Q47. Prudence, considered in itself

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Source context

Theme: prudence as the intellectual virtue directing right action through deliberation, judgment, and command
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

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not engaged in the GA corpus

Cross-tradition

Aristotelian phronesisAquinas's treatment of prudence (Q47) translates Aristotle's phronesis — practical wisdom as the architectonic virtue ordering all action toward the good — into a scholastic-theological framework, preserving the structural distinction between theoretical and practical intellect.
Vedantic viveka (discriminative discernment)Cross-tradition congruence exists between Aquinas's prudentia as right ordering of means to ends and the Vedantic faculty of viveka, both functioning as a higher discerning capacity that governs the orientation of will and desire toward their proper objects.

Article 1

[II-II.q.47.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): "Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prudentia non sit in vi cognoscitiva, sed in vi appetitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De moribus Ecclesiæ, c. xv, col. 1322, t. 1: «Prudentia est amor, ea quibus adjuvatur, ab eis quibus impeditur, sagaciter seligens. » Sed amor non est in vi cognoscitiva, sed in appetitiva. Ergo prudentia est in vi appetitiva.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.arg.2] Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the appetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, 13, 1). Therefore prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut ex prædicta definitione apparet, ad prudentiam pertinet eligere sagaciter. Sed electio est actus appetitivæ virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prudentia non est in vi cognoscitiva, sed in vi appetitiva.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the rational faculty.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., c. v, quod «in arte quidem volens peccans eligibilior est, circa prudentiam autem minus, quemadmodum et circa virtutes. » Sed virtutes morales de quibus ibi loquitur, sunt in parte appetitiva; ars autem in ratione. Ergo prudentia magis est in parte appetitiva quam in ratione.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.sc] Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."

[II-II.q.47.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. Lxi, § 4, col. 54, t. 6: «Prudentia est cognitio rerum appetendarum et fugiendarum. »

[II-II.q.47.a.1.co] As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut lsidorus dicit in lib. X Etym., § 202, col. 388, t. 3, «prudens dicitur, quasi porro videns; perspicax enim est, et incertorum prævidet casus. » Visio autem non est virtutis appetitivæ, sed cognoscitivæ. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia directe pertinet ad vim cognoscitivam, non autem ad vim sensitivam: quia per eam cognoscimus solum ea quæ præsto sunt, et quæ sensibus offeruntur. Cognoscere autem futura ex præsentibus vel præteritis, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, proprie rationis est, quia hoc per quamdam collationem agitur. Unde relinquitur quod prudentia proprie sit in ratione.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.ad.1] As stated above (I, 82, 4) the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above (I-II, 25, 1 and 2). Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in tending to God." Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas movet omnes potentias ad suos actus. Primus autem actus appetitivæ virtutis est amor, ut supra dictum est. Sic ergo prudentia dicitur esse amor, non quidem essentialiter, sed inquantum amor movet ad actum prudentiae. Unde et postea subdit Augustinus quod « prudentia est amor bene discernens ea quibus adjuvetur ad tendendum in Deum, ab iis quibus 1 impediri potest. » Dicitur autem amor discernere, inquantum movet rationem ad discernendum.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.ad.2] The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prudens considerat ea quæ sunt procul, inquantum ordinantur ad adjuvandum vel impedien-dum ea quæ sunt præsentialiter agenda. Unde patet quod ea quæ considerat prudentia, ordinantur ad alia sicut ad finem. Eorum autem quæ sunt ad finem, est consilium in ratione, et electio in appetitu; quorum duorum consilium magis proprie pertinet ad prudentiam; dicit enim Philosophus in VI Ethic., cap. v, quod « prudens est bene consiliativus. » Sed quia electio præsupponit consilium, est enim « appetitus præconsiliati, » ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. 11, circa fin., ideo etiam eligere potest attribui prudentiae consequenter, inquantum scilicet electionem per consilium dirigit.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.ad.3] The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is "something more than a merely rational habit," such as art is, since, as stated above (I-II, 57, 4) it includes application to action, which application is an act of the will.

[II-II.q.47.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod laus prudentiae non consistit in sola consideratione, sed in applicatione ad opus, quod est finis practicæ rationis. Et ideo si in hoc defectus accidat maxime est contrarium prudentiae: quia sicut finis est potissimus in unequoque, ita et defectus qui est circa finem est pessimus. Unde ibidem Philosophus subdit quod « prudentia non est solum cum ratione, sicut ars; » habet enim, ut dictum est, applicationem ad opus, quod fit per voluntatem.

Article 2

[II-II.q.47.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Proverbs 10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prudentia non solum pertineat ad rationem practicam, sed etiam ad speculativam. Dicitur enim Proverb., x, 23: Sapientia est viro prudentia. Sed sapientia principalius consistit in contemplatione. Ergo et prudentia.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.arg.2] Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason. Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Ambrosius dicit in I De officiis, cap. xxiv, § 415, col. 62, t. 3: « Prudentia in veri investigatione versatur, et scientiæ plenioris infundit cupiditatem. » Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem speculativam. Ergo prudentia consistit etiam in ratione speculativa.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence also is both practical and speculative.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in eadem parte animæ ponitur a Philosopho ars et prudentia, ut patet in VI Ethic., cap. 1, ad fin. Sed ars non solum inventur practica, sed etiam speculativa, ut patet in artibus liberalibus. Ergo etiam prudentia inventur et practica et speculativa.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., c. v, quod « prudentia est recta est. Ergo. Respondetur objicienti talia prudentiam non esse cognoscitivam solummodo singularium, sed et universalium, siquidem applicat ad singularia universalia principia rationis. Quod si intellectus non sit cognoscitivus singularium directe pro hoc statu conjunctionis ad corpus, quia species intelligibilis per quam directe cognoscit intellectus repræsentat directe naturas duntaxat universales, potest tamen indirecte et per quamdam reflexionem singularia cognoscere, quatenus, cognoscendo objectum suum quod est natura aliqua universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est sui actus principium, et ulterius in phantasma a quo species est abstracta, et sic aliquam cognitio-nem de singularibus accipit. ratio agibilium. » Sed hoc non pertinet nisi ad rationem practicam. Ergo prudentia non est nisi in ratione practica.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.co] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. v, in princ., « prudentis est bene posse consiliari. » Consilium autem est de his quæ sunt per nos agenda in ordine ad finem aliquem. Ratio autem eorum quæ sunt agenda propter finem, est ratio practica; unde manifestum est quod prudentia non consistit nisi in ratione practica.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.ad.1] As stated above (45, 1 and 3), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom absolutely.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, sapientia considerat causam altissimam simpliciter: unde consideratio causæ altissima in quolibet genere pertinet ad sapientiam in illo genere. In genere autem humanorum actuum causa altissima est finis communis toti vitæ humanæ; et hunc finem intendit prudentia; dicit enim Philosophus in VI Ethic., cap. v et 1x, quod sicut ille qui ratiocinatur bene ad aliquem finem particularem, puta ad victoriam, dicitur esse prudens, non simpliciter, sed in hoc genere, scilicet in rebus bellicis; ita ille qui bene ratiocinatur ad totum bene vivere, dicitur prudens simpliciter. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia est sapientia in rebus humanis: non autem sapientia simpliciter, quia non est circa causam altissimam simpliciter; est enim circa bonum humanum: homo 1 autem non est optimum eorum quæ sunt. Et ideo signanter dicitur, qnod « prudentia est sapientia viro, » non autem sapientia simpliciter.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.ad.2] Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Ambrosius et etiam Tullius, lib. II De invent., aliq. ante fin., nomen prudentiae largius sumunt pro qualibet cognitione humana tam speculativa, quam practica. Quamvis dici possit quod ipse actus speculativæ rationis, secundum quod est voluntarius, cadit sub elec-tione et consilio quantum ad suum exercitium, et per consequens cadit sub ordina-tione prudentiae; sed quantum ad suam speciem, prout comparatur ad objectum, quod est « verum necessarium, » non cadit sub consilio, nec sub prudentia.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.ad.3] Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnis applicatio rationis rectæ ad aliquid factibile pertinet ad artem; sed ad prudentiam non pertinet nisi applicatio rationis rectæ ad ea de quibus est consilium; et hujusmodi sunt in quibus non sunt viæ determinatæ perveniendi ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethicor., cap. 11. Quia ergo ratio speculativa quædam facit, puta syllogismum, propositionem et alia hujusmodi, in quibus proceditur secundum certas et determinatas vias, inde est quod respectu horum potest salvari ratio artis, non autem ratio prudentiae; et ideo invenitur aliqua speculativa ars, non autem aliqua prudentia.

