Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q23. Charity, considered in itself
Source context
- Theme
- charity (caritas) as a theological virtue: its nature, object, and grounding in friendship with God
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta: bhaktiBhakti as loving devotion directed toward the divine exhibits cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's caritas insofar as both posit a transformative bond between the human subject and the divine that exceeds mere obligation or knowledge.
- Sufism: mahabbaThe Sufi concept of mahabba (divine love) as a participatory union with God's own love mirrors Aquinas's definition of caritas as friendship (amicitia) with God grounded in God's self-communication, not merely in human affection.
Q23. Charity, considered in itself
Article 1
[II-II.q.23.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is not with men" (Daniel 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod charitas non sit amicitia. Nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae, sicut convivere amico, ut dicit Philosophus in VIII Ethic., cap. 1, ante med. Sed charitas est hominis ad Deum et ad angelos, quorum non est cum hominibus conversatio, ut dicitur Dan., 11, 14. Ergo charitas non est amicitia.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.arg.2] Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according to Matthew 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, amicitia non est sine redamatione, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic., c. 11. Sed charitas habetur etiam ad inimicos, secundum illud Matth., v, 44: Diligite inimicos vestros. Ergo charitas non est amicitia.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.arg.3] Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not friendship.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, amicitiae tres sunt species, secundum Philosophum in VIII Ethic., c. 11, scilicet amicitia delectabilis, utilis et honesti. Sed charitas non est amicitia utilis aut delectabilis; dicit enim Hieronymus in Epist. ad Paulinum, quæ ponitur in principio Bibliæ: « Illa est vera necessitudo, et Christi glutino copulata, quam non utilitas rei familiaris, non præsentia tantum corporum, non subdola et palpans adulatio, sed Dei timor, et divinarum Scripturarum studia conciliant. » Similiter etiam non est amicitia honesti, quia charitate diligimus etiam pecatores; amicitia vero honesti non est nisi ad virtuosos, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic., cap. 1v, circa med. Ergo charitas non est amicitia. Ep. LIII, col. 540, t. 1 Oper. D. Hieronymi. Ex P. Henno: « Remedia contra præsumptionem sunt: 4. considerare quod non minus sit Dei attributum justitia quam misericordia, et « quos modo sustinet peccantes, judicaturus est contementes, » inquit Augustinus, Tract. xxxiii in Joan.; 2. quod sit valde incertus vitæ terminus, et forte proprior quam credideris; unde Augustinus sup.: « Semper expectas, et de misericordia Dei tibi plurimum polliceris, quasi ille, qui tibi per patientiam promisit indulgentiam, promiserit tibi etiam prolixiorem vitam; » 3. serio reflectere ad hanc sentientiam auream: « Pœnitentia sera, raro vera; » 4. quod etiam sancti nimium de se præsumentes, enormiter prolapsi sunt: « Nam si Petrus lapsus est qui dixit: etsi allii scandalizati fuerint, ego non scandalizabor, quis alius de se præsumat? » Augustinus, lib. I De gratia Christi contra Pelagium, c. xLV; 5. quod peccatores confidentes in fine de bono Peccavi, sæpe reperiant infelicissimum desperari. » Hæc quæstio tractatur in dist. xxiv, part. 11, lib. I Speculi moralis. — Art. 6. Utrum charitas sit maxima virtutum. — Art. 7. Utrum sine charitate possit esse salus vel vera virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.sc] It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Joan., xv, 15, dicitur: Jam non dicam vos servos..., sed amicos meos. Sed hoc non dicebatur eis nisi ratione charitatis. Ergo charitas est amicitia.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.co] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.
Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.
Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Corinthians 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum in VIII Ethic., cap. II et III, non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiæ, sed amor qui est cum benevolentia; quando scilicet sic amamus aliquem ut ei bonum velimus. Si autem rebus amatis non bonum velimus, sed ipsum earum bonum nobis velimus, sicut dicimur amare vinum, aut equum, aut aliquid hujusmodi, non est amor amicitiæ, sed cujusdam concupiscentiae. Ridiculum enim est dicere quod aliquis habeat amicitiam ad vinum vel ad equum. Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiæ, sed requiritur quædam mutua amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliqua communicatione. Cum ergo sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum, secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. De qua quidem communicatione dicitur I ad Corinth., 1, 9: Fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii ejus. Amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est charitas. Unde manifestum est quod charitas amicitia quædam est hominis ad Deum.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.ad.1] Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written (Philippians 3:20): "Our conversation is in heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apocalypse 22:3-4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod duplex est hominis vita: una quidem exterior secundum naturam sensibilem et corporalem; et secundum hanc vitam non est nobis communicatio vel conversatio cum Deo et ange- Parm. hic et infra: « hanc communicationem. » In quodam cod.: « occidant; » in cæteris: « odiant; » in Parm.: « odio habeant. » Charitas, amor, dilectio et amicitia de bono sunt, et ad idem quodam modo pertinent. Ratio formalis boni consistit in perfectione, non ut constitutiva entis, sed ut conveniente et coaptata appetitui atque illius perfectiva per modum appetibilis. Deus est bonum per essentiam, quia unumquodque est bonum secundum quod est perfectum, et unumquodque perfectum secundum quod est actu; esse autem actu soli Deo essentialiter convenit. Deus est summum bonum, quia omnes rerum bonitates et perfectiones sunt ab ipso tanquam a causa aequivoca. Porro effectus est excellentius in causa aequivoca quam in seipso, quia causæ aequivocae producunt effectus sibi inferiores. Bonum itaque appetitui propositum, ut ipsi conveniens est et coaptatum, quasi pondus ipsum mo- vet, attrahit et inclinat ad se, et ista inclinatio seu propensio appetitus in ipsum dicitur « amor. » Si sit cum electione unius boni præ alio, dicitur « dilectio, » ut ipsum nomen sonat; si sit boni quod magni pretii aestimatur, dicitur « charitas, » ut etiam nomen sonat; si tandem sit cum redama-tione, dicitur « amicitia. » « Amor, » itaque magis late patet quam « dilectio, charitas, et amicitia. » Charitas est vere et proprie dicta amicitia inter Deum et hominem. Si dicas ad rationem amicitiae requiri quod amicus propter seipsum, non propter amantem diligatur, Deum autem non amare homines propter ipsos, sed propter semetipsum, respondetur quod quando dicitur amicum diligi propter seipsum et non propter amantem, sensus est quod amatus sit subjectum beneficiorum, ita ut amans non conferat illa ad suam, sed ad amici utilitatem; sensus autem non est quod bonum quod est in amico sit finis et ratio cur amans ilum amet, et illi beneficia conferat: quin e contra
[II-II.q.23.a.1.ad.2] Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Ondeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.
