Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q83. The subject of original sin
Source context
- Theme
- the human will as the seat and subject of inherited original sin
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 325, 1921-05-15Steiner describes how pre-modern thought grasped original sin as an objective condition pervading human nature rather than a merely subjective moral failing, a grasp that modern intellectual culture has largely lost.
- GA 343, 1921-10-05Steiner identifies original sin as a condition of human subjectivity from which redemption requires a living relationship with the Christ who passed through the Mystery of Golgotha, not an effort arising from within the individual alone.
- GA 175, 1917-04-12Steiner notes that even human thinking is subject to original sin and requires the impulse of the Mystery of Golgotha to be spiritually regenerated.
- GA 69c, 1911-10-04Steiner paraphrases the traditional view that being subject to original sin meant the human being had departed from the divine sphere and stood in need of redemption from outside his own nature.
- GA 114, 1909-09-21Steiner locates the origin of the Fall in events during the Lemurian epoch when certain beings influenced humanity, introducing the condition that theological tradition names original sin.
- GA 90a, 1904-11-14Steiner equates the karma arising from the shock of descending into deteriorated physical nature with what Christianity calls original sin.
Cross-tradition
- Augustinian theologyAugustine, whom Steiner discusses in GA 74 as the architect of Western original-sin doctrine, located the subject of sin in the disordered will (voluntas), establishing a structural precedent for Aquinas's treatment of the will as the formal subject of original sin.
- Vedantic karma doctrineVedantic and Theosophical karma doctrine presents a cross-tradition congruence with inherited original sin insofar as both describe a universal condition of bondage transmitted through embodied existence, though karma is individuated whereas original sin in Aquinas is a single nature shared by all of Adam's descendants.
Q83. The subject of original sin
Article 1
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Romans 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum originale magis sit in carne quam in anima. Repugnantia enim carnis ad mentem ex corruptione originalis peccati procedit. Sed radix hujus repugnantiæ in carne consistit; dicit enim Apostolus ad Rom., vii, 23: Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meæ. Ergo originale peccatum in carne principa-liter consistit.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.2] Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unumquodque potius est in causa quam in effectu, sicut calor magis est in igne calefaciente quam in aqua calefacta. Sed anima inficitur infectione originalis peccati per semen carnale. Ergo peccatum originale magis est in carne quam in anima.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.3] Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum originale ex primo parente contrahimus, prout in eo fuimus secundum « rationem seminalem. » Sic autem non fuit ibi anima, sed sola caro. Ergo originale peccatum non est in carne.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.4] Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's creation and fusion.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, anima rationalis creata a Deo corpori infunditur. Si igitur anima per peccatum originale inficeretur, consequens esset quod ex sua creatione vel infusione inquinaretur; et sic Deus esset causa peccati, qui est auctor creationis et infusionis.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.5] Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, nullus sapiens liquorem pretiosum vasi infunderet, ex quo sciret ipsum liquorem infici. Sed anima rationalis est pretiosior omni liquore. Si ergo anima ex corporis unione infici posset infectione originalis culpæ, Deus, qui ipsa sapientia est, nunquam animam tali corpori infunderet. Infundit autem. Non ergo inquinatur ex carne. Sic igitur peccatum originale non est in anima, sed in carne.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.sc] The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Romans 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.sc] Sed contra est, quod idem est subjectum virtutis et vitii, sive peccati, quod contraria-tur virtuti. Sed caro non potest esse subjectum virtutis. Dicit enim Apostolus ad Rom., vii, 18: Scio quod non habitat in me, hoc est, in carne mea, bonum. Ergo caro non potest esse subjectum originalis peccati, sed solum anima. 