Article 3

[II-II.q.47.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (1 and 2). But "reason deals with universals," according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prudentia non sit cognoscitiva singularium. Prudentia enim est in ratione, ut dictum est. Sed ratio est universalium, ut dictur in I Phys., text. 49. Ergo prudentia non est cognoscitiva nisi universalium.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.arg.2] Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is right reason, is not about singulars.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, singularia sunt infinita. Sed infinita non possunt comprehendi a ratione. Ergo prudentia quæ est ratio recta, non est singularium.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.arg.3] Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, particularia per sensum cognoscuntur. Sed prudentia non est in sensu; multi enim habentes sensus exteriores perspicaces non sunt prudentes. Ergo prudentia non est singularium.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars also."

[II-II.q.47.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. vii, circa fin., quod « prudentia non est universalium solum, sed oportet etiam singularia cognoscere. »

[II-II.q.47.a.3.co] As stated above (1, ad 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad prudentiam pertinet non solum consideratio rationis, sed etiam applicatio ad opus, quæ est finis practicæ rationis. Nullus autem potest convenienter alteri aliquid applicare, nisi utrumque cognoscat; scilicet et id quod applicandum est, et id cui applicandum est. Operationes autem sunt in singularibus; et ideo necesse est quod prudens et cognoscat universalia principia rationis, et cognoscat singularia, circa quæ sunt operationes.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.ad.1] Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as stated in De Anima iii.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio primo quidem et principaliter est universalium; potest tamen universales rationes ad particularia applicare; unde syllogismorum conclusiones non solum sunt universales, sed etiam particulares; quia intellectus per quamdam reflexionem se ad materiam extendit, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 10.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.ad.2] It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain" (Wisdom 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia infinitas singularium non potest ratione humana comprehendi, inde est quod sunt incertæ providentia nostræ, ut dicitur Sap., ix, 14. Tamen per experientiam singularia infinita reducuntur ad aliqua finita, quæ ut in pluribus accident; quorum cognitio sufficit ad prudentiam humanam.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.ad.3] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this sense.

[II-II.q.47.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in V1 Ethic., cap. viii, ad fin., prudentia non consistit in sensu exteriori, quo cognoscimus sensibilia propria, sed in sensu interiori, qui perficitur per memoriam, et per experimentum ad prompte judicandum de particularibus expertis; non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subjecto principali; sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quamdam autem applicationem pertingit ad hujusmodi sensum.

Article 4

[II-II.q.47.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prudentia non sit virtus. Dicit enim Augustinus in I De lib. arbitrio, cap. xiii, col. 1235, t. 4, quod « prudentia est appetendarum et vitandarum rerum scientia. » Sed scientia contra virtutem dividitur, ut patet in Prædicamentis, cap. « De qualit. » Ergo prudentia non est virtus.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.arg.2] Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Chronicles 2:14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtutis non est virtus. Sed artis est virtus, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. v, circa fin. Ergo ars non est virtus. Sed in arte est prudentia : dicitur enim II Paralip., ii, 14, de Hiram, quod sciebat cælare omnem sculpturam, et adinvenire prudenter quodcumque in opere necessarium est. Ergo prudentia non est virtus.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.arg.3] Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Proverbs 23:4): "Set bounds to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulla virtus potest esse immoderata. Sed prudentia est immoderata; alioquin frustra diceretur Prov., xxiii, 4: Prudentiae tuæ pone modum. Ergo prudentia non est virtus.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.sc] Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius in II Moral., cap. xlix, § 76, col. 592, t. 1, prudentia, temperantiam, fortitudinem et justitiam dicit esse quatuor virtutes.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.co] As stated above (I-II, 55, 3; I-II, 56, 1) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of good.

Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (1, ad 3; 3) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de virtutibus in communi ageretur, virtus est « quæ bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit. » Bonum autem dici potest dupliciter : uno modo materialiter pro eo quod est bonum, alio modo formaliter secundum rationem boni. Bonum autem, inquantum hujusmodi, est objectum appetitivæ virtutis. Et ideo si qui habitus sunt qui faciant rectam considerationem rationis, non habito respectu ad rectitudinem appetitus, minus habent de ratione virtutis, tanquam ordinantes ad bonum materialiter, id est, ad id quod est bonum, non sub ratione boni. Plus autem habent de ratione virtutis habitus illi qui respiciunt rectitudinem appetitus, quia respiciunt bonum non solum materialiter, sed etiam formaliter, id est, id quod est bonum sub ratione boni. Ad prudentia autem pertinet, sicut dictum est, applicatio rectæ rationis ad opus quod non fit sine appetitu recto. Et ideo prudentia non solum habet rationem virtutis quam habent aliæ virtutes intellectuales, sed etiam habet rationem virtutis quam habent virtutes morales, quibus etiam con numeratur.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.ad.1] Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any kind of right reason.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi large accipit scientiam pro qualibet recta ratione.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.ad.2] The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Philosophus dicit artis esse virtutem, quia non importat rectitudinem appetitus; et ideo ad hoc quod homo recte utatur arte, requiritur quod habeat virtutem, quæ faciat rectitudinem appetitus. Prudentia autem non habet locum in his quæ sunt artis : tum quia ars ordinatur ad aliquem particularem finem, tum quia ars habet determinata media per quæ pervenitur ad finem. Dicitur tamen aliquis prudenter operari in his quæ sunt artis, per similitudinem quamdam. In quibusdam autem artibus propter incertitudinem eorum quibus pervenitur ad finem, necessarium est consilium; sicut in medi- cinali et in navigatoria, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. iii vel vii.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.ad.3] This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other things according to prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud dictum Sapientis non est sic intelligendum, quod ipsa prudentia sit moderanda, sed quia secundum prudentiam est aliis modus imponendus.

