Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q49. Each quasi-integral part of prudence
Source context
- Theme
- quasi-integral parts of prudence: memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian practical philosophyAquinas's enumeration of prudence's quasi-integral parts draws directly on Aristotle's analysis of phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics, particularly the roles of experience (empeiria), good deliberation (euboulia), and practical insight (nous) in reaching correct action.
- Stoic ethicsThe Stoic emphasis on circumspection (circumspectio) and caution (cautio) as necessary for the sage's correct judgment of circumstances shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's treatment of these as structural components of prudence rather than optional dispositions.
Q49. Each quasi-integral part of prudence
Article 1
[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod memoria non sit pars prudentiæ. Memoria enim, ut probat Philosophus, lib. De mem. et reminisc., cap. 1, est in parte animæ sensitiva. Prudentia autem est in ratiocinativa, ut patet in VI Ethic., cap. v. Ergo memoria non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.2] Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prudentia per exercitium acquiritur et perficitur. Sed memoria inest nobis a natura. Ergo memoria non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.3] Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, memoria est prætitorum, prudentia autem est futurorum operabilium, de quibus est consilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. 11. Ergo memoria non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.sc] Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius, in II Rhet., aliquant. ante finem, ponit memoriam inter partes prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.co] Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above (Question 47, Article 5). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from like" (Ethic. vi [Anal. Post. i. 32). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prudentia est circa contingentia operabilia, sicut dictum est. In his autem non potest homo dirigi per ea quæ sunt simpliciter et ex necessitate vera, sed ex his quæ ut in pluribus accidunt. Oportet enim principia conclusionibus esse proportionata, et « ex talibus talia conclu-dere, » ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. 1 et 11. Quid autem in pluribus sit verum, oportet per experimentum considerare. Unde et in II Ethic., in princ., Philosophus dicit quod « virtus intellectualis habet generationem et augmentum ex experimento et tempore. » Experimentum autem est ex pluribus memoriis, ut patet in I Metaph., cap. 1; unde consequens est quod ad prudentiam requiritur plurium memoriam habere. Unde convenienter memoria ponitur pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.1] As stated above (47, 3,6), prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, prudentia applicat universalem cognitionem ad particularia, quorum est sensus; unde multa quæ pertinent ad partem sensitivam, requiruntur ad prudentiam, inter quæ est memoria.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.2] Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his Rhetoric [Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24, memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.
There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other." Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut prudentia aptitudinem quidem habet ex natura, sed ejus complementum est ex exercitio vel gratia; ita etiam, ut Tullius dicit in sua Rhet., lib. III ad Heren., aliquant. ante fin., Consideratio est pars prudentiæ, et dici potest intensa ad aliquid investigandum cogitatio, vel vehemens intentio animi investigantis verum. Debet vir prudens considerationem suam conver-tere ad Deum, seipsum et proximum. In Deo considerare debet summam potentiam quæ patet in omni creatione, summam sapientiam in mundi gubernatione et nuda omnium cognitione, summam misericordiam in hominis redemptione, justificatione et glorificatione, summam dulcedi-nem in degustatione et glorificatione, summam aequitatem in malorum punitione. Debet etiam considerare futurum judicium, inferni supplicia et gaudia beatorum. Item consideret homo prudens seipsum, ut post Dei cognitionem veniat in cognitionem sui, quod orabat Augustinus dicens: « Domine, noverim te, noverim me, » quia cognitio sui post cognitionem Dei maxime necessaria est homini, et est donum Dei speciale. Juxta Aristotelem, de cælo descendit cognitio sui. « Multi multa sciunt, se autem nesciunt, et quid valet alia scire, et se ignorare. » Auctor Meditationum sub nomine Bernardi. A te tua inchoet consideratio, ne frustra intendas et extendaris in alia, te neglecto. Nam quid proficit tibi si totum mundum lucreris teipsum perdens? Nam licet omnia mysteria noveris, lata terræ, profundum abyssi et alta cæli, si te nescieris, eris similis homini aedificanti sine fundamento, et quidquid extruxeris extra te erit ad instar congesti pulveris ventis obnoxium: a te ergo incipiat, et in te finiatur, de quocumque evagatur ad te revocabis eum