Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q20. Despair
Source context
- Theme
- despair as spiritual condition opposed to the theological virtue of hope
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 131, 1911-10-07Steiner identifies the Christ-impulse as the sole healing force that overcomes despair, not through a weakening humility but through a humility that restores inner strength transcending the despairing state.
- GA 130, 1911-11-05Steiner states that knowledge of higher spiritual laws becomes increasingly necessary for human beings to overcome states of despair, and that the mood of despair is itself a spiritually significant affliction of the modern soul.
- GA 148, 1913-12-17In a narrative passage, Steiner depicts a man in deep despair encountering Jesus of Nazareth, with a mediating spiritual being standing between them — illustrating despair as a condition that requires a supersensible intermediary for its resolution.
- GA 267A meditation exercise prescribes the resolve 'I will not despair in the darkness,' treating despair as a soul-temptation to be countered by deliberate inner discipline.
Cross-tradition
- Thomistic moral theology (Secunda Secundae, Q20)Aquinas treats despair as a sin against the theological virtue of hope, defining it as the soul's withdrawal from the divine good on the grounds that it is unattainable — structurally the opposite movement to the Christ-impulse Steiner identifies as hope's restoration.
- Sufi tradition (qabd / contraction)The Sufi distinction between qabd (contraction of the heart) and bast (expansion) offers a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's despair as a privation of hope, both framing spiritual desolation as a condition to be traversed rather than a final state.
- Buddhist tradition (vicikicchā / doubt-paralysis)The Pali term vicikicchā names a paralysing doubt or despondency listed among the fetters obstructing liberation, offering a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's despair as a movement away from the highest good.
Q20. Despair
Article 1
[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod præsumptio, quæ est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, non innitatur Deo, sed Prosper: • Quod quis non cecidit, propriis si viribus aptat, Hoc ipso quo se stare putat cecidit. In sacra Scriptura præsumptio multipliciter accipitur: uno modo proprie, per quam, scilicet, aliquis desiderat et attentat aliquid ultra propriam facultatem: Vidit præsumptionem eorum quia mala, Eccl., xxviii. Alio modo minus proprie pro fiducia: Non derelinquis præsumentes de te, Judith, vi, id est confidentes. Exaudi me miseram deprecantem, et de tua misericordia præsumtem, id est confidentem, Judith, ix. Alio modo improprie pro attentare simpliciter: Mihi dedit Deus dicere ex sententia, et præsumere digna horum quæ mihi dantur, Sap., vi. Alio modo abusive pro timore, sicut spes abusive dicitur de malo: Semper præsumit sæva perturbata conscientia, Sap., xv. Præsumptio primo modo dicta importat immoderantiam spei. Objectum autem spei est bonum arduum possibile. Sed aliquid dicitur possibile dupliciter, per virtutem, scilicet, propriam, et per virtutem divinam. Circa utramque per immoderantiam potest esse præsumptio. Nam circa spem per quam quis de propria virtute confidit attenditur præsumptio ex hoc quod quis tendit in aliquid ut sibi possibile, quod tamen facultatem suam excedit. Circa spem autem quis inhæret divinæ potentiae, potest per immoderantiam esse præsumptio, ex hoc quod tendit hoc in aliquid ut possibile per virtutem et misericordiam divinam, quod tamen possibile non est, sicut cum sperat quis veniam de peccatis sine pœnitentia, et gloriam sine meritis obtinere, et hæc præsumptio est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quia per hanc tollitur vel contemnitur adjutorium Spiritus sancti, per quod re-vocatur homo a peccato. Dividitur etiam præsumptio ex actu voluntatis quo quis facit vel aggreditur facere quod superat ejus facultatem sive juris, sive physicam et executivam; — juris, cum quis sciens et volens legem transgreditur, quomodo dicitur in jure: « Si quis hoc præsumpserit facere; » physicam et executivam cum quis id quod superat vires, sive proprias, sive quas habet in aliis paratas, aggreditur, ut majora pericula quam possit vincere, majores abstinentias quas possit sustinere, etc. In hac autem quæstione præsumptio definiri po-test: Temeraria expectatio beatitudinis mediorum ve ad illam. Est autem temeraria seu inconsulta, et infundata ex duplici capite, scilicet innitendo nimium propriis viribus, et innitendo inordinate divinæ misericordiae et potentiæ. propriæ virtuti. Quanto enim minor est virtus, tanto magis peccat qui ei nimis innititur. Sed minor est virtus humana quam divina. Ergo gravius peccat qui præsumit de virtute humana, quam qui præsumit de virtute divina. Sed peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est gravissimum. Ergo præsumptio, quæ ponitur species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, inhæret virtuti humanæ magis quam divina.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.2] Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matthew 7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair is not a sin.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.3] Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.sc] That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle says of certain men (Ephesians 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and [Vulgate: 'unto'] covetousness." Therefore despair is not only a sin but also the origin of other sins.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.co] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners, according to Ezekiel 18:23, "I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live" [Vulgate: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die . . . and not that he should be converted and live?' Cf. Ezekiel 33:11: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.1] In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which is that he departs from God.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum quod est contra Deum, secundum suum genus est gravius cæteris pecccatis. Unde præsumptio qua quis inordinate innititur Deo, gravius peccatum est quam præsumptio qua quis innititur propriæ virtuti; quod enim aliquis innitatur divinæ virtuti ad consequendum id quod Deo non convenit, hoc est diminuere divinam virtutem. Patet autem quod gravius peccat qui diminuit divinam virtutem, quam qui propriam virtutem superextollit.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.2] A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep. ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they may die." On this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.
