Q109. The necessity of grace

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Source context

Theme: the necessity of divine grace for human acts ordered toward supernatural ends
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

GA 210, 1922-01-19Steiner notes the existence, in Eastern philosophical-theological writing, of treatises specifically on freedom, necessity, grace, and sin as a cluster of problems — a thematic grouping that corresponds structurally to Aquinas's Q109 — and contrasts this with the absence of such categories in Western empirical philosophy.
GA 175, 1917-04-24Steiner identifies Origen's acceptance of the necessity of grace alongside pre-existence and free will as a formative nexus in early Christian theology, later condemned, whose suppression shaped the trajectory of Western doctrinal development.
GA 202, 1920-11-28Steiner describes a condition in which a human being, surrounded by an Ahrimanized world, could receive spiritual substance only through grace — indicating that for anthroposophy, grace functions as a real ontological mediation, not merely a juridical or moral category.

Cross-tradition

Vedanta (bhakti stream)The Vaishnava distinction between self-effort and divine grace (vyāpāra of the Lord as prerequisite for liberation) presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's argument that the natural will cannot order itself to the beatific vision without an infused supernatural principle.
Augustinian theologyAugustine's doctrine that fallen human nature requires gratia gratum faciens for every salutary act is the direct patristic source Aquinas systematizes in Q109, and the two positions differ structurally in how much residual capacity the will retains without grace.

Article 1

[I-II.q.109.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For, on 1 Corinthians 12:3: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost," a gloss says: "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know truth without grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo sine gratia nullum verum cognoscere possit. Quia super illud I Cor., xii, 3: Nemo potest dicere: Dominus Jesus, nisi in Spiritu sancto, dicit Glossa Ambrosii: « Omne verum a quocumque dicatur, a Spiritu sancto est. » Sed Spiritus sanctus habitat in nobis per gratiam. Ergo veritatem cognoscere non possumus sine gratia.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that "the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now God Himself is He Whom sheds the light. And reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul." Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible object, without the sun's light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: and this pertains to the aid of grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in I Soliloq., cap. vi, col. 875, t. 4, quod « disciplinarum certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quæ sole illustrantur, ut videri possint; Deus autem est ipse qui illustrat; ratio autem ita est in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus; mentis autem oculi sunt sensus animæ. » Sed sensus corporis, quantumcumque sit purus, non potest aliquod visibile videre sine solis illustratione. Ergo humana mens, quantumcumque sit perfecta, non potest ratio-cinando veritatem cognoscere absque illustratione divina, quæ ad auxilium gratia pertinet.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.arg.3] Further, the human mind can only understand truth by thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, humana mens non potest veritatem intelligere nisi cogitando, ut patet Simon Magus, Valentinus, Marcio, Origenes, Didymus, Evagrius, Ponticus, Jovinianus, Theodorus Mopsuestenus, Rufinus sacerdos aquileiensis, ut probabilius, vel syrus aut palestinus, Pelagiani, Semi pelagiani; post D. Thomæ tempora: Lutherus, Calvinus, Michael Baïus, Jansenius, Quesnelius, et alii nihil, vel minus, vel nimis gratiae tribuentes. Defensores præcipuos ante D. Thomam vera doctrina gratiae S. Augustinum, S. Hieronymus, S. Prosperum, S. Fulgentium et S. Hilarium habuit. per Augustinum, in XIV De Trin., cap. VII, col. 1042, t. 8. Sed Apostolus dicit, II ad Cor., III, 5. Non quod sufficientes simus aliquid cogitare a nobis quasi ex nobis. Ergo homo non potest cognoscere veritatem per seipsum sine auxilio gratiae.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.sc] Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): "I do not approve having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to know the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many truths." Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Psalm 50:12: "Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels." Therefore without grace man of himself can know truth.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in I Retract., cap. IV, col. 589, t. 1: « Non approbo quod in oratione dixi: Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti; responderi enim potest, multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera. » Sed per gratiam homo mundus efficitur, secundum illud psalm. L, 12: Cor mundum crea in me, Deus, et spiritum rectum innova in visceribus meis. Ergo sine gratia potest homo per seipsum veritatem cognoscere.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.co] To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light, since, according to the Apostle (Ephesians 5:13): "All that is made manifest is light." Now every use implies movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see that for movement there is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or action, but there is also required the motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the heavenly body. Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by the motion of the heavenly body. But it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act.

Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz. those we can come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things of the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz. the light of faith or prophecy which is called the "light of grace," inasmuch as it is added to nature.

Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cognoscere veritatem est usus quidam vel actus intellectualis luminis; quia secundum Apostolum, ad Ephes., v, 13: Omne quod manifestatur, lumen est. Usus autem quilibet quemdam motum importat, large accipiendo motum, secundum quod intelligere et velle motus quidam esse dicuntur, ut patet per Philosophum in III De anima, text. 28. Videmus autem in corporalibus quod ad motum non solum requiritur ipsa forma, quae est principium motus vel actionis, sed etiam requiritur motio primi moventis. Primum autem movens in ordine corporalium est corpus cæleste. Unde quantumcumque ignis habeat calorem perfectum, non alteraret nisi per motionem corporis cælestis. Manifestum est autem, quod sicut motus omnes corporales reducuntur in motum cælestis corporis sicut in primum movens corporale, ita omnes motus tam corporales quam spirituales reducuntur in primum movens simpliciter, quod est Deus.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.ad.1] Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak the truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes place with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the Apostle speaks.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, est a Spiritu sancto, sicut ab infundente naturale lumen, et movente ad intelligendum et loquendum veritatem, non autem sicut ab inhabitante per gratiam gratum facientem, vel sicut largiente aliquod habituale donum naturæ superadditum. Sed hoc solum est in quibusdam veris cognoscendis et loquendis, et maxime in illis quæ pertinent ad fidem, de quibus Apostolus loquebatur.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.ad.2] The material sun sheds its light outside us; but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sol corporalis illustrat exterius; sed sol intelligibilis, qui est Deus, illustrat interius; unde ipsum lumen naturale animæ inditum est illustratio Dei, qua illustramur ab ipso ad cognoscendum ea quæ pertinent ad naturalem cognitionem; et ad hoc non requiritur alia illustratio, sed solum ad illa quæ naturalem cognitionem exceedunt.

[I-II.q.109.a.1.ad.3] We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand anything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7).

[I-II.q.109.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod semper indigemus divino auxilio ad cogitandum quodcumque, inquantum ipsum movet intellectum ad agendum; actu enim intelligere aliquid, est cogitare, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV De Trin., loc. cit. in arg.

