Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q5. Those who have faith
Source context
- Theme
- the subjects of faith — who possesses faith and under what conditions
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 130, 1911-12-02Steiner identifies faith as a force residing in the human soul that must be consciously cultivated, distinguishing it as an inner capacity rather than a merely inherited disposition.
- GA 135, 1912-02-21Steiner argues that contrasting faith with knowledge reflects superficial logic, and that those with genuine spiritual insight recognise faith as a prerequisite for the acquisition of knowledge across incarnations.
- GA 95, 1906-09-04Steiner notes that in the Middle Ages a specific form of instruction arose precisely for those who experienced an inner tension between faith and knowledge, identifying this as a historically conditioned need.
Cross-tradition
- Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II Q1–2Aquinas establishes that faith is an act of the intellect moved by the will under grace, and Q5 delimits its proper subjects — those capable of receiving the infused theological virtue — in structural parallel to Steiner's identification of faith as a soul-force requiring inner conditions for its activation.
- Islamic kalam (ilm al-yaqin)Classical Islamic theology distinguishes degrees of certainty (knowledge, inference, direct witnessing) among those who hold belief, showing cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's graduated account of who properly possesses faith.
Q5. Those who have faith
Article 1
[II-II.q.5.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there was no faith, either in the angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh St. Victor says in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation." Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to contemplation, since "they saw things in the Word," according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that "in his original state man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation." Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original state.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angelus aut homo in sua prima conditione fidem non habuerit. Dicit enim Hugo de Sancto Victore, in suis Sententiis, lib. I De sacram., part. x, cap. π, col. 330, t. 2, quod « quia homo oculum contemplationis non habet, Deum et quæ in Deo sunt, videre non valet. » Sed angelus in statu suæ primæ conditionis ante confirmationem vel lapsum habuit oculum contemplationis; « videbat enim res in verbo, » ut Augustinus dicit in II Super Genes. ad litt., c. viii, § 17, col. 270, t. 3; et similiter primus homo Et primo citior. Scientia etenim naturalis ad quam pertinet probare Deum esse, et esse unum, et alia hujusmodi de Deo, ultimo hominibus addiscenda proponitur, suppositis multis aliis scientiis, et non nisi post multum tempus. Unde metaphysica quæ circa divina versatur inter philosophiæ partes ultima remanet addiscenda. Nec ad cognitionem etiam rerum sensibilium homo pertingere potest, nisi post longum studium, et de quodam philosopho dicitur quod stetit triginta annis in deserto ut cognosceret naturam apis. Quanto ergo magis post multum tempus vacabit ad naturalem cognitionem divinorum, quæ statim per fidem percipere potest, postquam ad usum rationis pervenerit. Secundo communior. Multi enim in studio scientia naturalis proficere non possunt propter multa impedimenta, ut complexionis indispositionem, rei familiaris necessitatem, pigritiam, etc. Sed cognitio fidei communis est omnibus hominibus. Tertio amplior. Nam per rationem naturalem possumus cognoscere de Deo quod sit, et sit unus, omnipotens, justus, etc. Non vero quod sit trinus in personis, nec quod sit incarnatus, passus, etc. Unde Apostolus : Loquimur Dei sapientiam quæ abscondita est, quam nemo principum hujus sæculi cognovit. Principes autem in hoc loco sunt philo-in statu innocentiæ videtur habuisse oculum contemplationis apertum; dicit enim Hugo de Sancto Victore in suis Sententiis, loc. cit., part. vi, cap. xiv, col. 271, t. 2, quod « cognovit homo in primo statu Creatorem suum, non ea cognitione qua foris ex auditu solo percipitur, sed ea quæ potius intus per inspirationem ministratur; non ea qua Deus modo a credentibus absens fide quæritur, sed ea qua tunc per præsentiam contemplationis scienti manifestius cernebatur. » Ergo homo vel angelus in statu primæ conditionis fidem non habuit.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.arg.2] Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure, according to 1 Corinthians 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Now in their original state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original state.