Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q19. The gift of fear
Source context
- Theme
- Fear of God as a gift of the Holy Spirit perfecting the virtue of hope
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Hebrew Bible / Old Testament (yirat Adonai)The fear of the Lord (yirat Adonai) is named in Proverbs and Psalms as the beginning of wisdom, providing a scriptural antecedent to Aquinas's treatment of timor as a gift ordered toward God rather than toward creaturely harm.
- Isaianic seven gifts tradition (Isaiah 11:2–3)Aquinas's enumeration of the gift of fear derives directly from Isaiah 11:2–3, where the Spirit of the Lord rests upon the messianic figure endowed with seven gifts, of which fear of the Lord is the seventh and foundational.
- Neoplatonic reverentiaPseudo-Dionysius's account of the soul's awe before divine transcendence shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's distinction between servile fear (avoidance of punishment) and filial fear (reverence before divine majesty as such).
Q19. The gift of fear
Article 1
[II-II.q.19.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of fear is a future evil, as stated above (I-II, 41, 2,3). But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God cannot be feared.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Christo sit una tantum operatio Divinitatis et humanitatis. Dicit enim Dionysius in II cap. De div. nom., § 6, col. 643, t. 1: «Discreta autem est benignissima erga nos Dei operatio per hoc quod secundum nos ex nobis integre vereque humanatum est Verbum supersubstantiale, et operatum, et passum quæcumque humanæ ejus divinæque operationi congruunt; » ubi unam operationem nominat humanam et divinam, quæ in Græco dicitur theandidriki, idest, deivirilis. Videtur igitur esse una operatio composita in Christo.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.arg.2] Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God. Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Magister dicit, IV, dist. xvIII, claves sunt duæ, scilicet scientia discernendi, et potentia judicandi. Sed ad utraque sacerdotes legales habebant auctoritatem. Ergo habebant claves. tatem arbitrandi, quia Deus hanc Ecclesiæ suæ non dedit.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.arg.3] Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from God, but from ourselves, according to Hosea 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be feared.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sacerdotes legales habebant aliquam potestatem super reliquum populum, non temporalem quia sic potestas regia non fuisset distincta a sacerdotali; ergo spiritualem, et hæc est clavis. Ergo habuerunt clavem.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.sc] It is written (Jeremiah 10:7): "Who shall not fear Thee, O King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where is My fear?"
[II-II.q.19.a.1.sc] Sed contra, claves ordinantur ad aperiendum regnum cælorum, quod aperiri non potuit ante Christi passionem. Ergo sacerdos legalis claves non habuit. Præterea, sacramenta veteris legis gratiam non conferebant. Sed aditus regni cælestis aperiri non potuit nisi per gratiam. Ergo per illa sacramenta non poterat aperiri; et sic etiam sacerdos, qui minister eorum erat, claves regni cælestis non habebat.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.co] Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation to Him.
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good. Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod in veteri lege erant claves regni apud sacerdotes, quia eis erat commissum imponere pœnam pro delictis, ut dicitur Levit., v, quod ad claves pertinere videtur; sed fuerunt tunc incompletæ, nunc autem per Christum in sacerdotibus novæ legis perfectæ sunt. Sed hoc videtur esse contra intentionem Apostoli in Epistola ad Hebr., cap. 1x. Ibi enim sacerdotium Christi præfertur sacerdotio legali, per hoc quod Christus assistit Pontifex futurorum bonorum, introducens per proprium sanguinem in tabernaculum non manufactum 1, in quod introducebat sacerdotium veteris legis per sanguinem hircorum et taurorum. Unde patet quod sacerdoti illius potestas non se extendebat ad cælestia sed ad figuras cælestium. Et ideo secundum alios dicendum quod non habebant claves, sed in eis clavium figura præcessit.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.ad.1] This objection considers the object of fear as being the evil which a man shuns.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod claves regni cælestis consequuntur ad sacerdotium, per quod homo in cælestia introducitur; non autem tale erat sacerdotium Leviticum; et ideo claves cæli non habuerunt, sed claves terreni tabernaculi.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.ad.2] In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under different aspects.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sacerdotes veteris legis habebant auctoritatem discernendi et judicandi, sed non ut admitteretur homo judicatus ab eis in cælestia, sed in figuras cælestium.
[II-II.q.19.a.1.ad.3] The evil of fault is not from God as its author but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good, since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly; although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is written (Wisdom 1:13-16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
[II-II.q.19.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non habebant spiritualem potestatem, quia per sacramenta legalia 2 non a culpis sed ab irregularitatibus purgabant homines, ut ad manufactum tabernaculum aditus purgatis per ea 5 pateret.
