Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q17. Hope, considered in itself
Source context
- Theme
- hope as a theological virtue: its object, subject, and proper act considered in themselves
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta: asha (hope/longing) and the orientation of the antahkarana toward the higher SelfCross-tradition congruence appears in the Vedantic account of the inner instrument's forward-directed longing for moksha, structurally parallel to Aquinas's treatment of hope as an appetite oriented toward a future arduous but attainable good.
- Aristotelian ethics: spes and the irascible appetiteAquinas's analysis of hope as an act of the irascible appetite—distinct from desire and directed toward a difficult future good—draws directly on Aristotle's taxonomy of the passions in De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics, which Aquinas systematically recasts within a theological frame.
Q17. Hope, considered in itself
Article 1
[II-II.q.17.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod claves in Ecclesia esse non debeant. Non enim requiruntur claves ad intrandum domum cujus ostium est apertum. Sed Apocalyp., iv, 1, dicitur: Vidi, et ecce in cælo * ostium apertum: quod Christus est qui de seipso dicit, Joan., x, 7: Ego sum ostium. Ergo ad introitum cæli Ecclesia clavibus non indiget.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.arg.2] Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, clavis est ad aperiendum et claudendum. Sed hoc solius Christi est, qui aperit, et nemo claudit, claudit, et nemo aperit, Apoc., 111, 7. Ergo Ecclesia in ministris suis claves non habet.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.arg.3] Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing" (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, cuicumque clauditur cælum, aperitur infernus, et e contrario. Ergo quicumque habet claves cæli, habet claves inferni. Sed Ecclesia non dicitur habere claves inferni. Ergo nec claves cæli habet.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.sc] Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., xv1, 19: Tibi dabo claves regni cælorum. Præterea, omnis dispensator debet habere claves eorum quæ dispensat. Sed ministri Ecclesia sunt dispensatores divinorum mysteriorum, ut patetI Corinth., iv. Ergo debent habere claves.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.co] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement. But, as we stated above (8, 3, ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated (I-II, 40, 1), when we were treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in corporalibus dicitur clavis instrumentum quo ostium aperitur. Regni autem ostium nobis per peccatum clauditur et quantum ad maculam, et quantum ad reatum pœnæ. Et ideo potestas qua tale obstaculum removetur, dicitur clavis. Hæc autem potestas est in divina Trinitate per auctoritatem; et ideo dicitur a quibusdam quod habeat clavem auctoritatis. Sed in Christo homine fuit hæc potestas ad removendum prædictum obstaculum per meritum passionis, quæ etiam dicitur januam aperire: et ideo dicitur habere secundum quosdam claves excellentiæ. Et quia ex latere Christi dormientis in cruce sacramenta fluxerunt, ex quibus Ecclesia fabricatur, ideo in sacramentis Ecclesia efficacia passionis manet. Et propter hoc etiam in ministris Ecclesia, qui sunt dispensatores sacramentorum, potestas aliqua manet ad prædictum obstaculum removendum non propria, sed virtute divina et passionis Christi; et hæc potestas metaphorice clavis Ecclesia dicitur, quæ est clavis ministerii.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.ad.1] In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue. Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (5; 18, 1).
[II-II.q.17.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ostium cæli, quantum est de se, semper est apertum: sed alicui clausum dicitur propter impedimentum intrandi in cælum, quod in ipso est. Impedimentum autem totius humanæ naturæ ex peccato primi hominis consecutum per passionum Christi amotum est: et ideo Joannes post passionem vidit in cælo ostium apertum. Sed adhuc quotidie alicui manet clausum propter peccatum originale quod contraxit, vel actuale, quod commisit; et propter hoc indigemus sacramentis et clavibus Ecclesia.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.ad.2] Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but from grace alone.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de clausione qua limbum clausit, ne aliquis ultra in illum descendat; et de apertione, qua paradisum aperuit, remoto impedimento naturæ per suam passionem.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.ad.3] He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans.