[II-II.q.23.a.1.ad.3] The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake.
Article 2
[II-II.q.23.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod charitas non sit aliquid creatum in anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in VIII De Trin., cap. viii, col. 958, t. 8: « Qui proximum diligit, consequens est ut ipsam dilectionem diligat. » Deus autem dilectio est. Consequens est ergo ut præcipue Deum diligat. Et in XV De Trinit., c. xvii, col. 1080, t. 8, dicit: « Ita dictum est: Deus charitas est, sicut dictum est: Deus spiritus est. » Ergo charitas non est aliquid creatum in anima, sed est ipse Deus.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.arg.2] Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to Deuteronomy 30:20: "He is thy life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Deus est spiritualiter vita animae, sicut anima vita corporis, secundum illud Deut., xxx, 20: Ipse est vita tua. Sed anima vivificat corpus per seipsam. Ergo Deus vivificat animam per seipsum. Vivificat autem eam per charitatem, secundum illud I Joan., 14: Nos scimus quoniam translati sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam diligimus fratres. Ergo Deus est ipsa charitas.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.arg.3] Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil creatum est infinitæ virtutis, sed magis omnis creatura est vanitas. Charitas autem non est vanitas, sed magis vanitati repugnat; et est infinitæ virtutis, quia animam hominis ad bonum infinitum perducit. Ergo charitas non est aliquid creatum in anima.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in tanto generosior et perfectior est amicitia, quanto amatus nihil in se amabile habens, ex sola voluntate gratuita amici diligitur et ejus beneficiis cumulatur. Si dicas non esse amicitiam nisi inter αquales, juxta sententiam Hieronymi: « Amicitia pares aut accipit aut facit; ubi in αqualitas est, amicitia non est, » Sup. cap. viii Micheæ; atqui inter Deum et homines non est αqualitas, sed infinita distantia; ergo. — Respondetur distinguendo inter αqualitatem absolutam, et αqualitatem proportionis, qualis est v. g. inter patrem et filium, inter maritum et uxorem. Æqualitas absoluta non exigitur ad amicitiam, sed sufficit αqualitas proportionis. Porro hæc αqualitas existit inter Deum et homines, quatenus homines per gratiam elevantur ad dignitatem filiorum Dei, divinæque fiunt consortes naturæ. Si dicas amicitiam requirere ut amor mutuus innotescat, atqui nescimus an Deum diligamus et an a Deo diligamur, quia nemo scit an amore vel odio dignus sit: respondetur distinguendo inter notitiam certam physice, et notitiam certam moraliter. Hæc ultima sufficit ad amicitiam. Porro titudo moralis haberi potest de mutuo amore charitatis inter Deum et homines ex indiciis et conjecturis, scilicet bona vita, observatione mandato-rum, bonis operibus, piis in Deum motibus, etc. Si dicas amicitiam non esse inter multos sicut charitas, respondetur distinguendo inter amicitiam humanam et amicitiam charitatis. In humanis difficile est unum placere multis et e converso, multorum consuetudine unum frui, et scire utrum sint futuri amici idonei. In charitate, Deus multos postest diligere, se fruendum multis præbere, et scire quid de ipso sentiant; et ex parte hominum Deus est in quo et propter quem omnia diliguntur, unde unum amant, scilicet Deum, et in Deo omnia. Si dicas Deum nullo bono carere, et consequenter amicitiam esse ipsi inutilem, respondetur homines posse velle Deo bonum, licet nullo bono careat, gaudendo scilicet de bonis ipsius internis, et procurando externa, laudem, honorem, cultum, obedientiam, etc. « Dilectionem necesse est ut diligat, qui diligit fratrem. » quod etsi sit principium actus, non tamen est in ipso agere vel non agere; sic enim etiam tolleretur ratio voluntarii, et excluderetur ratio meriti, cum tamen supra habitum sit, quod dilectio charitatis est radix merendi. Sed oportet quod si voluntas moveatur a Spiritu sancto ad diligendum, etiam ipsa sit efficiens hunc actum. Nullus autem actus perfecte producitur ab aliqua potentia activa, nisi sit ei connaturalis per aliquam formam, quae sit principium actionis. Unde Deus, qui omnia movet ad debitos fines, singulis rebus indidit formas per quas inclinantur ad fines sibi præstitutos a Deo; et secundum hoc disponit omnia suaviter, ut dicitur Sap., vIII, 1. Manifestum est autem quod actus charitatis excedit naturalam potentiae voluntatis. Nisi ergo aliqua forma superadderetur naturali potentiae, per quam inclinaretur ad dilectionis actum, esset actus iste imperfectior actibus naturalibus et actibus aliarum virtutum; nec esset facilis et delectabilis. Quod patet esse falsum, quia nulla virtus habet tantam inclinationem ad suum actum sicut charitas, nec aliqua ita delectabiliter operatur. Unde maxime necesse est quod ad actum charitatis in nobis existat aliqua habitualis forma superaddita potentiae naturali, inclinans ipsam ad charitatis actum, et faciens eam proprie et delectabiliter operari.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.co] The Master looks thoroughly into this question in 17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity.
