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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q12. Apostasy

Source context
Theme
deliberate renunciation of Christian faith and its moral-theological gravity
Soul-faculty
Consciousness Soul

Steiner

  • GA 223, 1923-09-28Steiner characterizes 19th-century materialism as an apostasy from the Michael power, treating departure from spiritual orientation as a cosmic-historical event with objective consequences.
  • GA 342, 1921-06-15Steiner references the apostasy of spiritual beings in connection with pre-hereditary cosmic conditions, framing willful departure from spiritual order as a primordial structural possibility within evolution.
  • GA 68c, 1906-11-28Steiner notes that in the medieval worldview, seeking the divine in nature was treated as apostasy from orthodox religious authority, illustrating how the concept functioned as a boundary-marker of legitimate spiritual inquiry.

Cross-tradition

  • Patristic theology (Augustine)Augustine's treatment of apostasy as a turning of the will away from the summum bonum provides the patristic background Aquinas systematizes in Q12, framing apostasy as a defect of the will rather than merely of intellect.
  • Islamic jurisprudence (riddah)Islamic law's category of riddah (apostasy) shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's Q12 in treating formal renunciation of faith as a legally and morally distinct act from mere unbelief.

Q12. Apostasy

Article 1

[II-II.q.12.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Sirach 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God," and further on, (Sirach 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod satisfactio non sit neque virtus neque actus virtutis. Omnis enim virtutis actus est meritorius. Sed satisfactio non est meritoria, ut videtur, quia meritum gratui-tum est; sed satisfactio debitum attendit. Ergo satisfactio non est actus virtutis.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.arg.2] Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, or even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Proverbs 6:12-14): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he soweth discord." Moreover if anyone were to have himself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis actus virtutis est voluntarius. Sed aliquando fit alicui satisfactio de aliquo, eo invito; ut quando aliquis pro offensa in alterum commissa a judice punitur. Ergo satisfactio non est virtutis actus.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.arg.3] Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said (10, 5). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, in VIII Ethic., cap. xiii, in fin., « in virtute moris principale est electio. » Sed satisfactio non fit per electionem, sed respicit principaliter exteriora opera. Ergo non est virtutis actus.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.sc] It is written (John 6:67): "Many of his disciples went back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously (John 6:65): "There are some of you that believe not." Therefore apostasy pertains to unbelief.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.sc] Sed contra, satisfactio ad pœnitentiam pertinet. Sed pœnitentia est virtus. Ergo et satisfactio est actus virtutis. Præterea, nullus actus operatur ad deletionem peccati, nisi actus virtutis, avertendi. Aliqui sustinuerunt posse revelari hæresim, crimen læsæ majestatis, et impedimenta matrimonii. Erasmus aiebat: jam sunt casus quidam excepti, in quibus fas est prodere confitentem. Joannes Denison librum scripseit de impietate sigilli confessionis. quia contrarium destruitur per suum contrarium; sed per satisfactionem peccatum totaliter annihilatur. Ergo satisfactio est virtutis actus.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.co] Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen in various ways according to the different kinds of union between man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or "Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.