Article 2
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness, shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, 41, 4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question. Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus non habuerit clavem. Clavis enim characterem ordinis consequitur. Sed Christus non habuit characterem. Ergo non habuit clavem.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.2] Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good, since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . . believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mark 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Christus habuit in sacramentis potestatem excellentiæ, ut effectum sacramenti sine sacramentalibus posset conferre. Sed clavis est quoddam sacramentale. Ergo non indigebat clavi; et sic frustra eam habuisset.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.3] Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all these other fears.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, instrumenta debent esse proportionata operationibus. Corpus autem humanum habet diversa membra differentia secundum formam, ergo diversis operationibus accommodata. Sunt ergo in Christo diversæ operationes secundum humanam naturam.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.4] Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between them.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut timor servilis timet pœnam, ita timor initialis et mundanus. Non ergo debuerunt ab invicem distingui isti timores.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.5] Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore "worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.arg.5] 5. Præterea, sicut concupiscentia est boni, ita etiam timor est mali. Sed alia est « concupiscentia oculorum, » qua quis concupiscit bona mundi; alia est « concupiscentia carnis, » qua quis concupiscit delectationem propriam. Ergo etiam alius est timor mundanus, quo quis timet amittere bona exteriora, et alius est timor humanus, quo quis timet propriæ personæ detrimentum.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.sc] stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
[II-II.q.19.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc., 111, 7: Hæc dicit qui habet clavem David, etc.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.co] We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated above (I-II, 42, 3) when we were considering the passion of fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtus aliquid agendi est in instrumento, et in per se agente, non eodem modo, sed in per se agente est perfectius. Potestas autem clavium quam nos habemus, et aliorum sacramentorum virtus est instrumentalis; sed in Christo est ut in per se agente ad salutem nostram, et per auctoritatem quidem, in quantum est Deus, sed per meritum, inquantum est homo. Clavis autem de ratione sua exprimit potestatem aperiendi et claudendi, sive aliquis aperiat, quasi principale agens, sive quasi minister. Et ideo in Christo oportet ponere clavem; sed altiori modo quam sit in ejus ministris; et ideo dicitur quod habeat clavem excellentiæ.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.1] Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul: whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as explained above.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod character de sua ratione dicit aliquid ab aliquo derivatum; et ideo potestas clavium, quæ in nobis a Christo derivata est, sequitur characterem, quo Christo conformamur: sed in Christo non sequitur characterem, sed principalem formam.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.2] Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not numbered among these kinds of fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod clavis illa quam Christus habuit, non erat sacra- 1 Ita edit. passim. Melius vetus exemplum ann. 1486: «Ad tabernaculum cæleste introducens per proprium sanguinem, non in manufactum, etc.» 2 mentalis, sed sacramentalis clavis principium.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.3] The relation of servant to master is based on the power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes our Father, according to Romans 8:15, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and by this same charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Corinthians 11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it does not include charity in its definition.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod habitudo servi ad dominum est per potestatem domini servum sibi subjicientis; sed habitudo filii ad patrem vel uxoris ad virum est e converso per affectum filii se subdentis patri, vel uxoris se conjungentis viro unione amoris. Unde timor filialis et castus ad idem pertinent, quia per charitatis amorem Deus pater noster efficitur, secundum illud Rom., viii, 15: Accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus Abba, Pater; et secundum eamdem charitatem dicitur etiam sponsus noster, secundum illud II ad Cor., xi, 2: Despondi vos uni viro virginem castam exhibere Christo. Timor autem servilis ad aliud pertinet, quia charitatem in sui ratione non includit.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.4] These three fears regard punishment but in different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it secondarily.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod prædicti tres timores respiciunt pœnam, sed diversimode: nam timor mundanus sive humanus respicit pœnam a Deo avertentem, quam quandoque inimici Dei infligunt vel comminantur. Sed timor servilis et initialis respiciunt pœnam, per quam homines attrahuntur ad Deum, divinitus inflictam vel comminatam; quam quidem pœnam principaliter timor servilis respicit, timor autem initialis secundario.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.5] It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins, all of which alike however lead man away from God.
[II-II.q.19.a.2.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod eadem ratione homo a Deo avertitur propter timorem amittendi bona mundana, et propter timorem amittendi incolumitatem proprii corporis: quia bona exteriora ad corpus pertinent. Et ideo uterque timor hic pro eodem computatur, quamvis mala quæ timentur gor. » sint diversa, sicut et bona quae concupis-cuntur. Ex qua quidem diversitate provenit diversitas peccatorum secundum speciem, quibus tamen omnibus commune est a Deo abducere.
Article 3
[II-II.q.19.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil. Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of whom we read (Luke 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non soli sacerdotes claves habeant. Dicit enim $^1$ Isidorus, lib. VII Etym., cap. xii, col. 293, t. 3, et lib. II De ecclesiast. offic., cap. xv, col. 794, t. 6, quod « ostiarii inter bonos et malos habent judicium, dignos recipiunt, indignos rejiciunt. » Sed hæc est definitio clavium, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo non solum sacerdotes, sed etiam ostiarii claves habent.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.arg.2] Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments incite us to good actions, according to Romans 13:3, "Wilt thou not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, claves sacerdotibus dantur dum per unctionem potestatem divinitus accipiunt. Sed reges etiam potestatem in populum fidelem divinitus habent, et unctione sanctificantur. Ergo non soli sacerdotes habent claves.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.arg.3] Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sacerdotium est ordo uni singulari personæ conveniens. Sed clavem aliquando videtur habere tota una congregatio, quia quædam capitula excommunicationem inferre possunt, quod ad potestatem clavium pertinet. Ergo non soli sacerdotes claves habent.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.sc] Our Lord said (Matthew 10:28): "Fear ye not them that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, lib. I De pænit., cap. 11, §7, col. 488, t. 3: « Hoc jus, » scilicet ligandi et solvendi « solis permissum sacerdotibus est. » Præterea, per potestatem clavium efficitur aliquis medius inter populum et Deum. Sed hoc tantum sacerdotibus competit, qui constituentur in his quæ sunt ad Deum, ut offerant dona et sacrificia pro peccatis, ut dicitur Hebr., v. 4. Ergo soli sacerdotes claves habent.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.co] As shown above (I-II, 1, 3; I-II, 18, 1; I-II, 54, 2) moral acts and habits take their name and species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is always evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod clavis est duplex: una quæ se extendit ad ipsum cælum immediate, removendo impedimenta introitus in cælum per remissionem peccati, et hæc vocatur clavis ordinis; et hanc soli sacerdotes habent, quia ipsi soli ordinantur populo in his quæ directe sunt ad Deum. Alia clavis est quæ non directe se extendit ad ipsum cælum, sed mediate militante Ecclesia, per quam aliquis ad cælum vadit, dum per eam aliquis excluditur vel admittitur ad consortium Ecclesiae militantis, per excommunicationem et absolutionem; et hæc vocatur clavis jurisdictionis in foro causarum: et ideo hanc etiam non sacerdotes habere possunt, sicut archidiaconi et electi, et allii qui excommunicare possunt. Sed non proprie dicitur clavis cæli, sed quædam dispositio ad ipsam $^2$.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.ad.1] One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias or Eliseus (Sirach 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince."