But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, 6, 1): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.
Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above (I-II, 114, 4) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.
Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things sweetly" (Wisdom 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.ad.1] The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ipsa essentia divina charitas est, sicut et sapien-tia est, et sicut bonitas est. Unde sicut dicimur boni bonitate, quae est Deus, et sapientes sapientia, quae est Deus, quia bonitas qua formaliter boni sumus est participatio quædam divinæ bonitatis, et sapientia qua formaliter sapientes sumus est participatio quædam divinæ sapientia, ita etiam charitas qua formaliter diligimus proximum est quædam participatio divinæ charitatis. Hic enim modus loquendi consuetus est apud Platonicos, quorum doctrinis imbutus fuit Augustinus; quod quidam non advertentes, ex verbis ejus sumpserunt occasionem errandi.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.ad.2] God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus est vita effective et animæ per charitatem, et corporis per animam; sed formaliter charitas est vita animæ, sicut et anima vita corporis. Unde per hoc potest concludi quod sicut anima immediate unitur corpori, ita charitas animæ.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.ad.3] Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.
[II-II.q.23.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod charitas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem formæ est secundum virtutem agentis, qui inducit formam; et ideo patet quod charitas non est vanitas; sed facit effectum infinitum, dum conjungit animam Deo, justificando ipsam, hoc demonstrat infinitatem virtutis divinæ, quae est charitatis auctor.
Article 3
[II-II.q.23.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod charitas non sit virtus. Charitas enim amicitia est quædam. Sed amicitia a philosophis non ponitur virtus, ut in VIII lib. Ethic., cap. 1, patet; neque enim connumeratur inter virtutes morales, neque etiam inter intellectuales. Ergo etiam neque charitas est virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.arg.2] Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus est ultimum potentiæ, ut dicitur in lib. I De cælo et mundo, text. 146. Sed charitas non est ultimum, sed magis gaudium et pax. Ergo videtur quod charitas non sit virtus, sed magis gaudium et pax.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.arg.3] Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis virtus est quidam habitus accidentalis. Sed charitas non est habitus accidentalis, cum sit nobilior ipsa anima. Nullum autem accidens est nobilius subjecto. Ergo charitas non est virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him."
[II-II.q.23.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De moribus Ecclesiæ, cap. xi, § 49, col. 1349, t. 4: « Charitas est virtus, quæ, cum nostra affectio est rectissima, conjungit nos Deo, qua eum diligimus. »
[II-II.q.23.a.3.co] Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Question 17, Article 1), viz. human reason and God.
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with right reason," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith, (4, 5) and hope (17, 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod humani actus bonitatem habent secundum quod regulantur debita regula et mensura. Et ideo humana virtus, quæ est principium omnium bonorum actuum hominis, consistit in attingendo regulam humanorum actuum, quæ quidem est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet humana ratio, et ipse Deus. Unde sicut virtus moralis definitur per habitus oppositi. Sed hoc non fit per fidem, nec per spem quia ista erant aque in peccatore, etiam ante pœnitentiam; ergo oportet quod hoc fiat per charitatem creatam quæ nunc inest, et prius non inhærebat, ergo, etc. III. Sed quid ad auctoritates sanctorum pro Magistri sententia inductas? S. Bonaventura dicit quod omnes hæc auctoritates quæ sonære videntur quod Spiritus sanctus sit charitas qua diligimus Deum et proximum accipiendae sunt non eo sensu quod Spiritus sanctus sit formaliter illa charitas, sed eo sensu quod sit illa charitas causaliter, vel exempliter; nec aliter intellexit ipse Magister, S. Bonaventura si credas. Augustinus dicit: « Deus est vita animæ, sicut anima est vita corporis. » Intellige cum hac differentia quod anima est causa formalis vita corporis ipsi inhærens; non sic Deus pro vita animæ. Dices: charitas justificat; atqui justificare solius Dei est; ergo. — Responde: pictor efficit parietem album, et albedo idem, sed pictor efficienter et albedo formaliter; non inde sequitur quod albedo sit hoc quod « est secundum rectam rationem, » ut patet in II Ethic., cap. vi, ita etiam attingere Deum constituit rationem virtutis, sicut etiam supra dictum est, de fide et spe. Unde cum charitas attingat Deum, quia conjungit nos Deo, ut patet per auctoritatem Augustini inductam, consequens est charitatem esse virtutem.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.ad.1] The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus in VIII Ethic., non negat amicitiam esse virtutem, sed dicit quod « est virtus, vel cum virtute. » Posset enim dici quod est virtus moralis circa operationes quæ sunt ad alium, sub alia tamen ratione quam justitia; nam justitia est circa operationes quæ sunt ad alium, sub ratione debiti legalis; amicitia autem sub ratione cujusdam debiti amicabilis et moralis; vel magis sub ratione beneficii gratuiti, ut patet per Philosophus in VIII Ethic., cap. xiii. Potest tamen dici quod non est virtus per se ab aliis distincta. Non enim habet rationem laudabilis et honesti, nisi ex objecto; secundum scilicet quod fundatur super honestatem virtutum: quod patet ex hoc quod non quæliet amicitia habet rationem laudabilis et honesti, sicut patet in amicitia delectabilis et utilis. Unde amicitia virtuosa magis est aliquid consequens ad virtutem quam sit virtus. Nec est simile de charitate, quæ non fundatur principaliter super virtute humana, sed super bonitate divina.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.ad.2] It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above (I-II, 25, 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ejusdem virtutis est diligere aliquem et gaudere de illo; nam gaudium amorem consequitur, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus pictor. — Sic ad propositum.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.ad.3] Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. On this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost.