Article 5

[II-II.q.47.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod prudentia non sit specialis virtus. Nulla enim specialis virtus ponitur in communi definitione virtutis: quia in II Ethic., cap. vi, definitur virtus « habitus electivus in medietate existens, determinata ratione quoad nos, prout sapiens determinabit. » Recta autem ratio intelligitur secundum prudentiam, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. v, a med., et cap. ult., circa med. Ergo prudentia non est specialis virtus.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of prudence, right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. xii, quod « virtus moralis recte facit operari finem, prudentia autem ea quae sunt ad finem. » Sed in qualibet virtute sunt aliqua operanda propter finem. Ergo prudentia est in qualibet virtute; non est ergo virtus specialis.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.arg.3] Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, specialis virtus habet speciale objectum. Sed prudentia non habet speciale objectum; est enim « recta ratio agibilium, » ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. v; agibilia autem sunt omnia opera virtutum. Ergo prudentia non est specialis virtus.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.sc] It is distinct from and numbered among the other virtues, for it is written (Wisdom 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude."

[II-II.q.47.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod condividitur et con numeratur aliis virtutibus; dicitur enim Sap., viii, 7: Sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, justitiam et virtutem.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.co] Since acts and habits take their species from their objects, as shown above (I-II, 01, 3; I-II, 18, 2; I-II, 54, 2), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above (I-II, 54, 2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated above (I-II, 54, 1). Consequently any difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will "a fortiori" require a difference of habits.

Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated above (Article 2), it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and "understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and "prudence" are about contingent things, art being concerned with "things made," that is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with "things done," that is, with things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above (I-II, 57, 4). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other virtues.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum actus et habitus recipiant speciem ex objectis, ut ex supra dictis patet, necesse est quod habitus cui respondet speciale objectum ab aliis distinctum, specialis sit habitus; et si est bonus, est specialis virtus. Speciale autem objectum dicitur, non solum secundum materialem considerationem ipsius, sed magis secundum rationem formalem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Nam una et eadem res cadit sub actu diversorum habituum, et etiam diversarum potentiarum, secundum rationes diversas. Major autem diversitas objecti requiritur ad diversitatem habitus, cum plures habitus inveniantur in una potentia, ut supra dictum est. Diversitas ergo rationis objecti, quae diversificat potentiam, multo magis diversificat habitum. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod cum prudentia sit in ratione, ut dictum est, diversificatur quidem ab aliis virtutibus intellectualibus secundum materialem diversitatem objectorum; nam « sapientia, scientia et intellectus » sunt circa necessaria; « ars » autem et « prudentia » circa contingentia; sed « ars » circa factibilia, quæ scilicet in exteriori materia constituuntur, sicut domus, cultellus et hujusmodi; « prudentia » autem est circa agibilia quæ scilicet in ipso operante consistunt, ut supra habitum est. Sed a virtutibus moralibus distinguitur prudentia secundum formalem rationem potentiarum distinctivam, scilicet « intellectivi, » in quo est prudentia, et « appetitivi, » in quo est virtus moralis. Unde manifestum est prudentiam esse specialem virtutem ab omnibus aliis virtutibus distinctam.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.ad.1] This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa definitio non datur de virtute in communi, sed de virtute morali, in cujus definitione convenienter ponitur virtus intellectualis, communicans in materia cum ipsa, scilicet prudentia; quia sicut virtutis moralis subjectum est aliquid participans rationem, ita virtus moralis habet rationem virtutis in quantum participat virtutem intellectualem.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.ad.2] This argument proves that prudence helps all the virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus from containing a species which is operative in every other species of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex illa ratione habetur quod prudentia adjuvet omnes virtutes, et in omnibus operetur; sed hoc non sufficit ad ostendendum quod non sit virtus specialis; quia nihil prohibet in aliquo genere esse aliquam speciem quæ aliqualiter operetur in omnibus specibus ejusdem generis, sicut sol aliqualiter influit in omnia corpora.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.ad.3] Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.

[II-II.q.47.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod agibilia sunt quidem materia prudentiae, secundum quod sunt objectum rationis, scilicet sub ratione veri; sunt autem materia moralium virtutum secundum quod sunt objectum virtutis appetitivæ, scilicet sub ratione boni.

Article 6

[II-II.q.47.a.6.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod prudentia præstituat finem virtutibus moralibus. Cum enim prudentia sit in ratione, virtus autem moralis in vi appetitiva, vide-tur quod hoc modo se habeat prudentia ad virtutem moralem, sicut ratio ad vim appetitivam. Sed ratio præstituit finem potentiæ appetitivæ. Ergo prudentia præstituit finem virtutibus moralibus.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above (Article 2). Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, homo excedit res irrationales secundum rationem; sed secundum alia cum eis communicat. Sic ergo se habent aliæ partes hominis ad rationem, sicut se habet homo ad creaturas irrationales. Sed homo est finis creaturarum irrationalium, ut dicitur in I Polit., cap. v, et lib. II Phys., text. 24. Ergo omnes aliæ partes hominis ordinantur ad rationem sicut ad finem. Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ut dictum est. Ergo omnia agibilia ordinantur ad prudentiam sicut ad finem. Ipsa ergo præstituit finem omnibus virtutibus moralibus.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, proprium est virtutis, vel artis, seu potentiæ, ad quam pertinet finis, ut præcipiat aliis virtutibus, seu artibus, ad quas pertinent ea quæ sunt ad finem. Sed prudentia disponit de aliis virtutibus moralibus, et præcipit eis. Ergo præstituit eis finem.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.sc] On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. xii, circa med., quod « virtus moralis intentionem finis facit rectam; prudentia autem quæ ad hanc. » Ergo ad prudentiam non pertinet præstituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed solum disponere de his quæ sunt ad finem.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.co] I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason.

Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is "science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (23, 07, ad 2; I-II, 13, 3); while certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod finis virtutum moralium est bonum humanum. Bonum autem humanæ animæ est « secundum rationem esse, » ut patet per Dionysium, iv cap. De div. nom., § 32, col. 734, t. 4. Ita cum mss. edit. omnes; theologi legendum putant: « Sic ergo se habet ratio ad alias partes hominis, sicut se habet homo, » etc. Minus expresse, vel potius sub contradictoria; Unde necesse est quod fines moralium virtutum præx existant in ratione. Sicut autem in ratione speculativa sunt quædam ut naturaliter nota, quorum est intellectus, et quædam quæ per illa innotescunt, scilicet conclusions, quarum est scientia; ita in ratione practica præx existunt quædam ut principia naturaliter nota; et hujusmodi sunt fines virtutum moralium, quia finis se habet in operabilibus, sicut principium in speculativis, ut supra habitum est; et quædam sunt in ratione practica, ut conclusions; et hujusmodi sunt ea quæ sunt ad finem, in quæ pervenimus ex ipsis finibus: et horum est prudentia, aplicans universalia principia ad particulares conclusions operabilium. Et ideo ad prudentiam non pertinet præstituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed solum disponere de his quæ sunt ad finem.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis" appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above (I, 79, 12): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutibus moralibus præstituit finem ratio naturalis, quæ dicitur synderesis, ut in I habitum est; non autem prudentia, ratione jam dicta. Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason. On this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet "synderesis" moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science.