cum salutis fructu, primus tibi, tu ultimus, ut quidquid non aliquo modo ad salutem tuam pertinet respuendum. In consideratione autem tui debes quatuor attendere: primo, quid es secundum corporis fragilitatem et miseriam; secundo quid es secundum animæ dignitatem et gratiam; tertio quid es secundum Dei misericordiam; quarto quid es secundum culpæ malitiam. — Triplex consideratio debet prævenire omnem actionem nostram. « Spiritualis qui omnia judicat, et a nemine judicatur, omne opus suum trina consideratione prævenit, an liceat, an deceat, an expediat. Nam etsi constat in christiana utique philosophia non decere nisi quod licet, non expedire nisi quod decet; licet non continue, tamen omne quod licet decere aut expedire conveniens erit. Aut quomodo non indecens erit voluntate pro lege uti? Potestatem exercere, ne-gligere rationem, non est tam electi quam dejecti animi. » Bernardus, lib. III De consideratione. Tertio debet vir prudens considerare quæ sunt proximi, scilicet profectus et defectus. Profectus considerat vir prudens ut ex eis proficiat, et suos eos faciat eis congaudendo, promovendo, fovendo, tuendo, et exemplum in eis accipiendo. Nostra debemus bona proximi facere non solum ex diligendo sed nobis eorum exempla incorporando, ut bona apis mel de floribus colligendo, et favum sibi conficiendo. Debemus etiam defectus pœnæ et culpæ proximi considerare subveniendo, compa-tiendo, et de miseriis et peccatis aliorum nostrum bonum facere. 1 In Parm.: « dicit. » memoria non solum a natura perficitur, sed etiam habet plurimum artis et industriæ: et sunt quatuor per quæ homo proficit in bene memorando. Quorum primum est ut eorum quæ vult memorari, quasdam similitudines assumat convenientes, nec tamen omnino consuetas; quia ea quæ sunt inconsueta, magis miramur, et sic in eis animus magis et vehementius detinetur; ex quo fit quod eorum quæ in pueritia vidimus, magis memorur. Ideo autem necessaria est hujusmodi similitudinum vel imaginum adinventio, quia intentiones simplices et spirituales facilius ex animo elabuntur, nisi quibusdam similitudinibus corporalibus quasi alligentur; quia humana cognitio potentior est circa sensibilia; unde et memorativa ponitur in parte sensitiva. Secundo oportet ut homo ea quæ memoriter vult tenere, sua consideratione ordinate disponat, ut ex uno memorato facile ad aliud procedatur. Unde Philosophus dicit in lib. De memoria, cap. 11, a med.: «A locis videntur reminisci aliquando. Causa autem est, quia velociter ab alio in aliud veniunt.» Tertio oportet ut homo sollicitudinem apponat, et affectum adhibeat ad ea quæ vult rememorari; quia quo aliquid magis fuerit impressum animo eo minus elabitur. Unde et Tullius dicit in sua Rhet., lib. III ad Heren., versus fin., quod « sollicitudino conservat integras simulacrorum figuras.» Quarto oportet quod ea frequenter meditemur quæ volumus memorari. Unde Philosophus dicit in lib. De memoria, loc. sup. cit., quod « meditationes memoriam salvant; » quia, ut in eodem lib. dicitur, « consuetudo est quasi natura. » Unde quæ multoties intelligimus, cito reminiscimur, quasi naturali quodam ordine ab uno ad aliud procedentes.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.3] It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for the future.
[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex præteritis oportet nos quasi argumentum sumere de futuris; et ideo memoria præteritorum necessaria est ad bene consiliandum de futuris.
Article 2
[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intellectus non sit pars prudentiae. Eorum enim quæ ex opposito dividuntur, unum non est pars alterius. Sed intellectus ponitur virtus intellectualis condivisa prudentiae, ut patet in VI Ethic., cap. 11. Ergo intellectus non debet poni pars prudentiae.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.2] Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (8, 1 and 8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been said above (4, 8; I-II, 62, 2). Therefore understanding does not pertain to prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, intellectus ponitur inter dona Spiritus sancti, et correspondet fidei, ut supra habitum est. Sed prudentia est alia virtus a fide, ut per supra dicta patet. Ergo intellectus non pertinet ad prudentiam.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.3] Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prudentia est singularium operabilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., c. VII Sic cod.; in Parm.: «quanto... tanto.» «Memoria» in idiomate medii aevi «monumentum est quod mortui causa aedificatum est, et quidquid ob memoriam alicujus factum est.» Festus. — Et est «Ecclesia, sacellum, altare, loculus in quo reliquiae alicujus sancti reconditæ, res quælibet quæ sancto alicui in usu fuit, v. g. baculus.» Et est «litis judicandæ instructio et ordinatio.» «Memoriæ» sunt in eodem idiomate «christianis præsertim oratoria in quibus reconduntur sanctorum corpora: interdum ipsa reliquiarum conditoria, exequiæ, anniversarii sanctorum dies, seu festa.» Sed secundum philosophos, et ut est pars prudentiae memoria est ad mentis intuitum imaginaria quaedam representatio prætentarum; seu potius: