Q58. Justice

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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q58. Justice

Source context

Theme: justice as cardinal virtue: its definition, subject, and relation to right-giving in social and moral life
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

GA 68b, 1909-10-21Steiner places justice alongside love as a polar ideal confronting the human ego: justice is described as a 'cold' but necessary ideal that the maturing ego must cultivate, in contrast to the warmth of love.
GA 159, 1915-01-31Steiner states that one who truly practices the virtue of justice places every thing and every being in its right position, thereby moving beyond self-enclosure into participation in the whole.
GA 170, 1916-08-06Steiner identifies moral justice as a force that first appears on earth working inwardly against the peripheral tendency of the senses, characterizing it as a centripetal stream in human moral evolution.
GA 329, 1919-04-02In his social threefolding lectures, Steiner assigns justice properly to the rights-state sphere, arguing that a rights-domain organized around justice as its own principle will naturally harmonize with the other two social members.
GA 53, 1905-03-23Steiner notes that for the ancient Roman, justice was self-evident — as unquestionable as light itself — marking an earlier stage of humanity's relationship to the virtue before modern individualism complicated it.
GA 97, 1907-01-19Steiner connects justice to the eighth Beatitude, interpreting Christ's demand that human beings pursue justice as a call to apply the standard of justice first to themselves.

Cross-tradition

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VAristotle defines justice as the complete virtue directed toward another, distinguishing universal justice (lawfulness) from particular justice (fair distribution and rectification) — a structural framework Aquinas inherits and reorganizes in Q58.
Platonic political philosophyPlato's Republic treats justice as the virtue that assigns each part of the soul and city its proper function, providing a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that justice renders to each their due (ius suum cuique).
Roman jurisprudence (Ulpian)Aquinas builds Q58's definition directly on Ulpian's formula — justice as the constant will to render to each their right — situating scholastic moral theology within the Roman legal tradition.

Article 1

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right" [Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiatur a jurisperitis, lib. X, ff. De just. et jure, quod justitia est « constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum unicuique tribuens. » Justitia enim, secundum Philosophum, in V Ethic., cap. 1, a princ., est « habitus a quo sunt aliqui operativi justorum, et a quo operantur et volunt justa. » Sed voluntas nominat potentiam vel etiam actum. Ergo inconvenienter justitia dicitur esse voluntas.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.2] Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, rectitudo voluntatis non est voluntas; alioquin si voluntas esset sua rectitudo, sequeretur quod nulla voluntas esset perversa. Sed secundum Anselmum, in lib. De veritate, c. xii, col. 480, t. 1, « justitia est rectitudo. » Ergo justitia non est voluntas.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.3] Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sola Dei voluntas est perpetua. Si ergo justitia est perpetua voluntas, in solo Deo erit justitia.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.4] Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say that it is both "perpetual" and "constant."

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, omne perpetuum est constans, quia est immutabile. Superflue ergo utrumque ponitur in definitione justitiae, et perpetuum et constans.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.5] Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, reddere jus unicuique pertinet ad principem. Ergo si justitia sit unicuique jus suum tribuens, sequitur quod justitia non sit nisi in principe, quod est inconveniens.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.6] Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one his right.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.6] 6. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De moribus Ecclesiæ, cap. xv, col. 1322, t. 1, quod « justitia est amor Deo tantum serviens. » Non ergo reddit unicuique quod suum est.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.co] The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (2). Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others."

Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since "what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.

Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that "justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice."