[II-II.q.47.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod finis non pertinet ad virtutes morales, tanquam ipsæ præstituant finem, sed quia tendunt in finem a ratione naturali præstitutum; ad quod juvantur per prudentiam quæ eis viam parat, disponendo ea quæ sunt ad finem. Unde relinquitur quod prudentia sit nobilior virtutibus moralibus, et moveat eas; sed synderesis movet prudentiam, sicut intellectus principiorum scientiam.

Article 7

[II-II.q.47.a.7.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as shown above (Article 6). Therefore it does not find the mean in them.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ad prudentiam non pertineat invenire medium in virtutibus moralibus. Consequi enim medium est finis moralium virtutum. dicit enim: « animo malum est quod a ratione deflexerit. » Unde concludi potest quod bonum animi est secundum rationem esse. Sed prudentia non præstituit finem moralibus virtutibus, ut ostensum est. Ergo non inventit in eis medium.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above (5, Objection 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral virtues.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod est per se, non videtur causam habere, sed ipsum esse est suiipsius causa; quia unumquodque dicitur esse per causam suam. Sed existere in medio convenit virtuti morali, per se, quasi positum in ejus definitione, ut ex dictis patet. Non ergo prudentia causat medium in virtutibus moralibus.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to moral virtues.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prudentia operatur secundum motum rationis. Sed virtus moralis tendit ad medium per modum naturæ: quia ut Tullius dicit in II Rhetor., aliquant. ante fin., « virtus est habitus per modum naturæ rationi consentaneus. » Ergo prudentia non præstituit medium virtutibus moralibus.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.sc] On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (5, Objection 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . . even as a wise man decides."

[II-II.q.47.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod in definitione virtutis moralis supra posita, dicitur quod « est in medietate existens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit. »

[II-II.q.47.a.7.co] I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act according to reason.

But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the end.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc ipsum quod est conformari rationi rectæ, est finis proprius cujuslibet virtutis moralis. Temperantia enim hoc intendit, ne propter concupiscentias homo divertat a ratione, et similiter fortitudo, ne a recto judicio rationis divertat propter timorem vel audaciam; et hic finis præstitutus est homini secundum naturalem rationem; naturalis enim ratio dictat unicuique ut secundum rationem operetur. Sed qualiter et per quæ homo in operando attingat medium rationis, pertinet ad dispositionem prudentiae. Licet enim attingere medium sit finis virtutis moralis, tamen per rectam dispositionem eorum quæ sunt ad finem, medium inventur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut agens naturale facit ut forma sit in materia, non tamen facit ut formæ conveniant ea quæ per se ei insunt; ita etiam prudentia medium constituit in passionibus et operationibus; non tamen facit quod medium quærere conveniat virtuti.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.

[II-II.q.47.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtus moralis per modum naturæ intendit pervenire ad medium. Sed quia medium non eodem modo inventur in omnibus; ideo inclinatio naturæ, quæ semper eodem modo operatur, ad hoc non sufficit, sed requiritur ratio prudentiae.

Article 8

[II-II.q.47.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod præcipere non sit principalis actus In Parm.: « modum. » — In Parm.: « consistens. » — Cod.; in Parm.: « rationem. » — Ita mss. et edit. passim; Nicolaï: « peracta dispositione eorum, » etc. — Sic cod.; Parm. addit: « secundum quod medium. » Virtutes morales quæ sunt in appetitu sufficienter quidem inclinant hominem ad sua objecta ut sic, nimirum justitia ad reddendum cuique jus suum, fortitudo ad fortiter agendum in periculis, temperantia ad temperate vivendum; sed quia non est veræ virtutis opus nisi servet medium rationis, hoc est, nisi vestiatur omnibus debitis circum-stantiis, puta nisi flat quando, ubi, quomodo, quantum, etc., fieri debet, necesse est aliam esse virtutem in intellectu quæ suo lumine virtutes præfatas dirigat in attingendo medium rationis, indicando scilicet media congrua, et circumstantias debitas cum quibus debeat fieri opus virtutis. Et ea virtus est prudentia. Si quæratur sub qua ratione suum attingat objectum, an sub ratione veri; vel sub ratione boni? — Utrumque adstruere videtur S. Thomas, primum a. v, ad 3, secundum a. iv. Fieri autem non potest ut eadem virtus respiciat suum objectum sub diversa ratione formali. — Unde dicendum est prudentiam primo et essentialiter respicere suum objectum sub ratione veri practici, et consequenter ac secundario sub ratione boni in quo nulla est implicantia. Aliud est verum speculativum, aliud verum practicum. Speculativum attenditur per conformitatem intellectus ad rem, practicum per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Intellectus concipit et enuntiat rem sicuti est: hoc est verum speculativum; concipit et enuntiat id quod est appetitui recto conforme: hoc est verum practicum. Prudentia primo attingit suum objectum sub ratione veri practici, quia objectum ejus est agibile et conforme appetitui recto, adeoque practice verum; et sub hac ratione est virtus intellectualis cui non subest falsum. Sed prudentia non cognoscit istud objectum ut in ejus cognitione sistat, bene autem ut illud quod est bonum per alias virtutes morales operetur, et ideo secundario respicit suum objectum sub ratione boni, sicque ratione materiae et finis est virtus moralis directiva morum, non elicitiva ut aliæ virtutes, justitia, fortitudo et temperantia. prudentiæ. Præcipere enim pertinet ad bona quæ sunt fienda. Sed Augustinus, XIV De Trin., c. ix, col. 1046, t. 8, ponit actum prudentiæ « præcavere insidias. » Ergo præcipere non est principalis actus prudentiæ.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above (I-II, 57, 6). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. v, in princ., quod « prudentis est bene consiliari. » Sed alius actus videtur esse consiliari et præcipere, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo prudentiæ principalis actus non est præcipere.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.arg.3] Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præcipere vel imperare videtur pertinere ad voluntatem; cujus objectum est finis, et quæ movet alias potentias animæ. Sed prudentia non est in voluntate, sed in ratione. Ergo prudentiæ actus non est præcipere.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence commands."

[II-II.q.47.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. x, quod « prudentia præceptiva est. »

[II-II.q.47.a.8.co] Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above (Article 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (I-II, 14, 1). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.

