Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q18. The subject of hope
Source context
- Theme
- hope as a theological virtue with a determinate subject in the soul's rational appetite
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Scholastic Christian — Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II Q18Aquinas locates hope as a passion when considered in the sensitive appetite and as a virtue when seated in the will (rational appetite), distinguishing its proper subject from related acts of faith and charity — a structural differentiation of soul-faculties without direct parallel in Steiner's anthroposophical anthropology.
- Aristotelian psychologyThe question of which faculty of the soul is the proper subject of a virtue follows Aristotle's account of appetite in De Anima III, which Aquinas inherits and refines to accommodate the theological virtue of hope as distinct from natural desire.
Q18. The subject of hope
Article 1
[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (17, 1; I-II, 40, 1). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod spes non sit in voluntate sicut in subjecto. Spei enim objectum est bonum arduum, ut supra dictum est. Arduum autem non est objectum voluntatis, sed irascibilis. Ergo spes non est in voluntate, sed in irascibili.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.2] Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad id ad quod unum sufficit, superflue apponitur aliud. Sed ad perficiendum potentiam voluntatis sufficit charitas, quæ est perfectissima virtutum. Ergo spes non est in voluntate.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.3] Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, una potentia non potest simul esse in duobus actibus, sicut intellectus non potest simul multa intelligere. Sed actus spei simul potest esse cum actu charitatis. Ergo cum actus charitatis manifeste pertineat ad voluntatem, actus spei non pertinet ad ipsam. Sic ergo spes non est in voluntate. Sic cod.; in Parm. : « ei. » Sic cod.; in edit. : « illi motus qui... sunt cum passione; in superiori autem sine passione. » Quidam theologi distinguunt inter subjectum
[II-II.q.18.a.1.sc] The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is in the will as its subject.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.sc] Sed contra, anima non est capax Dei nisi secundum mentem, in qua est memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, ut patet per Augustinum in lib. XIV De Trinit., cap. vi, col. 1041, t. 8. Sed spes est virtus theologica habens Deum pro objecto. Cum ergo non sit neque in memoria neque in intelligentia, quæ pertinent ad vim cognoscitivam, relinquitur quod sit in voluntate sicut in subjecto.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.co] As shown above (I, 87, 2), habits are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated in I, 82, 5, those movements which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (I, 87, 2, ad 1; I-II, 22, 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex prædictis patet, habitus per actus cognoscuntur. Actus autem spei est quidam motus appetitivæ partis, cum sit ejus objectum bonum. Cum autem sit duplex appetitus in homine, scilicet appetitus sensitivus, qui dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, ut in I habitum est; similes autem motus qui sunt in appetitu inferiori cum passione, superiorum sunt sine passione, ut ex supra dictis patet. Actus autem virtutis spei non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum : quia bonum, quod est objectum principale hujus virtutis, non est aliquod bonum sensibile, sed bonum divinum. Et ideo spes est in appetitu superiori, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut in subjecto; non autem in appetitu inferiori, ad quem pertinet irascibilis.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.1] The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod irascibilis objectum est arduum sensibile. Objectum autem virtutis spei est arduum intelligibile, vel potius supra intellectum existens.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.2] Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod charitas sufficienter perficit voluntatem quantum ad unum actum, qui est diligere; requiritur autem alia virtus ad perficiendum ipsam secundum alium actum ejus, qui est speare.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.3] The movement of hope and the movement of charity are mutually related, as was shown above (Question 17, Article 8). Hence there is no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the same time if they be related to one another, as stated in I, 85, 4.
[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod motus spei et motus charitatis habent ordinem ad invicem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde nihil prohibet utrumque motum simul esse unius potentiæ; sicut et intellectus potest simul multa intelligere ad invicem ordinate, ut in I habitum est.
