Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q46. Folly which is opposed to wisdom
Source context
- Theme
- Folly as privation of wisdom: the vice opposed to right judgment in ultimate causes
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Platonic philosophyPlato's treatment of aphrosyne (thoughtlessness) in the Phaedrus and Republic identifies folly as the soul's failure to orient itself toward the intelligible Good, a structural parallel to Aquinas's folly as insensibility to divine wisdom.
- Kabbalah (Sephirotic anthropology)Daath, the hidden sephirah of knowledge, when absent or inverted is associated with spiritual blindness (kelipotic opacity), offering a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's folly as the darkening of the intellect to transcendent order.
Q46. Folly which is opposed to wisdom
Article 1
[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod stultitia non opponatur sapientiæ. Sapientiæ enim directe videtur opponi insipientia. Sed stultitia non videtur esse idem quod insipientia; quia insipientia videtur esse solum circa divina, sicut et sapientia; stultitia autem se habet et circa divina, et circa humana. Ergo sapientiæ non opponitur stultitia.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.2] Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other. But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Corinthians 3:18): "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unum oppositorum non est via perveniendi ad aliud. Sed stultitia est via perveniendi ad sapientiam; dicitur enim I ad Cor., 18: Si quis videtur inter vos sapiens esse in hoc sæculo, stultus fiat ut sit sapiens. Ergo sapientiæ non oppositor stultitia.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.3] Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jeremiah 10:14): "Every man is become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of knowledge. Moreover, it is written (Isaiah 47:10): "Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be deceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unum oppositorum non est causa alterius. Sapientia autem est causa stultitiaæ: dicitur enim Jerem., x, 14: Stultus factus est omnis homo a scientia sua; sapientia autem quædam scientia est, et Isa., xlvii, 10, dicitur: Sapientia tua, et scientia tua, hæc decepit te; decipi autem ad stultitiam pertinet. Ergo sapientiæ non oppositor stultitia.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.4] Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etym., § 246, col. 393, t. 3, quod « stultus est qui per ignominiam non commovetur ad dolorem, et qui non movetur injuria. » Sed hoc pertinet ad sapientiam spiritualem, ut Gregorius dicit in X Moral., cap. xxviii et xxix, § A7, col. 947, t. 4. Ergo sapientiæ non oppositor stultitia.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.sc] Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of wisdom is given as a remedy against folly."
[II-II.q.46.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit in II tenda severitas, ut in conviviis, in lusu, deponenda persona sapientis, sumenda persona stulti, præsertim inter stultos, at ita, ut stultum agas, non ut stultus fias. Summa enim prudentia est servire tempori, « loco » id est cum est opportunum. » Erasmus super illud Distich. Catonis. Horatius dixerat: • Misce stultitiam consiliis brevem; Dulce est desipere in loco. Od. xxii, lib. IV. David coram rege Achis insaniam simulavit. I Reg., cap. xxi, 13. Solon, unus e septem Græcorum sapientibus, teste Plutarcho, finxit se delirum, ut Atheniensibus, quibus capitale erat de ea re loqui, persuade ret recuperare Salamina insulam. Ulysses simulatione insaniae militiam subterfugit, Moral., cap. xlix, § 77, col. 592, t. 4, quod « donum sapientiæ datur contra stultitiam. »
[II-II.q.46.a.1.co] Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from "stupor"; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S): "A fool is one who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved." And folly differs from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom.