But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of perfidy." On this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquis actus dicitur esse actus virtutis dupliciter: uno modo materialiter: et sic quilibet actus qui malitiam non habet implicitam vel defectum debitæ circumstantiæ, actus virtutis dici potest, quia quolibet tali actu potest uti virtus in suum finem, sicut est ambulare, loqui, et hujusmodi. Alio modo dicitur actus aliquis esse actus virtutis formaliter, quia ipse in suo nomine formam et rationem virtutis implicitam habet; sicut fortiter sustinere dicitur actus fortitudinis. Formale autem cujuslibet virtutis moralis est ratio medii. Unde omnis actus qui rationem medii importat actus virtutis formaliter dicitur. Et quia æqualitas medium est, quod suo nomine satisfactio importat, non enim dicitur aliquid satisfieri nisi secundum proportionem æqualitatis ad aliquid, constat quod satisfactio etiam formaliter est actus virtutis.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.ad.1] This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy, which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis satisfacere in se sit debitum, tamen inquantum satisfaciens voluntarie hoc opus exequitur, rationem gratuiti accipit ex parte operantis, et sic operans facit de necessitate virtutem; ex hoc enim debitum diminuere habet meritum, quod necessitatem importat, quæ voluntati contrariatur; unde si voluntas necessitati consentiat, ratio meriti non toletur.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.ad.2] It belongs to faith not only that the heart should believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. On this way too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies most truly to an apostate from the faith. For since faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without faith it is "impossible to please God"; when once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining of eternal salvation, for which reason it is written (Proverbs 6:12): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is the life of the soul, according to Romans 1:17: "The just man liveth by faith." Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result is that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from the faith even as he severed himself.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod actus virtutis non requirit voluntarium in eo qui patitur, sed in eo qui facit, quia illius actus est. Et ideo cum ille in quem judex vindictam exercet, se habeat ut patiens ad satisfactionem, non ut agens, non oportet quod in eo voluntarie sit satisfactio, sed in judice faciente.

[II-II.q.12.a.1.ad.3] The species of a quality or form are not diversified by the fact of its being the term "wherefrom" or "whereto" of movement: on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term "whereto" of the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance thereof, according to 2 Peter 2:21: "It had been better for them not to know the truth [Vulgate: 'the way of justice'], than after they had known it, to turn back."

[II-II.q.12.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod principale in virtute potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo principale in ipsa, inquantum est virtus; et sic ea quæ ad rationem pertinent, vel magis ei propinqua sunt, principaliora sunt in virtute, et sic electio et interiores actus in virtute, inquantum hujusmodi, principaliores sunt: alio modo potest accipi principale in virtute inquantum est talis virtus; et sic prin-cipalius in ipsa est ex quo determina-tionem recipit. Actus autem interiores, in aliquibus virtutibus determinantur per actus exteriores, quia electio, quæ est communis omnibus virtutibus, ex hoc quod est electio talis actus, efficitur propria hujus virtutis. Et sic actus exteriores in aliquibus virtutibus sunt principaliores; et ita etiam est in satisfac-tione.

Article 2

[II-II.q.12.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [St. Augustine, Super Psalm 124:3 says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate, nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to them, "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to their prince on account of his apostasy.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod satisfactio non sit actus justitiæ, quia satisfactio fit ad hoc quod reconcilietur homo ei quem offendit. Sed recon-ciliatio, cum sit amoris, ad charitatem pertinet. Ergo satisfactio est actus charitatis, et non justitiæ.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.arg.2] Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects from allegiance to their sovereign.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, causæ peccatorum in nobis sunt passiones animæ, quibus ad malum incitamur. Sed justitia, secundum Philosophum, lib. II Ethic., cap. 11 et 111, non est circa passiones, sed circa operationes. Cum ergo ad satisfactionem pertineat peccatorum causas excidere, ut in Littera dicitur, IV, dist. xv, videtur quod non sit actus justitiæ.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.arg.3] Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his apostatizing from the faith.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, cavere in futurum non est actus justitiæ, sed magis prudentiæ, cujus pars ponitur cautela. Sed hoc pertinet ad satisfactionem, quia ipsius est suggestionibus peccatorum aditum non in-dulgere. Ergo satisfactio non est actus justitiæ.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.sc] Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority, absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons, until these shall have made amends." Now apostates from the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal [Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore princes should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the faith.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.sc] Sed contra, nulla virtus attendit rationem debiti nisi justitia. Sed satisfactio honorem debitum Deo impendit, ut Anselmus ait in lib. I Cur Deus homo, cap. x1, col. 377, t. 4. Ergo satisfactio est actus justitiæ. Præterea, nulla virtus habet rerum exteriorum adæquationem perficere nisi justitia. Sed hoc fit per satisfactionem, qua constituitur æqualitas emendæ ad offensam pracedentem. Ergo satisfactio est justitiæ actus.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 10, Article 10), unbelief, in itself, is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the law of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul human right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account of other sins.

Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption of the faith, since, as was stated above (1, Objection 2), "a man that is an apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . . soweth discord," in order to sever others from the faith. Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are "ipso facto" absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound to him.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum, in V Ethic., cap. 11 et 14, medium justitiæ accipitur secundum adæquationem rei ad rem in proportionalitate aliqua. Unde cum talem adæquationem ipsum nomen satisfactionis importet, quia hoc adverbium, satis, æqualitatem proportionis designat, constat quod satisfactio formaliter justitiæ actus est. Sed justitiæ actus, secundum Philosophum, lib. V Ethic., cap. 11 et 14, est vel sui ad alterum, ut quando aliquis reddit alteri quod ei debet, vel alterius ad alterum, sicut quando judex facit justitiam inter duos. Quando autem est actus justitiæ sui ad alterum, æqualitas in ipso faciente constituitur; quando autem alterius ad alterum, æqualitas constituitur injustum passo. Et quia satisfactio æqualitatem in ipso faciente exprimit, dicit actum justitiæ qui est sui ad alterum, proprie loquendo. Sed sui ad alterum potest aliquis facere justitiam vel in actionibus et passionibus, vel in rebus exterioribus; sicut etiam injuria fit alteri subtrahendo res, vel per aliquam actionem laedendo. Et quia usus rerum exteriorum est dare, ideo actus justitiæ secundum quod æqualitatem in rebus exterioribus constituit, proprie dicit hoc quod est reddere: sed satisfacere manifeste æqualitatem in actionibus demonstrat, quamvis quando unum pro altero ponatur. Et quia adæquatio non est nisi inæqualium, ideo satisfactio inæqualitatem actionum præsupponit, quæ quidem offensam constituit; et ideo habet respectum ad offensam præcedentem. Nulla autem pars justitiæ respicit offensam præcedentem, nisi justitia vindicativa, quæ æqualitatem constituit in eo qui justum patitur, indifferenter; sive sit patiens idem quod agens, ut quando aliquis sibi ipsi pœnam infert, sive non sit idem, ut quando judex alium punit, ad utrumque vindicativa justitia se habente. Similiter et pœnitentia, quæ æqualitatem tantum in faciente importat, quia ipsemet pœnitens pœnam tenet, ut sic quodammodo pœnitentia vindicativæ justitia species sit. Et per hoc constat quod satisfactio, quæ æqualitatem respectu offensæ præcedentis in faciente importat,

[II-II.q.12.a.2.ad.1] At that time the Church was but recently instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she allowed the faithful to obey Julian the Apostate, in matters that were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet greater danger.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod satisfactio, ut ex dictis patet, est quædam injuriæ illatæ recompensatio. Unde sicut injuria illata immediate ad inæqualitatem justitiæ pertingebat, et per consequens ad inæqualitatem amicitiæ oppositam, ita et satisfactio directe ad æqualitatem justitiæ perducit, et ad æqualitatem amicitiæ ex consequenti. Et quia actus aliquis elicitive ab illo habitu procedit ad cujus finem immediate ordinatur, imperative autem ab illo ad cujus finem ulterius tendit, ideo satisfactio elicitive est a justitia, sed imperative a charitate.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.ad.2] As stated in the article, it is not a question of those unbelievers who have never received the faith.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis justitia sit principaliter circa operationes, tamen etiam ex consequenti est circa passiones, inquantum sunt operationum causæ. Quare sicut justitia cohibet iram, ne alteri læsionem injuste inferat, et concupiscentiam, ne ad aliorum torum accedat, sic etiam satisfactio potest peccatorum causas excidere.

[II-II.q.12.a.2.ad.3] Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether, as stated above (Article 1), which is not the case in any other sin.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.12.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quælibet virtus moralis participat actum prudentiae, eo quod formaliter ipsa complet in eis rationem virtutis, cum secundum eam medium accipiatur in singulis virtutibus moralibus, ut patet per definitionem virtutis positam in III Ethic., cap. 11 et xvi.

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