Article 2

[I-II.q.109.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that man can wish and do good without grace. For that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is master of his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above (1, 1; 13, 6). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the help of grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo possit velle et facere bonum absque gratia. Illud enim est in hominis potes-tatem, et non indiget homo illustratione superaddita naturæ, nisi in quibusdam quæ naturalem cognitionem exceedunt. Ita D. Thomas in hoc articulo. Nescio ideo, quo impellente spiritu, alio modo Billuart rem proponit: homo lapsus, inquit, sine gratia speciali naturæ superaddita, sed cum solo concursu generali prævio, qui tamen aliquo sensu « debet dici specialis et gratuitus » (non tamen supernaturalis), potest cognoscere quasdam veritates naturales. — Vasquez gratiam requirit ad hanc potius quam illam veritatem cognoscendam, quia intellectus indifferens indiget determinari. Responde Vasquesio intellectum nostrum non esse indifferentem dum ei veritas proponitur. Oratio autem ante studium fit ad referendum Deo studium, et ad obtinendam remotionem impedimentorum, præventionum, distractionum, etc. — Homo lapsus potest absque gratia singulas veritates sive specu-tate, cujus ipse est dominus. Sed homo est dominus suorum actuum, et maxime ejus quod est velle, ut supra dictum est. Ergo homo potest velle et facere bonum per seipsum absque auxilio gratia.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.arg.2] Further, man has more power over what is according to his nature than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against his nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of virtue are according to his nature, as stated above (Question 71, Article 1). Therefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unumquodque potest magis in id quod est sibi secundum naturam, quam in id quod est sibi præteter naturam. Sed peccatum est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit in II lib. Orthod. fid.; c. xxx, col. 975, t. 4, opus autem virtutis est homini secundum naturam, ut supra dictum est. Cum igitur homo per seipsum possit peccare, videtur quod multo magis per seipsum possit bonum velle et facere.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.arg.3] Further, the understanding's good is truth, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intellect can of itself know truth, even as every other thing can work its own operation of itself. Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and wish good.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « bonum intellectus est verum, » ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. 11. Sed intellectus potest cognoscere verum per seipsum, sicut et quælibet alia res potest suam naturalem operationem per se facere. Ergo multo magis homo potest per seipsum facere et velle bonum.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth," namely, to will, "nor of him that runneth," namely to run, "but of God that showeth mercy." And Augustine says (De Corrept. et Gratia ii) that "without grace men do nothing good when they either think or wish or love or act."

[I-II.q.109.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, Rom. 1x, 16: Non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere, sed miserentis est Dei. Et Augustinus dicit in lib. De correptione et gratia, cap. 11, col. 917, t. 10, quod « sine gratia nullum prorsus sive cognitando sive volendo et amando, sive agendo, faciunt homines bonum. »

[I-II.q.109.a.2.co] Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever, as stated above (Article 1). But in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured.

And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod natura hominis potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo in sui integritate, sicut fuit in primo parente ante peccatum; alio modo secundum quod est corrupta in nobis post peccatum primi parentis. Secundum autem utrumque statum natura humana indiget auxilio divino ad faciendum vel volendum quodcumque bonum, lativas, sive practicas cognoscere: est communis. Potest etiam sine gratia has omnes collective cognoscere potentia physica, eo sensu quod intellectus ejus sit huic cognitioni physice proportionatus, nisi temporis defectus, vel sollicitudines hujus vitæ impedimenta suscitarent. Propter hæc impedimenta homo lapsus potentia morali non potest sine gratia omnes veritates naturales cognoscere. Nonnulli tamen possibilitatem absque gratia omnis scientiæ naturalium nec exceedentium intellectus humani captum admiserunt. Sunt enim veritates quædam, etiam naturales, quæ pro hoc statu captum nostrum superant, ut substantia angeli, cogitationes cordium, futura contingentia, etc.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.ad.1] Man is master of his acts and of his willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one side or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and since it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chapter "On Good Fortune" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man still unweakened is not so much master of its act that it does not need to be moved by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened by sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of the nature.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homo est dominus suorum actuum, et volendi, et non volendi, propter deliberationem rationis, quæ potest flecti ad unam partem vel ad aliam. Sed quod deliberet vel non deliberet, etsi hujusmodi etiam sit dominus, oportet, quod hoc sit per deliberationem præcedentem; et cum hoc non procedat in infinitum, oportet quod finaliter deveniatur ad hoc quod liberum arbitrium hominis moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio, quod est supra mentem humanam, scilicet a Deo, ut etiam Philosophus probat in cap. « De bona fortuna, » lib. VII Moral. Eudem., cap. xviii; unde mens hominis etiam sani non ita habet dominium sui actus quin indigeat moveri a Deo; et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis infirmi post peccatum, per quod impeditur a bono per corruptionem naturæ.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.ad.2] To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccare nihil aliud est quam deficere a bono quod convenit alicui secundum suam naturam. Unaquæque autem res creata sicut esse non habet nisi ab alio, et in se considerata nihil est, ita indiget conservari in bono suæ naturæ convenienti ab aliquo; potest enim per seipsam deficere a bono, sicut et per seipsam potest deficere in non esse, nisi divinitus conservaretur.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.ad.3] Man cannot even know truth without Divine help, as stated above (Article 1). And yet human nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth.

[I-II.q.109.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam verum non potest homo cognoscere sine auxilio divino, sicut supra dictum est, et tamen magis est natura humana corrupta per peccatum quantum ad appetitum boni, quam quantum ad cognitionem veri.

