Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q110. The grace of God as regards its essence
Source context
- Theme
- The essence of divine grace as a supernatural quality of the soul, distinct from and elevating natural being
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta — shakti / anugrahaIn Shaiva Siddhanta and Vedantic streams, divine grace (anugraha) is understood as a transformative power descending from the Absolute to elevate the individual soul beyond its natural condition, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's account of grace as a quality infused into the soul's essence rather than merely its operative faculties.
- Neoplatonism — participatioThe Neoplatonic doctrine of participation holds that lower realities share in higher ones by receiving an influx of the One's power; Aquinas's account of grace as a participated similitude of the divine nature (participata similitudo divinae naturae) reflects a structural cross-tradition congruence with this Plotinian framework.
- Kabbalah — Or Ein Sof / tzimtzumThe Kabbalistic understanding of divine light (Or Ein Sof) flowing into the vessels of the soul as a gift beyond creaturely capacity exhibits cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that grace, as a quality of the soul's essence, cannot be self-generated but must originate from the divine source alone.
Q110. The grace of God as regards its essence
Article 1
[I-II.q.110.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the soul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of man. Hence it is written (Genesis 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph "grace [Douay: 'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison." Now when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance is implied in him whose favor he has. Hence when we say that a man has the grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul; but we merely signify the Divine acceptance.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod gratia non ponat aliquid in anima. Sicut enim homo dicitur habere gratiam Dei, ita etiam gratiam hominis; unde dicitur Genes., xxxix, 24, quod Dominus dedit Joseph gratiam in conspectu principis carceris. Sed per hoc quod homo dicitur habere gratiam hominis, nihil ponitur in eo qui gratiam alterius habet, sed in eo cujus gratiam habet, ponitur acceptatio quædam. Ergo per hoc quod homo habere gratiam Dei dicitur, nihil ponitur in anima, sed solum significatur acceptatio divina.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.arg.2] Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken the soul; hence it is written (Deuteronomy 30:20): "He is thy life." Now the soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as a medium between God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in the soul.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut anima vivificat corpus, ita Deus vivificat animam; unde dicitur Deut., xxx, 20: Ipse est vita tua. Sed anima vivificat corpus immediate. Ergo etiam nihil cadit medium inter Deum et animam. Non ergo gratia ponit aliquid creatum in anima.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.arg.3] Further, on Romans 1:7, "Grace to you and peace," the gloss says: "Grace, i.e. the remission of sins." Now the remission of sin implies nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the sin, according to Psalm 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad Rom., 1, super illud: Gratia vobis et pax, dicit Glossa interl.: Gratia, id est remissio peccatorum.》 Sed remissio peccatorum non ponit in anima aliquid, sed solum in Deo non imputante peccatum, secundum illud psal. xxxi, 2: Beatus vir cui non imputavit Dominus peccatum. Ergo nec gratia ponit aliquid in anima.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.sc] Light implies something in what is enlightened. But grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxii): "The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law, and those who have been thus deserted become blind." Therefore grace implies something in the soul.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.sc] Sed contra, lux ponit aliquid in illuminato. Sed gratia est quædam lux animæ; unde Augustinus dicit in libro De natura et gratia, cap. xxii, col. 258, t. 40: « Prævariatorem legis digne lux deserit veritatis, Sic ponit solutionem P. Henno: « Etsi possit justus potentia physica cum ordinariis gratiae auxiliis quae justis nunquam denegantur persevequa desertus utique fit cæcus. » Ergo gratia ponit aliquid in anima.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.co] According to the common manner of speech, grace is usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, i.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given "gratis," inasmuch as we are said to be "grateful" for benefits. Of these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows something on another "gratis" from the love wherewith he receives him into his good "graces." And from the second proceeds the third, since from benefits bestowed "gratis" arises "gratitude."
Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something in him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must be noted between the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the creature's good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things; and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love. And according to this difference of good the love of God to the creature is looked at differently. For one is common, whereby He loves "all things that are" (Wisdom 11:25), and thereby gives things their natural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.
Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is signified something bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless the grace of God sometimes signifies God's eternal love, as we say the grace of predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits predestines or elects some; for it is written (Ephesians 1:5): "He hath predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of the glory of His grace."