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, cognitio fidei est ænigmatica et obscura, secundum illud I ad Cor., xiii, 12 : Videmus nunc per speculum in ænig-mate. Sed in statu primæ conditionis non fuit aliqua obscuritas neque in homine neque in angelo, quia tenebrositas est pœna pecati. Ergo fides in statu primæ conditionis esse non potuit neque in homine, neque in angelo.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.arg.3] Further, the Apostle says (Romans 10:17) that "faith . . . cometh by hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in their original state; for then they could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Apostolus dicit ad Rom., x, 17, quod fides est ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi. Sed hoc locum non habuit in primo statu angelicæ conditionis aut humanæ; non enim erat ibi auditus ab alio. Ergo fides in statu illo non erat neque in homine, neque in angelo.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.sc] It is written (Hebrews 11:6): "He that cometh to God, must believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., xi, 6 : Credere oportet accedentem ad Deum quia est, et inquirentibus se remunerator sit. Sed angelus et homo in sui sophi, secundum Glossam. Ideo majorem cognitionem de divinis habere potest hodie una vetula quam olim maximi philosophi, Plato, Aristoteles, etc. Quarto est utilior. Nullius enim meriti est credere quod terra moveatur, vel quod homo sit mortalis, et hujusmodi, quæ vel humana ratione, vel humano sensu cognoscuntur. Sed assentiri his quæ humana ratione comprehendi non possunt, et ex divina revelatione cognoscuntur, est maximi meriti, duplici ratione, scilicet ratione reverentiae quam exhibet homo Deo, credendo propter auctoritatem Dei ea etiam quæ non capit, — et ratione humilitatis qua humiliat intellectum suum homo coram intellectu divino. Hyppocrates et Pythagoras induxerant hanc legem discipulis suis, ut non auderent in sententiis interrogare propter quid, sed eis pro ratione esset dicentis auctoritas : quanto magis auctoritas divina pro ratione habenda est. De hominibus dubitari potest; de Deo, quando revelat, dubitare non licet. Fides tamen habet meritum, quia humana ratio non ei præbet experimentum. Hæc tractantur in dist. xviii, part. iii, lib. I Speculi moralis. Edit. hic et supra addunt : « apertum. » Parm. : Dei. prima conditione erant in statu accedendi ad Deum. Ergo fide indigebant.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.co] Some say that there was no faith in the angels before they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that appear not," according to the Apostle (Hebrews 11:2), and since "by faith we believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude faith.
It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith. And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as some [St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29 hold, perhaps one might hold that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.
Since, however, we stated in I, 62, 3; I, 95, 1 that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Question 4, Article 7). Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe that in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a creature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another, even in the present state, as we have shown above (1, 5; 2, 4, ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we cannot know except by believing them.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod in angelis ante confirmationem et lapsum, et in homine ante peccatum, non fuit fides, propter manifestam contemplationem, quæ tunc erat de rebus divinis. Sed cum fides sit argumentum non apparentium, secundum Apostolum, Hebr., xi, « et per fidem credantur ea quæ non videntur, » ut Augustinus dicit lib. I Quæst. evang., cap. xxxix, col. 4352, t. 3, illa sola manifestatio excludit fidei rationem, per quam redditur apparens vel visum id de quo principaliter est fides. Principale autem objectum fidei est veritas prima, cujus visio beatos facit, et fidei succedit. Cum ergo angelus ante confirmationem, et homo ante peccatum non habuerit illam beatitudinem qua Deus per essentiam videtur, manifestum est quod non habuit sic manifestam cognitionem, quod excluderetur ratio fidei. Unde, quod non habuerit fidem, hoc esse non potuit nisi quia penitus ei erat ignotum id de quo est fides. Et si homo et angelus fuerunt creati in puris naturalibus, ut quidam dicunt, forte posset teneri quod fides non fuerit in angelo ante confirmationem, nec in homine ante peccatum. Cognitio