Article 3

[I-II.q.109.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself possess charity, since the "charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," as is said Romans 5:5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all things.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo non possit diligere Deum super omnia ex solis naturalibus sine gratia. Diligere enim Deum super omnia est proprius et principalis charitatis actus. Sed charitatem homo non potest habere per se ipsum, quia charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis, ut dicitur Rom., v, 5. Ergo homo ex solis naturalibus non potest Deum diligere super omnia.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.arg.2] Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can love God above itself.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nulla natura potest supra seipsam. Sed diligere aliquid plus quam se, est tendere in aliquid supra seipsum. Ergo nulla natura creata potest Deum diligere supra seipsam sine auxilio gratia.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.arg.3] Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Deo, cum sit summum bonum, debetur summus amor, qui est ut super omnia diligatur. Sed ad summum amorem Deo impendendum, qui ei a nobis debetur, homo non sufficit sine gratia; alioquin frustra adderetur gratia. Ergo homo non potest sine gratia ex solis naturalibus diligere Deum super omnia.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.sc] As some maintain, man was first made with only natural endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more than himself and above all things.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.sc] Sed contra, primus homo in solis naturalibus constitutus fuit, ut a quibusdam ponitur; in quo statu manifestum est quod aliqualiter Deum dilexit. Sed non dilexit Deum equaliter sibi, vel minus se, quia secundum hoc peccasset. Ergo dilexit Deum supra se. Ergo homo ex solis naturalibus Deum potest diligere plus quam se et super omnia.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.co] As was said above (I, 60, 5), where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since "all things act according as they are naturally fit" as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God leads everything to love of Himself." Hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God's grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est in I, in quo etiam circa naturalem dilectionem angelorum diversæ opiniones sunt positæ, homo in statu naturæ integræ poterat operari virtute suæ naturæ bonum quod est sibi connaturale, absque superadditione gratuiti boni, licet non absque auxilio Dei moventis. Diligere autem Deum super omnia, est quiddam connaturale homini et etiam cuilibet creaturæ non solum rationali, sed irrationali, et etiam inanimatæ, secundum modum amoris qui unicuique creaturæ competere potest. Cujus ratio est, quia unicuique naturale est quod appetat et amet aliquid, secundum quod aptum natum est esse; sic enim agit unumquodque, prout aptum natum est esse, ut dicitur in II Phys., text. 78. Manifestum est autem quod bonum partis est propter bonum totius; unde naturali appetitu vel amore unaquæque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus. Unde et Dionysius dicit in lib. De divin. nom., c. iv, col. 714, t. 1, quod « Deus convertit omnia ad amorem suiipsius. » Unde homo in statu naturæ integræ dilectionem suiipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum; et ita Deum diligebat plus quam seipsum et super omnia. Sed in statu naturæ corruptæ homo ad hoc deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quæ propter corruptionem naturæ sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei. Et ideo dicendum est, quod homo in statu naturæ integræ non indigebat dono gratiae superadditæ naturalibus bonis ad diligendum Deum naturaliter super omnia, licet indigeret auxilio Dei ad hoc eum moventis; sed in statu naturæ corruptæ indiget homo etiam ad hoc auxilio gratiae naturam sanantis.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.ad.1] Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod chari-gratia gratis data. Unde argumentum « Sed contra » hujus articuli minorem vim haberet impositione Scotorelli. Quidquid sit, nec cum Scotorello, nec cum aliis a se inductis D. Thomas consentit, siquidem ex professo docet Adamum in gratia fuisse creatum. Secundum D. Thomæ doctrinam in pra-senti articulo contentam, Adam, si creatus fuisset in statu per Scotorellum admisso, non indiguiset nisi auxilio Dei moventis. Amorem Dei ut auctoris naturæ ab amore Dei ut auctoris gratiae distingue, et etiam amorem amicitiae ab amore concupiscentiae, et amorem in-natum ab amore elicito, et elicitum necessarium et indeliberatum ab amore elicito deliberato, et amorem elicitum deliberatum imperfectum et inefficacem, qui sola complacentia est in Dei bonitas diligit Deum super omnia eminentius quam natura. Natura enim diligit Deum super omnia, prout est principium et finis naturalis boni; charitas autem, secundum quod est objectum beatitudinis, et secundum quod homo habet quamdam societatem spiritualem cum Deo. Addit etiam charitas super naturalem dilectionem Dei promptitudinem quamdam et delectationem, sicut habitus quilibet virtutis addit super actum bonum qui fit ex sola naturali ratione hominis virtutis habitum non habentis.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.ad.2] When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every creature, as was said above.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum dicitur quod nulla natura potest supra seipsam, non est intelligendum quod non possit ferri in aliquod objectum quod est supra se; manifestum est enim quod intellectus noster naturali cognitione potest aliqua cognoscere quæ sunt supra seipsum, ut patet in naturali cognitione Dei. Sed illud intelligendum est, quod natura non potest ferri in actum exceedentem proportionem suæ virtutis. Talis autem actus non est diligere Deum super omnia; hoc enim est naturale cuilibet naturæ creatæ, ut dictum est.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.ad.3] Love is said to be best, both with respect to degree of love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above.

[I-II.q.109.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod amor dicitur summus non solum quantum ad gradum dilectionis, sed etiam quantum ad rationem diligendi, et dilectionis modum; et secundum hoc summus gradus dilectionis est quo charitas diligit Deum ut beatificantem, sicut dictum est.

Article 4

[I-II.q.109.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle says (Romans 2:14) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law." Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of the Law without grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo sine gratia per sua naturalia tate, non inferens media ad Deo placendum, nec impedimenta peccati removens, ab amore elicito deliberato et efficaci, et iterum hunc amorem efficacem affective ab eodem efficacem effective. Baius et Jansenius non secreverunt amorem Dei naturalem ab amore Dei supernaturali. — Homo lapsus ad diligendum Deum naturaliter super omnia indiget auxilio gratia naturam sanantis: ita D. Thomas. — Non indiget ad diligendum Deum amore efficaci « affective, » non meritorio gratia vel glopossit præcepta legis implere. Dicit enim Apostolus ad Rom., ii, 14, quod gentes quæ legem non habent, naturaliter ea quæ legis sunt faciunt. Sed illud quod naturaliter homo facit, per seipsum potest facere absque gratia. Ergo homo potest legis præcepta facere absque gratia.

[I-II.q.109.a.4.arg.2] Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man." Now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of himself.

[I-II.q.109.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Hieronymus dicit in Expositione catholicæ fidei, illos esse maledicendos qui « Deum præcepisse homini aliquid impossibile dicunt. » Sed impossibile est homini quod per seipsum implere non potest. Ergo homo potest implere omnia præcepta legis per seipsum.

[I-II.q.109.a.4.arg.3] Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" (Matthew 27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by loving God above all things, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter omnia præcepta legis maximum est illud: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex tote corde tuo, ut patet Matth., xxii, 37. Sed hoc mandatum potest homo implere ex solis naturalibus, diligendo Deum super omnia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnia mandata legis potest homo implere sine gratia.

[I-II.q.109.a.4.sc] Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man can fulfil all the Divine commandments."

[I-II.q.109.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De hæresib., hæresi Lxxxviii, col. 47, t. 8, « hoc pertinere ad hæresim Pelagianorum, ut credant, sine gratia hominem posse facere omnia divina mandata. »

[I-II.q.109.a.4.co] There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having stated that "without grace men can do no good whatever," adds: "Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know." Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God's motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated above (2,3).

[I-II.q.109.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod implere mandata legis contingit dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad substantiam operum, prout scilicet homo operatur justa, et fortia, et alia virtutis opera; et hoc modo homo in statu naturæ integræ potuit omnia mandata legis implere; alioquin homo non potuisset in statu illo non peccare; cum nihil aliud sit peccare quam transgredi divina mandata; sed in statu naturæ corruptæ non potest homo implere omnia mandata divina sine gratia sanante. Alio modo possunt impleri mandata legis non solum quantum ad substantiam operis, sed etiam quantum ad modum agendi, ut scilicet ex charitate fiant; et sic neque in statu naturæ integræ, neque in statu naturæ corruptæ potest homo implere absque gratia legis mandata. Unde Augustinus in riæ: ita Scotus, Gabriel, Molina, et alii quibus anumerat D. Thomam P. Henno, non recte, ut arbitror, textum ejus de amore « effectivo » exponens. Contrarium enim tenet opinio textui D. Thomæ conformior et communior, quamvis dicat P. Henno opinionem Scoti esse satis communem. 1 Hæc Fidei expositio D. Hieronymo falso adscritur; est enim Pelagii hæretici confessio fidei ad Damasum papam missa. lib. De correctione et gratia, c. 11, col. 917, t. 10, cum dixisset quod sine gratia nullum prorsus bonum homines faciunt, subdit: « Non solum ut, monstrante ipsa quid facien-dum sit, sciant, verum etiam ut, praestante ipsa, faciant cum dilectione quod sciunt. » Indigent insuper in utroque statu auxi-lio Dei moventis ad mandata implenda, ut dictum est.