In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prudentia est « recta ratio agibilium, » ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod ille sit præcipuus actus prudentiæ, qui est præcipuus actus rationis agibilium; cujus quidem sunt tres actus. Quorum primus est consiliari, quod pertinet ad inventionem; nam consiliari est quærere, ut supra habitum est. Secundus actus est « judicare de inventis; » et hic stat speculativa ratio. Sed practica ratio, quæ ordinatur ad opus, procedit ulterius; et est tertius actus ejus « præcipere; » qui quidem actus consistit in applicatione consiliatorum et judicatorum ad operandum. Et quia iste actus est propinquior fini rationis practicæ, inde est quod iste est principalis actus rationis practicæ et per consequens prudentiæ. Et hujus signum est quod perfectio artis consistit in judicando, non autem in præcipiendo. Ideo reputatur melior artifex qui volens peccat in arte, quasi habens rectum judicium, quam qui peccat nolens, quod videtur esse ex defectu judicii. Sed in prudentia est e converso, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., Sic cod; non ut in Parm. : « et hoc facit. » « Sollicitus, quia solers, et citus, atque irrequietus. » Migne. Ita mss. et editi passim, cum Vulgata; al. omittitur: quas nudiustertius perdidisti. Videtur quod principalis actus prudentiæ non sit imperium. Nam virtus quæ est circa finem imperat illi quæ est circa media. Porro aliæ virtutes sunt circa finem, et prudentia circa media. Ergo aliæ virtutes imperant prudentiæ, non prudentia aliis virtutibus. — Sed finis virtutum mora-cap. v, circa fin.; imprudentior enim est qui volens peccat quasi deficiens in principali actu prudentiæ, qui est præcipere, quam qui peccat nolens.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.ad.1] The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence that does not continue in heaven.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actus præcipiendi se extendit et ad bona prose-quenda et ad mala cavenda; et tamen « præcavere insidias » non attribuit Augustinus prudentiæ quasi principalem actum ipsius, sed quia iste actus prudentiæ non manet in patria.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.ad.2] Good counsel is required in order that the good things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to prudence which takes good counsel.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonitas consiliii requiritur ut ea quæ sunt bene inventa applicentur ad opus; et ideo præcipere pertinet ad prudentiam, quæ est bene consiliativa.

[II-II.q.47.a.8.ad.3] Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the reason, as stated above (I-II, 17, 1).

[II-II.q.47.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod movere absolute pertinet ad voluntatem; sed præcipere importat motionem cum quadam ordinatione; et ideo est actus rationis, ut supra dictum est.

Article 9

[II-II.q.47.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion belongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sollicitudo non pertineat ad prudentiam. Sollicitudo enim inquietudinem quamdam importat; dicit enim Isidorus in lib. X Etym., § 244, col. 393, t. 3, quod « sollicitus dicitur qui est inquietus. » Sed motio maxime pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Ergo et sollicitudo. Sed prudentia non est in vi appetitiva, sed in ratione, ut supra habitum est. Ergo sollicitudo non pertinet ad prudentiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.arg.2] Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude, wherefore it is related (1 Samuel 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: "As for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, because they are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sollicitudini videtur opponi certitudo veritatis; unde dicitur I Reg., ix, 20, quod Samuel dixit ad Saul: De asinis, quas nudiustertius perdidisti, ne sollici- lium potest considerari dupliciter, in communi et in particulari: in communi ut est temperate vi-vendum, juste agendum, fortiter patiendum; in particulari et in certo casu, ut quantum, quomodo, loco et tempore sit agendum ad attingendum particularem finem virtutis moralis quod est medium rationis, et sic prudentia versatur circa media et finem. Dictat enim non solum media quibus attingatur hic finis, sed etiam dictat et jubet ut per illa in eum tendatur. tus sis, quia inventæ sunt. Sed certitudo veritatis pertinet ad prudentiam cum sit virtus intellectualis. Ergo sollicitudo opponitur prudentiae magis quam ad eam pertineat.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous man is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to solicitude. Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not opposed to good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. III, vers. fin., quod « ad magnanimum pertinet pigrum esse et otiosum. » Pigritiae autem opponitur sollicitudo. Cum ergo prudentia non opponatur magnanimitati, quia « bonum non est bono contra-rium, » ut dicitur in Prædicamentis, cap. « De oppositis, » videtur quod sollicitudo non pertineat ad prudentiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.sc] It is written (1 Peter 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and watch in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Petri, IV, 7: Estote prudentes, et vigilate in orationibus. Sed vigilantia est idem sollicitudini. Ergo sollicitudo pertinet ad prudentiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.co] According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel." Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil counsel."

[II-II.q.47.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Isidorus in lib. X Etym., ut supra, « sollicitus dicitur, quasi solers citus, » inquantum scilicet aliquis ex quadam solertia animi velox est ad prosequendum ea quæ sunt agenda. Hoc autem pertinet ad prudentiam, cujus præcipuus actus est circa agenda præcipere de præconsiliatis et judicatis. Unde Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. IX, circa princ., quod « oportet operari quidem velociter consiliata, consiliare autem tarde. » Et inde est quod sollicitudo proprie ad prudentiam pertinet; et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, lib. De moribus Eccl., cap. XXIV, § 45, col. 1330, t. 1, quod « prudentiae sunt excubiæ, atque diligentissima vigilantia, ne subrepente paulatim mala suasione fallamur. »

[II-II.q.47.a.9.ad.1] Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod motus quidem pertinet ad vim appetitivam sicut ad principium movens; tamen secundum præceptum et directionem rationis, in quo consistit ratio sollicitudinis.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.ad.2] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is the contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum, in I Ethic., cap. III, circa princ., et cap. VII, circa fin., « certitudo non est similiter quærenda in omnibus, sed in unaquaque materia secundum proprium modum. » Quia vero materia prudentiae sunt singularia contingentia, circa quæ sunt operationes humanæ, non potest certitudo prudentiae tanta esse, quod omnino sollicitudo tollatur.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.ad.3] The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely" not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since fear makes us take counsel, as stated above (I-II, 44, 2) when we were treating of the passion of fear.

[II-II.q.47.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod magnanimus dicitur esse piger et otiosus, non quia de nullo sit sollicitus, sed quia non est superflue sollicitus de multis, sed confidit in his de quibus confidendum est, et circa illa non superflue sollicitatur; superfluitas enim timoris et diffidentiæ facit superfluitatem sollicitudinis, quia timor facit consiliari nos, ut supra dictum est, cum de passione timoris ageretur.

Article 10

[II-II.q.47.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that prudence does not extend to the governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not directed to the common good.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod prudentia non se extendat ad regimen multitudinis, sed solum ad regimen sui-ipsius. Dicit enim Philosophus, in V Ethic., c. I, ad fin., quod « virtus relata ad bonum commune est justitia. » Sed prudentia differt a justitia. Ergo prudentia non refertur ad bonum commune.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.arg.2] Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own. Therefore they are not prudent.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ille videtur esse prudens qui sibiipsi bonum quærit et operatur. Sed frequenter illi qui quærunt bona communia negligunt sua. Ergo non sunt prudentes.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.arg.3] Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only to a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prudentia dividitur contra temperantiam et fortitudinem. Sed temperantia et fortitudo videntur dici solum per comparisonem ad bonum proprium. Ergo etiam prudentia.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.sc] Our Lord said (Matthew 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?"

[II-II.q.47.a.10.sc] Sed contra est-quod Dominus dicit Matth., XXIV, 45: Quis putas est fidelis servus et prudens quem constituit dominus super familiam suam?

[II-II.q.47.a.10.co] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Corinthians 13:5): wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Corinthians 10:33): "Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved." Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of the individual.

Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., cap. VII, quidam posuerunt quod prudentia non se extendit ad bonum commune, sed solum ad bonum proprium; et hoc ideo quia existimabant quod non oportet hominem quærere nisi bonum proprium. Sed hæc existimatio repugnat charitati, quæ non quærit quæ sua sunt, ut dicitur I ad Cor., XIII, 5. Unde et Apostolus de seipso dicit I ad Cor., X, 33: Non quærens quod mihi utile sit*, sed quod multis, ut salvi fiant. Repugnat etiam rationi rectæ, quæ hoc judicat quod bonum commune sit melius quam bonum unius. Quia ergo ad prudentiam pertinet recte consiliari, judicare et præcipere de his per quæ pervenitur ad debitum finem, manifestum est quod prudentia non solum se habet ad bonum privatum unius hominis, sed etiam ad bonum commune multitudinis.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.ad.1] The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral virtue.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de virtute morali. Sicut autem omnis virtus moralis relata ad bonum commune dicitur legalis justitia, ita prudentia relata ad bonum commune vocatur prudentia politica; ut sic se habeat politica ad justitiam legalem, sicut se habet prudentia simpliciter dicta ad virtutem moralem.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.ad.2] He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6 of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire." Secondly, because, since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive."