For "sapiens" [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from sapor [savor], because just as the taste is quick to distinguish between savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and causes." Wherefore it is manifest that "folly" is opposed to "wisdom" as its contrary, while "fatuity" is opposed to it as a pure negation: since the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute and penetrating.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen stultitiaæ a stupore videtur esse sumptum; unde Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etymol., ut supra : « Stultus est qui propter stuporem non movetur. » Et differt stultitia a fatuitate, sicut ibidem dicitur, quia stultitia importat hebetudinem cordis et obtusionem sensuum; fatuitas autem importat totaliter spiritualis sensus privationem. Et ideo convenienter stultitia sapientiæ opponitur. Sapiens enim, ut ibidem, § 240, Isidorus dicit, « dictus est a sapore, quia sicut gustus aptus est ad discretionem saporis ciborum, sic sapiens ad dignoscentiam rerum, atque causarum. » Unde patet quod stultitia opponitur sapientiæ sicut contrarium; fatuitas autem sicut pura negatio; nam fatuus caret sensu judicandi; stultus autem habet sensum, sed hebetatum; sapiens autem subtilem et perspicacem.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.1] According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is contrary to wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense"; so that unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason called a fool.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut Isidorus ibidem dicit, « insipiens contrarius est sapienti, quod sit sine sapore discretionis et sensus. » Unde idem videtur esse insipientia cum stultitia. Præcipue autem vide-tur aliquis esse stultus, quando patitur defectum in summa judicii, quae attenditur secundum causam altissimam; nam si deficiat in judicio circa aliquid modicum, non ex hoc vocatur aliquis stultus.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.2] Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (45, 1, ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes for the highest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut est quædam sapientia mala, ut supra dictum est, quæ dicitur sapientia stultis, quia accipit pro causa altissima et fine ultimo aliquod terrenum bonum; ita etiam est aliqua stultitia bona huic sapientia malæ opposita, per quam aliquis terrena contemnit; et de hac stultitia loquitur Apostolus. ut memorat ex tragicis veteribus, nunc amissis, Cicero, lib. III Offic. L. Junius Brutus, simulata mentis impotentia, Tarquiniorum insidias effugit. Tit. Liv., lib. I, c. Lvi. Alios qui loco stultitiam similarint, Freishemius recenset Ad Flor., lib. I, cap. ix, § 4. In aliis cod. : « utrum sit filia luxuriæ. » « Stultus est qui per stuporem non movetur injuria, sævitiam enim perfert, nec ultus est, nec ullo ignominiæ commovetur dolore. » Ita cum quinque codicibus edit. Rom.; Nicolaï cum exemplo Paris. et Duacensi : « in sapientia judicii, » mavult tamen, « in sapientia judicio, » quod habet edit. Patav. 1698; Patav. 1712 : « in sententia judicii; » al. : « in sapientiis judicii. » Cod. Paris. ut in textu. Sic omnes cod.; Parm. : « sapientia sæculi. »
[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.3] It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes us foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1 Corinthians 3:19).
[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sapientia sæculi est quæ decipit, et facit esse stultum apud Deum, ut patet per Apostolum I ad Cor., III.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.4] To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for heavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is the result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and this belongs to folly simply.
[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod non moveri injuriis, quandoque quidem contingit ex hoc quod homini non sapient terrena, sed sola cælestia; unde hoc non pertinet ad stultitiam mundi, sed ad sapientiam Dei, ut Gregorius ibidem dicit. Quandoque autem contingit ex hoc quod homo est simpliciter circa omnia stupidus, ut patet in amentibus, qui non discernunt quid sit injuria; et hoc pertinet ad stultitiam simpliciter.
