Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q6. The cause of faith
Source context
- Theme
- causation of faith — whether faith is infused by God or produced by human assent
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 212, 1922-05-27Steiner distinguishes faith from scientific knowledge, locating the latter in head-organisation while treating faith as a distinct soul-capacity not reducible to intellectual cognition.
- GA 246, 1908-08-17Steiner identifies the medieval separation of faith from knowledge — exemplified in scholastic method — as a structural rift whose consequences persisted into modern European spiritual life.
- GA 164, 1915-10-03Steiner treats the conflict between faith and knowledge as a consequence of forcing religious content into alignment with established natural-scientific achievements, diagnosing its origin in European intellectual history.
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta (śraddhā doctrine)In Advaita Vedanta, śraddhā (trust or faith) is a prerequisite for receiving scriptural instruction (śravaṇa), functioning as a preparatory inner disposition rather than a purely cognitive act — a structural parallel to Aquinas's treatment of faith as requiring both divine infusion and the will's free assent.
- Augustinian theology (gratia gratum faciens)Augustine locates the origin of faith entirely in divine grace (gratia), holding that the human will is incapable of initiating salvific faith — a position Aquinas qualifies by affirming both infused grace and the intellect's voluntary assent as co-causes.
Q6. The cause of faith
Article 1
[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fides non sit homini infusa a Deo. Dicit enim Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. XIV, 7. hostes superat tam corporales quam spirituales; 8. inducit fiduciam impetrandi; 9. præstat constantiam superandi; 10. facit omnia caduca et temporalia parvipendi; 11. mirificat, id est, mira signa et prodigia facit; 12. salvat et glorificat. Hæc omnia Speculum morale probat et testibus et exemplis. Notanda sunt inter exempla quæ dicit de conversione Helenæ, de Euchario, Valerio et Materno missis ad prædicandum Theutonicis, de conversione S. Dionysii Areopagitæ, de infortuniis Judæorum, de libro a S. Dominico conscripto, qui ter in ignem projectus, ter resiliit illæsus, de conversione Clodovei, qui, « desperans de victoria, vovit, si vinceet, quod fieret christianus, » et « statim vicit Alemannos omnes, » et de felici ob-sidione per eumdem Clodoveum urbis Pictavis, contra Alaricum. cap. 1, § 3, col. 1037, t. 8, quod « per scientiam gignitur in nobis fides, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur. » Sed ea quæ per scientiam in nobis gignuntur, magis videntur acquisita esse quam infusa. Ergo fides non videtur in nobis esse ex infusione divina.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.2] Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (John 4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house"; and (Romans 10:17) it is said that "faith is through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud ad quod homo pertingit audiendo et videndo, videtur esse ab homine acquisitum. Sed homo pertingit ad credendum et videndo miracula, et audiendo fidei doctrinam; dicitur enim Joan., iv, 53: Cognovit pater quia illa hora erat in qua dixit ei Jesus: Filius tuus vivit; et credidit ipse; et domus ejus tota. Et Rom., x, 17, dicitur quod fides est ex auditu. Ergo fides habetur ab homine tanquam acquisita.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.3] Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod consistit in hominis voluntate, ab homine potest acquiri. Sed « fides consistit in credentium voluntate, » ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De prædest. sanctorum, cap. v, § 10, col. 968, t. 10. Ergo fides potest esse ab homine acquisita.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.sc] It is written (Ephesians 2:8-9): "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . . . for it is the gift of God."
[II-II.q.6.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes., 11, 8: Gratia estis salvati per fidem; et hoc non ex vobis..., Dei enim donum est...; ne quis glorietur.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.co] Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Romans 10:15: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?"
As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.
The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad fidem duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut homini credibilia proponantur; quod requiritur ad hoc quod homo aliquid explicite credat. Aliud autem quod ad fidem requiritur, est assensus credentis ad ea quæ proponuntur. Quantum ergo ad primum horum, necesse est quod fides sit a Deo. Ea enim quæ sunt fidei, excedunt rationem humanam; unde non cadunt in contemplatione hominis, nisi Deo revelante. Sed quibusdam quidem revelantur immediate a Deo; sicut sunt revelata apostolis et prophetis; quibusdam autem proponuntur a Deo mittente fidei prædicatores, secundum illud Rom., x, 15: Quomodo prædicabunt, nisi mittantur? Qantum vero ad secundum, scilicet ad assensum hominis in ea quæ sunt fidei, potest considerari duplex causa: una qui dem exterius inducens, sicut miraculum visum, vel persuasio hominis inducentis ad fidem; quorum neutrum est sufficiens causa: videntium enim unum et idem miraculum, et audientium eamdem prædicationem, quidam credunt, et quidam non credunt. Et ideo oportet ponere aliam causam interiorem, quæ movet hominem interiorem ad assentiendum his quæ sunt fidei. Hanc autem causam Pelagiani ponebant solum liberum arbitrium hominis, et propter hoc dicebant quod initium fidei est ex nobis; inquantum scilicet ex nobis est quod parati sumus ad assentiendum his quæ sunt fidei, sed consummatio fidei, est a Deo, per quem nobis proponuntur ea quæ credere debemus. Sed hoc est falsum: quia cum homo, assentiendo his quæ sunt fidei, elevetur supra naturam suam; oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus. Et ideo fides, quantum ad assensum, qui est principalis actus fidei, est a Deo interius movente per gra-tiam.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.1] Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per scientiam gignitur fides, et nutritur per modum exterioris persuasionis, quæ fit ab aliqua scientia; sed principalis et propria causa fidei est id, quod interius movet ad assentiendum.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.2] This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam ratio illa procedit de causa proponente exterius ea quæ sunt fidei, vel persuadente ad credendum vel verbo, vel facto.