[II-II.q.19.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ostiarii habent clavem custodiendi ea quæ in templo materiali continentur; et habent judicium a tali templo excludendi et admittendi, non quidem sua auctoritate judicantes qui sint digni vel indigni; sed judicium sacerdotum exequentes, ut sic quodammodo executores potestatis sacerdotalis videantur.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.ad.2] When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to Romans 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod reges non habent aliquam potestatem in spiritualibus: et ideo clavem regni cælestis non accipiunt, sed solum in temporalibus, quæ etiam non nisi a Deo esse potest, ut patet Rom., xiii. Nec per unctionem in aliquo sacro ordine consecrantur; sed excellentia potestatis ipsorum a Christo descendere significatur, ut et ipsi sub Christo in populo christiano regnent.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.ad.3] It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever.
[II-II.q.19.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut in politicis quando judex habet potestatem, sicut est in regno; quandoque autem multi in diversis officiis constituti etiam ex æquo, ut patet in VIII Ethic., cap. x et xi, ita etiam spiritualis jurisdiction potest haberi ab uno solo, sicut ab episcopo, et a pluribus simul, sicut a capitulo; et sic habent clavem jurisdictionis, non tamen clavem ordinis simul omnes.
Article 4
[II-II.q.19.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Romans 8:15, "if a man do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well done." Therefore servile fear is not good.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod etiam sancti homines non sacerdotes usum clavium habeant. Absolutio enim et ligatio, quæ fit per claves, efficaciam habet ex merito passionis Christi. Sed illi maxime passioni Christi conformantur qui per patientiam et alias virtutes Christum passum sequuntur. Ergo videtur quod etiamsi non habeant sacerdotalem ordinem possint ligare et solvere.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.arg.2] Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, "Why did I not die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of pride, not of humility." Therefore servile fear is evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Heb., vii, 7, dicitur: Sine ulla contradictione quod minus est a majorre* benedicitur. Sed « in spiritualibus, » secundum Augustinum, lib. VI De Trinit., cap. viii, col. 929, t. 8, « hoc est majus esse quod est melius esse. » Ergo meliores, qui scilicet plus de charitate habent, possunt alios benedicere absolvendo; et sic idem quod prius.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.arg.3] Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, merces quam quis meretur, debetur secundum justitiam, et non secundum gratiam, ut patet Rom., iv. Si ergo Christus meruit salutem nostram, sequitur quod salus nostra non sit ex gratia Dei, sed ex justitia; et quod injuste agat cum eis quos non salvat, cum meritum Christi ad omnes se extendat.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.sc] Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Romans 8:15, "You have not received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear." Therefore servile fear is not evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.sc] Sed contra, « cujus est potentia, ejus est actio, » secundum Philosophum, lib. De somn. et vigil., cap. 11, parum a princ. Sed clavis quæ est potestas spiritualis, est tantum sacerdotum. Ergo et usus ejus nonnisi sacerdotibus convenire potest.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.co] It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary to charity belongs to its very species.
This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end. Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod agens per se et agens instrumentale in hoc differunt quod agens instrumentale non inducit in effectum similitudinem suam, sed similitudinem principalis agentis; principale autem agens inducit similitudinem suam. Et ideo ex hoc aliquid constituitur principale agens, quod habet aliquam formam, quam in alterum transfundere potest; non autem ex hoc constituitur agens instrumentale, sed ex hoc quod est applicatum a principali agente ad effectum aliquem inducendum. Cum ergo in actu clavium principale agens sit Christus, ut Deus per auctoritatem, et ut homo per meritum, ex ipsa plenitudine divinæ bonitatis in eo, et ex perfectione gratiae consequitur quod possit in actum clavium. Sed homo alius non potest in actum clavium sicut per se agens, quia nec ipse alteri gratiam qua remittuntur peccata, dare potest, nec sufficienter mereri; et ideo non est nisi sicut agens instrumentale. Unde et ille qui effectum clavium consequitur, non assimilatur utenti clavibus, sed Christo. Et propter hoc quatumcumque aliquis habeat de gratia, non potest pertingere ad effectum clavium, nisi applicetur ad hoc ut minister per ordinis susceptionem.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.ad.1] This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut inter instrumentum et effectum non exigitur similitudo secundum convenientiam in forma, sed secundum proportionem instrumenti ad effectum, ita etiam nec inter instrumentum et principale agens; et talis similitudo est in sanctis hominibus ad Christum passum: et talis similitudo eis usum clavium non confert.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.ad.2] Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to subject his affections to the yoke of justice.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis purus homo non possit alteri ex condigno mereri gratiam, tamen unius meritum potest cooperari ad salutem alterius. Et ideo duplex est benedictio: una quæ est ab ipso homine puro sicut merente per proprium actum; et talis potest fieri a quolibet sancto, in quo Christus habitat per gratiam, et hæc requirit majoritatem bonitatis ad minus, inquantum hujusmodi. Alia est benedictio qua homo benedicit, ut benedictionem, quæ est ex merito Christi, instrumentaliter alicui applicans, et quantum ad hanc requiritur majoritas ordinis, et non virtutis.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.ad.3] Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be feared as the principal evil.
[II-II.q.19.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut peccatum Adæ non derivatur ad alios nisi per carnalem generationem; ita meritum Christi non derivatur ad alios nisi per regenerationem spiritualem; quæfit in baptismo, per quem 4 Christo incorporur, secundum illud Galat., 11, 27: Omnes in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis; et hoc ipsum est gratia, quod homini conceditur regenerari in Christo: et sic salus hominis est ex gratia.