Article 2
[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of Psalm 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person. Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod spes sit in beatis. Christus enim a principio suæ conceptionis fuit perfectus comprehensor. Sed ipse habuit spem, cum ex ejus persona dicatur in psal. xxx, 4: In te, Domine, speravi, ut Glossa ord. exponit, col. 884, t. 4. Ergo in beatis potest esse spes.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.2] Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue in its possession.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut adeptio beatitudinis est quoddam bonum arduum, ita etiam ejus continuatio. Sed homines, antequam beatitudinem adipiscantur, habent spem de beatitudinis adeptione. Ergo postquam sunt beatitudinem adepti, possunt sperare beatitudinis continuationem.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.3] Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Question 17, Article 3). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in them.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per virtutem spei potest aliquis beatitudinem sperare non solum sibi, sed etiam aliis, ut supra dictum est. Sed beati qui sunt in patria, sperant beatitudinem aliis; alioquin non rogarent pro eis. Ergo in beatis potest esse spes.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.4] Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apocalypse 6:10; Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, ad beatitudinem sanctorum pertinet non solum gloria animæ, sed etiam gloria corporis. Sed animæ sanctorum, qui sunt in patria, expectant adhuc gloria corporis, ut patet Apoc., vi, et Aug., XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xxxv, col. 483, t. 3. Ergo spes potest esse in beatis.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 8:24): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore hope has no place in them.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Rom., viii, 24: Quod videt quis, quid sperat? Sed beati fruuntur Dei visione. Ergo in eis spes locum non habet.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.co] If what gives a thing its species be removed, the species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object, even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (17, 5,6; I-II, 54, 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above (Question 17, Article 2).
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, subtracto eo quod dat speiem rei, solvitur species, et res non potest eadem remanere; sicut, remota forma corporis naturalis, non remanet idem secundum speiem. Spes autem recipit speiem a suo objecto principali, sicut et cæteræ virtutes, ut ex supra dictis patet. Objectum autem principale ejus est beatitudino æterna secundum quod est possibilis haberi ex auxilio divino, ut supra dictum est. tum, et est potentia in qua virtus spei radicatur. Subjectum quod et totale idem est ac subjectum mediatum, et per hoc intelliguntur personæ quæ spem habent. Vocatur autem totale quia in ipso comprehenduntur et personæ et potentia spei receptiva. Primum autem subjectum vocatur partiale, quia concipitur, cum sermo est de ipso, potentia spei receptiva, abstrahendo a persona cujus est potentia illa. Porro est certum fere apud omnes, ut ait Henno, subjectum quo seu immediatum esse voluntatem. Nonnulli etenim inter voluntatem et Quia ergo bonum arduum possibile non cadit sub ratione spei, nisi secundum quod est futurum, ideo cum beatitudo jam non sit futura, sed præsens, non potest ibi esse virtus spei. Et ideo spes, sicut et fides, evacuatur in patria, et neutrum eorum in beatis esse potest.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.1] Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the enjoyment of God.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus etsi esset comprehensor, et per consequens beatus, quantum ad divinam fruitionem, erat tamen simul viator quantum ad passibilitatem naturæ, quam adhuc gerebat; et ideo gloriam impassibilitatis et immortaliatis sperare potuit, non tamen ita quod haberet virtutem spei, quæ non respicit gloriam corporis sicut principale objectum, sed potius fruitionem divinam.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.2] The happiness of the saints is called eternal life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod beatitudo sanctorum dicitur vita æterna, quia per hoc quod Deo fruuntur, efficiuntur quodam modo participes æternitatis divinæ, quæ excedit omne tempus; et ita continuatio beatitudinis non diversificatur per præsens, præteritum et futurum. Et ideo beati non habent spem de continuatione beatitudinis, sed habent ipsam rem, quia non est ibi ratio futuri.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.3] So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others. But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, durante virtute spei, eadem spe aliquis sperat beatitudinem sibi et aliis. Sed, evacuata spe in beatis, secundam quam sperabant sibi beatitudinem, sperant quidem aliis beatitudinem, sed non virtute spei, sed magis ex amore charitatis; sicut etiam qui habet charitatem Dei, eadem charitate diligit proximum; et tamen aliquis potest diligere proximum non habens virtutem charitatis, alio quodam amore.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.4] Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of the body.