enim fidei est supra naturalem cognitionem de Deo non solum hominis, sed etiam angeli. Sed quia in primo jam diximus, quod homo et angelus creati sunt cum dono gratiae, ideo necesse est dicere quod per gratiam acceptam et nondum consummatam fuerit in eis inchoatio quædam speratæ beatitudinis; quæ quidem inchoatur in voluntate per spem et charitatem, sed in intellectu per fidem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod angelus ante confirmationem habuerat fidem, et similiter homo ante peccatum. Sed tamen considerandum est, quod in objecto fidei est aliquid quasi formale, scilicet veritas prima super omnem naturalem cognitionem creaturæ existens, et aliquid materiale, sicut id cui assentimus, inhærendo primæ veritati. Quantum ergo ad primum horum, communiter fides est in omnibus habentibus cognitionem de Deo, futura beatitudine nondum adepta, inhærendo primæ veritati; sed quantum ad ea quæ materialiter credenda proponuntur, quædam sunt credita ab uno quæ sunt manifeste scita ab alio, etiam in statu præsenti, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc etiam potest dici quod angelus ante confirmationem, et homo ante peccatum, quædam de divinis mysteriis manifesta cognitione cognoverunt, quæ nunc non possumus cognoscere nisi credendo.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.ad.1] Although the words of Hugh of St. Victor are those of a master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence. Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light of wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quam vis dicta Hugonis de Sancto Victore magistralia sint, et robur auctoritatis non habeant, tamen potest dici quod contemplatio quæ tollit necessitatem fidei, est contemplatio patriæ, qua supernaturalis veritas per essentiam videtur. Hanc autem contemplationem non habuit angelus ante confirmationem, nec homo ante peccatum; sed eorum contemplatio erat altior quam nostra, per quam magis de propinquo accedentes ad Edit. : « habuit. » Sic cod.; edit. omnes : « robur auctoritatis habeant. » Sed S. Thomas vult innuere quod dicta Hugonis de Sancto Victore non aliam vim habeant quam dicta unius optimi magistri in theologia. Ita mss. et editi plurimi; edit. Patav. : « ratio-nem fidei. » Respondet Halensis : « In angelis non fuit fides primæ veritatis, sed fuit quædam scientia imperfecta respectu cognitionis beatæ. Ad quod intelligendum possunt poni tres gradus ex parte cognitionis intellectivæ, quemadmodum nos invenimus ex parte cognitionis sensitivæ. Est enim quædam cognition de dulci per auditum, per visum, per gustum. Cum auditur de re quia dulcis, si interveniat credulitas, fides est; si vero adveniat visio, cognitio est quædam speculativa; si vero adveniat gustus, experientia est, et completa cognitio de dulcedine. Ita et per intellectum, acceptio quædam est primæ veritatis quasi per auditum, cum non videtur, et est fidei. Quædam vero quasi per visum, cum scilicet per quamdam speculationem lux veri-tatis percipitur, sed non dulcedo. Quædam vero acceptio quasi per gustum, cum scilicet non solum speculatione lucet, sed sensu dulcedinis perfecte percipitur. Prima cognitio non est ponenda in angelis ante confirmationem et lapsum; sed ponitur in angelis post lapsum. Tertia vero ponenda est in angelis bonis post confirmationem. Media vero ponitur in angelis universaliter, ante confirmationem et lapsum. » Idem Alexander Halens. : « Adam in primo statu non habuit fidem in ratione fidei. Et hoc patet, si quis consideret comparisonem cognitionis quæ per fidem est, et cognitionis quæ erat in Adam ante peccatum ad cognitionem gloriae. Cognitio enim quæ est per fidem evacuatur, adveniente gloria. Cognitio vero Adæ de Deo non evacuaretur, adveniente gloria, si stetisset, sed perficeretur. » — Sed theologi tenent fidem theologicam fuisse pro statu viæ in angelis, sicut et in primis parentibus pro statu innocentiæ, et ut Scotus dicit : « Fides infusa fuit necessaria homini salvando pro omni statu. » Deum, plura manifeste cognoscere poterant de divinis effectibus et mysteriis, quam nos possumus. Unde non inerat fides, qua ita quæreretur Deus absens, sicut a nobis quæritur; erat enim res magis præsens per lumen sapientiæ, quam sit nobis; licet nec eis esset ita præsens, sicut est beatis per lumen gloriæ.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.ad.2] There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in statu primæ conditionis hominis vel angeli non erat obscuritas culpæ vel pœnæ; inerat ta-men intellectui hominis et angeli quædam obscuritas naturalis, secundum quod omnis creatura tenebra est comparata immensitati divini luminis; et talis obscuritas sufficit ad fidei rationem.