[II-II.q.47.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ille qui quærit bonum commune multitudinis, ex consequenti etiam quærit bonum suum, propter duo: primo quidem quia bonum proprium non potest esse sine bono communi vel familiæ, vel civitatis, aut regni. Unde et Valerius Maximus, lib. IV, cap. iv, § 9, dicit de antiquis Romanis quod « male-bant esse pauperes in divite imperio, quam divites in paupere imperio. » Secundo, quia cum homo sit pars domus vel civitatis, oportet quod consideret quid sit sibi bonum ex hoc quod est prudens circa bonum multitudinis. Bona enim dispositio partium accipitur secundum habitudinem ad totum; quia, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. III Conf., c. viii, col. 689, t. 4, « turpis omnis pars est suo universo non congruens. »

[II-II.q.47.a.10.ad.3] Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.

[II-II.q.47.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam temperantia et fortitudo possunt referri ad bonum commune; unde de actibus earum dantur præcepta legis, ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. i, a med. Magis tamen prudentia et justitia, quæ pertinent ad partem rationalem, ad quam directe pertinent communia, sicut ad partem sensitivam pertinent singularia.

Article 11

[II-II.q.47.a.11.arg.1] It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."

[II-II.q.47.a.11.arg.1] Ad undecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prudentia quæ est respectu boni proprii, sit eadem specie cum ea quæ se extendit ad bonum commune. Dicit enim Philosophus in VI Ethic., cap. viii, in princ., quod « politica, et prudentia idem habitus est; esse autem non idem ipsis. »

[II-II.q.47.a.11.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and political prudence are the same habit.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in III Polit., cap. iii, quod « eadem est virtus viri boni, et boni principis. » Sed politica maxime est in principe, in quo est sicut architectorica. Cum ergo prudentia sit virtus boni viri, videtur quod sit idem habitus prudentia et politica.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.arg.3] Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ea quorum unum ordinatur ad aliud, non diversificant speciem aut substantiam habitus. Sed bonum proprium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam simpliciter dictam, ordinatur ad bonum commune, quod pertinet ad politicam. Ergo politica et prudentia neque differunt specie, neque secundum habitus substantiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.sc] "Political prudence," which is directed to the common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.sc] Sed contra est quod diversæ scientiæ sunt « politica, » quæ ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis, et « œconomica, » quæ de his est quæ pertinent ad bonum commune domus vel familiæ; et « monastica, » quæ est de his quæ pertinent ad bonum unius personæ. Ergo pari ratione et prudentiae sunt species diversæ, secundum hanc diversitatem materiæ.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.co] As stated above (5; 54, 2, ad 1), the species of habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above (I-II, Prolog.; I-II, 102, 1), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is "prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good; another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, species habituum diversificantur secundum diversitatem objecti, quæ attenditur penes rationem formalem ipsius. Ratio autem formalis omnium quæ sunt ad finem attenditur ex parte finis, sicut ex supra dictis patet; et ideo necesse est quod ex relatione ad diversos fines diversificentur species habitus. Diversi autem fines sunt bonum proprium unius, et bonum familiæ, et bonum civitatis et regni. Unde necesse est quod prudentiae different specie secundum differentiam horum finium: ut scilicet una sit « prudentia » simpliciter dicta, quæ ordinatur ad bonum proprium; alia autem « œconomica » quæ ordinatur ad bonum commune domus, vel familiæ; et tertia « politica, » quæ ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis, vel regni.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.ad.1] The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called "political," as being directed to the common good.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus non intendit dicere quod politica sit idem secundum substantiam habitus cuilibet prudentiae, sed prudentiae quæ ordinatur ad bonum commune; quæ quidem « prudentia » dicitur secundum communem ratio- Sic cod.; in Parm: « nam sic se habet. » Sic cod.; in Parm: « architectonica. » nem prudentiae, prout scilicet est quædam « ratio recta agibilium : » dicitur autem « politica » secundum ordinem ad bonum commune.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.ad.2] As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well," wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).

[II-II.q.47.a.11.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut Philosophus ibid. dicit, « ad bonum virum pertinet posse bene principari, et bene subjici ; » et ideo in virtute boni viri includitur etiam virtus boni principis. Sed virtus principis et subditi differt specie, sicut etiam virtus viri et mulieris, ut ibidem dicitur.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.ad.3] Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another. On like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.

[II-II.q.47.a.11.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam diversi fines quorum unus ordinatur ad alium, diversificant speciem habitus; sicut equestris, et militaris, et civilis differunt specie, licet finis unius ordinetur ad finem alterius ; et similiter licet bonum unius ordinetur ad bonum multitudinis, tamen hoc non impedit quin talis diversitas faciat habitus differre specie ; sed ex hoc sequitur quod habitus qui ordinatur ad finem ultimum, sit principi alior et imperet aliis habitibus.

Article 12

[II-II.q.47.a.12.arg.1] It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a true opinion."

[II-II.q.47.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prudentia non sit in subditis, sed solum in principibus. Dicit enim Philosophus in III Polit., cap. III, quod « prudentia sola est propria virtus principis, aliæ autem virtutes sunt communes subditorum et princip pum; subditi autem non est virtus prudentia, sed opinio vera. » 2. Præterea, in I Polit., cap. ult., a med., dicitur quod « servus omnino non habet quid consiliativum. » Sed prudentia facit bene consiliativos, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. v. Ergo prudentia non competit servis seu subditis. 3. Præterea, prudentia est præceptiva, ut supra dictum est. Sed præcipere non pertinet ad servos vel subditos, sed solum ad principes. Ergo prudentia non est in subditis, sed solum in principibus.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.arg.2] Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.arg.3] Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (Article 8). But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs to rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in subjects.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. VIII, circa princ., quod prudentiae politicæ sunt duæ species: una quæ est legum positiva, quæ pertinet ad principales; alia quæ retinet commune nomen politicæ, quæ est circa singularia. Hujusmodi autem singularia peragere, pertinet etiam ad subditos. Ergo prudentia non est solum principum, sed etiam subditorum.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.co] Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject.

Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."

[II-II.q.47.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prudentia in ratione est. Regere autem et gubernare proprie rationis est; et ideo unusquisque inquantum participat de regimine et gubernatione, intantum convenit ei habere rationem et prudentiam. Manifestum est autem quod subditi, inquantum est subditus, et servi, inquantum est servus, non est regere et gubernare, sed magis regi et gubernari; et ideo prudentia non est virtus servi, inquantum est servus, nec subditi, inquantum est subditus. Sed quia quilibet homo, inquantum est rationalis, participat aliquid de regimine secundum arbitrium rationis, intantum convenit ei prudentiam habere. Unde manifestum est quod « prudentia quidem in principe est ad modum artis architectonicæ, » ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. VIII, circa princ.; « in subditis autem ad modum artis manu operantis. »

[II-II.q.47.a.12.ad.1] The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Philosophi est intelligendum, per se loquendo : quia scilicet prudentia non est virtus subditi, inquantum hujusmodi.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.ad.2] A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod servus non habet consiliativum, inquantum est servus, sic enim est instrumentum domini; est tamen consiliativus, inquantum est animal rationale.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.ad.3] By prudence a man commands not only others, but also himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.

