Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q13. The sin of blasphemy, in general
Source context
- Theme
- blasphemy as willful verbal denial or contempt directed against God
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Hebrew Bible / Rabbinic traditionThe Torah's prohibition on cursing God (Lev. 24:15–16) and Talmudic tractate Sanhedrin's categorization of blasphemy as a capital offense show cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's treatment of blasphemy as a grave sin against the virtue of faith directed toward God's honor.
- Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)Classical Islamic legal categories of sabb Allāh (reviling God) as among the gravest transgressions exhibit cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's structural claim that blasphemy is graver than most sins because its object is God directly rather than neighbor or self.
Q13. The sin of blasphemy, in general
Article 1
[II-II.q.13.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo non possit Deo satisfacere. Satisfactio enim debet æquari offensæ, ut ex dictis patet. Sed offensa in Deum commissa est infinita, quia quantitatem recipit ab eo in quem committitur, cum plus offendat qui principem percutit quam alium quemcumque. Cum ergo actio hominis non possit esse infinita, videtur quod homo Deo satisfacere non possit. 1 Sæpius dictum est hanc expositionem non esse Hieronymi, sed Pelagii hæretici; servatum tamen est in textu nomen Hieronymi, cum inconveniens videatur in
[II-II.q.13.a.1.arg.2] Further, on Ephesians 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the saints."
But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, servus, quia totum quod habet domini est, non potest pro aliquo debito recompensare. Sed nos servi Dei sumus, et quidquid boni habemus, ab ipso habemus. Cum ergo satisfactio sit recompensatio offensæ præteritæ, videtur quod Deo satisfacere non possimus.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.arg.3] Further, according to some, there are three kinds of blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession of faith.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ille cujus totum quod habet non proficit ad unum debitum exsolvendum, non potest pro alio debito satisfacere. Sed quidquid homo est, et potest, et habet, non sufficit ad solven-dum debitum pro beneficio conditionis; unde Isa., xL, 46, dicitur quod ligna Libani * non sufficient ad holocaustum. Ergo nullo modo potest satisfacere pro debito offensæ commissæ.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.sc] The Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:12-13): "I . . . before was a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it ignorantly in" my "unbelief." Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.sc] Sed contra, sicut Hieronymus 2 dicit, « qui dicit Deum aliquid impossibile homini præcepisse, anathema sit. » Sed satisfactio est in præcepto, Luc., III, 8: Facite dignos fructus * pœnitentiæ. Ergo possibile est Deo satisfacere. Præterea, Deus est magis misericors quam aliquis homo. Sed homini est possible satisfacere. Ergo et Deo. Præterea, debita satisfactio est cum pœna culpæ æquatur; quia justitia est idem quod contrapassum, ut Pythagorici dixerunt. Sed contingit æqualem pœnam assumere delectationi quæ fuit in pecando. Ergo contingit Deo satisfacere.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.co] The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness.
Now this may happen in two ways. On the first way it may happen merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, even as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him. Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in speech it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod homo Deo dupliciter debitor efficitur: uno modo ratione beneficii accepti; alio modo ratione peccati commissi 5. Et sicut gratiarum actio, vel latria, vel si quid est aliquid hujusmodi, respicit debitum ac opere Doctoris veritatis auctoritatem hæretici magistraliter afferri. 5 In exemplo an. 1486 desunt sequentia usque ad verba: « in his autem. » Satisfactionis Lutherani et Calvinistæ omnem necessitatem, ut Christo injuriosam, negant. cepti beneficii, ita satisfactio respicit debitum peccati commissi. In his autem honoribus qui sunt ad parentes et Deum, etiam secundum Philosophum, lib. VIII Ethic., sub fin. lib., impossibile est equivalens reddere secundum quantitatem, sed sufficit ut homo reddat quod potest, quia amicitia non exigit equivalens, sed quod possibile est; et hoc etiam est equale aliqualiter, scilicet secundum proportionalitatem, quia sicut se habet hoc quod Deo est debitum, ad ipsum Deum, ita hoc quod iste potest reddere ad ipsum; et sic aliquo modo forma justitiæ conservatur. Et similiter est ex parte satisfactionis. Unde non potest homo Deo satisfacere, si ly « satis » equalitatem quantitatis importet; contingit autem si importet equalitatem proportionis, ut dictum est; et hoc sicut sufficit ad rationem justitiæ, ita sufficit ad rationem satisfactionis.