[II-II.q.17.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod clavis inferni, qua aperitur et clauditur, est potestas gratiam conferendi per quam homini aperitur infernus, ut de peccato educatur, quod est inferni porta; et clauditur, ne ultra homo in peccatum labatur gratia sustentatus. Potestas autem gratiam conferendi solius Dei est, et ideo clavem inferni sibi soli retinuit. Sed clavis inferni est, potestas etiam dimitendi reatum pœnæ temporalis, qui manet, per quem homo a regno prohibetur. Et ideo magis potest homini dari clavis regni quam clavis inferni; non enim idem sunt, ut ex dictis patet. Aliquis enim de inferno educitur per remissionem aternæ pœnæ, qui non statim in regnum introducitur propter reatum temporalis pœnæ, qui manet. Vel dicendum, ut quidam dicunt, quod etiam est clavis inferni et cæli, quia ex hoc ipso quod alicui aperitur unum, clauditur alterum; sed denominatur a digniori.
Article 2
[II-II.q.17.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod clavis non sit potestas ligandi et solvendi, qua « ecclesiasticus judex dignos recipere, indignos excludere debet a regno, » ut ex Littera, IV, dist. xviii, habetur, et ex Glossa Hieronymi 4, Matth., xvi. Potestas enim spiritualis in sacramento collata est idem quod character. Sed clavis et character non videntur idem esse, quia per characterem homo ad Deum comparatur, per claves autem ad subditos. Ergo clavis non est potestas.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.arg.2] Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (Psalm 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, judex ecclesiasticus non dicitur nisi ille qui habet jurisdictionem, quæ simul cum ordine non datur. Sed claves in ordinis susceptione conferuntur. Ergo non debuit de ecclesiastico judice in definitione clavium mentio fieri.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.arg.3] Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad id quod aliquis habet ex seipso, non indiget aliqua potestate activa, per quam inducatur ad actum. Sed eo ipso quo aliquis est dignus, ad regnum admittitur. Ergo non pertinet ad potestatem clavium dignos ad regnum admittere.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.sc] The Apostle says (Hebrews 6:19) that we have hope "which entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.sc] Sed contra, unumquodque secundum hoc dicitur ens, secundum quod dicitur unum; quia unum et ens convertuntur. Si ergo in Christo essent duo esse, et non tantum unum, Christus esset duo, et non unum.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), the hope of which we speak now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal happiness.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum, in II De anima, text. 33, « potentiæ per actus definiuntur. » Unde cum clavis sit potentia quædam, oportet quod per actum sive usum suum definiatur, et quod in actu objectum exprimatur a quo speciem recipit actus et modus agendi, ex quo apparet potentia ordinata. Actus autem potestatis spiritualis non est ut cælum aperiat absolute, quia jam apertum est, ut dictum est, sed ut quantum ad hunc aperiat; quod qui dem ordinate fieri non potest, nisi ejus idoneitate cui aperiendum est cælum, pensata. Et ideo in prædicta definitione clavis, ponitur genus, scilicet « potestas; » et subjectum potestatis, scilicet « judex ecclesiasticus; » et actus, scilicet « excludere et recipere, » secundum duos actus materialis clavis, qui sunt aperire et claudere; cujus objectum tangitur in hoc quod dicit, « a regno; » modus autem in hoc quod dignitas et indignitas in illis in quos actus exercetur, pensatur.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.ad.1] Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly (Hebrews 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad duo, quorum unum est causa alterius, una potestas ordinatur; sicut in igne calor ad calefaciendum et dissolvendum. Et quia omnis gratia et remissio in corpore mystico ex capite suo provenit, ideo eadem potestas esse videtur per essentiam, qua sacerdos conficere potest, et qua potest solvere et ligare, si jurisdictio adsit; nec differt nisi ratione, secundum quod ad diversos effectus comparatur; sicut etiam ignis dicitur secundum aliam rationem calefactivus et liquefactivus. Et quia nihil est aliud character ordinis sacerdotalis quam potestas exercendi illud ad quod principaliter ordo sacerdotii ordinatur, sustinendo oportet 2 quod sit idem quod spiritualis potestas, ideo character et potestas conficiendi et potestas clavium est unum et idem per essentiam, sed differt ratione.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.ad.2] We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to God, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1).
[II-II.q.17.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnis potestas spiritualis datur cum aliqua consecratione. Et ideo clavis cum ordine datur; sed executio clavis indiget materia debita, quæ est plebs subjecta per jurisdictionem; et ideo antequam jurisdictionem habeat, habet claves, sed non habet actum clavium. Et quia clavis per actum definitur, ideo in definitione clavis potestur aliquid ad jurisdictionem pertinens.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.ad.3] To him that longs for something great, all lesser things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to its principal object.