1 Edit.: «vasi infecto.» — in edit. deest. Magister et sui sequaces dicunt quod est in carne quædam qualitas morbida, vel infectio in ea causata quæ animam inficit, dum sibi infunditur, Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquid potest esse in aliquo dupliciter: uno modo sicut in causa vel principali vel instrumentali; alio modo sicut in subjecto. Peccatum ergo originale omnium hominum fuit quidem in ipso Adam sicut in prima causa principali, secundum illud Apostoli Rom., v, 12: In quo omnes peccaverunt. In semine autem corporali est peccatum originale sicut in causa instrumentali, eo quod per virtutem activam seminis traducitur peccatum originale in prolem simul cum natura humana. Sed sicut in subjecto peccatum originale nullo modo potest esse in carne, sed solum in anima. Cujus ratio est, quia, sicut supra dictum est, hoc modo ex voluntate primi parentis peccatum originale traducitur in posteros per quamdam generativam motionem, sicut a voluntate alicujus hominis derivatur peccatum actuale ad alias partes ejus. In qua qui-dem derivatione hoc potest attendi, quod quidquid provenit ex motione voluntatis peccati ad quamcumque partem hominis quæ quocumque modo potest esse particeps peccati vel per modum subjecti, vel per modum instrumenti, habet rationem culpæ; sicut ex voluntate gulæ provenit concupis-centia cibi ad concupiscibilem, et sumptio cibi ad manus et os, quæ inquantum moventur a voluntate ad peccandum, sunt instrumenta peccati. Quod vero ulterius derivatur ad vim nutritivam, et ad interiora membra, quæ non sunt nata moveri a voluntate, non habet rationem culpæ. Sic igitur cum anima possit esse subjectum culpæ, caro autem de se non habeat quod sit subjectum culpæ, quidquid pervenit de corruptione primi peccati ad animam, habet rationem culpæ; quod autem pervenit ad carnem, non habet rationem culpæ, sed pœnæ. Sic igitur anima est subjectum peccati originalis, non autem caro.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.co] One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Romans 5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul.
The reason for this is that, as stated above (Question 81, Article 1), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt.
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the flesh.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.1] As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66, the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. I Retract., c. xxvi, col. 627, t. 1, Apostolus loquitur ibi de homine jam redempto, qui liberatus est a culpa, sed subjacet pœnæ, ratione cujus peccatum dicitur habitare in carne. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod caro sit subjectum culpæ, sed solum pœnæ.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.2] Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had the nature of actual sin.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum et sic in anima culpam originalem causat. Sed in hoc, dicit unus e Scotistarum schola, Magister non tenetur a nostris doctoribus. Quidam Scotistæ ta-men Magistrum interpretur. originale causatur ex semine sicut ex causa instrumentali; non autem oportet quod aliquid sit principalius in causa instrumentali quam in effectu, sed solum in causa principali. Et hoc modo peccatum originale potiori modo fuit in Adam, in quo fuit secundum rationem actualis peccati.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.3] The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima hujus hominis non fuit secundum « seminalem rationem » in Adam peccante sicut in principio effectivo, sed sicut in principio dispositivo; eo quod semen corporale, quod ex Adam traducitur, sua virtute non efficit animam rationalem, sed ad eam disponit.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.4] The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationem. Et ideo cum creatio importet respectum animæ ad solum Deum, non potest dici quod anima ex sua creatione inquinetur. Sed infusio importat respectum et ad Deum infundentem, et ad carnem, cui infunditur anima. Et ideo, habito respectu ad Deum infundentem, non potest dici quod anima per infusionem maculetur, sed solum habito respectu ad corpus, cui infunditur.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.5] The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the I, 90, 4; I, 118, 3. And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace.
[I-II.q.83.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod bonum commune præfertur bono singulari; unde Deus secundum suam sapientiam non prætermittit universalem ordinem rerum, qui est ut tali corpori talis anima infundatur, ut vitetur singularis infectio hujus animæ; præsertim cum natura animæ hoc habeat ut esse non incipiat nisi in corpore, ut in I habitum est. Melius est autem ei sic esse secundum naturam, quam nullo modo esse, præsertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere.