[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.3] The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever becoming rich.
Article 2
[II-II.q.20.a.2.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that there can be no despair without unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be removed.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod præsumptio magis opponatur timori quam spei. Inordinatio enim timoris opponitur recto timori. Sed præsumptio videtur ad inordinationem timoris pertinere; dicitur enim Sap., xvii, 10: Semper præsumit sæva perturbata conscientia; et ibidem dicitur quod timor est præsumptionis adjutorium. Ergo præsumptio opponitur timori magis quam spei.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Genesis 4:13: "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an unbeliever.
But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.sc] On the contrary, If we remove that which follows, that which precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Question 17, Article 7). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.co] I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition. Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter, although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith, viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. On the same way, a man while retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter. On this way there can be despair, just as there can be other mortal sins, without belief.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. The effect is done away, not only when the first cause is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut spes abusive dicitur de malo, proprie autem de bono, ita etiam præsumptio; et secundum hunc modum inordinatio timoris « præsumptio » dicitur.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.
The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
[II-II.q.20.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod contraria sunt quæ maxime distant in eodem genere. Præsumptio autem et spes important motum ejusdem generis, qui potest esse vel ordinatus vel inordinatus. Et ideo præsumptio directius contrariatur spei quam timori; nam spei contrariatur ratione propriæ differentiæ, sicut inordinatum ordinato; timori autem contrariatur ratione differentiæ sui generis, scilicet, motus spei.
Article 3
[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins. For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (Article 2). But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the greatest of sins.
[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod desperatio non sit maximum peccatorum. Potest enim esse desperatio absque infidelitate, sicut dictum est. Sed infidelitas est maximum peccatorum, quia subruit fundamentalum spiritualis aedificii. Ergo desperatio non est maximum peccatorum.
[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.2] Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than hope, according to 1 Corinthians 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater sin than despair.
[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, majori bono majus malum opponitur, ut patet per Philosophum in VIII Ethic., cap. x, a princ. Sed charitas est major spe, ut dicitur I Cor., xiii. Ergo odium Dei est majus peccatum quam desperatio.
[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.3] Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion. Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other sins.
[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in peccato desperationis est solum inordinata aversio a Deo. Sed in aliis peccatis est non solum aversio inordinata a Deo, sed etiam inordinata conversio. Ergo peccatum desperationis non est gravius, sed minus aliis.
[II-II.q.20.a.3.sc] An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, according to Jeremiah 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very grievous." Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jeremiah 15:18: "My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [Vulgate: 'Why is my wound,' etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.
[II-II.q.20.a.3.sc] Sed contra, peccatum insanabile videtur esse gravissimum, secundum illud Jerem., xxx, 12: Insanabilis fractura tua pessima plaga tua. Sed peccatum desperationis est insanabile, secundum illud Jerem., xv, 18: Plaga mea desperabilis renuit curari. Ergo desperatio est gravissimum peccatum.
[II-II.q.20.a.3.co] Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal sins.
Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in respect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of God arises from man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself; whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of God's goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him, according as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly speaking it is more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.
If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works. Wherefore a gloss on Proverbs 24:10, "If thou lose hope being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished," says: "Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle of faith." And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14): "To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into hell."