Article 5
[II-II.q.19.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod mali sacerdotes usum clavium non habeant. Joan., enim xx, ubi usus clavium apostolis traditur, Spiritus sancti donum præmittitur. Sed mali non habent Spiritum sanctum. Ergo non habent usum clavium.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.arg.2] Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus sapiens rex dispensationem sui thesauri suo inimico committit. Sed usus clavium in dispensatione consistit thesauri cælestis Regis qui est ipsa Sapientia. Ergo mali, qui per peccatum sunt ejus hostes, non habent usum clavium.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.arg.3] Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above (17, 2, ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Angustinus dicit, lib. V De baptismo contra Donatistas, cap. xxI, col. 191, t. 9, quod « sacramentum gratiae dat Deus etiam per malos, ipsam vero gratiam nonnisi per seipsum vel per sanctos suos; et ideo remissionem peccatorum per seipsum facit, vel per ipsius columbæ membra. » Sed remissio peccatorum est usus clavium. Ergo peccatores, qui non sunt columbæ membra, usum clavium non habent.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.sc] Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.sc] Sed contra, nullus potest scire de alio an sit in statu salutis. Si ergo nullus posset uti clavibus in absolvendo, nisi existens in statu salutis, nullus sciret se esse absolutum, quod est valde inconveniens. Præterea, iniquitas ministri non potest auferre liberalitatem domini. Sed sacerdos est solum minister. Ergo non potest sua malitia donum a Deo transmissum per eum nobis auferre.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.co] The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, 54, 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear correspond to different kinds of evil.
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown above (Article 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are not the same substantially but differ specifically.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut participatio formæ quæ est inducenda in effectum, non facit instrumentum, ita nec subtractio talis formæ tollit usum instrumenti. Et ideo cum homo sit tantum instrumentaliter agens in usu clavium, quantumcumque sit gratia per peccatum privatus per quam gratiam fit remissio peccatorum, nullo tamen modo privatur usu clavium.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.ad.1] Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand, servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the comparison fails.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod donum Spiritus sancti exigitur ad usum clavium, non ut sine quo fieri non possit, sed quia sine eo incongrue fit ex parte utentis, quamvis subjiciens se clavibus effectum clavium consequatur.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.ad.2] Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz. God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural movements differ specifically according to their different relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod rex terrenus in thesauro suo defraudari et decipi potest; et ideo dispensationem ejus hosti non committit. Sed rex cælestis defraudari non potest, quia totum ad ipsius honorem cedit, etiam quod aliqui clavibus male utantur, quia novit ex malis elicere bona, et per malos etiam multa bona facere. Et ideo non est simile.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.ad.3] Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
[II-II.q.19.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de remissione peccatorum, secundum quod sancti homines cooperantur ad ipsam, non ex vi clavium, sed ex merito congrui. Et ideo dicit quod etiam per malos sacramenta ministrat, et inter alia sacramenta etiam absolutio, quæ est usus clavium, computari debet; sed per membra columbæ, id est, per sanctos homines facit remissionem peccatorum, inquantum eorum intercessionibus peccata remittit. Vel potest dici quod membra columbæ nominat omnes ab Ecclesia non praecisos: qui enim ab eis sacramenta recipiunt, gratiam consequuntur, non autem qui recipiunt ab illis qui sunt ab Ecclesia præcisi, quia hoc ipso peccant; excepto baptismo, quem in casu necessitatis licet etiam ab excommunicato recipere.
Article 7
[II-II.q.19.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom. For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod timor non sit initium sapientiae. Initium enim est aliquid rei. Sed timor non est aliquid sapientiae; quia timor est in vi appetitiva, sapientia autem est in vi intellectiva. Ergo videtur quod timor non sit initium sapientiae.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.arg.2] Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of the Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil est principium sui ipsius. Sed timor Dei ipsa est sapientia, ut dicitur Job, xxviii, 28. Ergo videtur quod timor Dei non sit initium sapientiae.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.arg.3] Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, principio non est aliquid prius. Sed timore est aliquid prius, quia fides praecedit timorem. Ergo videtur quod timor non sit initium sapientiae.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.sc] It is written in the Psalm 110:10: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."
[II-II.q.19.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. cx, 10: Initium sapientiae timor Domini.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.co] A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is where the builder begins his work.
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state further on (45, 1), it is considered by us in one way, and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Sirach 1:27, "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin." On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod initium sapientiae potest aliquid dici dupliciter: uno modo quia est initium ipsius sapientiae quantum ad ejus essentiam; alio modo quantum ad ejus effectum: sicut initium artis secundum ejus essentiam sunt principia ex quibus procedit ars; initium autem artis secundum ejus effectum est unde ars incipit operari. Sicut si dicamus quod principium artis aedificativæ est fundamentum, quia ibi incipit aedificator operari. Cum autem sapientia sit cognitio divino-rum, ut infra dicetur, aliter consideratur a nobis, et aliter a philosophis: quia enim vita nostra ad divinam fruitionem ordinatur, et dirigitur secundum quamdam participationem divinæ naturæ, quæ est per gratiam, sapientia secundum nos non solum consideratur ut est cognoscitiva Dei, sicut apud Philosophum; sed etiam ut est directiva humanæ vitæ, quæ non solum dirigitur secundum rationes humanas, sed etiam secundum rationes divinas, ut patet per Augustinum, XII De Trinit., cap. xiv, col. 1009, t. 8. Sic ergo initium sapientiae secundum ejus essentiam sunt prima principia sapientiae, quæ sunt articuli fidei; et secundum hoc fides dicitur sapientiae initium. Sed quan- Alii, S. Bonaventura teste, dicunt quod, adveniente charitate, timor servilis expellitur quantum ad servilitatem, et quantum ad habitum. — Opinio D. Thomæ verior. tum ad effectum, initium sapientiae est unde sapientia incipit operari; et hoc modo timor est initium sapientiae: aliter tamen timor servilis, et aliter timor filialis. Timor enim servilis est sicut principium extra disponens ad sapientiam, inquantum ali-quis timore pœnæ discedit a peccato, et habilitatur per hoc ad sapientiae effectum, secundum illud Eccl., 1, 27: Timor Domini expellit peccatum. Timor autem castus vel filialis est initium sapientiae; sicut primus sapientiae effectus. Cum enim ad sapientiam pertineat quod humana vita reguletur secundum rationes divinas, hinc oportet sumere principium, ut homo Deum revereatur, et se ei subjiciat. Sic enim consequenter in omnibus secundum Deum regulabitur.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.ad.1] This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa ostendit quod timor non est principium sapientiae quantum ad essentiam sapientiae.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.ad.2] The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life that is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is written (Sirach 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for [Vulgate: 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said to be wisdom.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod timor Dei comparatur ad totam vitam humanam per sapientiam Dei regulatam, sicut radix ad arborem; unde dicitur Eccl., 1, 25: Radix sapientiae est timere Dominum; rami enim* illius longævi. Et ideo sicut radix virtute dicitur esse tota arbor, ita timor Dei dicitur esse sapientia.