[I-II.q.110.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum communem modum loquendi tripliciter gratia accipi consuevit: uno modo pro dilectione alicujus, sicut consuevimus dicere quod iste miles habet gratiam regis, id est, rex habet eum gratum; secundo sumitur pro aliquo dono gratis dato, sicut consuevimus dicere: Hanc gratiam facio tibi. Tertio modo sumitur pro recompensatione beneficii gratis dati, secundum quod dicimur agere gratias beneficiorum. Quorum trium secundum dependet ex primo; ex amore enim quo aliquis habet alium gratum, procedit quod aliquid ei gratis impendat; ex secundo autem procedit tertium, quia ex beneficiis gratis exhibitis gratiarum actio consurgit. Quantum igitur ad duo ultima, manifestum est quod gratia aliquid ponit in eo qui gratiam accipit: primo quidem ipsum donum gratis datum; secundo hujus doni recognitionem. Sed quantum ad primum est differentia attendenda circa gratiam Dei et gratiam hominis; quia enim bonum creaturæ provenit ex voluntate divina, ideo ex dilectione Dei, qua vult creaturæ bonum, profluit aliquod bonum in creatura. Voluntas autem hominis movetur ex bono præ-existente in rebus; et inde est quod dilectio hominis non causat totaliter rei bonitatem, sed præsupponit ipsam vel in parte vel in toto. Patet igitur quod quamlibet Dei dilectionem sequitur aliquod bonum in creatura causatum quando, non tamen dilectioni æternæ coæternum. Et secundum hujus modi boni differentiam differens consideratur dilectio Dei ad creaturam: una quidem communis, secundum quam diligit omnia quæ sunt, ut dicitur Sap., xi, 25, secundum quam esse naturale rebus creatis largitur; alia autem dilectio est specialis, secundum quam trahit creaturam rationalem supra conditionem naturæ ad participationem divini boni; et secundum hanc dilectionem dicitur aliquem diligere simpliciter, quia secundum hanc dilectionem vult Deus simpliciter creaturæ bonum æternum; quod est ipse. Sic igitur per hoc quod dicitur homo gratiam Dei habere, significatur quiddam supernaturale in homine a Deo proveniens. Quandoque tamen gratia Dei dicitur ipsa æterna Dei dilectio, secundum quod dicitur etiam gratia prædestinationis, inquantum Deus gratuito et non ex meritis aliquos prædestinavit sive elegit. Dicitur enim ad Ephes., 1, 5: Prædestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum..., in laudem gloriæ gratix suæ.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.ad.1] Even when a man is said to be in another's good graces, it is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the other; even as anyone is said to have God's grace--with this difference, that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the Divine love, as was said above.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod etiam in hoc quod dicitur aliquis habere gratiam hominis, intelligitur in illo esse aliquid quod sit homini gratum, sicut et in hoc quod dicitur aliquis gratiam Dei habere; sed tamen differenter; nam illud quod est homini gratum in alio homine, præsupponitur ejus dilectioni; causatur autem ex dilectione divina quod est in homine Deo gratum, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.ad.2] God is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the manner of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and matter, since the form, of itself, "informs" the matter or subject; whereas the agent "informs" the subject, not by its substance, but by the form, which it causes in the matter.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus est vita animæ per modum causæ efficientis; sed anima est vita corporis per modum causæ formalis. Inter formam autem et materiam non cadit aliquod medium, quia forma per seipsam informat materiam vel subjectum; sed agens informat subjectum, non per suam substantiam, sed per formam, quam causat in materia.
[I-II.q.110.a.1.ad.3] Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): "When I said that grace was for the remission of sins, and peace for our reconciliation with God, you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain to general peace, but that the special name of grace signifies the remission of sins." Not only grace, therefore, but many other of God's gifts pertain to grace. And hence the remission of sins does not take place without some effect divinely caused in us, as will appear later (113, 2).
[I-II.q.110.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I Retract., cap. xxv, col. 624, t. 4: « Ubi dixi gratiam esse in dimissione peccatorum, pacem vero in reconciliatione Dei, non sic accipiendum est, ac si pax ipsa et reconciliatione non pertineat ad gratiam generalem, sed quod specialiter nomine gratiae remissionem significaverit peccatorum. » Non ergo sola remissio peccatorum ad gratiam pertinet, sed etiam multa alia Dei dona. Et ideo remissio peccatorum non fit sine aliquo effectu divinitus in nobis causato, ut infra patebit.
Article 2
[I-II.q.110.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is not without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod gratia non sit qualitas animæ. Nulla enim qualitas agit in suum subjectum; quia actio qualitatis non est absque actione subjecti; et sic oporteret quod subjectum ageret in seipsum. Sed gratia agit in animam, justificando ipsam. Ergo gratia non est qualitas.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.arg.2] Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by grace, to which nature is not equal, as stated above (109, A1,2,3). Therefore grace is not a quality.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, substantia est nobilior qualitate. Sed gratia est nobilior quam natura animæ; multa enim possumus per gratiam, ad quæ natura non sufficit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia non est qualitas.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.arg.3] Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for thus it would be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing; hence it is called a "new creature"(Galatians 6:15).
