Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q42. Sedition
Source context
- Theme
- sedition as a species of social discord distinct from war, riot, and strife
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian political philosophyAristotle's analysis of stasis (civic faction) in the Politics distinguishes internal civil strife from external war, providing a structural precedent for Aquinas's differentiation of sedition from other forms of conflict.
- Ciceronian civic ethicsCicero's treatment of concordia ordinum in De Re Publica frames civil unity as the telos of political community, against which sedition constitutes a direct violation — a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's moral condemnation of seditious acts against the common good.
Q42. Sedition
Article 1
[II-II.q.42.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a seditious man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets discord." Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod seditio non sit speciale peccatum ab aliis distinctum. Quia, ut Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etymologiarum, col. 394, § 250, t. 3: « Seditiosus est qui dissensionem animorum facit, et discordias gignit. » Sed ex hoc quod aliquis aliquod peccatum procurat, non peccat alio peccati genere, nisi illo quod procurat. Ergo videtur quod seditio non sit speciale peccatum a discordia distinctum.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.arg.2] Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated above (Question 39, Article 1). Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of schism.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, seditio divisionem quamdam importat. Sed nomen etiam schismatis sumitur a scissura, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum seditionis non videtur esse distinctum a peccato schismatis.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.arg.3] Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special sin, distinct from other sins.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne speciale peccatum ab aliis distinctum, vel est vitium capitale, aut ex aliquo vitio capitali oritur. Sed seditio neque computatur inter vitia capitalia, neque inter vitia quæ ex capitalibus oriuntur, ut patet in XXXI Moral., cap. xlv, col. 620, t. 2, ubi utraque vitia numerantur. Ergo seditio non est speciale peccatum ab aliis distinctum.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.sc] Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins (2 Corinthians 12:20).
[II-II.q.42.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod II ad Cor., xii, seditiones ab aliis peccatis distinguuntur.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.co] Sedition is a special sin, having something in common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:20 says that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people and another, whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod seditio est quoddam speciale peccatum, quod quantum ad aliquid convenit cum bello et rixa; quantum autem ad aliquid differt ab eis. Convenit quidem cum eis in hoc quod importat quamdam contradictionem; differt autem ab eis in duobus: primo quidem quia bellum et rixa important mutuam impugnationem in actu; sed seditio potest dici, sive fiat hujusmodi impugnatio in actu, sive sit præparatio ad talem impugnationem. Unde Glossa interl., II ad Corinth., xii, sup. illud: Seditiones, animositates, dicit quod « seditiones sunt tumultus ad pugnam; » cum scilicet aliqui se praeparant et intentant pugnare. Secundo differunt, quia bellum proprie est contra extraneos hostes quasi multitudinis ad multitudinem; rixa autem est unius ad unum, vel paucorum ad paucos; seditio autem proprie est inter partes unius multitudinis inter se dissentientes, puta cum una pars civitatis excitatur in tumultum contra aliam. Et ideo quia seditio habet speciale bonum, cui opponitur, scilicet unitatem et pacem multitudinis, est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.ad.1] A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another inordinately.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod seditiosus dicitur ille qui seditionem excitat; et quia seditio quamdam discordiam importat, ideo seditiosus est qui discordiam facit, non qualemcumque, sed inter partes alicujus multitudinis. Peccatum autem seditionis non solum est in eo qui discordiam seminat, sed etiam in eis qui inordinate ab invicem dissentiunt.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.ad.2] Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First, because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude, viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod seditio differt a schismate in duobus; primo quidem quia schisma opponitur spirituali unitati multitudinis, scilicet unitati eclesiasticæ; seditio autem opponitur temporali vel sæculari multitudinis unitati, puta civitatis vel regni; secundo, quia schisma non importat aliquam præparationem ad pugnam corporalem, sed solum importat dissensionem spiritualem; seditio autem importat præparationem ad pugnam corporalem.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.ad.3] Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between the parts of a multitude.
[II-II.q.42.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod seditio, sicut et schisma, sub discordia continetur: utrumque enim est discordia quædam, non unius ad unum, sed partium multitudinis ad invicem.
