Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q15. The vices opposed to knowledge and understanding
Source context
- Theme
- Vices opposed to knowledge and understanding: blindness of mind and dulness of sense
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta — avidyā (ignorance)Advaita Vedanta identifies avidyā as the root obstruction to jñāna, a structural cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's blindness of mind as privation of the intellective capacity for truth.
- Aristotelian ethics — ἀκρασία and noetic failureAristotle's analysis of moral weakness (akrasia) in Nicomachean Ethics includes the failure of practical intellect, which runs structurally parallel to Aquinas's account of dulness of sense as a defect in the judgment of particular moral matters.
Q15. The vices opposed to knowledge and understanding
Article 1
[II-II.q.15.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin. Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin. Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (John 9:41): "If you were blind, you should not have sin." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod satisfactionem non oporteat fieri per opera pœnalia, quia per satisfactionem oportet fieri recompensationem ad divinam offensam. Sed nulla recompensatio videtur fieri per opera pœnalia, quia Deus non delectatur in pœnis nostris. Ergo non oportet satisfactionem per opera pœnalia fieri.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.arg.2] Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind is a punishment as appears from Isaiah 6:10, "Blind the heart of this people," for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quanto aliquod opus ex majori charitate procedit, tanto minus est pœnale, quia charitas pœnam non habet, ut dicitur IJoan., iv. Si ergo oporteat opera satisfactoria esse pœnalia, quanto magis sunt ex charitate facta, tanto minus erunt satisfactoria; quod falsum est.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.arg.3] Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as Augustine says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent truth," and as we read in Ecclesiastes 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « satisfacere, » ut dicit Anselmus, lib. I Cur Deus homo, cap. xi, col. 377, t. 1, « est honorem debitum Deo impendere. » Sed hoc etiam aliis quam operibus pœnalibus fieri potest. Ergo satisfactionem non oportet pœnalibus operibus fieri. Medina, Reginaldus, Armilla, et alii quibus falso ad numeraretur Scotus, contra theologos communiter, dixerunt pœnitentem non obligari ad acceptandam rationabilem pœnitentiam. —
[II-II.q.15.a.1.sc] Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of mind among the vices arising from lust.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, Hom. xx in Evang., § 8, col. 4164, t. 2: « Justum est ut peccator tanto majora sibi inferat lamenta per pœnitentiam, quanto majora sibi intulit damna per culpam. » Præterea, per satisfactionem oportet peccati vulnus sanari perfecte. Sed peccatorum medicinæ sunt pœnæ, ut Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. 111, ante med. Ergo oportet quod per pœnalia opera satisfactio fiat.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.co] Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of the principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light, since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never forfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers which the human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in I, 84, 7,8.
Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a punishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wisdom 2:21): "Their own malice blinded them."
A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle, through which a man understands other things; to which principle a man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle, according to Psalm 35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do well": whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about things which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, according to Psalm 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun." On either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod satisfactio, ut dictum est, respectum habet et ad præteritam offensam, pro qua recompensatio fit per satisfactionem, et etiam ad futuram culpam, a qua per eam præservamur. Et quantum ad utrumque exigitur quod satisfactio per opera pœnalia fiat. Recompensatio enim offensæ importat adæquationem, quam oportet esse ejus qui offendit ad eum in quem offensa commissa est. Adæquatio autem in humana justitia attenditur per subtractionem ab uno qui plus habet justo, et additionem ad alterum cui subtractum est aliquid. Quamvis autem Deo, quantum est ex parte ejus, nihil subtrahi possit, tamen peccator, quantum in ipso est, aliquid ei subtraxit peccando, ut dictum est. Unde oportet ad hoc quod recompensatio fiat, quod aliquid subtrahatur a peccante per satisfactionem, quod in honorem Dei cedat. Opus autem bonum, ex hoc quod est hujusmodi non subtrahit aliquid ab operante, sed magis perficit ipsum. Unde subtractio non potest fieri per opus bonum, nisi pœnale sit. Et ideo ad hoc quod aliquod opus sit satisfactorium, oportet quod sit bonum, ut in honorem Dei sit; et pœnale, ut per hoc aliquid peccatori subtrahatur. Similiter etiam pœna a culpa futura præservat, quia non facile homo ad peccata redit ex quo pœnam expertus est. Unde secundum Philosophum, loc. sup. cit., pœnæ medicinæ sunt.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.ad.1] The blindness that excuses from sin is that which arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis Deus non delectetur in pœnis, ut sunt pœnæ, delectatur tamen in eis, ut sunt justæ, et sic satisfactoria esse possunt.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.ad.2] This argument considers the second kind of blindness which is a punishment.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut in Nec est in potestate pœnitentis commutare satisfactionem a confessario sibi impositam, nequidem in aliam difficiliorem, quidquid dixerint Portel, Villalobos, et alii. satisfactione consideratur pœnalitas, ita et in merito consideratur difficultas. Diminutio autem difficultatis quæ est ex parte ipsius actus, diminuit, cæteris paribus, meritum; sed diminutio difficultatis quæ est ex promptitudine voluntatis, non diminuit meritum, sed auget; et similiter diminutio pœnalitatis ex promptitudine voluntatis, quam facit charitas, non diminuit efficaciam satisfactionis sed auget.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.ad.3] To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all; and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
[II-II.q.15.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod debitum pro peccato est recompensatio offensæ, quæ sine pœna peccantis non fit. Et de tali debito Anselmus intelligit.