[II-II.q.19.a.7.ad.3] As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Sirach 25:16): "The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith is to be fast joined to it."
[II-II.q.19.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, alio modo fides est principium sapientiae, et alio modo timor. Unde dicitur Eccl., xxv, 16: Timor Dei initium dilectionis * Et rami. est*: fidei autem initium agglutinandum est ei.
Article 8
[II-II.q.19.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the beginning of love, according to Sirach 25:16, "The fear of God is the beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod timor initialis differat secundum substantiam a timore filiali. Timor enim filialis ex dilectione causatur. Sed timor initialis est principium dilectionis, secundum illud Eccl., xxv, 16: Timor Domini initium dilectionis est. Ergo timor initialis est alius a filiali.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.arg.2] Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be the same.
But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, timor initialis timet pœnam, quae est objectum servilis timoris; et sic videtur quod timor initialis sit idem cum servili. Sed timor servilis est alius a filiali. Ergo etiam timor initialis est alius secundum substantiam a filiali.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.arg.3] Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, medium differt eadem ratione ab utroque extremorum. Sed timor initialis est medium inter timorem servilem et timorem filialem. Ergo differt et a filiali et a servili.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.sc] Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from filial fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod perfectum et imper- Legitur in psal. cx: Initium sapientiae timor Domini. Idem habetur Eccl., 1, et Prov., 1: Principium sapientiae timor Domini. Aliqui dicunt quod sapientia non dicit hic actum, vel habitum, sed discrete factum, secundum quod dicitur communiter: iste fecit magnam sapientiam, quando ali-quid magnum discrete fecit. Sic timor est principium ejus, quia timor facit declinare a malo, quod est principium faciendi bonum, Eccl., 1: Timor Domini expellit peccatum. Facit etiam timor hominem esse sollicitum de bono, Eccl., xv: Qui timet Deum faciet bona. Videtur quod non timor, sed fides sit initium sapientiae, quia ipsa est prima virtus. Respondent aliqui quod fides est prima in via generationis, quia alias virtutes generat; in via autem purificationis timor est primus, quia, purificato intellectu a reliquiis peccati, primo videt Deum. Alii dicunt quod in eis qui convertuntur de infidelitate ad fidem prima est fides; in eis autem qui de peccato mortali ad gratiam supposita fide informi, timor est primus. Ipse etiam timor præcedit opera fidei, secundum quod dicitur Act., 1x, quod Paulus tremens ac stupens dicit: Domine quid me vis facere? Et secundum hoc possumus dicere quod sapientia dicitur hic fides operans per dilectionem. Credens enim dicitur sapiens, nisi secundum quod credit operetur. Unde Matth., VII: Qui audit verba mea hæc, et non facit ea, similis est viro stulto; Eccl., I: Dilectio Dei honorabilis sapientia. Duplex est initium sapientiae: unum extrinse-cum, scilicet auditus de quo dictum est: Audiens sapiens sapientior erit, Prov., I; secundum intrinse-cum, scilicet timor servilis, de quo Prov., I, dici-tur: Timor Domini, id est datus a Domino, id est quo timetur Dominus, est principium sapientiae, quia præparat ei animam expellendo peccatum. Aliter non intraret sapientia: In malevolam animam non introibit sapientia. Vel ideo timor Domini dicitur initium sapientiae, quia prius oportet ut displiceant nobis mala, quod facit timor, et postea sapient bona, quod facit sapientia. Est etiam timor quasi expaventaculum motus illicitos arcens a corde, et sic viam præparat sapientiae. Est etiam vinculum quo ligatur vas cordis ne effundatur sapientia infusa; Eccl., I: Timor Domini scientiae religiositas. Est etiam operculum superpositum ori cordis, ne aliquid immundum interius cadat; Eccl., xxv: Timor Domini super omnia se superposuit. Est etiam quasi columna sustinens totam fabricam spiritualis aedificii; Eccl., xxvii: Nisi jugiter te tenueris in timore Domini, cito subvertetur domus tua. fectum non diversificant substantiam rei. Sed timor initialis et filialis differunt secundum perfectionem et imperfectionem charitatis, ut patet per Augustinum, Super I Canonic. Joan., tract. ix, § 5, col. 2049, t. 3. Ergo timor initialis non differt secundum substantiam a filiali.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.co] Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning [initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod timor initialis dicitur ex eo quod est initium. Sed cum et timor servilis, et timor filialis sint aliquo modo initium sapientiae, uterque potest aliquo modo initialis dici. Sed sic non accipitur initialis secundum quod distinguitur a timore servili et filiali; sed accipitur secundum quod competit statui incipientium, in quibus inchoatur quidam timor filialis per inchoationem charitatis; non tamen inest eis timor filialis perfecte, quia nondum pervenerunt ad perfectionem charitatis. Et ideo timor initialis hoc modo se habet ad filialem sicut charitas imperfecta ad perfectam. Charitas autem perfecta et imperfecta non differunt secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum statum. Et ideo dicendum est quod etiam timor initialis, prout hic sumitur, non differt secundum essentiam a timore filiali.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.ad.1] The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod timor qui est initium dilectionis, est timor servilis, qui introducit charitatem, sicut seta introducit linum, ut Augustinus dicit, Tract. ix in Epist. I Joan., § 4, col. 2047, t. 3. Vel si hoc referatur ad timorem initialem, dicitur esse dilectionis initium non absolute, sed quantum ad statum charitatis perfecte.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.ad.2] Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment, though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which "casteth out fear," according to 1 John 4:18.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod timor initialis non timet pœnam sicut proprium objectum, sed inquantum habet aliquid de timore servili adjunctum; qui secundum substantiam manet quidem cum charitate, servilitate remota; sed actus ejus manet quidem cum charitate imperfecte in eo qui non solum movetur ad bene agendum ex amore justitiæ, sed etiam ex timore pœnæ; Migne. S. Bonaventura aliter: « Quidam dicere voluerunt quod timor initialis et filialis non differunt nisi quantum ad statum, sicut et amor incipiens et perficiens est idem, licet status sit diversus hic et ibi. Sed hoc non videtur, tum quia non videmus talem modum distinguendi esse in aliis donis gratuitis, tum quia inter hos duos posset tertius timor assignari, scilicet proficiens. Ideo est alius modus dicendi quod timor initialis et timor filialis sunt diversæ species timoris. Verumtamen istud difficile est bene intelligere. Ideo possumus viam mediam sed iste actus cessat in eo qui habet charitatem perfectam, quæ foras mittit timorem habentem pœnam, ut dicitur I Joan., iv, 18.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.ad.3] Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph. ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it differs altogether from non-being.