virtus per quam animus retractat prætterita, ut ex eis metiatur futura. Unde Proverbium: «Discipulus prioris est posterior dies.» Ex Proverbiiis sapientum. Duo quidem præcipue retractare debemus, scilicet delicta perpetrata ad pœnitendum; et beneficia accepta ad remetiendum. — Illa pars vitæ nostræ quæ præterit memoriae manet; sine hac quasi mortua est. «Qui nihil de præterito cogitat vitam perdidit; memoria est thesaurus omnium cognoscibilium in quo veritas servatur. Animus obliviosus est quasi locus in quo quidquid repositum fuerit moritur.» Seneca. — Laudabilis est memoria quorumdam respectu Dei, et quorumdam respectu sui, et quorumdam respectu proximi. Multum laudabilis est memoria respectu Dei quantum ad quatuor: quantum ad beneficia ad regra-tiandum, quantum ad mandata ad exequendum, quantum ad judicia ad timendum, et quantum ad clementiam ad non desperandum. — Laudabilis est respectu sui memoria peccatorum; item memoria votorum et omnino bonorum conceptuum Domino promissorum. Item memoria eorum quae quis studuit vel audivit, vel cogitavit inspirante Deo. Item memoria præteritæ prosperitatis in adversitate, paupertatis in abundantia, et in tempore afflictionis et desolationis memoria bonorum quae facit homo ne cadat in desperationem. Item memoria novissimorum. — Laudabilis est quoque memoria multorum respectu proximi, miserorum ad miserendum, defunctorum ad succurrendum, virorum illustrium ad imitandum, minarum spiritualium ad eas evitandas. et viii. Sed intellectus est universalium cognoscitivus et immaterialium, ut patet in III De anima, text. 38 et 39. Ergo intellectus non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.sc] Tully [De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53 accounts "intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius, lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante finem, ponit « intelligentiam » partem prudentiæ; et Macrobius, libro I in Somn. Scip., cap. viii, circa med., « intellectum, » quod in idem redit.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.co] Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod intellectus non sumitur hic pro potentia intellectiva, sed prout importat quamdam rectam æstimationem alicujus extremi principii, quod accipitur ut per se notum; sicut et prima demonstrationum principia intelligere dicimur. Omnis autem deductio rationis ab aliquibus procedit, quæ accipiuntur ut prima. Unde oportet quod omnis processus rationis ab aliquo intellectu procedat. Quia ergo prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ideo necesse est quod totius processus prudentiae ab intellectu derivetur. Et propter hoc intellectus ponitur pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.1] The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above (47, A3,6), it applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One should do evil to no man," as shown above (Question 47, Article 6). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism of prudence, as stated above (47, 3,6). Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio prudentiae terminatur, sicut ad conclusionem quamdam, ad particulare operabile, ad quod applicat universalem cognitionem, ut ex dictis patet. Conclusio autem singularis syllogizatur ex universali et singulari propositione. Unde oportet quod ratio prudentiae ex duplici intellectu procedat. Quorum unus est qui est cognoscitivus universalium; quod pertinet ad intellectum, qui ponitur virtus intellectualis, quia naturaliter nobis cognita sunt non solum universalia principia speculativa, sed etiam practica, sicut « nulli esse malefaciendum, » ut ex dictis patet. Alius autem intellectus est, qui, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. xi, est cognoscitivus extremi, id est, alicujus primi singularis, et contingentis operabilis propositionis, scilicet minoris, quam oportet esse singularem in syllogismo prudentiae, ut dictum est. Hoc autem primum singulare est aliquis singularis finis, ut dicitur ibidem. Unde intellectus, qui ponitur pars prudentiæ, est quædam recta æstimatio de aliquo particulari fine.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.2] The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above (8, 1 and 2). It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus, qui ponitur donum Spiritus sancti, est quædam acuta perspectio divinorum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Aliter autem ponitur intellectus pars prudentiæ, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.3] The right estimate about a particular end is called both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and "sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular.
[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ipsa recta æstimatio de fine particulari, et « intellectus » dicitur, inquantum est alicujus principii, et « sensus, » inquantum est particulariis. Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. xi, circa med. : « Horum, » scilicet singularium, « oportet habere sensum; hic autem est intellectus. » Non autem hoc est intelligendum de sensu particulari, quo cognoscimus propria sensibilia, sed de sensu interiori, quo de particulari judicamus.