[I-II.q.109.a.4.ad.1] As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), "do not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made."

[I-II.q.109.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit, in lib. De spiritu et littera, cap. xxvii, col. 229, t. 10, « non moveat quod naturaliter eos dixit quæ legis sunt, facere; hoc enim agit spiritus gratia, ut imaginem Dei, in qua naturaliter facti sumus, instauret in nobis. »

[I-II.q.109.a.4.ad.2] What we can do with the Divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): "What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves." Hence Jerome [Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius] concedes that "our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still require God's help."

[I-II.q.109.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod possumus cum auxilio divino, non est nobis omnino imposibile, secundum illud Philosophi, in III Ethic., cap. iii, circa med.: « Quæ per amicos possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus. » Unde Hieronymus ibidem confitetur, « sic nostrum liberum esse arbitrium, ut dicamus nos semper indigere Dei auxilio. »

[I-II.q.109.a.4.ad.3] Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above (Article 3).

[I-II.q.109.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod præceptum de dilectione Dei non potest homo implere ex puris naturalibus, secundum quod ex charitate impletur, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Article 5

[I-II.q.109.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that man can merit everlasting life without grace. For Our Lord says (Matthew 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments"; from which it would seem that to enter into everlasting life rests with man's will. But what rests with our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting life of himself.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo possit mereri vitam æternam sine gratia. Dicit enim Dominus, Matth., xix, 17: Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata; ex quo videtur quod ingredi in vitam æternam sit constitutum in hominis voluntate. Sed id quod in nostra voluntate constitutum est, per nos ipsos possumus. Ergo videtur quod homo per seipsum possit vitam æternam mereri.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.arg.2] Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by God on men, according to Matthew 5:12: "Your reward is very great in heaven." But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, according to Psalm 61:12: "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, vita æterna est merces vel præmium quod hominibus redditur a Deo, secundum illud Matth., v, 12: Merces vestra est in cælis. Sed merces vel præmium redditur a Deo homini secundum opera ejus, secundum illud psalm. Lx1, 12: Tu reddes unicuique secundum opera ejus*. Cum igitur homo sit dominus suorum operum, videtur quod in ejus potestate constitutum sit ad vitam æternam pervenire.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.arg.3] Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments, without grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, vita æterna est ultimus finis vitæ humanæ. Sed quælibet res naturalis per sua naturalia potest consequi finem suum. Ergo multo magis homo, qui est altioris naturæ, per sua naturalia potest pervenire ad vitam æternam absque aliqua gratia.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting." And as a gloss says, this is said "that we may understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life."

[I-II.q.109.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Rom., vi, 23: Gratia Dei vita æterna, quod ideo dicitur, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit: « Ut intelligeremus, Deum ad vitam æternam pro sua miseratione nos perducere. »

[I-II.q.109.a.5.co] Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above (Question 5, Article 5). Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can perform works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as "to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends," and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians [Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine].

[I-II.q.109.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actus perdu- 1 Ut supra. Hic impletionem mandatorum quoad substantiam ab impletione eorumdem quoad modum, ut scilicet ex charitate fiant, D. Thomas distinguit; Baïus de hac distinctione dixit: « Celebris illa doctorum distinctio, divinæ legis mandata bifariam impleri, altero modo quantum ad præceptorum substantiam tantum, altero quantum ad certum quemdam modum, videlicet secundum quem valeant operantem perducere ad regnum æternum, hoc est, ad modum meritorium, commentitia est et explodenda. » Hæc Baïi sexagesima prima est Baïanarum a S. Pio papa V damnatarum. « Potens est homo lapsus potentia physica totam legem naturæ observare, etiam longo tempore, sine gratiae adjutorio, sic ut ipsam non violet, in re saltem gravi. » Ita P. Henno, sed addit: « Hoc non potest, longo tempore, potentia morali, nisi robot a gratia. » D. Thomas et Thomistæ simpliciter dicunt: Non potest absque gratia naturam sanante; nec discernunt inter longum et breve tempus.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.ad.1] Man, by his will, does works meritorious of everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homo sua voluntate facit opera meritoria vitæ æternæ; sed, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro, cap. v, dicit, ad hoc exigitur quod voluntas hominis præparetur a Deo per gratiam.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.ad.2] As the gloss upon Romans 6:23, "The grace of God is life everlasting," says, "It is certain that everlasting life is meter to good works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God's grace." And it has been said (4), that to fulfil the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious, requires grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Glossa super illud Rom., vi: Gratia Dei, vita æterna, dicit: « Certum est vitam æternam bonis operibus reddi; sed ipsa opera quibus redditur, ad Dei gratiam pertinent; » cum etiam supra dictum sit, quod ad implendum mandata legis secundum debitum modum, per quem eorum impletio est meritoria, requiritur gratia.

[I-II.q.109.a.5.ad.3] This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12).

[I-II.q.109.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de fine homini connaturali. Natura autem humana ex hoc ipso quod nobilior est, potest ad altiorem finem perduci, saltem auxilio gratiae, ad quem inferiores naturæ nullo modo pertingere possunt; sicut homo est melius dispositus ad sanitatem qui aliquiibus auxiliis medicinae potest sanitatem consequi, quam ille qui nullo modo, ut Philoso-sophus introducit in II De cælo, text. 64 et 65.