Article 2
[I-II.q.83.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only according to the powers.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit per prius in essentia animæ quam in potentiis. Anima enim nata est esse subjectum peccati quantum ad id quod potest a voluntate moveri. Sed anima non movetur a voluntate secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias. Ergo peccatum originale non est in anima secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.arg.2] Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum originale opponitur originali justitiae. Sed originalis justitia erat in aliqua potentia animæ, quæ est subjectum virtutis. Ergo et peccatum originale est magis in potentia animæ quam in ejus essentia.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.arg.3] Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut a carne peccatum originale derivatur ad animam, ita ab essentia animæ derivatur ad potentias. Sed peccatum originale magis est in anima quam in carne. Ergo etiam magis est in potentiis animæ quam in essentia.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.arg.4] Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated (82, 3). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, peccatum originale dicitur esse concupiscentia, ut dictum est. Sed concupiscentia est in potentiis animæ. Ergo et peccatum originale.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.sc] Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Question 81, Article 1). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the I, 76, 6. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod peccatum originale dicitur esse peccatum naturale, ut supra dictum est. Anima autem est forma et natura corporis secundum essentiam suam, et non secundum potentias, ut in I habitum est. Ergo anima est subjectum originalis peccati principaliter secundum suam essentiam.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.co] The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the I, 76, 6. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illud animæ est principaliter subjectum alicujus peccati, ad quod primo pertinet causa motiva illius peccati; sicut si causa motiva ad peccandum sit delectatio sensus, quæ pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem sicut objectum proprium ejus, sequitur quod vis concupiscibilis sit proprium subjectum illius peccati. Manifestum est autem, quod peccatum originale causatur per originem. Unde illud animæ quod primo attingitur ab origine hominis, est primum subjectum originalis peccati. Attingit autem origo animam ut terminum generationis, secundum quod est forma corporis; quod quidem convenit ei secundum essentiam propriam, ut in I habitum est. Unde anima secundum essentiam est primum subjectum originalis peccati.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.ad.1] As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut motio voluntatis alicujus proprie pervenit ad Hæc opinio D. Thomæ est falsa et falsum asserit, secundum Guillermum: quia essentia animæ potentias animæ, non autem ad animæ essentiam; ita motio voluntatis primi generantis per viam generationis pervenit primo ad animæ essentiam, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.ad.2] Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam originalis justitia pertinebat primordialiter ad essentiam animæ; erat enim donum divinitus datum humanæ naturæ, quam per prius respicit essentia animæ quam potentiæ. Potentiæ enim magis videntur pertinere ad personam, inquantum sunt principia personalium actuum. Unde sunt propria subjecta peccatorum actualium, quæ sunt peccata personalia.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.ad.3] The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod corpus comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam; quæ, etsi sit posterior in ordine generationis, est tamen prior ordine perfectionis et naturæ. Essentia autem animæ comparatur ad potentias, sicut subjectum ad accidentia propria, quæ sunt posteriora subjecto et ordine generationis, et etiam perfectionis. Unde non est similis ratio.
[I-II.q.83.a.2.ad.4] Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above (Question 82, Article 3).
[I-II.q.83.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod concupiscentia se habet materialiter et ex consequenti in peccato originali, ut supra dictum est.
Article 3
[I-II.q.83.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power more than to the others.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum originale non per prius inficiat voluntatem quam alias potentias. Omne enim peccatum principaliter pertinet ad potentiam per cujus actum causatur. Sed peccatum originale causatur per actum generativæ potentiae. Ergo inter cæteras potentias animæ videtur magis pertinere ad generativam potentiam.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.arg.2] Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than in the will.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum originale per semen carnale traducitur. Sed aliæ vires animæ propinquiores sunt carni quam voluntas, sicut patet de omnibus sensitivis, quæ utuntur organo corporali. Ergo magis in eis est peccatum originale quam in voluntate.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.arg.3] Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, intellectus est prior voluntate; non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto. Si ergo peccatum originale inficit omnes potentias animæ, videtur quod per prius inficiat intellectum, tanquam priorem.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.sc] Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.sc] Sed contra est, quod justitia originalis per prius respicit voluntatem; est enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut Anselmus dicit in lib. De conceptu virginali, cap. III, col. 436, t. 1. Ergo peccatum originale, quod ei opponitur, per prius respicit voluntatem.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.co] Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above (Article 2). In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (74, A1,2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in infectione peccati originalis duo est considerare: primo quidem inhærentiam ejus ad subjectum, et secundum hoc primo respicit essentiam animæ, ut dictum est. Deinde oportet considerare inclinationem ejus ad actum, et hoc modo respicit potentias animæ. Oportet ergo quod illam per prius respiciat, quæ primam inclinationem habet ad peccandnm. Hæc autem est voluntas, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde peccatum originale per prius respicit voluntatem.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.ad.1] Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod peccatum originale non causatur in homine per potentiam generativam prolis, sed per actum potentiae generativæ parentis. Unde oportet quod sua potentia generativa sit primum subjectum originalis peccati.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.ad.2] Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of original sin reaches it first.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum originale habet duplicem processum: unum quidem a carne ad animam; alium vero ab essentia animæ ad potentias. Primus quidem processus est secundum ordinem generationis; secundus autem secundum ordinem perfectionis. Et ideo, quamvis aliæ potentiae, scilicet sensitivæ, propinquiores sint carni; quia tamen voluntas est propinquior essentia animæ, tanquam superior potentia, primo pervenit ad ipsam infectio originalis peccati.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.ad.3] The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
[I-II.q.83.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus quodammodo pracedit voluntatem, inquantum proponit ei suum objectum; alio vero modo voluntas pracedit intellectum secundum ordinem motionis ad actum: quæ quidem motio pertinet ad peccatum.
