin., ibid., exponit, col. 360, t. 2.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.co] In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original sin. For it has been stated (81, 2), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in uno homine est unum peccatum originale. Cujus ratio dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo ex parte causæ peccati originalis. Dictum est enim supra, quod solum primum peccatum primi parentis in posteros traducitur. Unde peccatum originale in uno homine est unum numero, et in omnibus hominibus est unum proportione, in respectu scilicet ad primum principium. Alio modo potest accipi ratio ejus ex ipsa essentia originalis peccati: in omni enim inordinata dispositione unitas speciei consideratur ex parte causæ; unitas autem secundum numerum ex parte subjecti, sicut patet in ægritudine corporali; sunt enim diversæ ægritudines specie, quæ ex diversis causis procedunt, puta ex superabundantia calidi vel frigidi, vel ex laesione pulmonis vel hepatis; una autem ægrituduo secundum speciem in uno homine non est nisi una numero. Causa autem hujus corruptæ dispositionis, quæ dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio originalis justitiæ, per quam sublata est subjectio humanæ mentis ad Deum. Et ideo peccatum originale est unum specie, et in uno homine non potest esse nisi unum numero. In diversis autem hominibus est unum specie et proportione, diversum autem numero.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.ad.1] The employment of the plural--"in sins"--may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod pluraliter dicitur in peccatis, secundum illum morem divinæ Scripturæ, quo frequenter ponitur pluralis numerus pro singulari, sicut Matth., II, 20: Defuncti sunt qui quæ-rebant animam pueri; vel quia in peccato originali virtualiter præexistunt omnia peccata actualia sicut in quodam principio, unde est multiplex virtute; vel quia in peccato primi parentis, quod per originem traducitur, fuerunt plures deformitates, scilicet superbiæ, inobedientiæ, gulæ, et alia hujusmodi; vel quia multæ partes animæ inficiuntur per peccatum originale.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.ad.2] Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod unus habitus non potest inclinare per se et directe, id est, per propriam formam, ad contraria; sed indirecte et per accidens, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, nihil prohibet: sicut soluta harmonia corporis mixti, elementa tendunt in loca contraria; et similiter, soluta harmonia originalis justitiæ, diversæ animæ potentiæ in diversa feruntur.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.ad.3] Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man, although the various parts of the body are affected.
[I-II.q.82.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum originale inficit diversas partes animæ, secundum quod sunt partes unius totius; sicut et justitia originalis continebat omnes animæ partes in unum; et ideo est unum tantum peccatum originale, sicut etiam est una febris in uno homine, quamvis diversæ partes corporis graventur.
Article 3
[I-II.q.82.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit concupis-tia. Omne enim peccatum est contra natu-ram, ut dicit Damascenus in II lib. Orthod. fid., cap. iv, col. 875, et cap. xxx, col. 975, t. 1. Sed concupiscentia est secundum naturam; est enim proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis, quæ est potentia naturalis. Ergo concupiscentia non est peccatum origi-nale.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.arg.2] Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us, according to the Apostle (Romans 7:5). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above (Question 23, Article 4). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per peccatum originale sunt in nobis passiones peccatorum, ut patet per Apostolum, Rom., vii, 5. Sed multæ aliæ sunt passiones prætter concupiscentiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccatum originale non magis est concupiscentia quam aliqua alia passio.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.arg.3] Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (2, Objection 3). But the intellect is the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per peccatum originale deordinantur omnes animæ partes, ut dictum est. Sed intellectus est suprema inter animæ partes, ut patet per Philosophum, in X Ethic., cap. vii. Ergo peccatum originale magis est ignorantia quam concupiscentia.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.sc] Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin."