Article 3
[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be accounted a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod docilitas non debeat poni pars prudentiæ. Illud enim quod requiritur ad omnem virtutem intellectualem, non debet appropriari alicui earum. Sed docilitas necessaria est ad quamlibet virtutem intellectualem. Ergo non debet poni pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.2] Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ ad virtutes humanas pertinent, sunt in nobis; quia secundum ea quæ in nobis sunt, laudamur vel vituperamur. Sed non est in potestate nostra ut dociles simus; sed hoc ex naturali dispositione quibusdam contingit. Ergo non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.3] Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, docilitas ad discipulum pertinet. Sed prudentia, cum sit præceptiva, videtur magis ad magistros pertinere, qui etiam præceptores dicuntur. Ergo docilitas non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.sc] Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 following the opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Macrobius, lib. I in Somn. Scip., c. vIII, secundum sententiam Plotini, ponit « docilitatem » inter partes prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.co] As stated above (2, ad 1; 47, 3) prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into principles." Thus it is written (Proverbs 3:5): "Lean not on thy own prudence," and (Sirach 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence
[II-II.q.49.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudentia consistit circa particularia operabilia; in quibus cum sint quasi infinitæ diversitates, non possunt ab uno homine sufficienter omnia considerari, nec per modicum tempus, sed per temporis diuturnitatem. Unde in his quæ ad prudentiam pertinent, maxime indiget homo ab alio erudiri, et præcipue ex senibus, qui sanum intellectum adepti sunt circa fines operabi- an suo magnus. » Seneca. — « Si prudens est animus tuus, præsentia ordina, futura prævide, præterita recordare. » Seneca. Ex prudenti rerum æstimatione sequitur eorumdem justa ponderatio, qua, scilicet, potiora deterioribus præponuntur, ut anima corpori, virtus sanitati, honestas voluptati. Porro ex prudenti rerum æstimatione justaque ponderatione sequitur bonus ac rectus earum usus, quo vir prudens ad commodum suum cuncta retorquet. « Non est æquum id haberi malum quo bene uti licet. » Quintilianus, lib. II. Sic cod.; in Parm. : « convenit. » — In Parm. : « aliis. » Docilitas est recta discendi vel docendi habilitas, ut scilicet primum te, dehinc et alios instruas. « Dociles natura nos edidit, et rationem dedit imperfectam, sed quæ perfici posset. » Seneca, Ad Lucillum, epist. xlix. — « Quid autem stultius est quam quia non didiceris, non discere! Quamdiu vivas tamdiu discendum est quemadmodum vivas. » Seneca, Epist. Lxxvi. — « Sicut officium præceptorum est docere, sic discipulorum dociles præbere. Scientia enim coalescere nequit, nisi tradentis et accipientis concordia sociata fuerit. » Quintilianus, lib. II. — « Socrates dum semper ad discendum se pauperem credidit, ad docendum locupletissimum fecit. Sed Solon quanta industria flagraverit etiam versibus complexus est, quibus se quotidie aliquid addiscentem senescere significavit. » Valerius, lib. VIII. — « Oportet credere eum qui discit. » Aristoteles, in lib. Elenchorum. — « Olim erat Pythagoricis in morem ut cum quid a magistro Pythagora diceretur, hinc nullus rationem petere audebit, sed erat ratio ejus docentis auctoritas, idque fiebat
[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.1] Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.2] Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride.
[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.3] By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but also for himself, as stated above (47, 12, ad 3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
Article 4
[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies. Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod solertia non sit pars prudentiæ. Solertia enim se habet ad facile invenienda media in demonstrationibus, ut patet in I Posteriorum, text. ult. Sed ratio prudentiæ non est demonstrativa; cum sit contingentium. Ergo ad prudentiam non pertinet solertia.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.2] Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness [Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34 which is a kind of eustochia, i.e. "a happy conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., c. v. Sed in bene consiliando non habet locum solertia, quæ est eustochia quædam, id est, bona conjecturatio, quæ est sine ratione et velox. Oportet autem consiliari tarde, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. 1x, circa princ. Ergo solertia non debet poni pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.3] Further, shrewdness as stated above (Article 48) is a "happy conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, solertia, ut dictum est, est quædam bona conjecturatio. Sed conjecturis uti est proprium rhetorum. Ergo solertia magis pertinet ad rhetoricam quam ad prudentiam.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.sc] Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs to prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 09). Therefore shrewdness does also.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit in libro X Etymolog., § 244, col. 393, t. 3: « Sollicitus dicitur, quasi solers et citus. » Sed sollicitudo ad prudentiam pertinet, sicut supra dictum est. Ergo et solertia.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.co] Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for eustochia, of which it is a part. For eustochia is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher [Andronicus; Cf. 48, Objection 1] who calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for eustochia, in general, hence he says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly."
[II-II.q.49.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prudentia est rectam aestimationem habere de operandis. Recta autem aestimatio sive opinio acquiritur in operativis, sicut in speculativis, dupliciter: uno quidem modo per se inveniendo; alio modo ab alio addiscendo. Sicut autem docilitas ad hoc pertinet ut homo bene se habeat in acquirendo rectam opinionem ab alio, ita solertia ad hoc pertinet ut homo bene se habeat in acquirendo rectam aestimationem per seipsum; ita tamen ut solertia accipiatur pro eustochia, cujus est pars. Nam eustochia est bene conjecturativa de quibuscumque; solertia autem est « facilis et prompta conjecturatio circa inventionem medii, » ut dicitur in I Posterior., text. ult. quamdiu discentis animus firmiore doctrina roboratus, ipse eorumdem rerum rationem nullo etiam docente reperiet. » Ex Musica, lib. I. — « Artium mater est instantia, noverca eruditionis est negligentia. » Ennodius. • Instrue præceptis animum, ne discere cesset, Nam sine doctrina vita est quasi mortis imago. Cato, lib. III Distich., I. • Disce, sed a doctis; indoctos ipse doceto; Propaganda etenim est rerum doctrina bonarum. Id., lib. IV Distich., XXIII. Tamen ille philosophus qui ponit solertiam partem prudentiæ, accipit eam communiter pro omni eustochia; unde dicit: « Solertia est habitus qui provenit ex repentino, inveniens quod convenit.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.1] Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 34). On this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod solertia non solum se habet circa inventionem medii in demonstrativis, sed etiam in operativis; puta cum aliquis videns aliquos amicos factos, conjectat eos esse inimicos ejusdem, ut ibidem Philosophus dicit. Et hoc modo solertia pertinet ad prudentiam.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.2] The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that euboulia, i.e. good counsel, is not eustochia, which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Philosophus unam rationem inducit in VI Ethic., cap. 1x, ad ostendendum quod eubulia, quæ est bene consiliativa, non est eustochia, cujus laus est in veloci consideratione ejus quod oportet. Potest autem aliquis esse bene consiliativus, etsi diutius consilietur vel tardius; nec tamen propter hoc excluditur quin bona conjecturatio ad bene consiliandum valeat, et quandoque necessaria est, quando scilicet ex improviso occurrit aliquid agendum. Et ideo solertia convenienter pars prudentiæ ponitur.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.3] Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod rhetorica etiam ratiocinatur circa operabilia; unde nihil prohibet idem ad rhetoricam et prudentiam pertinere. Et tamen conjecturatio hic non sumitur solum secundum quod pertinet ad conjecturas, quibus utuntur rhetores, sed secundum quod in quibuscumque conjicere dicitur homo veritatem.