Article 4
[I-II.q.83.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prædictæ potentiæ non sint magis infectæ quam aliæ. Infectio enim originalis peccati magis videtur pertinere ad illam animæ partem, quæ prius potest esse subjectum peccati. Hæc autem est rationalis pars, et præcipue voluntas. Ergo ipsa est magis infecta per peccatum originale.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.arg.2] Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nulla vis animæ inficitur per culpam, nisi inquantum potest obedire rationi. Generativa autem non potest obedire, ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. ult., sub fin. Ergo generativa non est maxime infecta per originale peccatum.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.arg.3] Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, visus inter alios sensus est spiritualior et propinquior rationi, inquantum plures differentias rerum ostendit, ut dicitur in I Metaph., circa princ. lib. Sed infectio culpæ primo est in ratione. Ergo visus magis est infectus quam tactus.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in XIV De civitate Dei, cap. xvi, xvii, xix, col. 424, t. 7, quod « infectio originalis culpæ maxime apparet in motu genitalium membrorum, qui rationi non subditur. » Sed illa membra deserviunt generativæ virtuti in connexione sexuum, in qua est delectatio secundum tactum, quæ maxime concupiscentiam movet. Ergo infectio originalis peccati maxima pertinet ad ista tria, scilicet potentiam generativam, vim concupiscibilem et sensum tactus.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.co] Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above (Question 81, Article 1). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illa corruptio præcipue infectio nominari solet, quæ nata est in aliud transferri; unde et morbi contagiosi, sicut lepra, scabies, et hujusmodi, infectiones dicuntur. Corruptio autem originalis peccati traducitur per actum generationnis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde potentiae quæ ad hujusmodi actum concurrunt, maxime dicuntur esse infectæ. Hujusmodi autem actus deservit generativæ, inquantum ad generationem ordinatur; habet autem in se delectationem tactus, quæ est maximum objectum concupiscibilis. Et ideo cum omnes partes animæ dicantur esse corruptæ per peccatum originale, specialiter tres prædictæ dicuntur esse corruptæ et infectæ.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.ad.1] Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above (Article 3). But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod peccatum originale ex ea parte qua inclinat in peccata actualia, præcipue pertinet ad voluntatem, ut dictum est. Sed ex ea parte qua traducitur in prolem, pertinet propinque ad potentias prædictas, ad voluntatem autem remote.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.ad.2] The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod infectio actualis culpæ non pertinet nisi ad potentias quæ moventur a voluntate peccantis. Sed infectio originalis culpæ non derivatur a voluntate ejus qui ipsam contrahit, sed per originem naturæ, cui deservit potentia generativa. Et ideo in ea est infectio originalis peccati.
[I-II.q.83.a.4.ad.3] Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than to the sight.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.83.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod visus non pertinet ad actum generationis nisi secundum dispositionem remotam, prout scilicet per visum apparet species concupiscibilis; sed delectatio perficitur in tactu; et ideo talis infectio magis attribuitur tactui quam visui.
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