[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum spes sit virtus theologica habens Deum pro objecto, principale objectum spei est gloria animæ, quæ in fruitione divina consistit, non autem gloria corporis. Gloria etiam corporis, etsi habeat rationem ardui per comparisonem ad naturam humanam, non habet tamen rationem ardui habenti gloriam animæ; intellectum hærere potuerunt. Billuart tamen asserit absque ulla restrictione: « Certum est esse voluntatem. » « Spectatio quidem actus est intellectus; sed expectatio, saltem prout convenit spei, est actus voluntatis. » Sic P. Henno. Sic cod.; in edit.: « sed. » — Sic cod.; in edit.: « respectu habentis. » Juxta quosdam, Scotus contrarium teneret; ast expresse dicit de fide et spe: « Isti habitus non manebunt, quia essent superflui. » tum quia gloria corporis est minimum quid-dam in comparatione ad gloriam animæ; tum etiam quia habens gloriam animæ habet jam sufficienter causam gloriæ corporis.
Article 3
[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matthew 25:41: "Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope, according to Job 40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that the damned have hope.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in damnatis sit spes. Diabolus enim est et 1 damnatus, et princeps damnatorum, secundum illud Matth., xxv, 41: Ite, maledicti, in ignem æternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus. Sed diabolus habet spem, secundum illud Job, xL, 28: Ecce spes ejus frustrabitur eum. Ergo videtur quod damnati habeant spem.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.2] Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut fides potest esse 2 formata et informis, ita et spes. Sed fides informis potest esse in dæmonibus et damnatis, secundum illud Jacobi, 11, 49: Dæmones credunt, et contremiscunt. Ergo videtur quod etiam spes informis potest esse in damnatis.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.3] Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to Ecclesiastes 11:3, "If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be." Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulli hominum post mortem accrescit meritum vel demeritum, quod in vita non habuit, secundum illud Eccl., xi, 3: Si ceciderit lignum ad austrum, aut ad aquilonem, in quocumque loco ceciderit, ibi erit. Sed multi qui damnabuntur 3 habuerunt in hac vita spem, nunquam desperantes. Ergo etiam in futura vita spem habebunt.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.sc] Hope causes joy, according to Romans 12:12, "Rejoicing in hope." Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according to Isaiah 65:14, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit." Therefore no hope is in the damned.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod spes causat gaudium, secundum illud Rom., xii, 12: Spe gaudentes. Sed damnati non sunt in gaudio, sed in dolore et luctu, secundum illud Isa., Lxv, 14: Servi mei laudabunt præ exultatione cordis; et vos clamabitis præ dolore cordis, et præ contritione spiritus ululabitis. Ergo spes non est in damnatis.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.co] Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will: wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not rest.
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not that he may return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut de ratione beatitudinis est ut in ea quietetur voluntas, ita de ratione pœnæ est ut id quod pro pœna infligitur, voluntati repugnet. Non autem potest voluntatem quietare vel ei repugnare quod ignoratur. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, XI Super Genes. ad litter., cap. xvii, col. 438, t. 3, quod angeli perfecte beati esse non poterant in primo statu ante confirmationem vel miseri ante lapsum 4, cum non essent præscii sui eventus. Requiritur enim ad perfectam et veram beatitudinem ut aliquis certus sit de suæ beatitudinis perpetuitate; alioquin voluntas non quietaretur. Similiter etiam cum perpetuitas damnationis pertineat ad pœnam damnatorum, non vere haberet rationem pœnæ nisi voluntati repugnaret; quod esse non posset, 1 «Et» in edit. deest. — 2 Sic cod.; in edit.: «est. » — 3 In edit.: «damnantur.» — 4 Sic cod.; in edit.: «confirmationem vel lapsum.» Quidam theologi arbitrati sunt habitum, non actum spei remanere in patria; quidam et habitum et actum. Allegabatur pro illa doctrina Scotus dicens objectum fidei et spei non esse Deum ut latentem aut absentem, sed Deum ut Deum, et sic posse actus et habitus illarum virtutum esse in patria. Insuper Christus, licet comprehensor, spem habuit; nam dicitur ejus in persona: In te, Domine, speravi, ps. xxx. Præterea beati sperare possunt in patria continuationem suæ beatitudinis, gloriam in resurrectione universali obtinendam, beatitudinem viatoribus. Præterea, Paulus in