[I-II.q.82.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I Retract., cap. xv, col. 608, t. 1: Concupiscentia est reatus originalis peccati.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.co] Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated (2) that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1), so that the will being turned away from God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod unumquodque habet speciem a sua forma. Dictum est autem supra, quod species peccati originalis sumitur ex sua causa. Unde oportet quod id quod est formale in originali peccato, accipiatur ex parte causæ peccati originalis. Oppositorum autem oppositæ sunt causæ. Est igitur attendenda causa originalis peccati ex causa originalis justitiæ, quæ ei opponi-tur. Tota autem ordinatio originalis justitiæ ex hoc est quod voluntas hominis erat Deo subjecta. Quæ quidem subjectio primo et principaliter erat per voluntatem, cujus est movere omnes alias partes in finem, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex aversione voluntatis a Deo consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animæ viribus. Sic ergo privatio originalis justitiæ, per quam voluntas subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali; omnis autem alia inordinatio virium animæ se habet in peccato originali sicut quiddam materiale. Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animæ præcipue in hoc attenditur quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commuta-bile; quæ quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici « concupiscentia. » Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus originalis justitiæ.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.ad.1] Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia in homine concupiscentilis naturaliter regitur ratione, intantum concupiscere est homini naturale, inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem. Concupiscentia autem quæ transcendit limites rationis, inest homini contra naturam, et talis est concupiscentia originalis peccati.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.ad.2] As stated above (Question 25, Article 1), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above (25, 2, ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscentilis reducuntur sicut ad principaliores; inter quas concupiscentia vehementius movet, et magis sentitur, ut supra habitum est; et ideo concupiscentia attribuitur tanquam principaliori, et in qua quodammodo omnes aliæ passiones includuntur.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.ad.3] As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above (77, A1,2; 80, 2). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects of original sin.
[I-II.q.82.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut in bonis intellectus et ratio principalitatem habent, ita e converso in malis inferior pars animæ principalior inventur, quæ obnubilat et trahit rationem, ut supra dictum est. Et propter hoc peccatum originale magis dictur esse concupiscentia quam ignorantia; licet etiam ignorantia inter defectus materiales peccati originalis contineatur.
Article 4
[I-II.q.82.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above (Article 3). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit aqualiter in omnibus. Est enim peccatum originale concupiscentia inordinata, ut dictum est. Sed non omnes aqualiter sunt proni ad concupiscendum. Ergo peccatum originale non est aqualiter in omnibus.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.arg.2] Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum originale est quædam inordinata dispositio animæ, sicut agritudo est quædam inordinata dispositio corporis. Sed agritudo recipit magis et minus. Ergo peccatum originale recipit magis et minus.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in I De nupt. et concupiscent., cap. xxii et xxiv, col. 428, t. 10, quod libido transmittit originale peccatum in prolem. Sed contingit esse majorem libidinem unius in actu generationis, quam alterius. Ergo peccatum originale potest esse majus in uno quam in alio.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.sc] Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above (Question 81, Article 1). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quia peccatum originale est peccatum naturæ, ut dictum est. Sed natura aqualiter est in omnibus. Ergo et peccatum originale.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.co] There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (Question 73, Article 2). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in originali peccato sunt duo: quorum unum est defectus originalis justitiæ; aliud autem est relatio hujus defectus ad peccatum primi parentis, a quo per vitiatam originem deducitur. Quantum autem ad primum, peccatum originale non recipit magis et minus, quia totum donum originalis justitiæ est sublatum: privationes autem totaliter aliquid privantes, ut mors et tenebræ, non recipiunt magis et minus, sicut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam nec quantum ad secundum; aqualiter enim omnes relationem habent ad primum principium vitiatæ originis, ex quo peccatum originale recipit rationem culpæ; relationes enim non recipiunt magis et minus. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum originale non potest esse magis in uno quam in alio.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.ad.1] Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, soluto vinculo originalis justitiæ, sub quo quodam ordine omnes vires animæ continebantur, unaquæque vis animæ tendit in suum proprium motum, et tanto vehementius, quanto fuerit fortior. Contingit autem vires aliquas animæ esse fortiores in uno quam in alio, propter diversas corporis complexiones. Quod ergo unus homo sit pronior ad concupiscendum quam alter, non est ex ratione peccati originalis, cum in omnibus aqualiter solvatur vinculum originalis justitiæ, et aqualiter in omnibus partes inferiores animæ sibi relinquantur; sed accidit hoc ex diversa dispositione potentiarum, sicut dictum est.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.ad.2] Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod agritudo corporalis non habet in omnibus aqualem causam, etiamsi sit ejusdem speciei; puta si sit febris ex cholera putrefacta, potest esse major vel minor putrefactio, et propinquior vel remotior a principio vitæ. Sed causa originalis peccati in omnibus est aqualis. Unde non est simile.
[I-II.q.82.a.4.ad.3] It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.82.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod libido quæ transmittit peccatum originale in prolem, non est libido actualis; quia dato quod virtute divina concederetur alicui quod nullam inordinatam libidinem in actu generationis sentiret, adhuc transmitteret in prolem originale peccatum. Sed libido illa est intelli-genda habitualiter, secundum quod appetitus sensitivus non continetur sub ratione, soluto vinculo originalis justitiæ; et talis libido in omnibus est aqualis.
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