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.ad.1] He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to God, and this is perfect blasphemy.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut offensa habuit quamdam infinitatem ex infinitate divinæ majestatis, ita etiam satisfactio accipit quamdam infinitatem ex infinitate divinæ misericordiae, prout est gratia informata, per quam acceptum redditur quod homo reddere potest. Quidam tamen dicunt quod habet infinitatem ex parte aversionis, et sic gratis dimittitur: sed ex parte conversionis finita est; et sic pro ea satisfieri potest. Sed hoc nihil est, quia satisfactio non respondet peccato, nisi secundum quod est offensa Dei, quod non habet ex parte conversionis, sed solum ex parte aversionis. Alii vero dicunt quod etiam quantum ad aversionem pro peccato satisfieri potest virtute meriti Christi, quod quodammodo infinitum fuit. Et hoc in idem redit quod prius dictum est, quia per fidem Mediatoris gratia data credentibus est. Si tamen alio modo gratiam daret, sufficeret satisfactio per modum prædictum.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.ad.2] Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod homo, qui ad imaginem Dei factus est, aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum est dominus suorum actuum per liberum arbii Scotus docet quod possibile est de potentia Dei absoluta Deum accipere aliquem actum pennitentis tanquam satisfactionem justam pro peccato, non conjuncto merito passionis Christi. Aureolus vero dicit quod origo justitiæ exigit quod actus satisfactorius sit equivalens in bonitate malitiæ actus peccati, et vult possibile esse habere actum gratia informatum equivalentem in bonitate malitiæ peccati. Durandus autem con-trium; et ideo ex hoc quod per liberum arbitrium agit, Deo satisfacere potest, quia quamvis Dei sit, prout a Deo est sibi concessum, tamen libere ei traditum est ut ejus dominus sit, quod servo non competit.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.ad.3] Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert that God is the same as a creature.
[II-II.q.13.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa concludit quod Deo equivalens satisfactio fieri non possit, non autem quod non possit ei sufficiens fieri. Quamvis enim posse suum totum homo Deo debeat, non tamen ab eo exigitur de necessitate ut totum quod possit faciat, quia hoc est ei impossibile secundum statum præsen-tis vitæ, ut totum posse suum in aliquid unum expendat, cum oporteat eum circa multa esse sollicitum; sed est quæ-dam mensura homini adhibita, quæ ab eo requiritur, scilicet impletio mandatorum Dei; et super ea potest aliquid erogare ut satisfaciat.
Article 2
[II-II.q.13.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin. Because a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc. (Colossians 3:8) says: "After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins": and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod pœnam satisfactoriam non possit unus pro alio explere; quia ad satisfactionem meritum requiritur. Sed tendit quod quidquid erat in Christo secundum humanam naturam non potuit esse satisfactio de condigno pro quocumque peccato considerando naturam operis vel rei, sed solum secundum acceptationem gratuitam Dei. — Alii dicunt quod determinatio S Thomæ tollit omne meritum, et omnem possibilitatem satisfaciendi. — Scotus insuper probare intendit quod aliquis manens in uno peccato possit satisfacere pro alio. unus pro altero non potest mereri vel demereri, cum sit scriptum, psalmo lxi, 12: Reddes tu unicuique secundum opera sua. Ergo unus pro alio non potest satisfacere.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.arg.2] Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, satisfactio contra contritionem et confessionem dividitur. Sed unus pro alio non potest conteri nec confiteri. Ergo nec satisfacere.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.arg.3] Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal: hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the deliberation of the reason, as was shown above (I-II, 74, 3,10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unus pro alio orando etiam sibi meretur. Si ergo aliquis pro alio satisfacere potest, satisfaciendo pro alio pro se satisfacit; et ita ab eo qui pro altero satisfacit, non exigitur alia satisfactio pro peccatis propriis.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.sc] It is written (Leviticus 24:16): "He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.sc] Sed contra, Galat., vi, 2, dicitur: Alter alterius onera portate. Ergo videtur quod unus possit onus pœnitentiæ impositæ pro alio portare. Præterea, charitas magis potest apud Deum quam apud homines. Sed unus potest apud homines pro alterius amore debitum ejus solvere. Ergo multo fortius hoc in divino judicio fieri potest.