[II-II.q.5.a.1.ad.3] In the original state there was no hearing anything from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Psalm 84:9: "I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me."
[II-II.q.5.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in statu primæ conditionis non erat auditus ab homine exterius loquente, sed a Deo interius inspirante; sicut et prophetæ audiebant, secundum illud psal. Lxxxiv, 9: Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus.
Article 2
[II-II.q.5.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the demons have no faith. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the believer's will": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above (I, 64, 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is no faith.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in dæmonibus non sit fides. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De prædest. sanct., c. v, § 10, col. 968, t. 10, quod « fides consistit in credentium voluntate. » Hæc autem voluntas bona est, qua quis vult credere Deo. Cum ergo in dæmonibus non sit aliqua voluntas deliberata bona, ut in I dictum est, videtur quod in dæmonibus non sit fides.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.arg.2] Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Ephesians 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift of God." Now, according to a gloss on Hosea 3:1, "They look to strange gods, and love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their gifts of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons after they sinned.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fides est quoddam donum divinæ gratiae secundum illud Ephes., π, 8: Gratia estis salvati per fidem; Dei enim Sic cod.; in edit. : « inerat eis fides...; erat enim eis magis. » — « Ad ipsam quoque fidem, quæ in voluntate est, etc. » Migne. — Desumpta ex Hieronymo in eumdem locum, col. 842. Al. : « Sed quia convincitur per auctoritatem divinam assentire his quæ non videt, et propter imperium voluntatis moventis intellectum, et obedientis Deo. » Nicolaï omittit : « obedientis Deo. » Garcia Parm., et aliæ edit. addunt superflue : « moventis intellectum. » Docet Scotus angelum habuisse in statu viæ speciem distincte repræsentantem deitatem et personas. Non inde sequitur angelum in statu viæ non habuisse fidem. Nam habuit fidem circa mys- donum est. Sed dæmones dona gratuita amiserunt per peccatum, ut dicitur in Glossa super illud Oseæ, Ⅲ: Ipsi respiciunt ad deos alienos, et diligunt vinacia uvarum. Ergo fides in dæmonibus post peccatum non remansit.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.arg.3] Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on John 15:22, "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin." Now the sin of unbelief is in some men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in the demons there is no faith.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, infidelitas videtur esse gravius peccatum inter peccata, ut patet per Augustinum Tractatus Lxxxix in Joan., § 1, col. 1856, t. 3, super illud Joan., xv, 22: Si non venissem, et locutus eis non fuissem, peccatum non haberent; nunc autem excusationem non habent de peccato suo. Sed in quibusdam hominibus est peccatum infidelitatis. Si ergo fides esset in dæmonibus, aliquorum hominum peccatum esset gravius peccato dæmonum; quod videtur esse inconveniens. Non ergo fides est in dæmonibus.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.sc] It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe and tremble."
[II-II.q.5.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jac., π, 49: Dæmones credunt et contremiscunt.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.co] As stated above (1, 4; 2, 1), the believer's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something, and were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence of faith would not be removed.
Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons, but only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby they recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, intellectus credentis assentit rei creditæ, non quia ipsam videat vel secundum se, vel per resolutionem ad prima principia per se visa, sed propter imperium voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas moveat intellectum ad assentiendum, potest contingere ex duobus : uno modo ex ordine voluntatis ad bonum; et sic credere est actus laudabilis; alio modo quia intellectus convicitur ad hoc quod judicet esse credendum his quæ dicuntur, licet non convincatur per evidentiam rei; sicut si aliquis propheta prænuntiaret in sermone Domini aliquid futurum, et adhiberet signum, mortuum suscitando, ex hoc signo convinceret intellectus videntis, ut cognosceret manifeste hoc dici a Deo, qui non mentitur; licet illud futurum quod prædicitur, in se evidens non esset. Unde per hoc ratio fidei non tollere-tur. Dicendum est ergo, quod in fidelibus terium Incarnationis, illiusque mysterii antecedentia, concomitantia et consequentia. Aliunde ex hoc quod species in intellectu angelico, cum angelus adhuc erat viator, distincte repræsentasset ipsi personas divinas, non recte concludectetur angelum viatorem habuisse pro tunc intuitivam cognitionem personarum divinarum. Porro cognitio naturalis angelis est cognitio intuitiva. Unde non docet Scotus præcise angelum viatorem habuisse naturalem cognitionem divinarum personarum, et ideo quod docet Scotus de speciebus illis intellectus angeli viatoris non excludit in angelo viatore divinarum personarum cognitionem per fidem. Fides dæmonum non est infusa et superna- Christi laudatur fides secundum primum modum; et secundum hoc non est in dæmonibus, sed solum secundo modo; vident enim multa manifesta indicia, ex quibus percipiunt doctrinam Ecclesiæ a Deo esse; quamvis ipsi res ipsas quas Ecclesia docet, non videant, puta Deum esse trinum et unum, vel aliquid hujusmodi.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.ad.1] The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their belief.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dæmonum fides est quodammodo coacta ex signorum evidentia, et ideo non pertinet ad laudem voluntatis ipsorum quod credunt.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.ad.2] Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their natural intellectual acumen.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fides quæ est donum gratiae inclinat hominem ad credendum secundum aliquem affectum boni, etiamsi sit informis; unde fides quæ est in dæmonibus, non est donum gratiae, sed magis coguntur ad credendum ex perspicacitate naturalis intellectus.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.ad.3] The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so that their malice is by no means diminished by their believe.
[II-II.q.5.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc ipsum dæmonibus displicet quod signa fidei sunt tam evidentia, ut per ea credere compellantur; et ideo in nullo malitia eorum minuitur per hoc quod credunt.
Article 3
[II-II.q.5.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod hæreticus qui discredit unum articulum fidei, possit habere fidem informem de aliis articulus. Non enim intellectus naturalis hæretici est potentior quam intellectus catholici. Sed intellectus catholici indiget adjuvari ad credendum quemcumque articulum fidei dono fidei. Ergo videtur quod nec hæretici aliquos articulos fidei credere possint sine dono fidei informis.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.arg.2] Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some articles of faith without believing the others.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut sub fide continentur multi articuli fidei, ita sub una scientia, puta geometria, continentur multæ conclusiones. Sed homo aliquis potest habere scientiam geometriæ circa quasdam geometricas conclusiones, aliis ignoratis. Ergo homo aliquis potest habere fidem de aliquibus articulus fidei alios non credendo.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.arg.3] Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe some articles, and disbelieve others.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut homo obedit Deo ad credendum articulos fidei, ita etiam ad servanda mandata legis. Sed homo potest esse ab aliquibus. — S. Bonaventura duplicem fidem informem distinguit, unam quæ innititur primæ veritati propter aliquam rationem creatam, non tendit tamen in ipsam, amando; alteram quæ propter aliquam rationem creatam innititur veritati articulorum fidei. Hanc solam, non primam, concedit dæmonibus. Arnoldus autem hæreticus insipientisime dixit non differre Christianorum fidem a fide dæmonum. Quærunt insuper theologi utrum fides remaneat in beatis, in animabus purgatorii, in peccatoribus. Definitum est illam, sed mortuam, remanee in peccatore cujus peccatum non est peccatum infidelitatis. Certum est illam, et vivam, remanee in animabus purgatorii. Certum est tandem illam non remanere formaliter in beatis, quamvis dici possit illam in eis remanere eminenter. Sic intelligendi sunt Irenæus, lib. II, c. xlvii, et Tertullianus, lib. De pudicitia, cum docere videntur fidem remanee in beatis. Si dicas beatos habere fidem de futuro judicio, et de resurrectione corporum, etc. — Respondeo beatos non habere de his cognitionem obscuram fidei sed cognitionem claram et absque mysterio visionis intuitivæ. Si instes propter Paulum qui visionem beatificam habuit in raptu, nec tamen amisit fidem. Respondeo Paulum amisisse actum fidei incompossibilem cum actuali visione, non habitum fidei quia visio beata transunter tantum ipsi communicata fuit. obediens circa quædam mandata, et non circa alia. Ergo potest habere fidem circa quosdam articulos, et non circa alios.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.sc] Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves one article.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.sc] Sed contra, sicut peccatum mortale contrariatur charitati, ita discredere unum articulum contrariatur fidei. Sed charitas non remanet in homine post unum peccatum mortale. Ergo neque fides, postquam discredit unum articulum fidei.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.co] Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.