Article 6

[I-II.q.109.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (4, ad 1). But it is written (Zechariah 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo possit seipsum ad gratiam præparare per seipsum absque exteriori auxilio gratiae. Nihil enim imponitur homini quod sit ei impossibile, ut supra dictum est. Sed Zach., 1, 3, dicitur: Convertimini ad me, et convertar ad vos. Nihil autem est aliud se ad gratiam præparare quam ad Deum converti. Ergo videtur quod homo per seipsum possit se ad gratiam præparare absque auxilio gratiae.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.arg.2] Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny him grace, for it is written (Matthew 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit "to them that ask Him." But what is in our power is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, homo se ad gratiam præparat, faciendo quod in se est; quia si homo facit quod in se est, Deus ei non denegat gratiam; dicitur enim Luc., xi, 13, quod Deus dat spiritum bonum petentibus se. Sed illud in nobis esse dicitur quod est in nostra potestate. Ergo videtur quod in nostra potestate sit constitutum, ut nos ad gratiam præparemus.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.arg.3] Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si homo indiget gratia ad hoc quod præparet se ad gratiam, pari ratione indigebit gratia ad hoc quod præparet se ad illam gratiam; et sic procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Ergo videtur standum in primo, ut scilicet homo sine gratia possit se ad gratiam præparare.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.arg.4] Further, it is written (Proverbs 16:1) that "it is the part of man to prepare the soul." Now an action is said to be part of a man, when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Prov., xvi, 4, dicitur quod hominis est animam præparare. Sed illud dicitur esse hominis quod per se ipsum potest. Ergo videtur quod homo per seipsum se possit ad gratiam præparare.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.sc] It is written (John 6:44): "No man can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him." But if man could prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot prepare himself without the help of grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., vi, 44: Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum. Si autem homo seipsum præparare posset, non oporteret quod ab alio traheretur. Ergo homo non potest se ad gratiam præparare absque auxilio gratiae.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.co] The preparation of the human will for good is twofold: the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated above (Article 5). There is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, as stated above (2,3). Now that we need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct is effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army--and towards following the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the First Mover, simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks to be likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all to Himself." But He directs righteous men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling, according to Psalm 72:28, "it is good for Me to adhere to my God." And that they are "turned" to God can only spring from God's having "turned" them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God; just as, whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun, prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est præparatio voluntatis humanæ ad bonum: una quidem, qua præparatur ad bene operandum et ad Deo fruendum, et talis præparatio voluntatis non potest fieri sine habituali 1 Liber qui vulgo dicitur Hypognosticon, et a quibusdam Augustino adjudicatur, in hujus Operum append. jam relegatur ut spurius. Quidam Sixto papae, quidam Mercatori illum tribuunt. Contra Pelagium et Cælestium asserentes hominem suis operibus vitam æternam posse mereri. gratiæ dono, quod sit principium operis meritorii, ut dictum est. Alio modo potest intelligi præparatio voluntatis humanæ ad consequendum ipsum gratiae habitualis donum. Ad hoc autem quod præparet se homo ad susceptionem hu-jus doni, non oportet præsupponere aliquod aliud donum habituale in anima, quia sic procederetur in infinitum; sed oportet præ-supponi aliquod auxilium gratuitum Dei interius animam moventis, sive inspirantis bonum propositum. His enim duobus modis indigemus auxilio divino, ut supra dictum. Quod autem ad hoc indigeamus auxilio Dei moventis, manifestum est. Necesse est enim, cum omne agens agat propter finem, quod omnis causa convertat suos effectus ad suum finem: et ideo, cum secundum ordinem agentium sive moventium sit ordo finium, necesse est quod ad ultimum finem convertatur homo per motionem primi moventis, ad finem autem proximum per motionem alicujus inferiorum moventium; sicut animus militis convertitur ad quærendum victoriam ex motione ducis exercitus, ad sequendum autem vexillum alicujus aciei ex motione tribuni. Sic igitur cum Deus sit primum movens simpliciter, ex ejus motione est quod omnia in ipsum convertantur secundum communem intentionem boni, per quam unumquodque intendit assimilari Deo secundum suum modum. Unde Dionysius, in lib. De divin. nomin., cap. iv, col. 711, t. 1, dicit quod « Deus convertit omnia ad seip-sum. » Sed homines justos convertit ad seip-sum sicut ad specialem finem, quem intendunt, et cui cupiunt adhærere sicut bono proprio, secundum illud psal. Lxxii, 28: Mihi adhærere Deo bonum est; et ideo quod homo convertatur ad Deum, hoc non potest esse nisi Deo ipsum convertente. Hoc autem est præparare se ad gratiam, quasi ad Deum converti; sicut ille qui habet oculum aver-sum a lumine solis, per hoc se preparat ad recipiendum lumen solis, quod oculos suos convertit versus solem. Unde patet quod homo non potest se præparare ad lumen gratiae suscipiendum nisi per auxilium gratuitum Dei interius moventis.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.ad.1] Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to God, when God turns it, according to Jeremiah 31:18: "Convert me and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God"; and Lamentations 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted."

[I-II.q.109.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod conversio hominis ad Deum fit quidem per liberum arbitrium; et secundum hoc homini præcipitur quod se ad Deum convertat. Sed liberum arbitrium ad Deum converti non potest, nisi Deo ipsum ad se convertente, secundum illud Jerem., xxxi, 18: Converte me et convertar, quia tu Dominus Deus meus; et Thren., ultimo, 21: Converte nos, Domine, ad te, et convertemur.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.ad.2] Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to John 15:5: "Without Me, you can do nothing." Hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is moved by God.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nihil homo potest facere, nisi a Deo moveatur, secundum illud Joan., xv, 5: Sine me nihil potestis facere. Et ideo cum dicitur homo facere quod in se est, dicitur hoc esse in potestate hominis, secundum quod est motus a Deo.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.ad.3] This objection regards habitual grace, for which some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, no further motion is presupposed since God is the First Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa objectio Quidquid sit, Molina, in Concord., disp. x, q. xiv, a. 13, apertissime docet Deum bene utenti facultate naturali nunquam denegare gratiam, non quidem ex merito operis naturalis, sed « ex pacto inter Deum et Christum inito, » ut facienti quod in se est « ex viribus naturæ, » infallibiliter gratia detur; sic homo seipsum præpararet ad gratiam. En conclusio P. Henno: Nullatenus homo solis naturæ viribus potest gratiam actualem, etiam salutis initialem, nec a fortiori habitualem, consequi. Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam: hoc axioma Calvinus Ochamicum vocat irrisorie, sed ignoranter, siquidem S. Thomas eo utitur, et similiter omnes fere theologi tum veteres, tum moderni. Tripliciter intelligitur: 1. Facienti quod in se est ex viribus gratiae Deus non denegat gratiam; 2. Facienti quod in se est ex viribus naturæ Deus, ad impertiendum motus ab operibus naturalibus ejus qui facit quod in se est, non denegat gratiam; 3. Facienti quod in se est ex viribus naturæ Deus, propter pactum inter Christum et Patrem, non denegat gratiam. Primo sensu, est communis; procedit de gratia habituali, ad quam requiritur aliqua præparatio, quia omnis forma requirit susceptibile dispositum. Sed hoc quod homo moveatur a Deo, non præexigit aliquam aliam motionem, cum Deus sit primum movens: unde non oportet abire in infinitum.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.ad.4] It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he does this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.

[I-II.q.109.a.6.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod hominis est præparare animum, quia hoc facit per liberum arbitrium; sed tamen hoc non facit sine auxilio Dei moventis et ad se attrahentis, ut dictum est.