[II-II.q.19.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod timor initialis est medium inter timorem servilem et filialem, non sicut inter ea quæ sunt unius generis, sed sicut imperfectum est medium inter ens perfectum et non ens, ut dicitur in II Metaph., text. 7, quod tamen est idem secundum substantiam cum ente perfecto; differt autem totaliter a non ente.
Article 10
[II-II.q.19.a.10.arg.1] It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity increases, the more fear decreases."
[II-II.q.19.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod, crescente charitate, diminuatur timor. Dicit enim Augustinus, Super I Canon. Joan., tract. ix, § 4, col. 2047, t. 3: « Quantum charitas crescit, tantum timor decrescit. »
[II-II.q.19.a.10.arg.2] Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity increases when hope increases, as stated above (Question 17, Article 8). Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, homines in patria erunt Deo conformes, secundum illud I Joan., Ⅲ, 2: Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus. Sed Deus nihil timet. Ergo homines in patria non habebunt aliquem timorem.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.arg.3] Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation. Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear decreases when the love of charity increases.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, spes est perfectior quam timor, quia spes est respectu boni, timor respectu mali. Sed spes non erit in patria. Ergo nec timor erit in patria.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.sc] Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the fear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves."
[II-II.q.19.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. xviii, 10: Timor Domini sanctus permanet* in sæculum.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.co] Fear is twofold, as stated above (A2,4); one is filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears punishment.
Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one loves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.
On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains as to its substance, as stated above (Article 6). This fear decreases as charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod timor servilis, sive timor pœnæ nullo modo erit in patria; excluditur enim talis timor per securitatem æternæ beatitudinis, quæ est de ipsius beatitudinis ratione, sicut supra dictum est. Timor autem filialis sicut augetur augmentata charitate, ita charitate perfecta perficietur, unde non habebit in patria eumdem actum omnino quem habet modo. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod proprium objectum timoris est malum possibile, sicut proprium objectum spei est bonum possibile; et cum motus timoris sit quasi fugæ, importat timor fugam mali ardui possibilis; parva enim mala timorem non inducunt. Sicut autem bonum unius-cujusque est ut in suo ordine consistat, ita malum uniuscujusque est ut suum ordinem deserat. Ordo autem creaturæ rationalis est ut sit sub Deo et supra cæteras creaturas. Unde sicut malum creaturæ rationalis est ut subdat se creaturæ inferiori per amorem, ita etiam malum ejus est, si Deo se non subjiciat, sed in ipsum præsumptuose insi-liat vel eum contemnat. Hoc autem malum creaturæ rationali secundum suam naturam consideratæ possibile est, propter naturalem liberi arbitrii flexibilitatem; sed in beatis fit non possibile per gloriaæ perfectionem. Fuga ergo hujus mali, quod est Deo non subjici, ut possibilis naturæ, imposibilis autem beatitudini, erit in patria; in via autem est fuga hujus mali ut omnino possibilis. Et ideo Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., exponens illud Job, xxvi, 14: Columnæ cæli contremisunt et pavent ad nutum ejus, cap. xxix, § 44, col. 31, t. 2: « Ipsæ virtutes cæles-tium, quæ hunc sine cessatione conspiciunt; 1 Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius: « Eadem Deo et similia sunt et dissimilia: similia quidem secundum possibile ejus qui participari nequit participationem; dissimilia vero, secundum effectuum a causis differentiam infinitis pror-in ipsa sua contemplatione contremiscunt; sed idem tremor, ne eis pœnalis sit, non timoris est, sed admirationis; » quia scilicet admirantur Deum ut supra existentem, et eis incomprehensibilem. Augustinus etiam, XIV De civ. Dei, cap. Ⅺ, § 5, col. 446, t. 7, hoc modo ponit timorem in patria, quamvis hoc sub dubio derelinquat. « Timor, inquit, ille castus permanens in sæculum sæculi, si erit in futuro sæculo, non est timor exterens a malo, quod accidere potest, sed tenens in bono, quod amitti non potest. Ubi enim boni adepti amor immutabilis est, profecto, si dici potest, mali cavendi timor securus est. Timoris quippe casti nomine ea voluntas significata est qua nos necesse erit nolle peccare, et non sollicitudine infirmitatis ne forte peccemus, sed tranquillitate charitatis cavere peccatum. Aut si nullius omnino generis timor ibi esse poterit, ita fortasse timor in sæculum sæculi dictus est permanere; quia id permanebit quo timor ipse perducit. »