The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod is hæreticus qui discredit unum articulum fidei non habet habitum fidei neque formatæ, neque informis. Cujus ratio est, quia species cujuslibet habitus rerum dependet ex formali ratione objecti, qua sublata, species habitus remanere non potest. Formale autem objectum fidei est veritas prima, secundum quod manifestatur in Scripturis sacris et doctrina Ecclesiæ. Unde quicumque non inhæret sicut infallibili et divinæ regulæ, doctrinæ Ecclesiæ, quæ procedit ex veritate prima in Scripturis sacris manifestata, ille non habet habitum fidei; sed ea quæ sunt fidei, alio modo tenet quam per fidem; sicut si aliquis tenet mente aliquam conclusionem, non cognoscens medium illius demonstrationis, manifestum est quod non habet ejus scientiam, sed opinionem solum. Manifestum est autem, quod ille qui inhæret doctrinæ Ecclesiæ, tanquam infallibili regulæ, omnibus assentit quæ Ecclesia docet; alioquin, si de his quæ Ecclesia docet, quæ vult tenet, et quæ non vult non tenet, non jam inhæret Ecclesia doctrinæ, sicut infallibili regulæ, sed propriæ voluntati. Et sic manifestum est, quod hæreticus qui pertinaciter discredit unum articulum, non est paratus sequi in omnibus doctrinam Ecclesiæ; si enim non pertinaciter, jam non est hæreticus, sed solum errans. Unde manifestum est, quod talis hæreticus circa unum articulum, fidem non habet de aliis articulis, sed opinionem quamdam secundum propriam voluntatem.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.ad.1] A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod alios articulos fidei de quibus hæreticus non errat, non tenet eo modo sicut tenet eos fidelis, scilicet simpliciter inhærendo primæ veritati; ad quod indiget homo adjuvari per habitum fidei; sed tenet ea quæ sunt fidei, propria voluntate et judicio. Sic cod. in Parm.: « In hæretico discredente… non manet fides neque formata. » — « Rerum » in edit. deest. — Edit. addunt: « quæ procedit ex veritate prima. » — Sic cod.; in Parm.: « seu. »
[II-II.q.5.a.3.ad.2] The various conclusions of a science have their respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in diversis conclusionibus unius scientiæ sunt diversa media, per quæ probantur, quorum unum potest cognosci sine alio; et ideo homo potest scire quasdam conclusiones unius scientiæ, ignoratis aliis. Sed omnibus articulis fidei inhæret fides propter unum medium, scilicet propter veritatem primam propositam nobis in Scripturis secundum doctrinam Ecclesiæ intellectis sane. Et ideo qui ab hoc medio decidit, totaliter fide caret.
[II-II.q.5.a.3.ad.3] The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment, according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is become guilty of all."
[II-II.q.5.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod diversa præcepta legis possunt referri vel ad diversa motiva propria proxima, et sic unum sine alio servari potest; vel ad unum motivum primum, quod est perfecte obedire Deo, a quo decidit quicumque unum præceptum transgreditur, secundum illud Jacobi π, 10: Qui offendit in uno, factus est omnium reus.
Article 4
[II-II.q.5.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fides non possit esse major in uno quam in alio. Quantitas enim habitus attenditur secundum objecta. Sed quicumque habet fidem, credit omnia quæ sunt fidei; quia qui deficit ab uno totaliter amittit fidem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod fides non possit esse major in uno quam in alio.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.arg.2] Further, those things which consist in something supreme cannot be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme, because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."