Article 5
[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ratio non debeat poni pars prudentiæ. Subjectum enim accidentis non est pars ejus. Sed prudentia est in ratione sicut in subjecto, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. v, circa finem. Ergo ratio non debeat poni pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.2] Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence
[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod est multis commune, non debet alicujus eorum poni pars; vel si ponatur, debet poni pars ejus cui potissime convenit. Ratio autem necessaria est in omnibus virtutibus intellectualibus, et præcipue in sapientia et scientia, quæ utuntur ratione demonstrativa. Ergo ratio non debeat poni pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.3] Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the intelligence, as stated above (I, 79, 8). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add reason.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ratio non differt per essentiam potentiæ ab intellectu, ut prius habitum est. Si igitur intellectus ponitur pars prudentiæ, superfluum fuit addere rationem.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.sc] Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Macrobius, lib. II in Somn. Scip., cap. vIII, secundum sententiam Plotini, rationem numerat inter partes prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.co] The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be numbered among these parts.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod opus prudentis est esse bene consiliativum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. v. Consilium autem est inquisitio quædam ex quibusdam ad alia procedens; hoc autem est opus rationis; unde ad prudentiam necessarium est quod homo sit bene ratiocinativus. Et quia ea quæ exiguntur ad perfectionem prudentiæ, dicuntur quasi integrales partes prudentiæ, inde est quod ratio inter partes prudentiæ connumerari debet.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.1] Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its good use.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio non sumitur hic pro ipsa potentia rationis, sed pro ejus bono usu.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.2] The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and uncertain.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod certitudo rationis est ex intellectu; sed necessitas rationis est ex defectu intellectus. Illa enim in quibus vis intellectiva plenarie viget, ratione non indigent, sed suo simplici intuitu veritatem comprehendunt, sicut Deus et angeli. Particularia autem operabilia, in quibus prudentia dirigit, recedunt præcipue a conditione intelligibilium, et tanto magis, quanto sunt minus certa, seu determinata. Ea enim quæ sunt artis, licet sint singularia, tamen sunt magis determinata et certa; unde in pluribus eorum non est consilium propter certitudinem, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. III. Et ideo quamvis in quibusdam aliis virtutibus intellectualibus sit certior ratio quam in prudentia, tamen ad prudentiam maxime requiritur quod sit homo bene ratiocinativus, ut possit bene applicare universalia principia ad particularia, quæ sunt varia et incerta.
[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.3] Although intelligence and reason are not different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [Cf. II-II, 08, 1, while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained above (2; 47, 2,3).
[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etsi intellectus et ratio non sint diversæ potentiæ, tamen denominantur ex diversis actibus. Intellectus enim nomen sumitur ab intima penetratione veritatis; nomen autem rationis ab inquisitione et discursu. Et ideo utrumque ponitur pars prudentiæ, ut ex dictis patet.
Article 6
[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also the derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod providentia non debeat poni pars prudentiæ. Nihil enim est pars suiipsius. Sed providentia videtur idem esse quod prudentia, quia, ut Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etym., § 202, col. 388, t. 3: « Prudens dicitur quasi porro videns; » et ex hoc etiam nomen providentia sumitur, ut Boetius dicit in lib. V De consolat., prosa vi, col. 860, t. 4. Ergo providentia non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.2] Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prudentia est solum practica. Sed providentia potest etiam esse speculativa, quia visio, ex qua sumitur nomen providentia, magis pertinet ad speculativam quam ad operativam. Ergo providentia non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.3] Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, principalis actus prudentia est præcipere; secundarius autem est judicare et consiliari. Sed nihil horum videtur importari proprie per nomen providentia. Ergo providentia non est pars prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.sc] stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Article 48).
[II-II.q.49.a.6.sc] Sed contra est auctoritas Tullii, lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., et Macrobii, lib. I in Somn. Scip., cap. vIII, qui ponunt providentiam partem prudentiæ, ut ex supra dictis patet.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.co] As stated above (47, 1, ad 2, 6,13), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. On like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.
Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudentia proprie est circa ea quæ sunt ad finem, et hoc ad ejus officium proprie pertinet ut ad finem debite ordinentur; et quamvis aliqua necessaria sint propter finem, quæ subjiciuntur divinæ providentiae, humanæ tamen providentiae non subjiciuntur nisi contingentia operabilia, quæ per hominem possunt fieri propter finem. Præterita autem in necessitatem quamdam transeunt : quia impossibile est non esse quod factum est. Similiter etiam præsentia, inquantum hujusmodi, necessitatem quamdam habent : necesse est enim Socratem sedere, dum sedet. Unde consequens est quod contingentia futura, secundum quod sunt per hominem in finem humanæ vitæ ordinabilia, pertineant ad prudentiam. Utrumque autem horum importatur in nomine providentiae; importat enim providentia respectum quem-dam alicujus distantis, ad quod ea quæ in præsenti occurrunt, ordinanda sunt. Unde providentia est pars prudentiae.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.1] Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quandocumque multa requiruntur ad unum, necesse est unum eorum esse principale, ad quod omnia alia ordinantur. Unde in quo-libet toto necesse est esse unam formalem partem et prædominantem, a qua totum unitatem habet. Et secundum hoc providentia est principalior inter omnes partes prudentiae; quia omnia alia quæ requiruntur ad prudentiam, ad hoc necessaria sunt ut aliquid recte ordinetur in finem. Et ideo nomen ipsius prudentiae sumitur a providentia sicut a principaliori sua parte.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.2] Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical matters.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod speculatio est circa universalia et circa necessaria; quæ secundum se non sunt procul, cum sint ubique et semper; etsi sint procul quoad nos, inquantum ab eorum cognitione deficimus. Unde providentia non proprio dicitur in speculativis, sed solum in practicis.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.3] Right order to an end which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, without which no right order to the end is possible.
[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in recta ordinatione ad finem, qui includitur in ratione providentiae, importatur rectitudo consilii, et judicii, et præcepti, sine quibus recta ordinatio in finem esse non potest.
Article 7
[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod circumspectio non possit esse pars prudentiae. Circumspectio enim videtur esse consideratio quædam eorum quæ circum-stant. Hujusmodi autem sunt infinita, quæ non possunt comprehendi ratione, in qua est prudentia. Ergo circumspectio non debet poni pars prudentiae.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.2] Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, circumstantiæ magis videntur pertinere ad virtutes morales quam ad prudentiam. Sed circumspectio nihil aliud esse videtur quam respectus circumstantiæ rum. Ergo circumspectio magis videtur ad morales pertinere virtutes quam ad prudentiam.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.3] Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, qui potest videre quæ procul sunt, multo magis potest videre quæ circa se sunt. Sed per providentiam homo est potens prospicere quæ procul sunt. Ergo ipsa sufficit ad considerandum ea quæ circumstant. Non ergo oportuit præter providentiam ponere circumspectionem partem prudentiae.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.sc] stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Article 48).
[II-II.q.49.a.7.sc] Sed contra est auctoritas Macrobii, lib. I in Somn. Scip., cap. viii, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.co] As stated above (Article 6), it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 3) is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad prudentiam, sicut dictum est, præcipue pertinet recte ordinare aliquid in finem; quod quidem recte non fit, nisi et finis bonus sit, et id quod ordinatur in finem, sit etiam bonum et conveniens fini. Sed quia prudentia, sicut dictum est, est circa singularia operabilia, in quibus multa concurrunt, contingit aliquid secundum se consideratum esse bonum et conveniens fini, Ita optima mss. passim.; editi quos vidimus : « Ad ea quæ in præsenti occurrunt, et ordinanda sunt. » — In Parm. : « ad. » Providentia est virtus per quam sagaci subtilitate futurorum eventus colligitur, adversaque prævidet solerter animus præmunitus. « Illud magni ingenii est cogitatione percipere, et ante constituere quid evenire possit, et quid agendum sit, cum evenerit. » Tullius, De offic. — « Adversus omnia quæ accidere possunt te adhortare et indura; neminem enim eo fortuna provexit, ut non tantum illi minaretur quantum promiserat. Noli huic tranquillitati confidere, momento mare concurritur. » Seneca, Ad Lucillum, epist. iv. — « Venit aliquis ad mortem iratus morti, venientem illam nemo hilaris excipit, nisi qui se ad illam diu composuerit. » Seneca, Epist. xxx. — « Dum vita suppetit enitamur, ut mors quam paucissima quae abolere possit inveniat. » Plinius secundus, in Epist. ad Navicum Maximum. quod tamen ex aliquibus concurrentibus redditur vel malum, vel non optimum ad finem; sicut ostendere signa amoris alicui secundum se consideratum, videtur esse conveniens ad alliciendum ejus animum ad amorem; sed si contingat in animo illius superbia, vel suspicio adulationis, non erit hoc conveniens ad finem. Et ideo necessaria est circumspectio ad prudentiam, ut scilicet homo id quod ordinatur in finem, comparet etiam cum his quae circumstant.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.1] Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number