[II-II.q.23.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omne accidens secundum suum esse est inferius substantia, quia substantia est ens per se, accidens autem in alio; sed secundum rationem suæ speciei, accidens quidem quod causatur ex principiis subjecti, est indignius subjecto, sicut effectus causa; accidens autem quod causatur ex participatione alicujus superioris naturæ, est dignius subjecto, inquantum est similitudo superioris naturæ, sicut lux diaphano. Et hoc modo charitas est dignior anima, inquantum est participatio quaedam Spiritus sancti.
Article 4
[II-II.q.23.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love God" [The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [De Civ. Dei xv, 22 that "virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod charitas non sit virtus specialis. Dicit enim Hieronymus: « Ut breviter omnem virtutis definitionem complectar, virtus est charitas, qua diligitur Deus et proximus . » Et Augustinus dicit in lib. De moribus Ecclesiæ, quod « virtus est ordo amoris. » Sed nulla virtus specialis ponitur in definitione virtutis communis. Ergo charitas non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.arg.2] Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, according to 1 Corinthians 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Corinthians 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, id quod se extendit ad opera omnium virtutum, non potest esse specialis virtus. Sed charitas se extendit ad opera omnium virtutum, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xiii, 4: Charitas patiens est, benigna est, etc.; extendit etiam se ad omnia opera humana, secundum illud I ad Cor., ult., 14: Omnia vestra in charitate fiant. Ergo charitas non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.arg.3] Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love" is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præcepta legis respondent actibus virtutum. Sed Augustinus, in lib. De perfectione humanæ justitiæ, cap. v, col. 297, t. 10, dicit quod « generalis jussio est: Diliges; et generalis prohibitio: Non concupisces. » Ergo charitas est generalis virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.sc] Nothing general is enumerated together with what is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Corinthians 13:13: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.sc] Sed contra, nullum generale connumeratur speciali. Sed charitas connumeratur specialibus virtutibus, scilicet spei et fidei, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xiii, 13: Nunc autem manent fides, spes, charitas, tria hæc. Ergo charitas est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.co] Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, 18, 2; I-II, 54, 2). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, 27, 1), so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. Therefore charity is a special virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actus et habitus specificantur per objecta, ut ex supra dictis patet. Proprium autem objectum amoris est bonum, ut supra habitum est: et ideo ubi est specialis ratio boni, ibi est specialis ratio amoris. Bonum autem divinum, inquantum est beatitudinis objectum, habet specialem rationem boni; et ideo amor charitatis, qui est amor hujus boni, est specialis amor. Unde et charitas est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.ad.1] Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (A7,8). On this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod charitas ponitur in definitione omnis virtutis, non quia sit essentialiter omnis virtus, sed quia dependent ab ea aliqualiter omnes virtutes, ut infra dicetur. Sicut etiam prudentia ponitur in definitione virtutum moralium, ut patet in II Ethic., cap. vi, et in VI, cap. ult., circa fin., eo quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.ad.2] The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod virtus vel ars ad quam pertinet finis ultimus, imperat virtutibus vel artibus ad quas pertinent alli fines secundarii; sicut militaris imperat equestri, ut dicitur in I Ethic., c. 1. Et ideo quia charitas habet pro objecto ultimum finem humanæ vitæ, scilicet beatitudinem æternam, ideo extendit se ad actus totius humanæ vitæ per modum imperii, non quasi immediate eliciens omnes actus virtutum.
[II-II.q.23.a.4.ad.3] The precept of love is said to be a general command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Timothy 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity."
[II-II.q.23.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod præceptum de diligendo dicitur esse jussio generalis, quia ad hoc reducuntur omnia alia præcepta sicut ad finem, secundum illud I ad Timoth., 1, 5: Finis præcepti charitas est.
Article 5
[II-II.q.23.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of charity--God and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod charitas non sit una virtus. Habitus enim distinguuntur secundum objecta. Sed duo sunt objecta charitatis, scilicet Deus, et proximus; quae in infinitum ab invicem distant. Ergo charitas non est una virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.arg.2] Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (17, 6; I-II, 54, 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, diversæ rationes objecti diversificant habitum, etiamsi objectum sit realiter idem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed multæ sunt rationes diligendi Deum, quia ex singulis beneficiis ejus perceptis debitores sumus dilectionis ipsius. Ergo charitas non est una virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.arg.3] Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3,11,12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various species.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sub charitate includitur amicitia ad proximum. Sed Philosophus, in VIII Ethic., cap. xi et xii, ponit diversas species amicitiae. Ergo charitas non est una virtus, sed multiplicatur in diversas species.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.sc] Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Ephesians 4:5: "One faith." Therefore charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.sc] Sed contra, sicut objectum fidei est Deus, ita et charitatis. Sed fides est una virtus propter unitatem divinæ veritatis, secundum illud ad Ephes., iv, 5: Una fides. Ergo etiam charitas est una virtus propter unitatem divinæ bonitatis.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.co] Charity, as stated above (Article 1) is a kind of friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod charitas, sicut dictum est, est quædam amicitia hominis ad Deum. Diversæ autem amicitiarum species accipiuntur, uno quidem modo secundum diversitatem finis, et secundum hoc dicuntur tres species amicitiae, scilicet amicitia utilis, delectabilis et honesti; alio modo secundum diversitatem communicationum in quibus amicitiae fundantur, sicut alia species amicitiae est consanguineorum, et alia concivium aut peregrinantium; quarum una fundatur super communicatione naturali, alia super communicatione civili vel peregrinationis, ut patet per Philosophum in VIII Ethic., cap. xi et xii. Neutro autem istorum modorum charitas potest dividi in plura; nam charitatis finis est unus, scilicet divina bonitas; est etiam una communicatio beatitudinis aternæ, super quam hæc amicitia fundatur. Unde re-linquitur quod charitas est simpliciter una virtus, non distincta in plures species.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.ad.1] This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God's sake.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa recte procederet, si Deus et proximus ex aequo essent charitatis objecta. Hoc autem non est verum; sed Deus est principale objectum charitatis, proximus autem ex charitate diligitur propter Deum.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.ad.2] God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Psalm 105:1: "Give glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary and result from the first.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod charitate diligitur Deus propter seipsum; unde una sola ratio diligendi attenditur principaliter a charitate, scilicet divina bonitas, quæ est ejus substantia, secundum illud psal. cv, 1: Confitemini Domino, quoniam bonus. Aliæ autem rationes ad diligendum inducentes, vel debitum dilectionis facientes, sunt secundariae, et consequentes ex prima.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.ad.3] Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
[II-II.q.23.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod amicitiae humanæ, de qua Philosophus loquitur, est diversus finis et diversa communicatio; quod in charitate locum non habet, ut dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio.