[II-II.q.20.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccata quæ opponuntur virtutibus theologicis, sunt secundum suum genus graviora peccatis aliis. Cum enim virtutes theologicæ habeant Deum pro objecto, peccata eis opposita important directe et principaliter aversionem a Deo. In quolibet autem peccato mortali principalis ratio mali et gravitas est ex hoc quod averit a Deo; si enim posset esse conversio ad bonum commutabile sine aversione a Deo, quamvis esset inordinata, non esset peccatum mortale. Et ideo illud quod primo et per se habet aversionem a Deo, est gravissimum peccatum inter peccata mortalia. Virtutibus autem theologicis opponuntur infidelitas, desperatio et odium Dei; inter quæ odium et infidelitas, si desperationi comparentur, inveniuntur secundum se quidem, id est, secundum rationem propriæ speciei, graviora. Infidelitas enim provenit ex hoc quod homo ipsam Dei veritatem non credit; odium vero Dei provenit ex hoc quod voluntas hominis ipsi divinæ bonitati contrariatur; desperatio autem ex hoc quod homo non sperat se bonitatem Dei participare. Ex quo patet quod infidelitas et odium Dei sunt contra Deum, secundum quod in se est; desperatio autem, secundum quod ejus bonum participatur a nobis. Unde majus peccatum est, secundum se loquendo, non credere Dei veritatem, vel odire Deum, quam non sperare consequi gloriam ab ipso. Sed si comparetur desperatio ad alia duo peccata ex parte nostra, sic desperatio est periculosior, quia per spem revocamur a malis et introducimur in bona prosequenda; et ideo sublata spe, irrefrenate homines labuntur in vitia, et a bonis laboribus retrahuntur. Unde super illud Prov., xxiv, 10: Si desperaveris lapsus* in die angustiæ, minuetur fortitudo tua, dicit Glossa ordin., col. 4107, t. 1: « Nihil est execrabilius desperatione: quam qui habuerit, et in generalibus hujus vitæ laboribus, et, quod pejus est, in fidei certamine constantiam perdit. » Et Isidorus dicit, in lib. II De summo bono sive Sentent., c. xiv, § 2, col. 617, t. 6: « Perpetrare flagitium aliquod, mors animæ est; sed desperare est descendere in infernum. » Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
Article 4
[II-II.q.20.a.4.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth. Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod præsumptio non causetur ex inani gloria. Præsumptio enim maxime videtur inniti divinæ misericordiae. Misericordia autem respicit miseriam, quæ opponitur gloriae. Ergo præsumptio non oritur ex inani gloria.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope, according to Romans 12:12, "rejoicing in hope." Therefore sloth arises from despair, and not vice versa.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof could we have of this than that God's Son should deign to unite Himself to our nature?" Therefore despair arises rather from the neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.sc] On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among the effects of sloth.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., cap. xLV, § 88, col. 624, t. 2, quod « præsumptio novitatum est filia inani gloria. »
[II-II.q.20.a.4.co] I answer that, As stated above (17, 1; I-II, 40, 1), the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness may be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not deeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it impossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact that spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of no great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiritual things, and not to hope for them as arduous goods. On this way despair is caused by lust.
On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his affections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way despair is born of sloth.
Now this is the proper object of hope--that the thing is possible, because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise from lust, for the reason given above.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est præsumptio : una quidem quae innititur propriæ virtuti, attentans scilicet aliquid ut sibi possibile, quod propriam virtutem excedit; et talis præsumptio manifeste ex inani gloria procedit; ex hoc enim quod aliquis multum desiderat gloriam, sequitur quod attentet ad gloriam quamdam aliqua super vires suas; et hujusmodi præcipue sunt nova quae majorem admirationem habent. Et ideo signanter Gregorius præsumptionem novitatum posuit filiam inanis gloria. Alia vero est præsumptio quae innititur inordinate divinæ misericordiae vel potentiae, per quam quis sperat se obtinere gloriam sine meritis, vel veniam sine pœnitentia; et talis præsumptio videtur oriri directe ex superbia, ac si ipse tanti se aestimet, quod etiam eum peccantem Deus non puniat vel a gloria excludat. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope: and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into despair, according to 2 Corinthians 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be swallowed up by overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the contrary despair is born of sorrow.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut Philosophus dicit in I Rhet., cap. xi, ante med., sicut spes facit delectationem, ita etiam homines in delectationibus existentes efficiuntur majoris spei; et per hunc etiam modum homines in tristitiis existentes facilius in desperationem incidunt, secundum, illud II ad Cor., ii, 7: Ne majori* tristitia absorbeatur qui ejusmodi est. Sed tamen quia spei objectum est bonum, in quod naturaliter tendit appetitus, non autem refugit ab eo naturaliter, sed solum propter aliquod impedimentum superveniens; ideo directius quidem ex spe oritur gaudium, desperatio autem e converso ex tristitia.
[II-II.q.20.a.4.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his thoughts away from sadness.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.20.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ipsa etiam negligentia considerandi divina beneficia ex acedia provenit. Homo enim affectus aliqua passione, praecipue illa cogitat quæ ad illam pertinent passionem. Unde homo in tristitiis constitutus non de facili aliqua magna et jucunda cogitat, sed solum tristia, nisi per magnum conatum se avertat a tristibus.
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