[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet ea quae possunt circumstare sint infinita, tamen ea quae circumstant in actu non sunt infinita; sed pauca quædam sunt quae immutant judicium rationis in agendis. 1 Sic plerique cod.; unus codex habet: « operativum; » in Parm: « opportunum. » — 2 Ita cum mss. edit. Rom.; al.: « eam. » Prudentiae quoque species est cautela qua malum sagaciter et astute cavetur. Circumspectio autem est contrariorum vitiorum cautela, qua si unum fugimus, alterum declinamus. « Melius est cavere quam pavere. » Socrates. — « Bonum est in alieno malo fugiendo aspicere, citius evenit periculum cum contemnitur. Ex alterius vitio sapiens emendat suum. Inimicum quamvis humilem docti est metuere. » Ex Proverbii sapientum. — « Vitam hominum qui aetatem in medio rerum agunt, ac sibi suisque usui esse volunt, ad cavenda pericula ex improviso assidua, et prope quotidiana, oportet esse animo prompto semper et intento, ut sunt Athelarum (qui Paucratii vocantur), ut sicut illi ad vitandos ictus cauti, et ad faciendos sunt periti, ita animus et mens viri prudentis adversus virus, et petulantias injuriarum omnium, in loco atque tempore prospiciens debet esse recta, ardua, septa, nunquam connivens, nusquam aciem flectens, consilia, cogitationesque contra fortunæ verbera atque insidias inimicorum, quasi brachia et manus protendens, ne qua in re adversa repentina incursio imparatis, improtectisque nobis oriatur. » Panetius. — « Dum maxime hominum secundæ sunt res, tunc maxime meditari eum oportet quo pacto adversam aerumnam ferat, ne quid animo sit novum. Et sic quidquid præter spem eveniet in lucro deputare. » Terentius, in Phormione. — « Major in conservandis rebus quam in inveniendis adhibenda est cautela. » Cassiodorus in libro Epist., xxxiii. • Syrenes exemplar habens docearis in illis Casibus in laetis semper pejora cavere; Esto argus, et argutis oculis circumspice ne sis Securus hodie vel crus moriturus. Intus sivo foris est plurima causa timoris. Cunctis sis horis hominis memor interioris. Gaufredus. • Cum fueris felix, quae sunt adversa caveto; Prospice qui veniunt hos casus esse ferendos. Nam laevius laedit quidquid prævidimus ante. Quod tibi suspectum est confestim discute quid sit. Namque solent primo quae sunt neglecta nocero.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.2] Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circumstances.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod circumstantiæ pertinent ad prudentiam quidem, sicut ad determinandum eas; ad virtutes autem morales, inquantum per circumstantiarum determinationem perficiuntur.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.3] Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut ad providentiam pertinet prospicere id quod est per se conveniens fini, ita ad circumspectionem pertinet considerare, an sit conveniens fini secundum ea quæ circumstant. Utrumque autem horum habet specialem difficultatem; et ideo utrumque eorum seorsum ponitur pars prudentiae.
Article 8
[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the virtues.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod cautio non debeat poni pars prudentiæ. In iis enim in quibus malum non potest esse, non est necessaria cautio. Sed « virtutibus nemo male utitur, » ut dicit Augustinus in lib. II De lib. arb., cap. xix, § 50, col. 1268, t. 1. Ergo cautio non pertinet ad prudentiam, quæ est directiva virtutum.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.2] Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ejusdem est providere bona et cavere mala, sicut ejusdem artis est facere sanitatem et curare ægritudinem. Sed providere bona pertinet ad providentiam. Ergo etiam cavere mala. Non ergo cautio debet poni pars alia prudentiæ a providentia. aut dependentia, aut fluxa, aut nimis stricta, sive quolibet alio modo secundum sæculi vanitatem detorta. Coaptatio ad modum portandi pertinet, et sunt mille modi quibus homines suavissimi de se intuentibus spectaculum facere concupiscunt. « Vestimenta appetant servi Dei plus vilia quam pretiosa, plus crassa quam subtilia, plus aspera quam mollia, plus fusca quam nitida, plus neglecta quam composita accurate. » Richardus de Sancto Victore. « Beatus est gestus, et figuratio corporis et membrorum ad omnem agendi et habendi modum. Hic sex modis reprehensibile inventur: si est aut mollis, aut dissolutus, aut tardus, aut citatus, aut procax, aut turbidus. Mollis significat lasciviam, dissolutus negligentiam, tardus pigritiam, citatus inconstantiam, procax superbiam, turbidus iracundiam. Diligenter observandum est ut singula membra suum retineant officium, ut id agat horum quodlibet ad quod factum est, nec unum usurpet officium alterius, ut nec loquatur manus, nec os audiat, nec oculus linguæ officium assumat, et sic de aliis. Sunt enim quidam qui audire vel auscultare nesciunt, nisi buccis patentibus, quasi per os audiant. Alii labia velut molam circumdant. Alii ut canes sitientes linguam extrahunt. Alii loquendo digitum extendunt, et superbia erigunt. Alii oculos in orbem rotant, et sic de aliis. Alii nares rugant, alii labia contorquent, alii ore dimidio loquuntur; alii brachiis navigando; alii pedibus per terram ambulando, et lacertis in aere volitant: mirabile monstrum quod fingit in se hominis incessum, navis remigium, avis volatum.» Richardus de Sancto Victore. — Unumquodque membrum id quod facit eo modo ac mensura quo faciendum est facere debet: « Hoc est ridere sine aspectione dentium, videre sine defixione oculorum, loqui sine extensione manuum et intensione digitorum, sine contorsione labiorum, incedere sine modulatione gressuum, sine ventilatione brachiorum, sine gesticulatione scapularum, sedere sine divariatione crurium, sine alterutra superjectione pedum, sine extensione vel agitatione tibiarum, sine altera cu-
[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.3] Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution does not belong to prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus prudens conatur ad impossibile. Sed nullus potest præcavere omnia mala quæ possunt contingere. Ergo cautio non pertinet ad prudentiam.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.sc] The Apostle says (Ephesians 5:15): "See how you walk cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']."