[I-II.q.110.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulla qualitas remanet, post-quam desinit esse in subjecto. Sed gratia remanet; non enim corrumpitur, quia sic in nihilum redigeretur, sicut ex nihilo creatur: unde et dicitur nova creatura ad Galat., ult. Ergo gratia non est qualitas.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.sc] on Psalm 103:15: "That he may make the face cheerful with oil"; the gloss says: "Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which wins the Divine love." But beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. Therefore grace is a quality.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.sc] Sed contra est, quod, super illud ps. cii, 15: Ut exhilaret faciem in oleo, dicit Glossa ord., col. 1016, t. 2, quod « gratia est nitor animæ, sanctum concilians amorem. » Sed nitor animæ est quædam qualitas sicut et pulchritudo corporis. Ergo gratia est quædam qualitas.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), there is understood to be an effect of God's gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God's grace. Now it was stated (109, 1) that man is aided by God's gratuitous will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man's soul is moved by God to know or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; for "motion is the act of the mover in the moved." Secondly, man is helped by God's gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for this reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatural good, than for creatures, whom He loves that they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that not merely does He move them to their natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the principles of acts, in order that they may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and thus the movements whereby they are moved by God become natural and easy to creatures, according to Wisdom 8:1: "she . . . ordereth all things sweetly." Much more therefore does He infuse into such as He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a quality.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, in eo qui dicitur gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitæ Dei voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra, quod dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adjuvatur: uno modo inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum, vel agendum; et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animæ; « actus » enim « moventis in moto est motus, » ut dicitur in III Physic., text. 18. Alio modo adjuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate secundum quod aliquod habituale donum a Deo animæ infunditur; et hoc ideo, quia non est conveniens quod Ergo gratia actualis est quid a Deo distinctum, ab ipso causatum. Non est de fide gratiam sanctificantem esse rigorose et philosophice qualitatem seu habitum; id tamen est certo tenendum, quamvis illa gratia non sit habitus immediate operativus, sed habitus operativus mediate per virtutes infusas. Consulto Deus minus provideat his quos diligit ad supernaturale bonum habendum, quam creaturis, quas diligit ad bonum naturale habendum. Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet, ut non solum moveat eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis formas et virtutes quasdam, quæ sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinentur ad hujusmodi motus; et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur, fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles, secundum illud Sap., viii, 4: Et disponit omnia suaviter. Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale æternum infundit aliquas formas, seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum æternum consequendum; et sic donum gratiae qualitas quædam est.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.ad.1] Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod gratia, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur agere in animam, non per modum causæ efficientis, sed per modum causæ formalis, sicut albedo facit album, et justitia justum.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.ad.2] Every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as matter and form are called substance. And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode of being.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnis substantia vel est ipsa natura rei cujus est substantia, vel est pars naturæ; secundum quem modum materia vel forma substantia dicitur. Et quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis; sed est forma accidentalis ipsius animæ. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo, accidentaliter fit in anima participante divinam bonitatem, ut de scientia patet. Secundum hoc ergo, quia anima imperfecte participat divinam bonitatem, ipsa participatio divinæ bonitatis, quæ est gratia, imperfectiori modo habet esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat; est tamen nobilior quam natura animæ in quantum est expressio vel participatio divinæ bonitatis, non autem quantum ad modum essendi.
[I-II.q.110.a.2.ad.3] As Boethius [Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist] says, the "being of an accident is to inhere." Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but because by it something is; hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of nothing, i.e. not from merits, according to Ephesians 2:10, "created in Jesus Christ in good works."
[I-II.q.110.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Boetius in Isagog. Porphyr., dialog. ii, cap. « De accid., » col. 55, t. 2, « accidentis esse est inesse. » Unde omne accidens non dicitur ens, quasi ipsum esse habeat, sed quia a vocibus « qualitatis » et « habitus » duo concilia viennense scilicet et tridentinum abstinuerunt, ne quæstionem de nomine inter theologos controversam dirimerent. Cæterum S. Bonaventura, Guillermus, Pelbartus et communiter alii doctores gratiam habitum creatum esse tenent. eo aliquid est; unde et magis dicitur entis quam ens, ut dicitur in VII Metaph., text. 2. Et quia ejus est fieri vel corrumpi, cujus est esse; ideo proprie loquendo nullum accidens neque fit, neque corrumpitur; sed dicitur fieri vel corrumpi, secundum quod subjectum incipit vel desinit esse in actu secundum illud accidens. Et secundum hoc etiam gratia dicitur creari, ex eo quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, id est in novo esse constituuntur ex nihilo, id est non ex meritis, secundum illud Ephes., ii, 40: Creati in Christo Jesu in operibus bonis.