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.co] As stated above (I-II, 72, 5), a mortal sin is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as stated above (Article 1), it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod pœna satisfactoria est ad duo ordinata, scilicet ad solutionem debiti et ad medicinam pro peccato vitando. Inquantum ergo est ad medicinam sequentis peccati, sic satisfactio unius non prodest alteri, quia ex jejunio unius caro alterius non domatur; nec ex actibus unius alius bene agere consuevit, nisi secundum accidens, inquantum scilicet aliquis per bona opera potest alteri mereri augmentum gratia, quæ efficacissimum remedium est ad vitandum peccatum. Sed hoc est per modum meriti magis quam per modum satisfactionis. Sed quantum ad solutionem debiti unus potest pro alio satisfacere, dummodo sit in charitate, ut opera ejus satisfactoria esse possint. Nec oportet quod major pœna imponatur ei qui pro altero satisfacit, quam principali imponeretur, ut quidam dicunt, hac ratione moti, quod pœna propria magis satisfaciat quam aliena, quia pœna habet vim maxime satisfaciendi ratione charitatis, qua homo ipsam sustinet. Et quia major charitas apparet in hoc quod aliquis pro altero satisfacit, quam si ipse satisfaceret, ideo minor pœna requiritur in eo qui pro alio satisfacit, quam in principali requireretur; unde dicitur in Vi'is Patrum, lib. V, libello v, §27, col. 880, t. 4, quod propter charitatem unius qui alterius fratris sui charitate ductus pœnitentiam fecit pro peccato quod non commiserat, alteri peccatum quod commiserat dimissum est. Nec etiam exigitur quantum ad solutionem debiti quod ille pro quo fit satisfactio, sit impotens ad satisfaciendum; quia etiamsi esset potens, alio satisfaciente pro ipso, ipse a debito immunis esset. Sed hoc requiritur in quantum pœna satisfactoria est in remedium. Unde non est permittendum quod aliquis pro alio pœnitentiam agat, nisi defectus aliquis appareat in pœnitente; vel corporalis, per quem sit impotens ad sustinendum; vel spiritualis, per quem non sit promptus ad portandum pœnam.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.ad.1] This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous sins are included.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod præmium essentiale redditur secundum dispositionem hominis, quia secundum capacitatem videntium erit plenitudo visionis divinæ. Et ideo sicut unus non disponitur per actum alterius, ita unus alteri non meretur præmium essentiale, nisi meritum ejus habeat efficaciam infinitam, sicut Christi, cujus merito solo pueri per baptismum ad vitam æternam perveniunt. Sed pœna temporalis pro peccato debita post culpæ remissionem non taxatur secundum dispositionem ejus cui debetur, quia quandoque ille qui est melior habet majoris pœnæ reatum. Et ideo quantum ad pœnæ remissionem unus alteri potest mereri; et actus unius efficitur alterius, charitate mediante, per quam omnes unum sumus in Christo, Gal., 111, 29.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.ad.2] Since, as stated above (Article 1), blasphemy is contrary to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the prohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: "I am the Lord thy God," etc. (Exodus 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain" (Exodus 20:7). Because he who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even more than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod contritio ordinatur contra culpam, quæ ad dispositionem bonitatis vel malitiæ hominis pertinet; et ideo per contritionem unius alius a culpa non liberatur. Similiter per confessionem homo se sacramentis Ecclesiæ subjicit. Non autem potest unus sacramentum pro alio accipere, quia in sacramento gratia suscipienti datur, non alii. Et ideo non est similis ratio de satisfactione, contritione et confessione.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.ad.3] There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur unawares and without deliberation. On the first way, by a man failing to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of those words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so called. On the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words, and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger, kills one who is sitting beside him.
[II-II.q.13.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in solutione debiti attenditur quantitas pœnæ, sed in merito attenditur charitatis radix: et ideo ille qui ex charitate pro alio meretur salem merito congrui, etiam sibi magis meretur; non autem qui pro alio satisfacit, etiam pro se satisfacit, quia illa quantitas pœnæ non sufficit ad utrumque peccatum: tamen satisfaciendo pro alio sibi meretur aliquid majus quam sit dimissio pœnæ, scilicet vitam æternam.