[II-II.q.17.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquis potest esse dignus aliquo dupliciter: aut ita quod ipsum habendi jus habeat, et sic quilibet dignus jam habet cælum apertum; aut ita quod insit ei aliqua congruitas ad hoc quod ei detur, et sic dignos, quibus nondum totaliter apertum est cælum, potestas clavium recipit.
Article 3
[II-II.q.17.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal happiness. For the Apostle says (Philippians 1:6): "Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal happiness.
[II-II.q.17.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sint duæ claves, sed tantum una. Ad unam enim seram non requiritur nisi una clavis. Sed sera, ad quam amovendam ordinantur Ecclesiæ claves, est peccatum. Ergo contra unum peccatum non indiget Ecclesia duabus clavibus.
[II-II.q.17.a.3.arg.2] Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore we can hope for another's eternal happiness.
[II-II.q.17.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, claves in collatione ordinis conferuntur. Sed scientia non est semper ex infusione, sed quando ex acquisitione: nec ab omnibus ordinatis habetur, et a quibusdam non ordinatis habetur. Ergo scientia non est clavis, et sic est una tantum clavis, scilicet potestas judicandi.
[II-II.q.17.a.3.arg.3] Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can also hope for another's eternal salvation.
[II-II.q.17.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, potestas quam habet sacerdos super corpus Christi mysticum, dependet ex potestate quam habet super corpus Christi verum. Sed potestas conficiendi corpus Christi verum est una tantum. Ergo clavis quæ est potestas respiciens corpus Christi mysticum, est una tantum. 4. Sed contra, videtur quod sint plures quam duæ: quia sicut ad actum hominis requiritur scientia et potentia, ita et voluntas. Sed scientia discernendi ponitur clavis, et similiter potentia judicandi. Ergo et voluntas absolvendi debet dici clavis.
[II-II.q.17.a.3.sc] Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them."
[II-II.q.17.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in Enchir., cap. viii, col. 235, t. 6, quod « spes non est nisi rerum ad eum pertinentium qui earum spem gerere perhibetur. » In assignando spei objecto formali quo multum variare authores. Nil aliud est juxta quosdam quam arduitas beatitudinis, seu beatitudo ipsa quatenus difficulter obtinenda. Juxta alios, divina omnipotentia est quatenus auxilians. Juxta alios, divina est promissio. Juxta alios Dei bonitas est, ut nobis conveniens, et amabilis amore concupiscentiae. Juxta alios est bonitas Dei respectiva nobis infallibiliter promissa, ita ut bonitas et promissio infallibilis ingrediantur rationem objecti motivi: sic Henno et Frassen, etc. Prima opinio est Amici post plures veteres. Sed objectum formale quo spei illud est quod nos ad sperandum movet; arduitas autem beatitudinis potius removeret; ergo.
[II-II.q.17.a.3.co] We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way its object can be something pertaining to someone else. On order to explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal's life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[II-II.q.17.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in omni actu qui requirit idoneitatem ex parte recipientis duo sunt necessaria ei qui debet actum illum exercere, scilicet judicium de idoneitate recipientis, et expletio actus. Et ideo etiam in actu justitiæ, per quem redditur alicui hoc quo dignus est, oportet esse judicium quo discernatur an sit dignus, et ipsa redditio; et ad utrumque horum auctoritas quædam sive potestas exigitur; non enim dare possumus nisi quod in potestate habemus: nec judicium dici potest, nisi vim coactivam habeat, eo quod judicium ad unum jam determina-tur; quæ quidem determinatio in speculativis fit per virtutem primorum principium, quibus resisti non potest, et in rebus practicis per vim imperativam in judicante existentem. Et quia actus clavis requirit idoneitatem in eo in quem exercetur, quia « recipit » per clavem judex ecclesiasticus « dignos, et excludit indignos, » ut ex dicta definitione patet, ideo indiget judicio discretionis quo idoneitatem judicat, et ipso receptionis actu; et ad utrumque horum potestas quædam sive auctoritas requiritur. Et secundum hoc distinguuntur duæ claves, quarum una pertinet ad judicium de idoneitate ejus qui absolvendus est; et alia ad ipsam absolutionem. Et hæ duæ claves non distinguuntur in essentia auctoritatis, qua utrumque ex officio sibi competit; sed ex comparatione ad actus quorum unus alium præsupponit.
Article 4
[II-II.q.17.a.4.arg.1] It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers." Therefore one may hope in man.