[II-II.q.58.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prædicta justitiae definitio conveniens est, si recte intelligatur. Cum enim omnis virtus sit habitus qui est principium boni actus, necesse est quod virtus definiatur per actum bonum circa propriam materiam virtutis. Est autem justitia´ circa ea quæ ad alterum sunt, sicut circa propriam materiam, ut infra paea, » etc. Deest argumentum « Sed contra » in omnibus codicibus et editionibus. Theologi in suis observationibus supplent: « Sed contra est auctoritas jurisperitorum. » 4 Edit. addunt: « propre. » tebit. Et ideo actus justitiae per comparatio-nem ad propriam materiam et objectum tangitur cum dicitur: « Jus suum unicuique tribuens; » quia ut Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etym., § 125, col. 380, t. 3, « justus dicitur quia jus custodit. » Ad hoc autem quod aliquis actus circa quamcumque materiam sit virtuosus, requiritur quod sit voluntarius, et quod sit stabilis et firmus: quia Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. iv, ante med., quod ad virtutis actum requiritur primo quidem quod « operetur sciens; » secundo autem quod « eligens, et propter debitum finem; » tertio quod « immobiliter operetur. » Primo autem horum includitur in secundo; quia « quod per ignorantiam agitur, est involuntarium, » ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. I, circa med. Et ideo in definitione justitiae primo ponitur « voluntas, » ad ostendendum quod actus justitiae debet esset voluntarius; additur autem de constantia et perpetuitate, ad designandam actus firmitatem. Et ideo prædicta definitio est completa definitio justitiae; nisi quod actus ponitur pro habitu, qui per actum specificatur; habitus enim ad actum dicitur. Et si quis vellet eam in debitam formam definitionis reducere, posset sic dicere quod « justitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate jus suum unicuique tribuit. » Et quasi est eadem definitio cum ea quam Philosophus ponit in V Ethicor., cap. v, a med., dicens quod « justitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis dicitur operativus secundum electionem justi. »

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.1] Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what one sees not."

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntas hic nominat actum, non potentiam. Est autem consuetum quod apud auctores habitus per actus definiantur; sicut Augustinus dicit, Super Joan., tract. Lxxix, col. 1837, t. 3, quod « fides est credere quod non vides. »

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.2] Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod neque etiam justitia est essentialiter rectitudo, sed causaliter tantum: est enim habitus secundum quem aliquis recte operatur et vult.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.3] The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all cases.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas potest dici perpetua dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsius actus, qui perpetuo durat, et sic solius Dei voluntas est perpetua; alio modo ex parte objecti, quia scilicet aliquis vult perpetuo facere aliquid, et hoc requiritur ad rationem justitiae; non enim sufficit ad rationem justitiae quod aliquis velit ad horam in aliquo negotio servare justitiam, quia vix inventur aliquis qui velit in omnibus injuste agere; sed requiritur quod homo habeat voluntatem perpetuo et in omnibus justitiam conservandi.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.4] Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the "perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always, "constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quia « perpetuum » non accipitur secundum durationem perpetuam actus voluntatis, non superflue additur « constans, » ut sicut per hoc quod dicitur « perpetua voluntas » designatur quod aliquis gerat in proposito perpetuo justitiam conservandi; ita etiam per hoc quod dicitur « constans, » designetur quod in hoc proposito firmiter perseveret.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.5] A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of execution.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod judex reddit quod suum est per modum imperantis et dirigentis, quia judex est « justum animatum, » et princeps est « custos justi, » ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. iv et vi; sed subditi reddunt quod suum est unicuique per modum executionis.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.6] Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as stated above (Question 25, Article 1), so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due.

[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut in dilectione Dei includitur dilectio proximi, ut supra dictum est, ita etiam in hoc quod homo servit Deo, includitur quod unicuique reddat quod debet.

Article 2

[II-II.q.58.a.2.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the Apostle says (Romans 3:22) that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia non sit virtus. Dicitur enim Luc., xvii, 40: Cum feceritis omnia quæ præcepta sunt vobis, dicite: Servi inutiles sumus; quod debuimus facere fecimus. Sed non est inutile facere opus virtutis; dicit enim Ambrosius in II De offic., cap. vi, § 23, col. 416, t. 3: « Utilitatem non pecuniarii lucri æstimationem dicimus, sed acquisitionem pietatis. » Ergo facere quod quis debet facere, non est opus virtutis. Est In Parm.: « est. » — Sic cod.; in edit.: « respectum. » — Sic cod.; in edit.: « æqualitas. » — « Estimatione subducimus, sed acquisitionem pietatis. » autem opus justitiae. Ergo justitia non est virtus.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive appetite is subject to man, according to Genesis 4:7, where it is written: "The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards oneself.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards another.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.arg.4] Objection 4. Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified by justice, according to Proverbs 11:5, "The justice of the upright shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut operationes quæ sunt ad alterum indigent rectificari, ita etiam operationes quæ sunt ad seipsum. Sed per justitiam rectificantur operationes, secundum illud Proverb., xi, 5: Justitia simplis dirigit viam ejus. Ergo justitia non est solum circa ea quæ sunt ad alterum, sed etiam circa ea quæ sunt ad seipsum.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.sc] On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit in II Moral., cap. xlix, § 76, col. 592, t. 1, quod « in quatuor virtutibus, » scilicet temperantia, prudentia, fortitudine et justitia, « tota bona operis structura consurgit. »

[II-II.q.58.a.2.co] I answer that, As stated above (Question 57, Article 1) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (57, 1; I-II, 113, 1) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [Cf. I, 29, 2] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."