Article 3
[II-II.q.13.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since it destroys a man's life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, which can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more grievous than that of blasphemy.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod anima Christi habuerit omnipotentiam respectu proprii corporis. Dicit enim Damascenus in III lib. Orth. fid., cap. xx, col. 1083, t. 1, quod « omnia naturalia fuerunt Christo voluntaria: volens enim esurivit, volens sitivit, volens timuit, mortuus est, etc. » Sed ex hoc Deus dicitur omnipotens, quia omnia quæcumque voluit fecit. Ergo videtur quod anima Christi habuerit omnipotentiam respectu naturalium operationum proprii corporis.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.arg.2] Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood, and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more grievous sin than blasphemy.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in Christo fuit perfectius humana natura quam in Adam; in quo secundum originalem justitiam, quam habuit in innocentiæ statu, corpus habebat omnino subjectum animæ, ut nihil in corpore posset accidere contra animæ voluntatem. Ergo multo magis anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam respectu sui corporis.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.arg.3] Further, on Psalm 74:6, "Lift not up your horn on high," a gloss says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all." Therefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad imaginationem animæ naturaliter corpus immutatur; et tanto magis, quanto magis anima fuerit fortis imaginationis, ut in prima parte habitum est. Sed anima Christi habuit virtutem perfectissimam et quantum ad imaginationem, et quantum ad alias vires. Ergo anima Christi fuit omnipotens in respectu ad corpus proprium.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.sc] On Isaiah 18:2, "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss says: "In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight."
[II-II.q.13.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Hebr., ii, 17, quod debuit per omnia fratribus assimilari*, et præcipue in his quæ pertinent ad conditionem naturæ humanæ. Sed ad conditionem humanæ naturæ pertinet quod valetudo corporis et ejus nutritio et augmentum imperio rationis seu voluntatis non subdantur: quia naturalia soli Deo, qui est auctor naturæ, subduntur. Ergo nec in Christo subdebantur. Non igitur anima Christi fuit omnipotens respectu proprii corporis. palis agentis: ita Soto, Cajetanus, Zumel, Cabrera et Joannes a S Thoma. In In deest. In
[II-II.q.13.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 1), blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief: while the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love and confession add to the praise of faith.
Therefore, since, as stated above (Question 10, Article 3), unbelief is the greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, anima Christi potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum propriam naturam; et hoc modo sicut non poterat immutare exteriora corpora a cursu et ordine naturæ, ita etiam non poterat immutare proprium corpus a naturali dispositione; quia anima Christi secundum propriam naturam habet determinatam proportionem ad suum corpus. Alio modo potest considerari anima Christi secundum quod est instrumentum unitum Verbo Dei in persona: et sic subdebatur ejus potestati totaliter omnis dispositio proprii corporis. Quia tamen virtus actionis non proprie attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti; talis omnipotentia magis attribuitur ipsi Verbo Dei quam animæ Christi.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.ad.1] If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for murder does more harm to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above (I-II, 73, 8), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do harm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously that the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Damasceni est intelligendum quantum ad voluntatem Christi divinam: quia, sicutipse in præcedenti cap. dicit, col. 1079, t. 1, « beneplacito divinæ voluntatis permittebatur carni pati, et operari quæ propria. »
[II-II.q.13.a.3.ad.2] A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away from you" (Ephesians 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non pertinebat hoc ad originalem justitiam, quam Adam habuit in statu innocentiæ, quod anima hominis haberet virtutem transmutandi proprium corpus in quamcumque formam; sed quod posset ipsum conservare absque omni nocumento. Et hanc etiam virtutem Christus assumere potuisset si voluisset. Sed cum sint tres status hominum; scilicet innocentiæ, culpæ et gloriæ; sicut de statu gloriæ assumpsit comprehensionem, et de statu innocentiæ immunitatem a peccato; ita et de statu culpæ assumpsit necessitatem subjacendi pœnalitatibus hujus vitæ, ut infra dicetur.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.ad.3] To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the most grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.
[II-II.q.13.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod imaginationi, si fuerit fortis, naturaliter obedit corpus quantum ad aliqua, puta quantum ad casum de trabe in alto posita, quia imaginatio nata est esse principium motus localis, ut dicitur III De anima, text. 48 et seq. Similiter etiam quantum ad alterationem quæ est secundum calorem et frigus, et alia consequentia: eo quod ex imaginatione consequenter natæ sunt consequi animæ passiones secundum quas movetur cor; et sic per commotionem spirituum totum corpus alteratur. Aliæ vero dispositiones corporales, quæ non habent naturalem ordinem ad imaginationem, non transmutantur ab imaginatione, quantumcumque sit fortis; puta figura manus, vel pedis, vel aliquid simile.