[II-II.q.17.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis possit licite sperare in homine. Spei enim objectum est beatitudo æterna. Sed ad beatitudinem æternam consequendam adjuvamur patrociniis sanctorum; dicit enim Gregorius, I Dialog., c. viii, col. 188, t. 3, quod « prædestinatio juvatur precibus sanctorum. » Ergo aliquis potest in homine sperare.
[II-II.q.17.a.4.arg.2] Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jeremiah 9:4: "Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
[II-II.q.17.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si non potest aliquis sperare Dici posset: concedimus aliquem sperare posse alteri beatitudinem ætternam; sed tunc producit actum charitatis, et non actum spei; nam vult alteri bonum, quod est actus charitatis. Mirum esset equidem quod sperare non esset actus spei. Sed ad notionem spei redeamus. Spes habitus est animi divinitus infusus per quem certa cum fiducia ætternæ vitæ bona auxilio divino obtinenda in homine, non esset reputandum alicui in vitium quod in eo aliquis sperare non possit. Sed hoc de quibusdam in vitium dicitur, ut patet Jerem., xi, 4: Unusquisque a proximo suo se custodiat, et in omni fratre suo non habeat fiduciam. Ergo licite potest aliquis sperare in homine.
[II-II.q.17.a.4.arg.3] Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above (2, Objection 2). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something. Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.
[II-II.q.17.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, petitio est interpretativa spei, sicut dictum est. Sed licite potest homo aliquid petere ab homine. Ergo licite potest sperare de eo.
[II-II.q.17.a.4.sc] It is written (Jeremiah 17:5): "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
[II-II.q.17.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jerem., xvii, 5: Maledictus homo qui confidit in homine.
[II-II.q.17.a.4.co] Hope, as stated above (1; I-II, 40, 7), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is referred to an end. On like manner the principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as the first cause leading to happiness.
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[II-II.q.17.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod spes, sicut dictum est, duo respicit; scilicet bonum quod obtinere intendit, et auxilium per quod illud bonum obtinetur. Bonum autem quod aliquis sperat obtinendum, habet rationem causæ finalis; auxilium autem per quod aliquis sperat illud bonum obtinere, habet rationem causæ efficientis. In genere autem utriusque causæ inventur principale et secundarium. Principalis enim finis est finis ultimus; secundarius autem finis est bonum quod est ad finem. Similiter principalis causa agens est primum agens, secundaria vero causa efficiens est agens secundarium instrumentale. Spes autem respicit beatitudinem ætternam sicut finem ultimum, divinum autem auxilium sicut primam causam inducentem ad beatitudinem. Sicut ergo non licet sperare aliquod bonum præter beatitudinem, sicut ultimum finem, sed solum sicut id quod est ad finem beatitudinis ordinatum; ita etiam non licet sperare de aliquo homine, vel de aliqua creatura, sicut de prima causa movente in beatitudinem. Licet autem sperare de aliquo homine vel de aliqua creatura sicut de agente secundario et instrumentali, per quod aliquis adjuvatur ad quæcumque bona consequenda in beatitudinem ordinata. Et hoc modo ad sanctos convertimur, et ab hominibus etiam aliqua petimus; et vituperantur illi de quibus aliquis confidere non potest ad auxilium ferendum. expectamus. Nonne supposita unione amoris, etsi naturalis tantum, bonumque alterius quasi meum reputans, sperare possum alteri vitam æternam auxilio divino obtinendam? Actus est amoris certe, sed etiam actus spei. Et est in hoc casu actus spei informis, siquidem non adest charitas, sine qua spes informis remanet. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
Article 5
[II-II.q.17.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod spes non sit virtus theologica. Virtus enim theologica est quæ habet Deum pro objecto. Sed spes non habet solum Deum pro objecto, sed etiam alia bona quæ a Deo obtinere speramus. Ergo spes non est virtus theologica.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.arg.2] Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as stated above (I-II, 64, 4). But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus theologica non consistit in medio duorum vitiorum, ut supra habitum est. Sed spes consistit in medio præsumptionis et desperationis. Ergo spes non est virtus theologica.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.arg.3] Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, expectatio pertinet ad longanimitatem, quæ est species fortitudinis. Cum ergo spes sit quædam expectatio, videatur quod spes non sit virtus theologica, sed moralis.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.arg.4] Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, objectum spei est arduum. Sed tendere in arduum pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quæ est virtus moralis. Ergo spes est virtus moralis, et non theologica.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.sc] Hope is enumerated (1 Corinthians 13) together with faith and charity, which are theological virtues.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod I ad Cor., xiii, conumeratur spes fidei et charitati quæ sunt virtutes theologicæ.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.co] Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above (Article 1) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God for its object, as stated above (I-II, 62, 1), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum differentia specificæ per se dividant genus, oportet attendere unde habeat spes rationem virtutis, ad hoc ut sciamus sub qua differentia virtutis collocetur. Dictum est autem supra, quod spes habet rationem virtutis ex hoc quod attingit supremam regulam humanorum actuum; quam attingit et sicut primam causam efficientem, inquantum ejus auxilio innititur; et sicut ultimam causam finalem, inquantum in ejus fruitione beatitudinem expectat. Et sic patet, quod spei, inquantum est virtus, principale objectum est Deus. Cum ergo in hoc consistat ratio virtutis theologicæ, quod Deum habeat pro objecto, sicut supra dictum est, manifestum est quod spes est virtus theologica.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.ad.1] Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as stated above (Article 4).