[II-II.q.5.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ sunt in summo, non recipiunt magis et minus. Sed ratio fidei est in summo; requiritur enim ad fidem quod homo inhæreat primæ veritati super omnia. Ergo fides non recipit magis et minus.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.arg.3] Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above (Question 1, Article 7). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree by all the faithful.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ita se habet fides in cognitione gratuita, sicut intellectus principiorum in cognitione naturali, eo quod articuli fidei sunt prima principia gratuitæ cognitionis, ut ex dictis patet. Sed intellectus principiorum æqualiter inventur in omnibus hominibus. Ergo et fides æqualiter inventur in omnibus fidelibus.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.sc] Wherever we find great and little, there we find more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our Lord said to Peter (Matthew 14:31): "O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?" And to the woman he said (Matthew 15:28): "O woman, great is thy faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.co] As stated above (I-II, 52, 1,2; I-II, 112, 4), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its participation by the subject.
Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (Question 4, Article 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more explicit.
If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated above (2, 1,2; 4, 2). Consequently a man's faith may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, quantitas habitus ex duobus attendi potest: uno modo ex objecto, alio modo secundum participationem subjecti. Objectum autem fidei potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo secundum formalem rationem; alio modo secundum ea quæ materialiter credenda proponuntur. Formale autem objectum fidei est unum et simplex, scilicet veritas prima, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex hac parte fides non diversificatur in credentibus, sed est una specie in omnibus, ut supra dictum est. Sed ea quæ materialiter credenda proponuntur sunt plura, et possunt accipi vel magis vel minus explicite; et secundum hoc potest unus homo plura explicite credere quam alius; et sic in uno potest esse major fides secundum majorem fidei explicationem. Si vero consideretur fides secundum participationem subjecti, hoc contingit dupliciter: nam actus fidei procedit et ex intellectu et ex voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Potest ergo fides in aliquo dici major uno modo ex parte intellectus, propter majorem certitudinem et firmitatem; alio modo ex parte voluntatis, propter majorem promptitudinem, seu devotionem, vel confidentiam.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.ad.1] A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. On this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ille qui pertinaciter discredit aliquid eorum quæ sub fide continentur, non habet habitum fidei, quem tamen habet ille qui non explicite 1 Sic cod.; edit. addunt: « infusa. » — 2 Sic cod.; edit. addunt: « Dei. » B. Petrus Hieremias in Sermone de utilitate fidei sic se exprimit: « Si quis vellet omnes effectus fidei numerare, potius sibi tempus deficeret, aut memoria quam materia. Unde Apostolus loquens de fide dicit: Quid adhuc dicam? Deficiet enim me tempus enarrantem, Hebr., xi. Et hoc dicit post-quam multas laudes de fide narravit. — Aliquos ergo in præsenti sermone effectus fidei prosequemur. Ubi nota octo effectus: 1. fides peccata dimittit; 2. hominem Deo subjicit; 3. mundum vincit; 4. carnem comprimit; 5. dæmonem deprimit; 6. mirabilia facit; 7. gratiam infundit; 8. gloriam tribuit. » Speculum autem morale Vincentii Bello-vacensis duodecim enumerat effectus: 1. fides vivificat; 2. mentem illuminat; 3. aedificat; 4. Deo gratificat; 5. examinat; 6. a periculis liberat; credit omnia, sed paratus est omnia credere. Et secundum hoc ex parte objecti unus habet majorem fidem quam alius, inquantum plura explicite credit, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.ad.2] It is essential to faith that one should give the first place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater in one than in another.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod de ratione fidei est ut veritas prima omnibus præferatur; sed tamen eorum qui eam omnibus præferunt, quidam certius et devotius se ei subjiciunt quam alii; et secundum hoc fides est major in uno quam in alio.
[II-II.q.5.a.4.ad.3] The understanding of principles results from man's very nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above (I-II, 112, 4). Hence the comparison fails.
Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.5.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus principiorum consequitur ipsam naturam humanam, quæ aqualiter in omnibus invenitur; sed fides consequitur donum gratiae, quod non est aqualiter in omnibus. Unde non est eadem ratio. Et tamen secundum majorem capacitatem intellectus, unus magis vel minus cognoscit veritatem principiorum quam alius.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/secunda-secundae/q005.json