Article 4
[II-II.q.13.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more are they restrained from blaspheming.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima Christi non habuerit omnipotentiam respectu executionis propriæ voluntatis. Dicitur enim Marci vii, quod ingressus domum neminem voluit scire, et non potuit latere. Non ergo potuit in omnibus exequi propositum suæ voluntatis.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.arg.2] Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, præceptum est signum voluntatis, ut in prima parte dictum est. Sed Dominus quædam facienda præcepit, quorum contraria acciderunt: dicitur enim Matth., ix, 31, quod cæcis illuminatis comminatus est Jesus, dicens: Videte ne quis sciat. Illi autem exeuntes diffamaverunt illum* per totam terram illam*. Non ergo in omnibus potuit exequi propositum suæ voluntatis.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.arg.3] Further, it is written (Ecclesiastes 11:3) that "the tree . . . in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it clearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they blaspheme in the life to come.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, id quod potest aliquis facere, non petit ab alio. Sed Domiuus petivit a Patre, orando, illud quod fieri volebat: dicitur enim Lucæ, vi, 12, quod exiiit in montem orare, et erat pernoctans in oratione Dei. Ergo non potuit exequi in omnibus propositum suæ voluntatis.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.sc] It is written (Apocalypse 16:9): "The men were scorched with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power over these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will nevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them thus." Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and consequently it will also be in their future state.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit in lib. Augustinus De quæst. veteris et novi Testamenti, quæst. Lxxvii, col. 2274, t. 3: « Impossibile est ut Salvatoris voluntas non impleatur; nec potest velle quod scit fieri non debere. »
[II-II.q.13.a.4.co] As stated above (A1,3), detestation of the Divine goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's justice, since they love the things for which they are punished, would wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod anima Christi dupliciter aliquid voluit: uno modo quasi per se implendum: et sic dicendum est, quod quidquid voluit, potuit; non enim conveniret sapientiae ejus ut aliquid vellet per se facere quod suæ virtuti non subjaceret. Alio modo voluit aliquid ut implendum virtute divina; sicut resuscitationem proprii corporis et alia hujusmodi miraculosa opera: quæ quidem non poterat propria virtute, sed secundum quod erat instrumentum Divinitatis, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.ad.1] In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy through fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas, in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. De quæstionibus veteris et novi Testamenti, ut sup., « quod factum est, hoc voluisse dicendus est Christus. Advertendum est enim quod illud in finibus gestum est Gentilium, quibus adhuc tempus prædicandi non erat. Ultro tamen venientes ad fidem non suscipere, invidiæ erat. A suis ergo noluit prædicari, requiri autem se voluit: et ita factum est. » Vel potest dici quod hæc voluntas Christi non fuit de eo quod per eam fiendum erat, sed de eo quod erat fiendum per alios, quod non subjacebat humanæ voluntati ipsius. Unde in Epistola Agathonis Papæ quæ est recepta in sexta synodo, act. iv, legitur: « Ergone ille omnium conditor ac Redemptor, in terris latere volens non potuit? nisi hoc ad humanam ejus voluntatem, quam temporaliter est dignatus assumere, redigatur. »
[II-II.q.13.a.4.ad.2] Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer, wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious. On the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned, evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Gregorius dicit XIX Moralium, cap. xxiii, § 36, col. 420, t. 2, per hoc quod « Dominus præcepit taceri virtutes suas, servis suis se sequentibus exemplum dedit, ut ipsi quidem virtutes suas occultari desiderent, et tamen ut alii eorum exemplo proficiant, prodantur inviti. » Sic ergo præceptum illud designabat voluntatem ipsius qui humanam gloriam refugiebat, secundum illud Joan., viii, 50, Ego non quæro gloriam meam. Volebat tamen absolute, præsertim secundum divinam voluntatem, ut publicaretur miraculum factum propter aliorum utilitatem.
[II-II.q.13.a.4.ad.3] Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in this respect there can be blasphemy in him.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.13.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christus orabat et pro his quæ virtute divina fienda erant, et pro his etiam quæ humana voluntate erat facturus; quia virtus et operatio animæ Christi dependebata Deo, qui operatur in nobis velle, et perficere, ut dicitur Philipp., ii, 13.
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