[II-II.q.17.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quæ-cumque alia spes adipisci expectat, sperat in ordine ad Deum sicut ad ultimum finem, vel sicut ad primam causam efficientem, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.ad.2] In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod medium accipitur in regulatis et mensuratis, secundum quod regula vel mensura attingitur; secundum autem quod exceditur regula est superfluum; secundum autem defectum a regula est diminutum. In ipsa autem regula vel mensura non est accipere medium et extrema. Virtus autem moralis est circa ea quæ regulantur ratione, sicut circa objectum proprium; et ideo per se convenit ei esse in medio ex parte proprii objecti. Sed virtus theologica est circa ipsam regulam primam non regulatam alia regula, sicut circa proprium objectum; et ideo per se et secundum proprium objectum non convenit virtuti theologicæ esse in medio; sed potest ei competere per accidens ratione ejus quod ordinatur ad principale objectum; sicut fides non potest habere medium et extrema in hoc quod innitatur primæ veritati, cui nullus potest nimis inniti; sed ex parte eorum quæ credit potest habere medium et extrema; sicut unum verum est medium inter duo falsa; et similiter spes non habet medium et extrema ex parte principalis objecti, quia divino auxilio nullus potest nimis inniti; sed quantum ad ea quæ confidit aliquis se adepturum, potest ibi esse medium et extrema, inquantum vel præsumit ea quæ sunt supra suam proportionem, vel desperat de his quæ sunt sibi proportionata.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.ad.3] The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod expectatio quæ ponitur in definitione spei, non importat dilationem sicut expectatio quæ pertinet ad longanimitatem; sed importat respectum ad auxilium divinum; sive id quod speratur, differatur, sive non differatur.
[II-II.q.17.a.5.ad.4] Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by another's help, as stated above (Article 1).
[II-II.q.17.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod magnanimitas tendit in arduum, sperans aliquid quod est suæ potestatis; unde propriie respicit operationem aliquorum magnorum. Sed spes, 1 2 Ita mss. et editi passim; theologi « operans » legendum putant; Nicolaï « sperans » habet, sed utrumque superfluum existimat, et sic tantum dicendum: « tendit in arduum aliquid. » Licet sperare sed secundario in omnibus adjuvantibus ad consequendam beatitudinem ατεnam; et ideo non solum in homine inquantum ad hoc adjuvat aut adjuvare potest, sed et in sacra-mentis, et in nostris vel aliorum meritis, etc. secundum quod est virtus theologica, respicit arduum alterius auxilio assequendum, ut dictum est.