Article 6
[II-II.q.23.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod charitas non sit excellentissima virtutum. Altioris enim potentiæ altior est virtus, sicut et altior operatio. Sed intellectus est altior voluntate, et dirigit ipsam. Ergo fides, quæ est in intellectu, est excellentior charitate, quæ est in voluntate.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.arg.2] Further, the thing by which another works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according to Galatians 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud per quod aliud operatur, videtur eo esse inferius, sicut minister, per quem Dominus aliquid operatur, est inferior domino. Sed fides per dilectionem* operatur, ut habetur ad Gal., v, 6. Ergo fides est excellentior charitate.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.arg.3] Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than charity.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse perfectius. Sed spes videtur se habere ex additione ad charitatem: nam charitatis objectum est bonum, spei autem objectum est bonum arduum. Ergo spes est excellentior charitate.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.sc] It is written (1 Corinthians 13:13): "The greater of these is charity."
[II-II.q.23.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Corinth., xiii, 13: Major horum est charitas.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.co] Since good, in human acts, depends on their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (Article 3), namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains God most.
Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human operations or passions.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum bonum in humanis actibus attendatur secundum quod regulantur debita regula, necesse est quod virtus humana, quæ est principium bonorum actuum, consistat in attingendo humanorum actuum regulam. Est autem duplex regula humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana et Deus; sed Deus est prima regula, a qua etiam humana ratio regulanda est. Et ideo virtutes theologicæ, quæ consistunt in attingendo illam regulam primam, eo quod earum objectum est Deus, excellentiores sunt virtutibus moralibus vel intellectualibus, quæ consistunt in attingendo rationem humanam. Propter quod oportet quod etiam inter ipsas virtutes theologicas illa sit potior quæ magis Deum attingit. Semper autem id quod est per se, majus est eo quod est per aliud. Fides autem et spes attingunt quidem Deum secundum quod ex ipso provenit nobis vel cognitio veri vel adeptio boni; sed charitas attingit ipsum Deum, ut in ipso sistat, non ut ex eo aliquid nobis proveniat; et ideo charitas est excellentior fide et spe, et per consequens omnibus aliis virtutibus, sicut etiam prudentia, quæ attingit rationem secundum se, est excellentior quam aliæ virtutes morales quæ attingunt rationem secundum quod ex ea medium constituitur in operationibus, vel passionibus humanis.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.ad.1] The operation of the intellect is completed by the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod operatio intellectus completur secundum quod intellectum est in intelligente; et ideo nobilitas operationis intellectualis attenditur secundum mensuram intellectus. Operatio autem voluntatis et cujuslibet virtutis appe-titivæ perficitur in inclinatione appetentis ad rem sicut ad terminum; et ideo dignitas operationis appetitivæ attenditur secundum rem quæ est objectum operationis. Ea autem quæ sunt infra animam, nobiliori modo sunt in anima quam in seipsis, quia unum-quodque est in aliquo per modum ejus in quo est, ut habetur in lib. De causis, prop. 12 et 20. Quæ vero sunt supra animam, nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis quam sint in anima. Et ideo eorum quæ sunt infra nos, nobilior est cognitio quam dilectio; propter quod Philosophus, in VI Ethic., c. vii et xii, prætulit virtutes intellectuales moralibus. Sed eorum quæ sunt supra nos, et præcipue Dei, dilectio cognitioni præfertur. Et ideo charitas est excellentior fide.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.ad.2] Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not prove.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fides non operatur per directionem sicut per instrumentum, ut dominus per servum, sed sicut per formam propriam; et ideo ratio non sequitur.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.ad.3] The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.
[II-II.q.23.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod idem bonum est objectum charitatis et spei; sed charitas importat unionem ad illud bonum, spes autem distantiam quamdam ab eo. Et inde est quod charitas non respicit illud bonum ut arduum, sicut spes; quod enim jam unitum est, non habet rationem ardui. Et ex hoc apparet quod charitas est perfectior spe.