Article 7

[I-II.q.109.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without grace. But to rise to sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace; since it is written (Ephesians 5:14): "Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee." Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo possit resurgere a peccato sine auxilio gratiae. Illud enim quod præexigitur ad gratiam fit sine gratia. Sed resurgere a peccato præexigitur ad illuminationem gratiae: dicitur enim ad Ephes., v, 14: Exurge a mortuis, et illuminabit te Christus. Ergo homo potest resurgere a peccato sine gratia.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.arg.2] Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as stated above (71, 1, ad 3). Now, man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum virtuti opponitur, sicut morbus sanitati, ut supra dictum est. Sed homo per virtutem naturæ potest resurgere de aegritudine ad sanitatem, sine auxilio exterioris medicinæ, propter hoc quod Secundo sensu, pelagiana et semipelagiana; Tertio sensu, Molinæ est et infundata positio. Pactum Molinæ, unus e suis consodalibus, P. Valentia, in congregatione de auxiliis ultimæ diei septembris 1602, coram Clemente VIII, demonstrare voluit ex Augustino, cujus sequentem ex lib. XIX, cap. xiii Civitatis Dei, recitavit textum: « Deus ergo naturarum omnium sapientissimus conditor, et justissimus ordinator, qui terrenorum ornamentorum maximum instituit mortale genus humanum, dedit hominibus quædam bona huic vitæ congrua » (ergo, naturalia)... « eo pacto aegissimo » (ecce pactum), « ut quicumque mortalis talibus bonis recte usus fuerit, accipiat ampliora atque meliora, et ipsam immortalitatis pacem. » — Unde, virtute « pacti aegissimi, » quicumque naturalibus bene utitur ampliora atque meliora, scilicet gratiam, accipit, et consequenter ex gratia gloriam. Sic ille. Non mihi videtur aegissimum esse ut ex unico textu etiam S. Augustini intus manet principium vitæ, a quo procedit operatio naturalis. Ergo videtur quod homo simili ratione possit reparari per seipsum, redeundo de statu peccati ad statum justitiæ absque auxilio exterioris gratiae.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.arg.3] Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of justice.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quælibet res naturalis potest redire ad actum convenientem suæ naturæ, sicut aqua calefacta per seipsam redit ad naturalem frigiditatem, et lapis sursum projectus per seipsum redit ad suum motum naturalem. Sed peccatum est quidam actus contra naturam, ut patet per Damascenum, in II lib. Orthod. fid., cap. xxx, col. 975, t. 1. Ergo videtur quod homo possit per seipsum redire de peccato ad statum justitiæ.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.sc] The Apostle says (Galatians 2:21; Cf. Galatians 3:21): "For if there had been a law given which could give life--then Christ died in vain," i.e. to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature, whereby he can he justified, "Christ died in vain," i.e. to no purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Galatas, ii, 24: Si data est lex quæ potest justificare*, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est, id est, sine causa. Pari ergo ratione si homo habet naturam, per quam potest justificari, Christus gratis, id est, sine causa, mortuus est. Sed hoc est inconveniens dicere. Ergo non potest per seipsum justificari, id est, redire de statu culpæ ad statum justitiæ.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.co] Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in its guilt, as stated above (Question 87, Article 6), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above (85, 1; 86, 1; 87, 1), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not being subject to God's; and this order being overthrown, the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man deserves everlasting damnation.

Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e. man's will can only be subject to God when God draws man's will to Himself, as stated above (Article 6). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who is man's Judge. And thus in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift, and as regards the internal motion of God.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod homo nullo modo potest resurgere a peccato per seipsum sine auxilio gratiae. Cum enim peccatum transiens actu, remaneat reatu, ut supra dictum est; non est idem resurgere a peccato quod cessare ab actu peccati; sed resurgere a peccato, est reparari hominem ad ea quæ peccando amisit. Incurrit autem homo triplex detrimentum peccando, ut ex supra dictis patet, scilicet maculam, corruptionem naturalis boni et reatum pœnæ. Maculam quidem incurrit, inquantum privatur decore gratiae ex controversia tanta dirimatur. S. Augustino, S. Thomas, ut par est, debuisset opponi. Sed erraverat P. Valentia recitando S. Augustini textum, qui aliter in codicibus et impressis invenitur; loco enim hujus conjunctionis: «et » in hac propositione: « et ipsam immortalitatis pacem, » habetur: « scilicet, » ipsam « scilicet» immortalitatis pacem, eique convenientem gloriam, et honorem in vita aeterna. Ampliora bona et meliora non sunt igitur in mente et in textu S. Augustini gratiae quibus gloria meretur, sed ipsa gloria quae opponitur ut bonum melius bonis hujus exilii. Sed quis Catholicus affirmare auderet hominem gloriam absque gratia ex recto usu bonorum naturalium mereri? — Dominicanus quidam, P. Lemos scilicet, assumpto codice, textum, absque mora, S. Augustini restituit qui eodem modo legitur in quadam editione nostra Friburgensi anni 1494. 1 In edit.: « per seipsam. » deformitate peccati. Bonum autem naturæ corrumpitur, inquantum natura hominis deordinatur, voluntate hominis Deo non subjecta; hoc enim ordine sublato, consequens est ut tota natura hominis peccantis inordinata remaneat. Reatus vero pœnæ est per quem homo peccando mortaliter meretur damnationem æternam. Manifestum est autem de singulis horum trium quod non possunt reparari nisi per Deum. Cum enim decor gratiae proveniat ex illustratione divini luminis, non potest talis decor in anima reparari, nisi Deo denuo illustrante; unde requiritur habituale donum, quod est gratiae lumen. Similiter ordo naturæ reparari non potest, ut scilicet voluntas hominis Deo subjiciatur, nisi Deo voluntatem hominis ad se trahente, sicut dictum est. Similiter etiam reatus pœnæ æternæ remitti non potest nisi a Deo, in quem est offensa commissa, et qui est hominum judex. Et ideo requiritur auxilium gratiae ad hoc quod homo a peccato resurgat, et quantum ad habituale donum, et quantum ad interiorem Dei motionem.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.ad.1] To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of free-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise from sin. Hence when it is said, "Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee," we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud indicitur homini quod pertinet ad actum liberi arbitrii; qui requiritur in hoc quod homo a peccato resurgat. Et ideo, cum dicitur: Exurge, et illuminabit te Christus, non est intelligendum quod tota exsurrectio a peccato præcedat illuminationem gratiae; sed quia cum homo per liberum arbitrium a Deo motum surgere conatur a peccato, recipit lumen gratiae justificantis.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.ad.2] The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace. This principle is grace which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be restored by himself; but he requires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod naturalis ratio non est sufficiens principium hujus sanitatis, quæ est in homine per gratiam justificantem; sed hujus principium est gratia, quæ tollitur per peccatum. Et ideo non potest homo per seipsum reparari; sed indiget ut denuo ei lumen gratiae infundatur, sicut si corpori mortuo resuscitando denuo infunderetur anima.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.ad.3] When nature is perfect, it can be restored by itself to its befitting and proportionate condition; but without exterior help it cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And thus human nature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer perfect, but corrupted, as stated above (Article 85); nor can it be restored, by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the supernatural good of justice.

[I-II.q.109.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quando natura est integra, per seipsam potest reparari ad id quod est sibi conveniens et proportionem; sed ad id quod superexcedit suam proportionem, reparari non potest sine exteriori auxilio. Sic igitur humana natura defluens per actum peccati, quia non manet integra, sed corrumpitur, ut supra dictum est, non potest per seipsam reparari neque etiam ad bonum sibi connaturale, et multo minus ad bonum supernaturale justitiæ.