[II-II.q.47.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod per prudentia homo non solum præcipit aliis, sed etiam sibiipsi, prout scilicet ratio dicitur præcipere inferioribus viribus.

Article 13

[II-II.q.47.a.13.arg.1] It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For our Lord said (Luke 16:8): "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." Now the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in sinners.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.arg.2] Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fides est nobilior virtus quam prudentia. Sed fides potest esse in peccatoribus. Ergo et prudentia.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.arg.3] Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of good counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « prudentis hoc opus maxime dicimus, bene consiliari, » ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. v, circa princ., et cap. vii, a med. Sed multi peccatores sunt boni consilii. Ergo multi peccatores habent prudentiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.sc] The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no inner is a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. xii, in fine: « Impossibile est prudentem esse non existentem bonum. » Sed nullus peccator est bonus. Ergo nullus peccator est prudens.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.co] Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says (Romans 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh.

The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command.

The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prudentia dicitur tripliciter: est enim quædam prudentia falsa, vel per similitudinem dicta. Cum enim prudens sit qui bene disponit ea quæ sunt agenda propter aliquem bonum finem, ille qui propter malum finem aliqua disponit congruentia illi fini, habet falsam prudentiam, inquantum illud quod accipit pro fine, non est vere bonum, sed secundum similitudinem; sicut dicitur aliquis « bonus latro; » hoc enim modo potest secundum similitudinem dici « prudens latro, » qui convenientes vias adinvenit ad latrocinandum. Et hujusmodi est prudentia de qua Apostolus dicit ad Rom., viii, 6: Prudentia carnis mors est, quæ scilicet finem ultimum constituit in delectatione carnis. Secunda autem prudentia est quidem vera, quia adinvenit vias accommodatas ad finem vere bonum, sed est imperfecta, duplici ratione: uno modo quia illud bonum quod accipit pro fine, non est communis finis totius humanæ vitæ, sed alicujus specialis negotii: puta cum aliquis adinvenit vias accommodatas ad negotiandum vel ad navigandum, dicitur prudens negotiator vel nauta; alio modo, quia deficit in principali actu prudentiae, puta cum aliquis recte consiliatur, et bene judicat etiam de his quæ pertinent ad totam vitam, sed non efficaciter præcipit. Tertia autem prudentia est et vera, et perfecta, quæ ad bonum finem totius vitæ recte consiliatur, judicat et præcipit; et hæc sola dicitur prudentia simpliciter; quæ in peccatoribus esse non potest; prima autem prudentia est in solis peccatoribus; prudentia autem imperfecta est communis bonis et malis, maxime illa quæ est imperfecta propter finem particularem: nam illa quæ est imperfecta propter defectum principalis actus, etiam non est nisi in malis.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.ad.1] This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation."

[II-II.q.47.a.13.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud verbum Domini intelligitur de prima prudentia; unde non dicitur simpliciter, quod sint prudentes, sed « in generatione sua. »

[II-II.q.47.a.13.ad.2] The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there is no prudence, as shown above (I-II, 58, 5); secondly because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fides in sui ratione non importat aliquam conformitatem ad appetitum rectorum operum, sed ratio fidei consistit in sola cognitione. Sed prudentia importat ordinem ad appetitum rectum; tum quia principia prudentiae sunt fines operabilium, de quibus aliquis habet rectam existimationem per habitus virtutum moralium, quæ faciunt appetitum rectum; unde prudentia non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, ut supra ostensum est; tum etiam quia prudentia est præceptiva rectorum operum; quod non contingit, nisi existente appetitu recto. Unde licet fides sit nobilior quam prudentia, propter objectum, tamen prudentia secundum sui rationem magis repugnat peccato, quod procedit ex perversitate appetitus.

[II-II.q.47.a.13.ad.3] Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is "cleverness," [deinotike] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [panourgia] which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be "false prudence" or "prudence of the flesh."

[II-II.q.47.a.13.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatores possunt quidem esse bene consiliativi ad aliquem finem malum, vel ad aliquod particulare bonum; ad finem autem bonum totius vitæ non sunt bene consiliativi perfecte, quia consilium ad effectum non perducunt. Unde non est in eis prudentia, quæ se habet solum ad bonum; sed sicut Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., cap. xii, circa fin., est in talibus « dinotica, » id est, naturalis industria, quæ se habet ad bonum et malum; vel astutia, quæ se habet solum ad malum, quam supra diximus « falsam prudentia, » vel « prudentia carnis. »

Article 14

[II-II.q.47.a.14.arg.1] It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace. Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all who have grace have prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.arg.2] Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated above (8, Objection 2; 13, Objection 3). Yet many have grace who do not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence

[II-II.q.47.a.14.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prudens dicitur qui est bene consiliativus, ut dictum est. Sed multi habent gratiam qui non sunt bene consiliativi, sed necesse habent regi consilio alieno. Ergo non omnes habentes gratiam habent prudentiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in III Topic., cap. 11, quod « juvenes constat non esse prudentes. » Sed multi juvenes habent gratiam. Ergo prudentia non invenitur in omnibus gratiam habentibus.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.sc] No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace have prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.sc] Sed contra est quod nullus habet gratiam, nisi sit virtuosus. Sed nullus potest esse virtuosus, nisi habeat prudentiam; dicit enim Gregorius in II Moral., cap. xlvvi, col. 588, t. 4, quod « cæteræ virtutes, nisi ea quæ appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt. » Ergo omnes habentes gratiam habent prudentiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.co] The virtues must needs be connected together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). Now whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (Article 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est virtutes esse connexas, ita ut qui unam habet, omnes habeat, sicut supra ostensum est. Quicumque autem habet gratiam, habet charitatem; unde necesse est quod habeat omnes alias virtutes; et ita, cum prudentia sit virtus, ut ostensum est, necesse est quod habeat prudentiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.ad.1] Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things" (1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is not in all who have grace.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod duplex est industria: una quidem quæ est sufficiens ad ea quæ sunt de necessitate salutis, et talis industria datur omnibus habentibus gratiam, quos unctio docet de omnibus, ut dicitur I Joan., 11. Est autem alia industria plenior, per quam aliquis sibi et aliis potest providere, non solum de his quæ sunt necessaria ad salutem, sed etiam de quibus-cumque pertinentibus ad humanam vitam, et talis industria non est in omnibus habentibus gratiam.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.ad.2] Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern good from evil counsel.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illi qui in-III. digent regi consilio alieno, saltem in hoc sibi ipsis consulere sciunt, si gratiam habent, ut aliorum requirant consilia, et discernant consilia bona a malis.

[II-II.q.47.a.14.ad.3] Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic. ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion. Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Hebrews 5:14) that "strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil."