raptu non perdidit habitum fidei per actum visionis, nec habitum spei; ergo nec beati perdunt habitum spei per actum possessionis. Quoad Scotum, loquitur inquisitive, nihil resolvendo. Immo expresse tenet habitum spei non remanere in patria: « Isti habitus (fidei et spei) non manebunt, quia essent superflui; » nam in patria, « erit verum patens, et bonum habitum. » Quoad objectiones alias meminisse oportet conditionum objecti spei quod debet esse absens, futurum, et arduum. Porro beatis continuatio suæ beatitudinis, et gloria in resurrectione universali obtinenda non sunt quid arduum. Idem dicam de beatitudine viatoribus sperata, quia ex parte beatorum, ut aiunt Joannes a S. Thoma et Serra, non est quid arduum, sicut bonis filiis non est arduum consuetum cibum obtinere a patre. Salus viatorum ex sola viatorum resistentia, non ex consueto beatorum intercessionis effectu est quid arduum et difficile. Sed et responderi potest spem quam habemus de salute aliorum esse in nobis secundario, non primario. Atqui, suppressa spe quae de salute nostra in nobis est primario, spes quae secundario est non remanet, loco cujus ex amore charitatis stat desiderium. Unde beati non haberent spem theologicam de salute viatorum. De Christo respondendum quod nec ipse spem habuit theologicam; de Paulo, quia transeunter Deum videbat, quod perdidit quidem in ipsa visione actum spei, non vero habitum. Qui autem negant Paulum intuitive vidisse Deum de facili solvunt objectionem; nam in Paulo nec habitus nec actus spei evacuari debuerunt, si Paulus intuitive Deum non vidit. Cæterum Malderus refert Benedictum XI, in extravaganti Benedictus, definiisse visionem Dei evacuare actum spei. Ubi autem non exercetur actus, ad quid habitus? si perpetuitatem suæ damnationis ignorant. Et ideo ad conditionem miseriæ damnatorum pertinet ut ipsi sciant quod nullo modo possunt damnationem evadere, et ad beatitudinem pervenire. Unde dicitur Job, xv, 22: Non credit quod reverti possit de tenebris ad lucem. Unde patet quod non possunt apprehendere beatitudinem ut bonum possibile, sicut nec beati ut bonum futurum. Et ideo neque in beatis, neque in damnatis est spes. Sed in viatoribus, sive sint in vita ista, sive in purgatorio, potest esse spes, quia utrobique apprehendunt beatudinem ut futurum possibile.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.1] As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before (Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, XXXIII Moral., cap. xx, § 37, col. 697, t. 2, hoc dicitur de diabolo secundum membra ejus, quorum spes annullabitur. Vel si intelligatur de ipso diabolo, potest referri ad spem qua sperat se de sanctis victoriam obtinere, secundum illud quod supra præmiserat: Habet fiduciam quod Jordanis influat in os ejus. Hæc autem non est spes de qua loquimur.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.2] As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future possible things, but far removed from them.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in Enchir., cap. viii, col. 234, t. 6, « fides est malarum rerum, et bonarum, et præteritarum, et præsentium, et futurarum, et suarum, et alienarum; sed spes non est nisi rerum bonarum futurarum ad se pertinentium. » Et ideo magis potest esse fides informis in damnatis quam spes: quia bona divina non sunt eis futura possibilia, sed sunt eis absentia.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.3] Lack of hope in the damned does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their respective states.
[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod defectus spei in damnatis, non variat demeritum, sicut nec evacuatio spei in beatis auget meritum; sed utrumque contingit propter mutationem status.
Article 4
[II-II.q.18.a.4.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
[II-II.q.18.a.4.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above (Question 17, Article 1). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above (I-II, 112, 5). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.
[II-II.q.18.a.4.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
[II-II.q.18.a.4.sc] On the contrary, "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness," as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from 2 Timothy 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him."
[II-II.q.18.a.4.co] I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power; by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power. On this way we say that nature works with certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with certainty to its end. On this way too, the moral virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[II-II.q.18.a.4.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
[II-II.q.18.a.4.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
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