Article 7
[II-II.q.23.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that there can be true virtue without charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sine charitate possit esse aliqua vera virtus. Virtutis enim proprium est bonum actum producere. Sed illi qui non habent charitatem, faciunt aliquos bonos actus, puta dum nudum vestiunt, famelicum pascunt, et similia operantur. Ergo sine charitate potest esse aliqua vera virtus.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.arg.2] Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5). Now, in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, charitas non potest esse sine fide; procedit enim ex fide non ficta, ut Apostolus dicit, I ad Tim., 1. Sed in infidelibus potest esse vera castitas, dum concupiscentiam cohibent, et vera justitia, dum recte judicant. Ergo vera virtus potest esse sine charitate.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.arg.3] Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic. vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore true virtue can be without charity.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, scientia et ars virtutes quædam sunt, ut patet in VI Ethic., c. 111 et 11v. Sed hujusmodi inveniuntur in hominibus peccatoribus non habentibus charitatem. Ergo vera virtus potest esse sine charitate.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.sc] The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:3): "If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet true virtue is very profitable, according to Wisdom 8:7: "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no true virtue is possible without charity.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit I ad Corinth., xiii, 3: Si distribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas, et si tradidero corpus meum, ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habeam*, nihil mihi prodest. Sed virtus vera multum prodest, secundum illud Sap., viii, 7: Sobrietatem et justitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem; quibus in vita nihil est utilius hominibus*. Ergo sine charitate vera virtus esse non potest.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.co] Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above (I-II, 55, 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Psalm 72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this way no true virtue is possible without charity.
If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude, whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtus ordinatur ad bonum, ut supra habitum est. Bonum autem principaliter est finis; nam quia Deus est prima regula actuum humanorum. Porro, charitas melius attingit Deum quam virtutes morales quæ attingunt tantum rationem humanam; melius etiam quam aliæ virtutes theologicæ, fides scilicet et spes, quæ attingunt Deum secundum quod ex ipso nobis provenit vel cognitio veri, vel adeptio boni; nam charitas in ipso Deo sistit, et ut in ipso sistat ipsum attingit, non ut ex ipso aliquid nobis proveniat. Insuper fides et spes compatiuntur peccatum, non charitas. Denique, fides et spes imperfectionem involvunt, fides obscuritatem, spes proprium commodum. Ergo perfectior est charitas in esse moris. Id tamen negarunt Lutherani, quia dicentes nos justificari per fidem, contendunt fidem aliis virtutibus in esse moris pracellere. Quoad perfectionem in ente physico, et independent a regula morum, scinduntur Thomistæ, allii ea quæ sunt ad finem, non dicuntur bona nisi in ordine ad finem. Sicut ergo duplex est finis, unus ultimus, et alius proximus; ita etiam est duplex bonum, unum quidem ultimum, et aliud proximum et particulare. Ultimum quidem principale bonum hominis est Dei fruitio, secundum illud psal. Lxxii, 28: Mihi adhærere Deo bonum est; et ad hoc ordinatur homo per charitatem. Bonum autem secundarium, et quasi particulare hominis potest esse duplex: unum quidem quod est vere bonum, utpote ordinabile, quantum est in se, ad principale bonum, quod est ultimus finis; aliud autem est bonum apparens, et non verum, quia abducit a finali bono. Sic ergo patet quod virtus vera simpliciter est illa quæ ordinatur ad principale bonum hominis; sicut etiam Philosophus, in VII Physic., text. 17, dicit quod « virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. » Et sic nulla vera virtus potest esse sine charitate. Sed si accipiatur virtus secundum quod est in ordine ad aliquem finem particularem, sic potest aliqua virtus dici sine charitate, in quantum ordinatur ad aliquod particulare bonum. Sed si illud particulare bonum non sit verum bonum, sed apparens; virtus etiam quæ est in ordine ad hoc bonum, non erit vera virtus, sed falsa similitudo virtutis; sicut non est « vera virtus avarorum prudentia, qua excogitat diversa genera locellorum; et avarorum justitia, qua gravium damnorum metu contemnunt aliena; et avarorum temperantia, qua luxuriæ, quæ sumptuosa est, cohibent appetitum; et avarorum fortitudo, qua, ut ait Horatius, lib. I, Epist. i, v. 46: Per mare pauperiem fugiunt, per saxa, per ignes; » volentes fidem esse perfectiorem in ente physico charitate, alii volentes in eodem ente perfectiorem esse fide charitatem. Ratio primæ sententiæ est quod cognitio actus est nobilioris potentiae, id est intellectus, et consequenter fides per quam cognos-citur est virtus nobilior charitate per quam amatur; amor enim est actus potentiae minus nobilis, id est voluntatis. Huic rationi secundæ sententiæ patroni opponunt quod dilectio eorum quæ supra nos sunt nobilior est quam cognitio, quia ea quæ supra nos sunt ad differentiam eorum quæ infra nos sunt, nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis ubi vadit dilectio quam in intellectu nostro ubi manet cognitio. Parm. addit: « et universale. » — Sic cod.; in Parm.: « lucrorum. » « Et avarorum justitia, qua gravium damnorum metu, facilius sua nonnunquam contemnunt quam usurpant aliquid alienum, » etc. ut Augustinus dicit in IV lib. Contra Julia-num, cap. III, § 49, col. 748, t. 40. Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis, vel aliquid hujusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum. Et secundum hoc simpliciter vera virtus sine charitate esse non potest.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.ad.1] The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and directs it to his unbelief as end.
There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated above (10, 4; I-II, 85, 2). On this way it is possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actus alicujus charitate carentis potest esse duplex: unus quidem secundum hoc quod charitate caret, utpote cum facit aliquid in ordine ad id per quod caret charitate; et talis actus semper est malus: sicut Augustinus dicit in IV Contra Julian., c. III, § 30, etc., col. 753, t. 40, quod actus infidelis, inquantum est infidelis, semper est peccatum, etiamsi nudum operiat, vel quidquid aliud hujusmodi faciat, ordinans ad finem suæ infidelitatis. Alius autem potest esse actus charitate carentis, non secundum id quod charitate caret, sed secundum quod habet aliquod aliud donum Dei, vel fidem, vel spem, vel etiam naturale bonum: quod non totum per peccatum tollitur, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc sine charitate potest qui dem esse aliquis actus bonus ex suo genere; non tamen perfecte bonus, quia deest debita ordinatio ad ultimum finem.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.ad.2] Since the end is in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum finis se habeat in agibilibus, sicut principium in speculativis; sicut non potest esse simpliciter vera scientia, si desit recta aestimatio de primo et indemonstrabili principio, ita non potest esse simpliciter vera justitia aut vera castitas, si desit ordinatio debita ad finem, quæ est per charitatem, quantum-cumque aliquis se recte circa alia habeat.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.ad.3] Science and art of their very nature imply a relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life, as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above (I-II, 56, 3). Hence the comparison fails.