[II-II.q.49.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Ephes., v, 15: Videte quomodo caute ambuletis.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.co] The things with which prudence is concerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ea cirça quæ est prudentia, sunt contingentia operabilia; in quibus sicut verum potest admiseri falso, ita et malum bono, propter multiformitatem hujusmodi operabilium in quibus bona plerumque impediuntur a malis, et mala habent speciem boni. Et ideo necessaria est cautio ad prudentiam, ut sic accipiantur bona quod vitentur mala.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.1] Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cautio non est necessaria in moralibus actibus ut aliquis sibi caveat ab actibus virtutum, sed mulatione laterum, jacere sine dejectione membrorum. » Richardus de Sancto Victore. « In locutione servanda est disciplina, ut attendat homo quid, cui, ubi, quomodo, quando, quare loquatur et quantum; quod verba vera et utilia et nunquam otiosa habeantur; otiosa autem sunt omnia quæ sunt aut nociva aut inhonesta, aut inutilia; inutilia sunt quæ nec audientibus, nec loquentibus prosunt; inhonesta sunt quæ vel illius qui loquitur, vel illius cui loquitur, vel de quo loquitur dignitati non conveniunt; nociva sunt quæ suis suasionibus animos auditorum sive ad errorem, sive ad praviatem inducunt. Qualitas autem personæ cui loquendum est quatuor modis consideratur: secundum Ætatem, secundum scientiam, secundum officium, secundum conditionem, quia aliter convenit loqui senibus, aliter juvenibus, aliter sapientibus, aliter simplicibus, aliter activis in negotiis sæcularibus, aliter contemplativis in spiritualibus, aliter dominis, aliter servis, aliter prælatis, aliter subditis. » Richardus de Sancto Victore. In mensa autem debet esse duplex custodia disciplinae: prima in gestu suo, secunda in cibo suo. Tribus modis inter epulas in gestu suo debet homo servare disciplinam in semetipso, videlicet ut linguam a loquacitate restringat, et oculos suos a circumspectione coerceat, et ut cætera membra cum modestia et quiete contineat. Triplex etiam observantia debet esse in cibo, ut attendat homo quid sumat, quantum et quomodo sumat. Quid sumat, ut non nimis delicata, et pretiosa, aut nimis rara et insolita, aut nimis accurate et laute praparata concupiscat. In quantitate sumendi habenda est custodia disciplinae, ut neque contra honestatem neque supra necessitatem sumatur cibus. In modo sumendi habenda est disciplina, ut homo cibum munde sumat et temperate; munde ut in sumendo caveat homo ab omni immunditia et inhonestate; temperate ut caveat a cibi et potus superfluitate, et sumendi nimis festinatione, et mora nimia in comedendo. Ita mss. cum Garcia et editi passim.; edit. Rom. cum cod. Alcan.: « ad prudentiam. » ut sibi caveat ab eis per quæ actus virtutum impediri possunt.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.2] It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod opposita mala cavere ejusdem rationis est, et prosequi bona; sed vitare aliqua impedimenta extrinseca, hoc pertinet ad aliam rationem; et ideo cautio distinguitur a providentia, quamvis utrumque pertineat ad unam virtutem prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.3] Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them, although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod malorum quæ homini vitanda occurrunt, quædam sunt quæ ut in pluribus accidere solent: et talia comprehendi ratione possunt; et contra hæc ordinatur cautio, ut totaliter vitentur, vel ut minus noceant. Quædam vero sunt quæ ut in paucioribus et casualiter accident; et hæc, cum sint infinita, ratione comprehendi non possunt; nec homo sufficit ea præcavere. Quamvis per officium prudentiæ homo contra omnes fortunæ insultus se disponere possit, ut minus lædatur.
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