Article 8

[I-II.q.109.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin. Because "no one sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. x, xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin, which is impossible.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo sine gratia possit non peccare. «Nullus enim peccat in eo quod vitare non potest, » ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De lib. arb., lib. III, cap. xviii, col. 1295, t. 4. Si ergo homo existens in peccato mortali non possit vitare peccatum, videtur quod pecando non peccet, quod est inconveniens.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.arg.2] Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem to be given to no purpose; which is absurd.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad hoc corripitur homo ut non peccet. Si igitur homo in peccato mortali existens non potest non peccare, videtur quod frustra ei correptio adhibeatur; quod est inconveniens.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.arg.3] Further, it is written (Sirach 15:18): "Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him." But by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Eccli., xv, 18, dicitur: Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum; quod placuerit ei, dabitur illi. Sed aliquis peccando non desinit esse homo. Ergo adhuc in ejus potestate est eligere bonum vel malum; et ita potest homo sine gratia vitare peccatum.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.sc] Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): "Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation' (and they deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of all."

[I-II.q.109.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De perfectione justitiæ, in fine, col. 317, t. 10: « Quisquis negat nos orare debere ne intremus in tentationem, negat autem hoc qui contendit ad non peccandum gratiae Dei adjutorium non esse homini necessarium, sed sola lege accepta humanam sufficere voluntatem, ab auribus omnium removendum et ore omnium anathematizandum esse non dubito. »

[I-II.q.109.a.8.co] We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature--and in the state of perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not have done it without God's help to uphold him in good, since if this had been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into nothingness.

But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought in the mind--the carnal appetite being not yet restored. Hence the Apostle (Romans 7:25) says in the person of one who is restored: "I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin." And in this state man can abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as stated above (Question 74, Article 5); but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above (74, 3, ad 2).

So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that " a sin not at once taken away by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins": and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For when man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally: especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly brought back to the due order.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod de homine dupliciter loqui possumus: uno modo secundum statum naturæ integræ; alio modo se-propositum et inchoatio per Dei gratiam inspiratur, alterius qua vivificatur qui vere justificatur, et palmes vivus in vite Christo efficitur, commentitia est, et Scripturis minime congruens. » cundum statum naturæ corruptæ. Secundum statum quidem naturæ integræ etiam sine gratia habituali poterat homo non pecare nec mortaliter nec venialiter: quia pecare nihil aliud est quam recedere ab eo quod est secundum naturam; quod vitare homo poterat in statu naturæ integræ; non tamen hoc poterat sine auxilio Dei in bono conservantis, quo subtracto, etiam ipsa natura in nihilum decideret. In statu autem naturæ corruptæ indiget homo gratia habituali sanante naturam ad hoc quod omnino a peccato abstineat. Quæ quidem sanatio primo fit in præsenti vita secundum mentem, appetitu carnali non-dum totaliter reparato. Unde Apostolus, ad Rom., vii, 25, in persona hominis reparati dicit: Ego ipse mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati. In quo quidem statu potest homo abstinere ab omni peccato mortali, quod in ratione consistit, ut supra habitum est; non autem potest homo abstinere ab omni peccato veniali propter corruptionem inferioris appetitus sensualitatis; cujus motus singulos quidem ratio reprimere potest, et ex hoc habent rationem peccati et voluntarii; non autem omnes, quia dum uni resistere nititur, fortassis alius insurgit; et etiam quia ratio non semper potest esse pervigil ad hujusmodi motus vitandos, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam antequam hominis ratio, in qua est peccatum mortale, reparetur per gratiam justificantem, potest singula peccata mortalia vitare, et secundum aliquod tempus; quia non est necesse quod continuo peccet in actu. Sed quod diu maneat absque peccato mortali, esse non potest. Unde et Gregorius dicit, Super Ezechiel., hom. xi, § 24, col. 915, t. 2, quod « peccatum quod mox per pœnitentiam non deletur, suo pondere ad aliud trahit. » Et hujus ratio est, quia sicut rationi subdi debet inferior appetitus, ita etiam ratio subdi debet Deo, et in ipso constituere finem suæ voluntatis. Per finem autem oportet quod regulentur omnes actus humani, sicut per rationis judicium regulari debent motus inferioris appetitus. Sicut ergo inferiori appetitu non totaliter subjecto rationi, non potest esse quin contingant inordinati motus in appetitu sensitivo, ita etiam ratione hominis non totaliter existente subjecta Deo, consequens est ut contingant multæ inordinationes in ipsis actibus rationis. Cum enim homo non habet cor suum firmatum in Deo, ut pro nullo bono consequendo vel malo vitando ab eo separari vellet, occurrunt multa propter quæ consequenda vel vitanda homo recedit a Deo, contemnendo præcepta ipsius; et ita peccat mortaliter, præcipue quia « in repentinis homo operatur secundum finem præconceptum, et secundum habitum præexistentem, » ut Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., cap. viii, ad fin. Quamvis ex præmeditatione rationis homo possit aliquid agere præter ordinem finis præconcepti, et præter inclinationem habitus. Sed quia homo non potest semper esse in tali præmeditatione, non potest contingere ut diu permaneat quin operetur secundum convenientiam voluntatis deordinatæ a Deo, nisi cito per gratiam ad debitum ordinem reparetur.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.ad.1] Man can avoid each but not every act of sin, except by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homo Ita mss. et editi passim. Homo absque gratia omnia peccata vitare potest: ita rabbi Moyses. Absque gratia potest non peccare, imo esse justus: ita Cælestius et Pelagius. Quidam theologi inter resistentiam, trophæum et victoriam distinguunt. Quando quis, etsi non vincat, tamen non vinci-tur, resistentia est. Quando pars adversa sana fugit, et non laesa, parte alia non prosequente, trophæus est. Quando, parte adversa aut pene, aut funditus destructa, pars alia aut nullum aut modicum habuit detrimentum, victoria est. Sic Guillermus, qui cum S. Bonaventura docet quod homo lapsus sine gratia gratum faciente non potest tentationem vincere, quamvis mediantibus gratiis datis tentationi resistere possit. Admittit insuper quod homo, per possibile vel impossibile a gratia omni gratis data semotus, bene alicui tentationi resistere potest, quamvis sine gratia gratum faciente vincere non possit. Theologi quidam alii distinguunt inter victoriam salutarem seu meritoriam, damnabilem qua peccatum peccato superatur, et sterilem. Pro prima gratiam, non pro secunda, pro tertia gratiam pariter non contra leves aut modicas, sed contra omnem tentationem gravem requirunt. Vasquez autem nullam tentationem ab homine lapso sine gratia superari posse contendit, etiam minimam, et victoria sterili, seu non meritoria vitæ aeternæ. Juxta Lutherum, Calvinum, Kemnitium et alios, homo nec unum veniale vitare potest, quantum-cumque gratiae auxilio sit adjutus. Nos autem dicimus: homo lapsus et in peccato mortali existens non potest, sine speciali gratia superaddita, vitare diu omnia peccata mortalia potest vitare singulos actus peccati, non tamen omnes, nisi per gratiam, ut dictum est. Et tamen quia ex ejus defectu est quod homo se ad gratiam habendam non præparat, propter hoc a peccato non excusatur quod sine gratia peccatum vitare non potest.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.ad.2] Correction is useful "in order that out of the sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the noise of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden inspirations is inwardly causing to will," as Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact that man's will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet it is not sufficient without God's help. Hence it is written (Ecclesiastes 7:14): "Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath despised."