[II-II.q.58.a.2.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated above (I-II, 113, 1) where we were treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum aliquis facit quod debet, non affert utilitatem lucri ei cui facit quod debet, sed solum abstinet a damno ejus; sibi tamen facit utilitatem, inquantum spontanea et prompta voluntate facit illud quod debet; quod est virtuose agere. Unde dicitur Sap., viii, 7, quod sapientia Dei sobrietatem et justitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem, quibus in vita nihil est utilius hominibus, scilicet virtuosis.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. God's justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with God.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod justitia non consistit circa exteriores res, quantum ad facere quod pertinet ad artem, sed quantum ad hoc quod utitur eis ad alterum.

[II-II.q.58.a.2.ad.4] Reply to Objection 4. Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice.

Article 3

[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written (Luke 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.2] Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quod fit ex necessitate non est meritorium. Sed reddere alicui quod suum est, quod pertinet ad justitiam, est necessitatis. Ergo non est meritorium. Actibus autem virtutum meremur. Ergo justitia non est virtus.

[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.3] Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) [Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis virtus moralis est circa agibilia. Ea autem quæ exterius constituentur non sunt agibilia, sed factibilia, ut patet per Philosophum in IX Metaph., text. 46. Cum ergo ad justitiam pertineat exterius facere aliquod opus secundum se justum, videtur quod justitia non sit virtus moralis.

[II-II.q.58.a.3.sc] Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice

[II-II.q.58.a.3.co] A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man himself good" [Ethic. ii, 6, and this can be applied to justice. For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all in justice."

[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.1] When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously. Hence it is written (Wisdom 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in life."

[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.2] Necessity is twofold. One arises from "constraint," and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a "command," or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Corinthians 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me."

[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex est necessitas : una coactionis, et hæc, quia repugnat voluntati, tollit rationem meriti. Alia autem est necessitas ex obligatione præcepti, sive ex necessitate finis, quando scilicet aliquis non potest consequi finem virtutis, nisi hoc faciat; et talis necessitas non excludit rationem meriti, inquantum aliquis hoc quod sic est necessarium, voluntarie agit; excludit tamen gloriam supererogationis, secundum illud I ad Corinth., ix, 16: Si evangelizavero, non est mihi gloria, necessitas enim mihi incumbit.

[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.3] Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other men.

Article 4

[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia non sit in voluntate sicut in subjecto; justitia enim quandoque veritas dicitur. Sed veritas non est voluntatis, sed intellectus. Ergo justitia non est in voluntate sicut in subjecto.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.2] Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, justitia est circa ea quæ sunt ad alterum. Sed ordinare aliquid ad alterum est rationis. Justitia ergo non est in voluntate sicut in subjecto, sed magis in ratione.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.3] Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is "rational by participation," viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, justitia non est virtus intellectualis, cum non ordinetur ad cognitionem; unde relinquitur quod sit virtus moralis. Sed subjectum virtutis moralis est « rationale per participationem, » quod est irascibilis et concupiscibilis, ut patet per Philosophum in I Ethic., cap. ult. Ergo justitia non est in voluntate sicut in subjecto, sed magis in irascibilis et concupiscibilis.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.sc] Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake."

[II-II.q.58.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Anselmus dicit, lib. De veritate, cap. xii, col. 482, t. 4, quod « justitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata. »

[II-II.q.58.a.4.co] The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.

Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in I, 81, 2. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (Article 1).