[II-II.q.19.a.10.ad.1] Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in auctoritate prædicta excluditur a beatis timor sollicitudinem habens, et de malo præcavens, non autem timor securus, ut Augustinus dicit.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.ad.2] It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases, because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another's help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Dionysius, Ⅺ cap. De divin. nomin., § 7, col. 915, t. 4, « eadem et similia sunt Deo, et dissimilia; hæc quidem secundum contingentem non imitabilis imitationem, » id est, inquantum secundum suum posse imitantur Deum, qui non est perfecte imitabilis, « hæc autem secundum quod hic causata minus habent, a causa infinitis mensuris et incomparabilibus deficientia. » Unde non oportet, si Deo non convenit timor, quia non habet superiorem, cui subjiciatur, quod propter hoc non conveniat beatis, quorum beatitudo consistit in perfecta subjectione ad Deum.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.ad.3] Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod spes importat quemdám defectum, scilicet futuritionem beatitudinis, quæ tollitur per ejus præsen-tiam; sed timor importat defectum naturalem creaturæ, secundum quod in infinitum distat a Deo; quod etiam in patria remane-bit. Et ideo timor non evacuabitur totaliter.
Article 11
[II-II.q.19.a.11.arg.1] It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it is written (Proverbs 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who already enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above (A2,5; I-II, 42, 1). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.
[II-II.q.19.a.11.arg.2] Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to 1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.11.arg.3] Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore neither will there be fear in heaven.
[II-II.q.19.a.11.sc] It is written (Psalm 18:10): "The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever."
[II-II.q.19.a.11.co] Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (I-II, 5, 4).
But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its staying in its own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder," because, to wit, they wonder at God's supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting."
[II-II.q.19.a.11.ad.1] The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear which is accompanied by security.
[II-II.q.19.a.11.ad.2] As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable imitation of the Inimitable"--that is, because, so far as they can, they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly--"they are unlike because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short infinitely and immeasurably." Hence, if there be no fear in God (since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect subjection to God.
[II-II.q.19.a.11.ad.3] Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.
Article 12
[II-II.q.19.a.12.arg.1] It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of the spiritual life, as explained above (Article 7): whereas poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to Matthew 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift of fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod paupertas spiritus non sit beatitudo respondens dono timoris. Timor enim est initium spiritualis vitæ, ut ex dictis patet. Sed paupertas pertinet ad perfectionem vitæ spiritualis, secundum illud Matth., xix, 21: Si vis perfectus esse, vade*, et vende omnia quæ habes, et da pauperibus. Ergo paupertas spiritus non respondet dono timoris.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.arg.2] Further, it is written (Psalm 118:120): "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of poverty.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in psal. cxviii, 120, dicitur: Confige timore tuo carnes meas; ex quo videtur quod ad timorem pertineat carnem reprimere. Sed ad repressionem carnis maxime videtur pertinere beatitudo luctus. Ergo beatitudo luctus magis respondet dono timoris quam beatitudo paupertatis.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.arg.3] Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (9, ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to Romans 5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than poverty of spirit.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, donum timoris respondet virtuti spei, sicut dictum est. Sed spei maxime videtur respondere beatitudo ultima, quæ est: Beati pacifici, quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur; quia, ut dicitur Rom., v, 2: Gloriamur in spe gloriæ filiorum Dei. Ergo beatitudo illa magis respondet dono timoris quam paupertas spiritus.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.arg.4] Further, it was stated above (I-II, 70, 2) that the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the beatitudes.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.arg.4] 4. Præterea, supra dictum est quod beatitudinibus respondent fructus. Sed nihil in fructibus inventur respondere dono timoris. Ergo etiam neque in beatitudinibus aliquid ei respondet.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.sc] Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed are the poor in spirit."
[II-II.q.19.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I De serm. Domini in monte, cap. iv, § 11, col. 1234, t. 3: « Timor Dei congruit humilibus, de quibus dicitur: Beati pauperes spiritu. »
[II-II.q.19.a.12.co] Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Psalm 19:8): "Some trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our God." It follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and riches. On either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and proud spirit, according to Augustine's interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the expounding of Ambrose on Luke 6:20 and Jerome on Matthew 5:3.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod timori proprie respondet paupertas spiritus. Cum enim ad timorem filialem pertineat Deo reverentiam exhibere, et ei subditum esse; id quod ex hujusmodi subjectione consequitur pertinet ad donum timoris. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis Deo se subjicit, desinit quærere in seipso vel in aliquo alio magnificari, nisi in Deo. Hoc enim repugnaret perfectæ subjectioni ad Deum; unde dicitur in psal. xix, 8: Hi in curribus, et hi in equis; nos autem in nomine Dei nostri invocabimus. Et ideo ex hoc quod aliquis perfecte timeat Deum, consequens est quod non quærat magnificari in seipso per superbiam, neque etiam quærat magnificari in exterioribus bonis, scilicet honoribus et divitiis; quorum utrumque pertinet ad paupertatem spiritus, secundum quod paupertas spiritus intelligi potest vel exinanitio inflati et superbi spiritus, ut Augustinus exponit, vel etiam abjectio temporalium rerum, quæ fit spiritu, id est, propria voluntate per instinctum Spiritus sancti, ut Ambrosius, super illud Luc., vi: Beati pauperes, et Hieronymus, In v Matth., v. 3, col. 34, t. 7, exponunt.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.ad.1] Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts. Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above (A7,10).