Article 2
[II-II.q.42.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin. For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the gloss quoted above (Article 1). But fighting is not always a mortal sin, indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Question 40, Article 1). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod seditio non semper sit peccatum mortale. Seditio enim importat tumultum ad pugnam, ut patet per Glossam supra inductam. Sed pugna non semper est peccatum mortale, sed quando est justa et licita, ut supra habitum est. Ergo multo magis seditio potest esse sine peccato mortali.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.arg.2] Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (1, ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, seditio est discordia quædam, 1 Sic cod.; in edit.: « intendunt. » Robertus de Litio, Sermone quadragesimali xxxix, dicit: « Secunda discordia est civilis partialitatis, quando cives relicto amore communis boni, convertentesque omnia ad proprium commodum discordant ad invicem. » Nam, ut inquit Aristoteles, II Polit., civilitas quædam communicatio est. Et ibidem: Politica est ordo quidam inhabitantium civitatem. Quando ergo cives non reguntur secundum ordinem, nec sunt communicativi ad dissensiones veniunt. Tales sunt hodie quasi in omnibus civitatibus Italiae tyranni quidem de quibus dici potest quod Sapiens ait: Homines pestilentes dissipant civitatem, Prov., xxxix. Et, ut idem ait xi cap.: Benedictione justorum exaltabitur civitas, et ore impiorum subvertetur. Impii quidam et partiales non reipublicæ sed propriæ utilitati semper invigilant. Contra quos ait Cassiodorus, lib. III Epistolarum: « Nobilissimi civis est patriæ suæ augmenta cogitare. » Et Tullius, in I De offic. : « Omnino qui reipublicæ præsunt servent duo præcepta Platonis: unum ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quæcumque agant ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum; alterum ut corpus totum reipublicæ curent, ne dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. » Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio reipublicæ ad eorum utilitatem qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum quibus commissa est gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem negligunt, rem perniciosissimam in civita-tem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam. Hinc apud Athenienses magnæ discordia ortæ: hinc non solum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia quæ gravis et fortis civis in republica, dignus principatu, fugiet atque oderit, tradetque se totum reipublicæ, neque opes aut potentiam consectabitur, totamque eam sic tuebitur ut omnibus consulat, necnon criminibus falsis in odium aut invidiam vocabit, omninoque ita justitiæ honestati-que adhærescet, ut ea conservet, mortemque potius appetat quam deserat illa. Antiqui Romani propter rempublicam domesticas injurias dissimulabant. Unde Valerius Maximus, lib. IV De moderatione: « Nagippus Teciates, hortantibus amicis ut gravem in administratione reipublicæ, et aemulum sibi vehementer adversarium, sed alioquin probum et ornatum virum qualibet ratione vel tolleret, vel submoveret, negavit se facturum, ne quem in tute-lam patriæ bonus civis locum obtineret, malus et improbus occuparet, seque vehementi adversario urgeri quam patriam egregio advocato carere præoptavit. » Æmilius Lepidus, bis consul et pontifex maximus, splendoreque horum par vitæ gravitate, diutinas inimicitias cum Fulvio Flacco ejusdem amplitudinis viro gessit, quas, simul ut censores renuntiati sunt, in campo deposuit, existimans eos non oportere privatis inimicitiis dissidere qui publice summa juncti essent potestate. Sæpius ubi partialitates abundant, omne bonum publicum penitus destructum est et eversum, omnisque justitia conculcata et eversa. ut dictum est. Sed discordia potest esse sine peccato mortali, et quando etiam sine omni peccato. Ergo etiam seditio.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.arg.3] Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be sedition without mortal sin.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, laudantur qui multitudinem a potestate tyrannica liberant. Sed hoc non de facili potest fieri sine aliqua dissensione multitudinis, dum una pars multitudinis nititur retinere tyrannum, alia vero nititur cum abjicere. Ergo seditio potest fieri sine peccato.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.sc] The Apostle forbids seditions together with other things that are mortal sins (2 Corinthians 12:20).
[II-II.q.42.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus II ad Cor., xii, prohibet seditiones inter alia quæ sunt peccata mortalia. Ergo seditio est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.co] As stated above (1, ad 2), sedition is contrary to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.
Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors, who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself, as stated above (Question 41, Article 1).
[II-II.q.42.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, seditio opponitur unitati multitudinis, id est, populi, civitatis vel regni. Dicit autem Augustinus II De civitate Dei, cap. xxI, § 2, col. 67, t. 7, quod « populum determinant sapientes, non omnem cœtum multitudinis, sed cœtum juris consensu, et utilitatis communione sociatum. » Unde manifestum est, unitatem, cur opponitur seditio, esse unitatem juris et communis utilitatis. Manifestum est ergo, quod seditio opponitur et justitiae et communi bono, et ideo ex suo genere est peccatum mortale, et tanto gravius quanto bonum commune, quod impugnatur per seditionem, est majus quam bonum privatum, quod impugnatur per rixam. Peccatum autem seditionis primo quidem et principaliter pertinet ad eos qui seditionem procurant, qui gravissime peccant; secundo autem ad eos qui eos sequuntur, perturbantes bonum commune. Illi vero qui bonum commune defendunt, eis resistentes, non sunt dicendi seditiosi; sicut nec illi qui se defendunt, dicuntur rixosi, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.ad.1] It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common good, as stated above (Question 40, Article 1). But sedition runs counter to the common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod pugna quæ est licita, fit pro communi utilitate, sicut supra dictum est. Sed seditio fit contra commune bonum multitudinis: unde semper est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.ad.2] Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin: and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the multitude, which is a manifest good.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod discordia ab eo quod non est manifeste bonum, potest esse sine peccato; sed discordia ab eo quod est manifeste bonum, non potest esse sine peccato; et talis discordia est seditio, quæ opponitur unitati multitudinis, quæ est manifeste bonum.
[II-II.q.42.a.2.ad.3] A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government. Ondeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the injury of the multitude.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.42.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod regimen tyrannicum non est justum, quia non ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis, ut patet per Philosophum in III Polit., cap. v, et in VIII Ethic., cap. x. Et ideo perturbatio hujus regiminis non habet rationem seditionis; nisi forte quando sic inordinate perturbatur tyrannicum regnum, quod multitudo subjecta majus detrimentum patitur ex perturbatione consequenti quam ex tyranni regimine. Magis autem tyrannus seditiosus est, qui in populo sibi subjecto discordias et seditiones nutrit, ut tutius dominari possit: hoc enim tyrannicum est, cum sit ordinatum ad bonum proprium præsidentis, cum multitudinis no-cumento.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/secunda-secundae/q042.json