Article 2
[II-II.q.46.a.2.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises in us from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is not a sin.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod stultitia non sit peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum provenit in nobis a natura. Sed quidam sunt stulti naturaliter. Ergo stultitia non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it is not a sin.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « omne peccatum est voluntarium, » ut Augustinus dicit lib. De vera relig., cap. xiv, col. 133, t. 3. Sed stultitia non est voluntaria. Ergo non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly is not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne peccatum opponitur alicui præcepto divino. Sed stultitia nulli præcepto opponitur. Ergo stultitia non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.sc] On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 1:32): "The prosperity of fools shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin. Therefore folly is a sin.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov., I, 32: Prosperitas stultorum perdet eos*. Sed nullus perditur nisi pro peccato. Ergo stultitia est peccatum.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.co] I answer that, Folly, as stated above (Article 1), denotes dullness of sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is the last end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect contract dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural indisposition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to 1 Corinthians 2:14, "The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God," even as sweet things have no savor for a man whose taste is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod stultitia, sicut dictum est, importat quemdam stuporem sensus in judicando, et præcipue circa altissimam causam, quæ est finis ultimus, et summum bonum. Circa quod aliquis potest pati stuporem in judicando, dupliciter: uno modo ex indispositione naturali, sicut patet in amentibus; et talis stultitia non est peccatum; alio modo inquantum immergit homo sensum suum rebus terrenis, ex quo redditur ejus sensus ineptus ad percipien-dum divina, secundum illud I ad Cor., II, 14: Animalis homo non percipit ea quæ sunt spiritus Dei; sicut etiam homini habenti gustum infectum malo humore non sapiunt dulcia; et talis stultitia est peccatum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense from spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same thing happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does not desire sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis stultitiam nullus velit, vult tamen ea ad quæ consequitur esse stultum, scilicet abstrahere sensum suum a spiritalibus et immergere terrenis. Et idem etiam contingit in aliis peccatis: nam luxuriosus vult delectationem, sine qua non est peccatum, quamvis non simpliciter velit peccatum; vellet enim frui delectatione sine peccato.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. Folly is opposed to the precepts about the contemplation of truth, of which we have spoken above (Article 16) when we were treating of knowledge and understanding.
[II-II.q.46.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod stultitia opponitur præceptis quæ dantur de contemplatione veritatis; de quibus supra habitum est, cum de scientia et intellectu ageretur.
Article 3
[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among which however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from lust.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod stultitia non sit filia luxuriæ. Gregorius enim, XXXI Moral., cap. xlv, § 88, col. 621, t. 2, enumerat luxuriæ filias, inter quas tamen non continetur stultitia. Ergo stultitia non procedit ex luxuria.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 3:19): "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29) "the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with crafty devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter of duplicity rather than of lust.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Apostolus dicit I ad Cor., III, 19: Sapientia hujus mundi stultitia est apud Deum. Sed, sicut Gregorius dicit, X Moral., cap. xxix, § 48, col. 947, t. 4, hujus mundi sapientia est, cor machination-nibus tegere; » quod pertinet ad duplicitatem. Ergo stultitia est magis filia duplicitatis quam luxuriæ.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.3] Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from anger rather than from lust.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ex ira aliqui præcipue vertuntur in furorem et insaniam, quæ pertinent ad stultitiam. Ergo stultitia magis oritur ex ira quam ex luxuria.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.sc] It is written (Proverbs 7:22): "Immediately he followeth her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn like a fool to bonds."
[II-II.q.46.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Proverb., VII, 22: Statim eam sequitur, scilicet meretricem, ignorans quod ad vincula stultus tra-hatur.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.co] As already stated (2), folly, in so far as it is a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, stultitia, secundum quod est peccatum, provenit ex hoc quod sensus spiritualis hebetatus est, ut non sit aptus ad spiritualia dijudicanda. Maxime autem sen- sus hominis immergitur ad terrena per luxuriam, quæ est circa maximas delectationes, quibus anima maxime absorbetur; et ideo stultitia quæ est peccatum, maxime nascitur ex luxuria.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.1] It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust, pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life to come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad stultitiam pertinet quod homo habeat fastidium de Deo et de donis ipsius. Unde Gregorius duo numerat inter filias luxuriæ quæ pertinent ad stultitiam, scilicet «odium Dei, et desperationem futuri sæculi, » quasi dividens stultitiam in duas partes.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.2] These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum illud Apostoli non est intelligendum causaliter, sed essentialiter, quia scilicet ipsa sapientia mundi est stultitia apud Deum. Unde non oportet quod quæcumque pertinent ad sapientiam mundi, sint causa hujus stultitiae.
[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.3] Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above (I-II, 48, 2,3,4), produces a great change in the nature of the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ira, ut supra dictum est, sua acuitate maxime immutat corporis naturam; unde maxime causat stultitiam quæ provenit ex impedimento corporali. Sed stultitia quæ provenit ex impedimento spirituali, scilicet ex immersione mentis ad terrena, maxime provenit ex luxuria, ut dictum est.
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