[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.3] To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above (2, 3).
[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod credere quidem in voluntate credentium consistit; sed oportet quod voluntas hominis præparetur a Deo per gratiam, ad hoc quod elevetur in ea quæ sunt supra naturam, ut supra dictum est.
Article 2
[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. For it is written (Deuteronomy 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of God.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod fides informis non sit donum Dei. Dicitur enim Deuter., xxxii, 4, quod Dei perfecta sunt opera. Fides autem informis est quoddam imperfectum. Ergo fides informis non est opus Dei.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.2] Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from God, as stated above (I-II, 79, 2, ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith from God.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut actus dicitur deformis propter hoc quod caret debita forma, ita etiam fides dicitur informis propter hoc quod caret debita forma. Sed actus deformis peccati non est a Deo, ut supra dictum est. Ergo neque etiam fides informis est a Deo.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.3] Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is written (John 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quemcumque Deus sanat, totaliter sanat; dicitur enim Joan., VII, 23: Si circumcisionem accipit homo in sabbato, ut non solvatur lex Moysi; mihi indignamini, quia totum hominem sanum feci in sabbato? Sed per fidem homo sanatur ab infidelitate. Quicumque ergo donum fidei a Deo accipit, simul sanatur ab omnibus pecatis. Sed hoc non fit nisi per fidem formatam. Ergo sola fides formata est donum Dei. Non ergo fides informis.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.sc] A gloss on 1 Corinthians 13:2 says that "the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod quædam Glossa dicit I ad Cor., xiii, quod « fides quæ est sine charitate est donum Dei. » Hæc autem est informis. Ergo fides informis est donum Dei.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.co] Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the diaphanous body.
Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form, as stated above (Question 4, Article 4). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as stated above (Article 1). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a gift of God.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod informitas privatio quædam est. Est autem considerum, quod privatio quando quidem pertinet ad rationem speciei, quandoque autem non, sed supervenit rei jam habenti propriam speciem; sicut privatio debitæ commensurationis humorum est de ratione speciei ipsius ægritudinis; tenebrositas autem non est de ratione speciei ipsius diaphani, sed supervenit. Quia ergo cum assignatur causa alicujus rei, intelligitur assignari causa ejus, secundum quod in propria specie existit; ideo quod non est causa privationis, non potest dici esse causa illius rei ad quam pertinet privatio, sicut existens de ratione speciei ipsius; non enim potest dici causa ægritudinis quod non est causa distemperantiæ humorum; potest tamen dici aliquid esse causa diaphani, quamvis non sit causa obscuritatis, quæ non est de ratione speciei diaphani. Informitas autem fidei non pertinet ad rationem speciei ipsius fidei, cum fides dicatur informis propter defectum cujusdam exterioris formæ, sicut dictum est. Et ideo illud est causa fidei informis, quod est causa fidei simpliciter dictæ. Hoc autem est Deus, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod fides informis sit donum Dei.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.1] Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod fides informis, etsi non sit perfecta simpliciter perfectione virtutis, est tamen perfecta qua-dam perfectione quæ sufficit ad fidei rationem.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.2] The deformity of an act is essential to the act's species, considered as a moral act, as stated above (I, 48, 1, ad 2; I-II, 18, 5): for an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He is the cause of the act as such.
We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod deformitas actus est de ratione speciei ipsius actus, secundum quod est actus moralis, ut supra dictum est; dicitur enim actus deformis per privationem formæ intrinsecæ, quæ est debita commensuratio circumstantiarum actus. Et ideo non potest dici causa actus deformis Deus, qui non est causa deformitatis, licet sit causa actus, inquantum est actus. Vel dicendum, quod deformitas non solum importat privationem debitæ formæ, sed etiam contrariam dispositionem: unde deformitas se habet ad actum, sicut falsitas ad fidem. Et ideo, sicut actus deformis non est a Deo, ita nec aliqua fides falsa; et sicut fides informis est a Deo, ita etiam actus qui sunt boni ex genere, quamvis non sint charitate formati, sicut plerumque in peccatoribus contingit, sunt a Deo.
[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.3] He who receives faith from God without charity, is healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given to some without charity.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui accipit a Deo fidem absque charitate, non simpliciter sanatur ab infidelitate, quia non removetur culpa præcedentis infidelitatis; sed sanatur secundum quid, ut scilicet ceset a tali peccato. Hoc autem frequenter contingit quod aliquis desistat ab uno actu peccati, etiam Deo hoc faciente, qui tamen ab actu alterius peccati non desistit, propria iniquitate suggerente. Et per hunc etiam modum datur aliquando homini a Deo quod credat; non tamen datur ei charitatis do-num; sicut etiam aliquibus absque charitate datur donum prophetiae, vel aliquod simile.
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