[II-II.q.23.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientia et ars de sui ratione important ordinem ad aliquod particulare bonum, non autem ad ultimum finem humanæ vitæ; sicut virtutes morales, quæ simpliciter faciunt hominem bonum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio.
Article 8
[II-II.q.23.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that charity is not the true form of the virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential. Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the virtues.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod charitas non sit forma virtutum. Forma enim alicujus rei vel est exemplaris, vel est essentialis. Sed charitas non est forma exemplaris aliarum virtutum; quia sic oporteret quod aliæ virtutes essent ejusdem speciei cum ipsa; similiter etiam non est forma essentialis aliarum, quia non distingueretur ab aliis. Ergo nullo modo est forma virtutum.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.arg.2] Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their root and foundation, according to Ephesians 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, charitas comparatur ad alias ejus in charitate; I Joan., iv: Qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et alibi. Sex sunt effectus gratiae sanctificantis, ut dicit Tournely: 1. gratia sanctificans nos filios Dei efficit; at id de charitate affirmat Joan., I ep., iv: Omnis qui diligit, ex Deo natus est. 2. Gratia nos Deo gratos et acceptos reddit: id efficit charitas, Joan., iv: Qui diligit me, diligitur a Patre meo. 3. Gratia vitam spiritualem nobis confert: at de charitate dicitur I Joan., III: Scimus quoniam translati sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam diligimus fratres. Qui non diligit manet in morte. 4. Gratia nos Deo conjungit: at id quoque præstat charitas. 5. Gratia est radix omnium bonorum operum: at Apostolus I Cor., xiii, omnium fere virtutum actus charitati tribuit: Charitas patiens est, benigna est, non æmulatur, non agit peram, non inflatur, non est ambitiosa, non quærit quæ vera sunt, non irritatur, non cogitat malum, non gaudet super iniquitate, congaudet autem veritati, omnia suffert, omnia credit, omnia sperat, omnia sustinet. 6. Denique gratia est semen vitæ æternæ ac salutis nostræ causa; at de charitate id ipsum dicitur: Coronam vitæ repromisit Deus diligentibus se, Jacob, I. II. Tridentinum concilium, sess. vi, c. xi, loquens de nostra justificatione, asserit non fieri illam sola remissione peccatorum exclusa gratia et charitate « quæ per Spiritum sanctum diffundatur; » ergo censet unicam esse formam, gratiam et charitatem, quia si duæ essent, dixisset « diffunduntur » et non « diffunditur. » Præterea, c. vii, idem concilium, postquam dixisset unicam esse causam formalem nostræ justificationis, docet illam esse charitatem quæ diffunditur in cordibus eorum qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhæret: imo subdit in justificatione, ultra peccatorum remissionem, infundi spem, fidem et charitatem nulla facta mentione gratia; quam sane mentionem fecisset, si credidisset illam esse a charitate distinctam cum hic præcipue agat de forma sanctificante. III. Causa formalis nostræ justificationis est gratia sanctificans, hinc enim justificans etiam appellatur; sed charitas est causa formalis qua justificamur. Concilium enim tridentinum dicit, sess. vi, cap. vii, nos effici formaliter justos per justitiam qua donamur a Deo, et paulo post ait id fieri in nobis dum charitas diffunditur in cordibus eorum qui justificantur, ut supra retulimus. Augustinus quoque, lib. De nat. et grat., c. xxxviii, dicit: « Charitas Dei qua una vere justus est, qui cumque justus est. » IV. Si charitas et gratia taliter distinguerentur possent separari; sed inde sequitur magnum inconveniens; ergo. Prob. Min. Si quis moreretur habens charitatem, et non habens gratiam, nec damnare- virtutes ut radix et fundamentum, secundum illud Ephes., 17: In charitate radicati et fundati. Radix autem vel fundamentum non habet rationem formæ, sed magis tur, nec salvaretur; non damnaretur quia nullum haberet peccatum, utpote incompatibile cum charitate; nec salvaretur, quia defectu gratiae non esset filius Dei adoptivus cui soli gloria repromissa est. V. Nulla ratio vel authoritas sive Scripturæ, sive conciliorum, sive Patrum affert aliquam necessitatem distinguendi realiter gratiam a charitate; ergo. Aliter alii quartam rationem exponunt dicentes: Si gratia et charitas realiter distinguerentur, possent saltem de potentia Dei absoluta separari, sicut proprietates naturales possunt de potentia Dei absoluta separari ab essentia; atqui falsum consequens; ergo. — Prob. min.: Si gratia esset in aliquo sine charitate, ille esset Deo gratus et amicus, quia eum esse talem efficeret gratia; et non esset quia non diligeret Deum. Item salvaretur quia per gratiam esset filius Dei adoptivus, et consequenter haeres regni; et non salvaretur quia non haberet charitatem, sine qua nemo salvatur. Similiter, si esset in eo charitas sine gratia esset gratus Deo, quia ipsum diligeret, et non esset gratus, quia careret gratia per quam fit gratus. Item posset salvari, quia nullum haberet peccatum, quod est incompossibile cum charitate, et non posset, quia, carens gratia, non esset filius et haeres, et ideo non haberet jus ad regnum. VI. Si gratia distinguitur a charitate, ut essentia a proprietate, sequitur quod gratia non possit augeri quia essentia rei non suscipit magis et minus. Falsum est consequens. Ergo.