[I-II.q.109.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod « correptio utilis est, ut ex dolore correctionis voluntas regenerationis oriatur; si tamen qui corri-pitur filius est promissionis, ut strepitu correctionis forinsecus insonante ac flagellante, Deus in illo intrinsecus occulta inspiratione operetur et velle, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De correptione et gratia, c. vi, col. 921, t. 40. Ideo ergo necessaria est correptio, quia voluntas hominis requiritur ad hoc quod a peccato abstineat; sed tamen correptio non est sufficiens sine Dei auxilio. Unde Eccle., vii, 14: Considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ille despexerit.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.ad.3] As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of man in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God's assistance.

[I-II.q.109.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in Hypognostic., lib. III, cap. 1 et 11, col. 4621, t. 40, verbum illud intelligitur de homine secundum statum naturæ integræ, quando nondum erat servus peccati; unde poterat peccare et non peccare. Nunc etiam, quodcumque vult homo, datur ei; sed hoc quod bonum velit, habet ex auxilio gratiae.

Article 9

[I-II.q.109.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace, can by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either useless or imperfect.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ille qui jam consecutus est gratiam, per seipsum possit operari bonum, et vitare peccatum absque alio auxilio gratiae. Unum-quodque enim aut frustra est, aut imperfectum, si non implet illud ad quod datur. contra legem naturalem, et omnes tentationes vin-cere; si vero in peccato mortali non existat, cum ordinariis gratiae auxiliis peccata venialia singula, Sed gratia ad hoc datur nobis ut possimus bonum facere et vitare peccatum. Si igitur per gratiam hoc homo non potest, videtur quod vel gratia sit frustra data, vel sit imperfecta.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.arg.2] Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to 1 Corinthians 3:16: "Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Now since the Spirit of God is omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two things without any further assistance of grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per gratiam ipse Spiritus sanctus in nobis habitat, secundum illud I ad Corinth., 11, 46: Nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis? Sed Spiritus sanctus, cum sit omnipotens, sufficiens est ut nos inducat ad bene operandum, et ut nos a peccato custodiat. Ergo homo gratiam consecutus potest utrumque prædictorum absque alio auxilio gratiae.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.arg.3] Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with equal reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has obtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity; which is impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in order to do righteously and to keep free from sin.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si homo consecutus gratiam adhuc alio auxilio gratiae indiget ad hoc quod recte vivat, et a peccato abstineat; pari ratione, etsi illud aliud auxilium gratiae consecutus fuerit, adhuc alio auxilio gratiae indigebit. Procedetur ergo in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Ergo ille qui est in gratia non indiget alio auxilio gratiae ad hoc quod bene operetur et a peccato abstineat.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.sc] Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that "as the eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he is most righteous, live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of justice." But justification is by grace, according to Romans 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace." Hence even a man who already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De natura et gratia, cap. xxvi, col. 261, t. 10, quod « sicut oculus corporis plenissime sanus, nisi candore lucis adjutus, non potest cernere; sic et homo etiam perfectissime justificatus, nisi æterna luce justitiæ divini-tus adjuvetur, recte non potest vivere. » Sed justificatio fit per gratiam, secundum illud Rom., 11, 24: Justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius. Ergo etiam homo jam habens gratiam indiget alio auxilio gratiae ad hoc quod recte vivat.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.co] As stated above (Article 5), in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God--first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act.

Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason--the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves "the law of sin," Romans 7:25. In the intellect, too, there seems the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written (Romans 8:26): "We know not what we should pray for as we ought"; since on account of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wisdom 9:14: "For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain." Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all things. For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: "Lead us not into temptation," and "Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven," and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, homo ad recte vivendum dupli-citer auxilio Dei indiget: uno quidem modo quantum ad aliquod habituale donum, per quod natura humana corrupta sanetur, et etiam sanata elevetur ad operanda opera meritoria vitæ æternæ quæ exceedunt proportionem naturæ; alio modo indiget homo auxilio gratiae, ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum. Quantum igitur ad primum auxilii modum, homo in gratia existens non indiget alio auxilio gratiae, quasi aliquo habitu alio infuso. Indiget tamen auxilio gratiae secundum sed non diu omnia peccata venialia, vitare potest: ad hoc ultimum speciali auxilio gratiae indiget. alium modum, ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum, et hoc propter duo: primo quidem ratione generali; propter hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, nulla res creata potest in quemcumque actum pro-dire, nisi virtute motionis divinæ. Secundo ratione speciali propter conditionem status humanæ naturæ; quæ quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem, per quam servit legi peccati, ut dicitur ad Rom., vii, 25. Remanet etiam quædam ignorantiæ obscuritas in intellectu, secundum quam, ut etiam dicitur Rom., viii, 26, quid oremus, sicut oportet, nescimus; propter varios enim rerum eventus, et quia etiam nos ipsos non perfecte cognoscimus, non possumus ad plenum scire quid nobis expediat, secundum illud Sap., ix, 14: Cogitationes mortalium timidæ, et incertæ providentiæ nostræ. Et ideo necesse est nobis ut a Deo dirigamur et protegamur, qui omnia novit et omnia potest. Et propter hoc etiam renatis in filios Dei per gratiam convenit dicere: Et ne nos inducas in tentationem; et: Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in cælo et terra, et cætera, quæ in oratione dominica continentur ad hoc pertinentia.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.ad.1] The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after having received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man will need the Divine help even in the state of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated above.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod donum habitualis gratiae non ad hoc datur nobis ut per ipsum non indigeamus ulterius divino auxilio; indiget enim quælibet creatura ut a Deo conservetur in bono quod ab eo accepit. Et ideo si post acceptam gratiam homo adhuc indiget divino auxilio, non potest concludi quod gratia sit in vanum data, vel quod sit imperfecta; quia, etiam in statu gloriæ, quando gratia erit omnino perfecta, homo divino auxilio indigebit. Hic autem aliququaliter gratia imperfecta est, inquantum hominem non totaliter sanat, ut dictum est.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.ad.2] The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father and the Son, moves and protects us.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod operatio Spiritus sancti, quæ nos movet et protegit, non circumscribitur per effectum habitualis doni, quod in nobis causat; sed præter hunc effectum nos movet et protegit simul cum Patre et Filio.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.ad.3] This argument merely proves that man needs no further habitual grace.

[I-II.q.109.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa concludit quod homo non indigeat alia habituali gratia.

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