[II-II.q.47.a.14.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod prudentia acquisita causatur ex exercitio actuum; unde indiget ad sui generationem experimento et tempore, ut dicitur in II Ethic., in princ., et lib. VI, cap. viii, a med., unde non potest esse in juvenibus nec secundum habitum, nec secundum actum. Sed prudentia gratuita causatur ex infusione divina; unde in pueris baptizatis nondum habentibus usum rationis est prudentia secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, sicut et in amentibus; in his autem qui jam habent usum rationis, est etiam secundum actum, quantum ad ea quæ sunt de necessitate salutis; sed per exercitium meretur augmentum quousque perficiatur, sicut et cæteræ virtutes. Unde et Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., v, 14, quod perfectorum est solidus cibus, eorum qui pro consuetudine exercitatos habent sensus ad discretionem boni ac mali.

Article 15

[II-II.q.47.a.15.arg.1] It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [synesis and gnome, Cf. I-II, 57, 6 and the like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.arg.2] Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is natural.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ætatum variatio est secundum naturam. Sed prudentia consequitur ætates, secundum illud Job, xii, 12: In antiquis est sapientia, et in multo tempore prudentia. Ergo prudentia est naturalis.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.arg.3] Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prudentia magis convenit naturæ humanæ quam naturæ brutorum animalium. Sed bruta animalia habent quasdam naturales prudentias, ut patet per Philosophum, in VIII De histor. animal., cap. i, et lib. IX, cap. v et vi. Ergo prudentia est naturalis.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. 1, quod « virtus intellectualis ut plurimum ex doctrina habet et generationem et augmentum; ideo experimento indiget, et tempore. » Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prudentia non inest nobis a natura, sed ex doctrina et experimento.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.co] As shown above (Article 3), prudence includes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative science, because the primary universal principles of either are known naturally, as shown above (Article 6): except that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the speculative reason is better than that which is according to man": whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching.

On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above (I-II, 51, 1; I-II, 63, 1) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.

But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated above (6; I-II, 57, 5), it follows that prudence is not from nature.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut ex præmissis patet, prudentia includit cognitionem et universalium, et singularium operabilium, ad quæ prudens universalia principia applicat. Quantum ergo ad universalem cognitionem, eadem ratio est de prudentia et scientia speculativa: quia utriusque prima principia universalia sunt naturaliter nota, ut ex supra dictis patet, nisi quod principia communia prudentiae sunt magis connaturalia homini. Ut enim Philosophus dicit in X Ethic., cap. vii et viii, « vita quæ est secundum speculationem, est melior quam quæ est secundum hominem. » Sed alia principia universalia posteriora, sive sint rationes speculativæ, sive practicæ, non habentur per naturam, sed per inventionem secundum viam experimenti vel per disciplinam. Quantum autem ad particularem cognitionem eorum circa quæ operatio consistit, est iterum distinguendum: quia operatio consistit circa aliquid vel sicut circa finem, vel sicut circa ea quæ sunt ad finem. Fines autem recti humanæ vitæ sunt determinati; et ideo potest esse naturalis inclinatio respectu horum finium; sicut supra dictum est, quod quidam habent ex naturali dispositione quasdam virtutes, quibus inclinantur ad rectos fines; et per consequens etiam habent naturaliter rectum judicium de hujusmodi finibus. Sed ea quæ sunt ad finem in rebus humanis non sunt determinata, sed multipliciter diversificantur secundum diversitatem personarum et negotiorum. Unde quia inclinatio naturæ semper est ad aliquid determinatum, talis cognitio non potest homini inesse naturaliter; licet ex naturali dispositione unus sit aptior ad hujusmodi discernenda quam alius, sicut etiam accidit circa conclusiones speculativarum scientiarum. Quia ergo prudentia non est circa fines, sed circa ea quæ sunt ad finem, ut supra habitum est, ideo prudentia non est naturalis.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.ad.1] The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that "they are the principles of the ou heneka" [Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)], namely, the end; and so he does not mention euboulia among them, because it takes counsel about the means.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de pertinentibus ad prudentiam, secundum quod ordinatur ad fines. Unde supra præmiserat, ibid., quod « principia sunt ejus quod est cujus gratia, » id est, finis; et propter hoc non facit inter ea mentionem de eubulia, quæ est consilia-tiva eorum quæ sunt ad finem.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.ad.2] Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but also because of their long experience.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prudentia magis est in senibus, non solum propter naturalem dispositionem quietatis motibus passionum sensibilium, sed etiam propter experientiam longi temporis.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.ad.3] Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an infinity of singulars.

[II-II.q.47.a.15.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam in brutis animalibus sunt determinatæ viæ perveniendi ad finem; unde videmus quod omnia animalia ejusdem speciei similiter operantur. Sed hoc non potest esse in homine propter rationem ejus, quæ cum sit cognoscitiva universalium, ad infinita singularia se extendit.

Article 16

[II-II.q.47.a.16.arg.1] It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.arg.2] Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of many memories," as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. 1 et Ⅱ, « virtus ex eisdem generatur et corrumpitur, contrario modo factis. » Sed ad generationem prudentiae necessarium est experimentum, quod fit ex multis memoriis, ut dicitur in princ. Metaphysic. Ergo cum oblivio memoriae opponatur, videtur quod prudentiae per oblivionem possit amitti.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.arg.3] Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals.

But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prudentia non est sine cognitione universalium. Sed universalium cognitio potest per oblivionem amitti. Ergo et prudentia.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."

[II-II.q.47.a.16.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. v, in fin., quod « oblivio est artis, et non prudentiae. »

[II-II.q.47.a.16.co] Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above (Article 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Daniel 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Exodus 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']."

Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod oblivio respi-tem motum. » cit cognitionem tantum; et ideo per oblivionem potest aliquis artem totaliter perdere, et similiter scientiam quæ in ratione consistunt. Sed prudentia non consistit in sola cognitione, sed etiam in appetitu: quia, ut dictum est, principalis ejus actus est praecipere, quod est applicare cognitionem habitam ad appetendum et operandum. Et ideo prudentia non directe tollitur per oblivionem, sed magis corrumpitur per passiones; dicit enim Philosophus in VI Ethic., cap. v, a med., quod « delectabile et triste pervertit aestimationem prudentiæ. » Unde Dan., xiii, 56, dicitur: Species decepit te, et concupiscentia subvertit cor tuum; et Exod., xxiii, 8, dicitur: Ne accipias munera, quæ etiam excæcant prudentes. Oblivio tamen potest impedire prudentiam, inquantum procedit ad praecipiendum ex aliqua cognitione, quæ per oblivionem tolli potest.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.ad.1] Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, as stated above [Cf. I-II, 53, 1].

[II-II.q.47.a.16.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod scientia est in sola ratione; unde de ea est alia ratio, ut supra dictum est.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.ad.2] The experience required by prudence results not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod experimentum prudentiæ non acquiritur ex sola memoria, sed ex exercitio recte praecipiendi.

[II-II.q.47.a.16.ad.3] Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (Article 3). Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.47.a.16.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod prudentia principaliter consistit non in cognitione universalium, sed in applicatione ad opera, ut dictum est. Et ideo oblivio universalis cognitionis non corrumpit id quod est principale in prudentia, sed aliquod impedimentum ei affert, ut dictum est.

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