Article 3
[I-II.q.110.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is faith that worketh by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod gratia sit idem quod virtus. Dicit enim Augustinus, quod « gratia operans est fides quæ per dilectionem operatur, » ut habetur in libro De spiritu et littera, cap. xxxii, col. 237, t. 40. Sed fides quæ per dilectionem operatur, est virtus. Ergo gratia est virtus.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.arg.2] Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, since "it makes its subject good, and his work good," and "it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously," etc. Therefore grace is virtue.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, cuicumque convenit definitio, convenit et definitum. Sed definitiones de virtute datæ sive a sanctis, sive a philosophis, conveniunt gratia; ipsa enim « bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit; » ipsa etiam « est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, » etc. Ergo gratia est virtus.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.arg.3] Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the "fourth" species of quality; viz. "form" which is the "abiding figure of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the "third," since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the "second" species, which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the "first" species which is "habit" or "disposition." Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (57, A1,2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, gratia est qualitas quædam. Sed manifestum est quod non est in quarta specie qualitatis, quæ est « forma, et circa aliquid constans figura, » quia non pertinet ad corpus; neque etiam in tertia est, quia non est « passio » vel « passibilis qualitas, » quæ est in parte animæ sensitiva, ut probatur in VIII Physic., text. 14 et seq.; ipsa autem gratia principaliter est in mente; neque iterum est in secunda specie, quæ est potentia vel impotentia naturalis; quia gratia est supra naturam, et non se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut potentia naturalis. Ergo relinquitur quod sit in prima specie quæ est habitus vel dispositio. Habitus autem mentis sunt virtutes; quia etiam ipsa scientia quodammodo est virtus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia est idem quod virtus.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.sc] If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is not virtue.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.sc] Sed contra, si gratia est virtus, maxime videtur quod sit aliqua trium theologicarum virtutum. Sed gratia non est fides vel spes, quia hæ possunt esse sine gratia gratum faciente; neque etiam charitas, quia « gratia praevenit charitatem, » ut Augustinus dicit in libro De dono persev., cap. xvi, § 41, col. 1018, t. 10. Ergo gratia non est virtus.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.co] Some held that grace and virtue were identical in essence, and differed only logically--in the sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously--and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).
But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), "virtue is disposition of what is perfect--and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature." Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke above (55, seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Peter 1:4: "He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature." And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God.
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Ephesians 5:8): "For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as children of the light." For as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt idem esse gratiam et virtutem secundum essentiam, sed differre solum secundum rationem; ut gratia dicatur, secundum quod facit hominem Deo gratum vel secundum quod gratis datur; virtus autem secundum quod perficit ad bene operandum. Et hoc videtur sensisse Magister in II Sent., dist. xxvi. Sed si quis recte consideret rationem virtutis, hoc stare non potest: quia, ut Philosophus dicit in VII Physic., text. 17, « virtus est quædam dispositio perfecti; dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. » Ex quo patet quod virtus uniuscujusque rei dicitur in ordine ad aliquam naturam pra-existentem, quando scilicet unumquodque sic est dispositum, secundum quod congruit suæ naturæ. Manifestum est autem, quod virtutes acquisitæ per actus humanos, de quibus supra dictum est, sunt dispositiones, quibus homo convenienter disponitur in ordine ad naturam, qua homo est. Virtutes autem infusæ disponunt homines altiori modo, et ad altiorem finem; unde etiam oportet quod in ordine ad aliquam altiorem naturam, hoc est, in ordine ad naturam divinam participatam, quæ dicitur lumen gratia, secundum quod dicitur II Petr., i, 4: Maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut per hæc efficiamini divinæ consortes naturæ. Et secundum acceptionem hujusmodi naturæ dicimur regenerari in filios Dei. Sicut igitur lumen naturale rationis est aliquid præter virtutes acquisitas, quæ dicuntur in ordine ad ipsum lumen naturale; ita etiam ipsum lumen gratia, quod est participatio divinæ naturæ, est aliquid præter virtutes infusas, quæ a lumine illo derivantur, et ad illud lumen ordinantur; unde Apostolus dicit ad Ephes., v, 8: Eratis aliquando tenebræ, nunc autem lux in Domino; ut filii lucis ambulate. Sicut enim virtutes acquisitæ perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum, congruenter lumini naturali rationis; ita virtutes infusæ perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum, congruenter lumini gratiae.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.ad.1] Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity" grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus nominat « fidem per dilectionem operantem » gratiam, quia actus fidei per dilectionem operantis est primus actus in quo gratia gratum faciens manifestatur.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.ad.2] Good is placed in the definition of virtue with reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum positum in definitione virtutis dicitur secundum convenientiam ad aliquam naturam praeexistentem, vel essentialem, vel participatum; sic autem bonum non attribuitur gratiae, sed sicut radici bonitatis in homine, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.ad.3] Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root.
[I-II.q.110.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis; nec tamen est idem quod virtus, sed habitudo quaedam, quae praesupponitur virtutibus infusis, sicut earum principium et radix.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-secundae/q110.json