Article 2
[II-II.q.15.a.2.arg.1] It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod flagella quibus a Deo in hac vita punimur, non possint satisfactoria esse. Nihil enim potest esse satisfactorium, nisi quod est meritorium, ut ex dictis patet. Sed non meremur nisi per ea quæ in nobis sunt. Cum ergo flagella quibus a Deo punimur non sint in nobis, videtur quod satisfactoria esse non possint.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.arg.2] Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness describes it as "dullness of sense in respect of understanding." Now dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, satisfactio tantum bonorum est. Sed hujusmodi flagella etiam malis inducuntur, et præcipue eis debentur. Ergo non possunt esse satisfactoria.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.arg.3] Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above (Article 1), while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin, which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, satisfactio respicit peccata præterita. Sed aliquando ista flagella infliguntur illis qui peccata non habent, sicut de Job patet. Ergo videtur quod non sint satisfactoria.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.sc] Different causes produce different effects. Now Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., v, 3: Tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia autem probationem, « a peccato purgationem, » ut Glossa interl., ibidem dicit. Ergo flagella hujus vitæ peccata purgant; et sic sunt satisfactoria. Præterea, Ambrosius dicit Sup.ps. cxviii, octonar. 17, parum a princ.: « Et si fides, » idest, peccati conscientia, « desit, pœna satisfacit. » Ergo hujus vitæ flagella sunt satisfactoria.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.co] Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on the other hand they are said to be dull, through being unable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or of great power.
Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a thing's essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details: whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a thing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the nature of that thing.
Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of spiritual things.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[II-II.q.15.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod recompensatio offensæ præteritæ potest fieri ab eo qui offendit, et ab alio. Quando autem fit ab alio, talis recompensatio vindicationis magis quam satisfactionis rationem habet; quando autem fit ab ipso qui offendit, etiam rationem satisfactionis habet. Unde si flagella, quæ pro peccatis a Deo infliguntur, fiant aliquo modo ipsius patientis, rationem satisfactionis accipiunt. Fiunt autem ipsius, inquantum ea acceptat ad purgationem peccatorum, eis utens patienter. Si autem ratio eis per impatientiam dissentiat, tunc non efficiuntur aliquo modo ipsius, et ideo non habent rationem satisfactionis, sed vindicationis tantum.
Article 3
[II-II.q.15.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i, 4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst wish none but the clean to know the truth," and says that one might reply that "many, even those who are unclean, know many truths." Now men become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus possit dici homo dominicus. Dicitenim Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII QQ., quæst. xxxv1, col. 26, t. 6: « Monendum est ut illa bona expectentur quæ fuerunt in illo homine dominico; » loquitur autem de Christo. Ergo videtur quod Christus sit homo dominicus.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.arg.2] Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne peccatum vel est carnale, vel spirituale. Sed sicut Hieronymus dicit in illud Marc., ix, Hoc genus dæmoniorum in nullo potest exire, nisi in oratione et jejunio col. 646: « Jejunio sanantur passiones corporis, oratione pestes mentis. » Ergo non debet esse aliquod aliud opus satisfactorium.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.arg.3] Further, all things are more passive to what is near them than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, satisfactio est necessaria ad emundationem peccatorum. Sed eleemosyna ab omnibus peccatis emundat; Luc., xi, 44: Date eleemosynam et ecce omnia munda sunt vobis. Ergo alia duo sunt superflua. 4. Sed contra, videtur quod debeant esse plura, quia contraria contrariis curantur, ut dicitur II Ethic., cap. 11, vel 111. Sed multo plura sunt peccatorum genera quam tria. Ergo debent plura satisfactionis opera computari.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I Retract., cap. xix, § 8, col. 616, t. 1: « Non video utrum recte dicatur homo dominicus Jesus Christus, cum sit utique Dominus. »
[II-II.q.15.a.3.co] The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be "detached" in order to command, and that the agent must have power over matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that pleasure fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.
Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices cause man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things is weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is written (Daniel 1:17) that "to these children" on account of their abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and understanding in every book, and wisdom."
[II-II.q.15.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod satisfactio debet esse talis per quam aliquid nobis subtrahamus ad honorem Dei. Nos autem non habemus nisi tria bona, scilicet bona animæ, et bona corporis et bona fortunæ, scilicet exteriora. Ex bonis quidem fortunæ subtrahimus nobis aliquid per eleemosynam; sed ex bonis corporis per jejunium; ex bonis autem animæ non oportet quod aliquid subtrahamus nobis quantum ad essentiam, vel quantum ad diminutionem ipsorum, quia per ea efficimur Deo accepti, sed per hoc quod ea submittimus Deo totaliter: et hoc fit per orationem. Competit etiam iste numerus ex parte illa qua satisfactio peccatorum causas excidit, ut dictum est, quia radices peccatorum tres ponuntur I Joan., ii, 46, scilicet concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, et superbia vitæ. Contra concupiscentiam carnis ordinatur « jejunium; » contra concupiscentiam oculorum ordinatur « eleemosyna; » contra superbiam vitæ ordinatur « oratio, » ut Augustinus dicit Super Matthæum. Competit etiam quantum ad hoc quod satisfactio est peccatorum suggestionibus aditum non indulgere, quia omne peccatum vel in Deum committimus, et contra hoc ordinatur « oratio; » vel in proximum, et contra hoc ordinatur « eleemosyna; » vel in nos ipsos, et contra hoc ordinatur « jejunium. »
[II-II.q.15.a.3.ad.1] Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum quosdam duplex est oratio; quædam quæ est contemplativorum, quorum conversatio in cælis est; et talis, quia totaliter est delectabilis, non est satisfactoria; alia est quæ pro peccatis gemitus fundit, et talis habet pœnam, et est satisfactionis pars. Vel dicendum, et melius, quod quælibet oratio habet rationem satisfactionis, quia quamvis habeat suavitatem spiritus, habet tamen afflictionem carnis, quia, ut dicit Gregorius Super Ezech., hom. ii, lib. II, § 13, col. 955, t. 2, « dum crescit in nobis fortitudo amoris intimi, infirmatur procul dubio fortitudo carnis; » unde et nervus femoris Jacob ex lucta angeli emarcuisse legitur Gen., xxxii.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.ad.2] The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid manner.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum carnale dicitur dupliciter: uno modo quod in ipsa delectatione carnis completur, ut gula et luxuria: alio modo quod completur in his quæ ad carnem ordinatur, quamvis non in delectatione carnis, sed in delectatione animæ magis, ut avaritia. Unde talia peccata sunt quasi media inter spiritualia et carnalia; et ideo oportet quod eis etiam aliqua satisfaction respondeat propria, scilicet eleemosyna.
[II-II.q.15.a.3.ad.3] It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's contemplation all the more.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.15.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis singula istorum trium per quamdam convenientiam singulis peccatis approprientur, quia congruum est ut in quo quis peccavit, in hoc puniatur, et quod peccati commissi per satisfactionem radix abscindatur, tamen quodlibet horum pro quolibet peccato satisfacere potest. Unde ei qui non potest unum ex his perficere, injungatur aliud, et praecipue eleemosyna quæ aliorum vices supplere potest, in quantum alia satisfactionis opera per eleemosyna quisque sibi mereatur quoddamodo in illis quibus eleemosyna 1 Opus istud non est Hieronymi. 2 tribuit. Unde non oportet quod si eleemosyna omnia mundet peccata, propter hoc aliæ satisfactiones superfluant.
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