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.arg.3] Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, forma et finis et efficiens Quod si objicias non idem esse naturam quae substantia est et naturam quae accidens est, quia natura quae substantia est non est per se operativa, excepta natura Dei, dum natura quae accidens est operatur; unde, quando natura est substantia non operativa per se non est idem ac dispositio ad operandum; quando autem natura est accidens quod operatur, possibile est eamdem formam dare et esse talis naturæ et dispositionem ad operandum, sicut, v. g., idem calor tribuit ligno esse et calidum et calefactivum. Atqui gratia est accidens; ergo eadem forma in ordine supernaturali tribuere po-test et elevationem ad ordinem supernaturalem et dispositionem ad operandum; ergo virtus in ordine supernaturali non necessario distincta est a natura, nec charitas a gratia; respondetur elevationem naturæ esse in essentia animæ, virtutem autem operativam in potentia animæ; atqui ex philosophia non potest eadem forma subjectari in duobus subjectis realiter distinctis, ut sunt essentia et potentia animæ. Insuper quod dicitur de virtute charitatis dici posset a pari de omnibus aliis virtutibus infusis et de donis. III. Gratia est effectus et terminus dilectionis Dei; charitas est qua diligimus Deum; atqui Deus « prior dilexit nos, » I Joann., iv. Ergo gratia non idem est ac charitas. IV. Gratia est participatio divinæ naturæ, charitas participatio divinæ voluntatis; atqui istæ participationes sunt naturaliter distinctæ; ergo. Prob. Min.: Natura et voluntas in Deo virtualiter distinguunt; quae autem in Deo virtualiter distinguunt, participata in creaturis distinguunt realiter; natura insuper plus differt a voluntate quam voluntas ab intellectu, sed participatio voluntatis differt a participatione intellectus; ergo. V. Omnis inclinatio sequitur ad formam; sed charitas est inclinatio ordinis supernaturalis; ergo supponit formam supernaturalem ad quam sequitur. VI. Deus non minus providet naturæ in ordine supernaturali quam in ordine naturali; atqui in ordine naturali primo dat formam essentialem, seu naturam cui competit talis finis, deinde potentias in ea radicatas ad operandum pro assecutione finis; ergo similiter in ordine supernaturali.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.sc] Ambrose [Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23 says that charity is the form of the virtues.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit charitatem esse formam virtutum.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.co] In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been said (7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation to "informed" acts.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in moralibus forma actus attenditur principaliter ex parte finis. Cujus ratio est quia principium moralium actuum est voluntas; cujus objectum et quasi forma est finis. Semper autem forma actus consequitur formam agentis. Unde oportet quod in moralibus id quod dat actui ordinem ad finem, det ei et formam. Manifestum est autem secundum prædicta, quod per charitatem ordinantur actus omnium aliarum virtutum ad ultimum finem; et secundum hoc ipsa dat formam actibus omnium aliarum virtutum: et pro tanto dicitur « esse forma virtutum, » nam et ipsæ virtutes dicuntur in ordine ad actus formatos. objectum specie distinctum ab objecto uniuscujusque aliarum virtutum supernaturalium; atqui si esset forma essentialis et intrinseca aliarum virtutum, virtutes idem cum ea objectum haberent, quod falsum est; ergo aliarum virtutum charitas non est forma essentialis et intrinseca. Idem argumentum efformari non potest de gratia cujus objectum est elevatio ad ordinem supernaturalem, quæ elevatio omnibus virtutibus convenit supernaturalibus, objecto uniuscujusque earum eodem remanente, et inde forsitan recte concludi posset quod Thomistæ contendunt ut probabilius, charitatem scilicet realiter distingui a gratia. Implicite in supposititio Commentario in I ad Cor., c. xiii, v. 3, ubi dicit: « Caput religionis caritas est; et qui caput non habet, vitam non habet...; sine caritate nihil prodest, quia fundamentum religionis caritas est. Quidquid ergo sine caritate fit, caducum est, » col. 266, t. 4. — Et expressius, in quadam precatione preparatoria ad missam quæ inter ejus Opera dubia legitur, col. 835, § 5, t. 4, « charitas, quæ fundamentum est omnium virtutum. » Al: « in operando ipsos. » In hac quæstione S. Doctor disserit de charitate secundum se. Hoc nomen « charitas » christianum est; sed a christianis decursu sæculorum secundum sensus multiplices usurpatum est, et hos exponere licebit. I. Charitas virtus theologica, sive sit, sive non sit idem ac gratia habitualis. II. Agape christianorum, convivium quo amici, vel etiam pauperes excipiuntur. III. Eleemosyna. IV. Prædia et bona omnia quæ a fidelibus christianis in eleemosynam gratuito collata sunt, seu ob anniversaria, seu ob alia pietatis officia in ecclesiis et monasteriis exsolvenda; et monachus qui isti bonorum generi in monasterio sandionysiano, ac
[II-II.q.23.a.8.ad.1] Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod charitas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutum, non quidem exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed magis effective, inquantum scilicet omnibus formam imponit, secundum modum prædictum.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.ad.2] Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character of a material cause.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod charitas comparatur fundamento et radici, inquantum ex ea sustentantur et nutriuntur omnes aliæ virtutes; et non secundum rationem, qua fundamentum et radix habent rationem causæ materialis.
[II-II.q.23.a.8.ad.3] Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.23.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod charitas dicitur finis aliarum virtutum, quia omnes alias virtutes ordinat ad finem suum. Et quia mater est quæ in se concipit ex alio, ex hac ratione dicitur mater aliarum virtutum, quia ex appetitu finis ultimi concipit actus aliarum virtutum, imperando ipsos.
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