[II-II.q.19.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum beatitudo sit actus virtutis perfectæ, omnes beatitudines ad perfectionem spiritualis vitæ pertinent. In qua quidem perfectione principium esse videtur ut tendens ad perfectam spiritualium bonorum participationem, terrena bona contemnat, sicut et timor primum locum habet in donis. Non autem consistit perfectio in ipsa temporalium bonorum desertione. Timor autem filialis, cui respondet beatitudo paupertatis, etiam est cum perfectione sapientiae, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.ad.2] The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod directius opponitur subjectioni ad Deum, quam facit timor filialis, indebita magnificatio hominis Timor filialis non quoad omnem partem, sed secundum aliquid remanet in patria, et similiter in Christo fuit, licet Christus fuerit simul comprehensor et viator. Dona Spiritus sancti sunt perfectiones potentiarum animæ secundum quod natæ sunt moveri a Spiritu sancto. Sed et beati et anima Christi perfecte a Spiritu sancto moventur. Ergo. Timor respicit duo objecta, quorum unum est malum terribile imminens, et aliud, illud cujus potestate malum inferri potest, v. g. regem inquantum habet potestatem occidendi. Non autem timeretur ille qui potest nocere, nisi haberet quamdam eminentiam potestatis, cui de facili resisti non possit; ea enim quæ in promptu habemus repellere non timemus. Et sic patet quod nemo timetur nisi propter eminentiam quamdam. Malum autem terribile est objectum primarium timoris, et fuga istius mali primarius ejus actus; sed hic timor pro passione sumitur. Si sumatur ut donum, objectum primarium ipsius est eminentia potestatis quæ malum inferre potest, et actus primarius ejus reverentia eminentiae illius, quia habitus virtutum et donorum proprie et per se respiciunt non malum, sed bo-num. Porro bonum in hoc loco est eminentia Dei quam revereri oportet. Ista autem eminentia permanet in aternum reverenda. Ergo timor filialis, sub ipso respectu reverentiae Dei quam agit, permanet in aternum. vel in seipso vel in aliis rebus quam delectatio extranea; quæ tamen opponitur timori ex consequenti, quia qui Deum reveretur, et ei subditur, non delectatur in aliis a Deo. Sed tamen delectatio non pertinet ad rationem ardui, quam respicit timor, sicut magnificatio; et ideo directe beatitudo paupertatis respondet timori, beatitudo autem luctus ex consequenti.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.ad.3] Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly corresponds to fear.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod spes importat motum secundum habitudinem ad terminum ad quem tenditur; sed timor importat magis motum secundum habitudinem recessus a termino « a quo; » et ideo ultima beatitudo, quæ est spiritualis perfectionis terminus, congrue respondet spei per modum objecti ultimi; sed prima beatitudo, quæ est per recessum a rebus exterioribus impedientibus divinam subjectionem, congrue respondet timori.
[II-II.q.19.a.12.ad.4] As regards the fruits, it seems that those things correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty, continency and chastity.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.19.a.12.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in fructibus Non sunt omittenda in hac quæstione de dono timoris quæ dicit Hugo a S. Charo: « Timor servilis est timor experientiae, sicut si aliquis esset in nave fracta in mari timeret pericula expertus, sic fluctus peccatorum intrant navem cordis servilis timentis. Timor initialis est timor conscientiae, sicut qui est in nave integra videt tamen guttas aquæ intrare, sic ille guttas aquæ intrare, scilicet venialia. Timor filialis est timor cautelæ, sicut qui est in navi omnino integra, timet tamen piratas. » S. Joannes Damasc. assignat species sex timoris, alias ab his quas enumeravimus, ut videtur. Dicit enim: dividitur timor in sex, in segnitiem, in erubescentiam, in verecundiam, in admirationem, in stuporem et in agoniam. Segnities est timor futuræ opinionis. Erubescentia est timor in expectatione convitii. Verecundia est timor in turpi facto. Admiratio est timor ex magna imaginatione. Stupor est timor ex inconsueta imaginatione. Agonia est timor pro casu, scilicet per infortunium. — Quidam dicunt S. Joannem Damascenum hic loqui tantum de passionibus, et ad timorem naturalem reduci asserunt quæ evolvit. Alii dicunt eumdem loqui de timore mundano large sumpto, ita ut comprehendat et timorem humanum. Nec tacendum est de effectibus timoris filialis qui donum est Spiritus sancti. Primus est evacuatio timoris mali, id est, mundani et humani. Nam, ut dicit Augustinus, qui hoc timore Deum timet, nihil timet, et qui Deum non sic timet, omnia timet. Unde Eccl., xxxiv: Qui timet Deum, nihil trepidabit et non pavebit, quoniam ipse est spes ejus. Secundus effectus est cordis laetitia. Unde Eccl., 1: Timor Domini gloria, et gloriatio, et laetitia, et corona exultationis. Et iterum: Timor Domini delectabit cor et dabit laetitiam et gaudium in longitudinem dierum. Tertius est custodia cordis. Unde Eccl., 1: Timor Domini scientiæ religiositas: religiositas autem custodiet, et justificabit cor. Quartus est finalis benefictio. Unde Eccl., 1: Timenti Deum bene erit, et in illa quæ pertinent ad moderatum usum vel abstinentiam a rebus temporalibus, videntur dono timoris convenire, sicut modestia, et continentia, et castitas.
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