Article 6
[II-II.q.17.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as stated above (I-II, 54, 2). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod spes non sit virtus distincta ab aliis virtutibus theologicis. Habitus enim distinguentur secundum objecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed idem est objectum spei et aliarum virtutum theologicarum. Ergò spes non distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus theologicis.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.arg.2] Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as stated above (Article 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in Symbolo fidei, in quo fidem profitemur, dicitur: « Expecto resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam venturi saeculi. » Sed expectatio futuræ beatitudinis pertinet ad spem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo spes a fide non distinguitur.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.arg.3] Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per spem homo tendit in Deum. Sed hoc proprie pertinet ad charitatem. Ergo spes a charitate non distinguitur.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.sc] There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.sc] Sed contra, ubi non est distinctio, ibi non est numerus. Sed spes connumeratur aliis virtutibus theologicis; dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., cap. xxvii, § 38, col. 544, t. 1, esse tres virtutes, spem, fidem et charitatem. Ergo spes est virtus distincta ab aliis virtutibus theologicis.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.co] A virtue is said to be theological from having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtus aliqua dicitur esse theologica ex hoc quod habet Deum pro objecto, cui inhæret. Potest autem aliquis alicui inhærere dupliciter: uno modo propter seipsum; alio modo inquantum ex eo in aliud devenitur. Charitas ergo facit hominem Deo inhærere propter seipsum, voluntatem hominis uniens Deo per affectum amoris. Spes autem et fides faciunt hominem inhærere Deo sicut cuidam principio, ex quo aliqua nobis provenient. De Deo autem provenit nobis et cognitio veritatis, et adeptio perfectæ bonitatis. Fides ergo facit hominem Deo adhærere, inquantum est nobis principium cognoscendi veritatem; credimus enim ea vera esse quæ nobis a Deo dicuntur. Spes autem facit Deo adhærere, prout est in nobis principium perfectæ bonitatis, inquantum scilicet per spem divino auxilio innitimur ad beatitudinem obtinendam.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.ad.1] God is the object of these virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, 54, 2).
[II-II.q.17.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus secundum aliam et aliam rationem est objectum harum virtutum, ut dictum est. Ad distinctionem autem habituum sufficit diversa ratio objecti, ut supra habitum est.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.ad.2] Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (7). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod expectatio ponitur in Symbolo fidei, non quia sit actus proprius fidei sed inquantum actus spei præ-supponit fidem, ut infra dicetur. Et sic actus fidei manifestatur per actus spei.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.ad.3] Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
[II-II.q.17.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod spes facit tendere in Deum sicut in quoddam bonum finale adipiscendum, et sicut in quoddam adjutorium efficax ad subveniendum; sed charitas proprie facit tendere in Deum, uniendo affectum hominis Deo, ut scilicet homo non sibi vivat, sed Deo.
Article 7
[II-II.q.17.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Psalm 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod spes præcedat fidem. Quia super illud ps. xxxvi: Spera in Domino, et fac bonitatem, dicit Glossa Cassiod.: « Spes est introitus fidei, initium salutis. » Sed salus est per fidem, per quam justificamur. Ergo spes præcedit fidem.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.arg.2] Further, that which is included in a definition should precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in the definition of faith (Hebrews 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod ponitur in definitione alicujus, debet esse prius et magis notum. Sed spes ponitur in definitione fidei, ut patet Hebr., xi, 1: Fides est substantia sperandarum rerum. Ergo spes est prior fide.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.arg.3] Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes faith.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, spes præcedit actum meritorium: dicit enim Apostolus, I ad Cor., ix, 10, quod qui arat, debet arare in spe fructus percipiendi. Sed actus fidei est meritorius. Ergo spes præcedit fidem.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.sc] It is written (Matthew 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i.e. "Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Matth., 1, 2, dicitur: Abraham genuit Isaac, id est, fides spem, sicut dicit Glossa interlin.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.co] Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as explained above (2; 6, ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us, according to Hebrews 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod fides absolute præcedit spem. Objectum enim spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile haberi. Ad hoc ergo quod aliquis speret, requiritur quod objectum spei proponatur ei ut possibile. Objectum autem spei est uno modo beati-tudo aeterna, et alio modo divinum auxilium, ut ex dictis patet. Et utrumque eorum proponitur nobis per fidem, per quam nobis innotescit quod ad vitam aeternam possumus pervenire, et quod ad hoc paratum est nobis divinum auxilium, secundum illud Hebr., xi, 6: Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est, et quia inquirentibus se remunerator est. Unde manifestum est quod fides pra-cedit spem.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.ad.1] As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called "the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established and perfected in faith.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Glossa ibidem subdit, spes dicitur « introitus fidei, » id est, rei creditæ, quia per spem intratur ad videndum id quod creditur. Vel potest dici quod est « introitus fidei, » quia per eam homo intrat ad hoc quod stabiliatur et perficiatur in fide.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.ad.2] The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in defini-tione fidei ponitur res speranda, quia proprium objectum fidei non est apparens secundum seipsum. Unde fuit necessarium ut quadam circumlocutione designaretur per id quod consequitur ad fidem.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.ad.3] Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
[II-II.q.17.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non omnis actus meritorius habet spem pra-cedentem; sed sufficit, si habeat concomitantem, vel consequentem.
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