[II-II.q.58.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illa potentia est subjectum virtutis, ad cujus potentiae actum rectificandum virtus ordinatur. Justitia autem non ordinatur ad dirigendum aliquem actum cognoscitivum; non enim dicimur justi ex hoc quod recte aliquid cognoscimus. Et ideo subjectum justitiae non est intellectus, vel ratio, quae est potentia cognoscitiva. Sed quia justi in hoc dicimur quod aliquid recte agimus, proximum autem prin- cipium actus est vis appetitiva, necesse est quod justitia sit in aliqua vi appetitiva sicut in subjecto. Est autem duplex appetitus: scilicet voluntas, quæ est in ratione; et appetitus sensitivus consequens apprehensionem sensus, qui dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem, ut in I habitum est. Reddere autem unicuique quod suum est, non potest procedere ex appetitu sensitivo, quia apprehensio sensitiva non se extendit ad hoc quod considerare possit proportionem unius ad alterum; sed hoc est proprium rationis. Unde justitia non potest esse sicut in subjecto in irascibili vel concupiscibili, sed solum in voluntate. Et ideo Philosophus, lib. V Ethic., cap. 1, a princ., definit justitiam per actum voluntatis, ut ex supra dictis patet.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.1] Since the will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia voluntas est appetitus rationalis, ideo rectitudo rationis, quæ veritas dicitur, voluntati impressa, propter propinquitatem ad rationem nomen retinet veritatis; et inde est quod quandoque justitia veritas vocatur.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.2] The will is borne towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, and this belongs to justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas fertur in suum objectum consequenter ad apprehensionem rationis; et ideo quia ratio ordinat in alterum, voluntas potest velle aliquid in ordine ad alterum, quod pertinet ad justitiam.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.3] Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are "rational by participation," but the entire "appetitive" faculty, as stated in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of moral virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod « rationale per participationem » non solum est irascibile et concupiscibile, sed omnino « appetitivum, » ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. ult.; quia « omnis appetitus obedit rationi. » Sub appetitivo autem comprehenditur voluntas; et ideo voluntas potest esse subjectum virtutis moralis.

Article 5

[II-II.q.58.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wisdom 8:7, "She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not a general virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia non sit virtus generalis. Justi- 1 Sic cod.; in Parm. : « non potest esse. » Negant Scotistæ proprium esse justitia et virtutum ipsi annexarum subjectari in voluntate, quia virtus est habitus electivus, et ipsius est rectam facere electionem. Debet ergo subjectari in ea potentia cujus est eligere : hæc autem est voluntas. Sed virtus dicitur habitus electivus dispositive, non elicitive, quatenus rectificando passiones in appetitu sensitivo disponit voluntatem ad rectam electionem. Unde virtus non necessario, quia habitus electivus est, in voluntate subjectatur. dat legi ordinanti actus omnium virtutum in bonum commune.

[II-II.q.58.a.5.arg.2] Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.5.arg.3] Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (Article 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.5.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is every virtue."

[II-II.q.58.a.5.co] Justice, as stated above (Article 2) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, 90, 2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.1] Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on (A07,12).

[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia condividitur seu connumeratur aliis virtutibus, non inquantum est generalis, sed inquantum est specialis virtus, ut infra dicetur.

[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.2] Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.

[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod temperantia et fortitudo sunt in appetitu sensitivo, id est in concupiscibili et irascibili. Hujusmodi autem vires sunt appetitivæ quorumdam bonorum particularium, sicut et sensus est particularium cognoscitivus. Sed justitia est sicut in subjecto in appetitu intellectivo, qui potest esse universalis boni, cujus intellectus est apprehensivus. Et ideo justitia magis potest esse virtus generalis quam temperantia vel fortitudo.

[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.3] Things referable to oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written (1 John 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."

[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa quæ sunt ad seipsum, sunt ordinabilia ad alterum, præcipue quantum ad bonum commune. Unde et justitia legalis, secundum quod ordinat ad bonum commune, potest dici virtus generalis; et eadem ratione injustitia potest dici peccatum commune; unde dicitur I Joan., Ⅲ, 4, quod omne peccatum est iniquitas.

Article 6

[II-II.q.58.a.6.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia, secundum quod est generalis, sit idem per essentiam cum omni virtute. Dicit enim Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. Ⅰ, in fin., quod « virtus et justitia legalis est eadem omni virtuti, esse autem non est idem. » Sed illa quæ differunt solum secundum esse, vel secundum rationem, non different secundum essentiam. Ergo justitia est idem secundum essentiam cum omni virtute.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis virtus quæ non est idem per essentiam cum omni virtute, est pars virtutis. Sed justitia prædicta, ut ibidem Philosophus dicit, « non est pars virtutis sed tota virtus. » Ergo prædicta justitia est idem essentialiter cum omni virtute.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per hoc quod aliqua virtus ordinat actum suum ad altiorem finem, non diversificatur secundum essentiam habitus; sicut idem est essentialiter habitus temperantia, etiamsi actus ejus ordinetur ad bonum divinum. Sed ad justitiam legalem pertinet quod actus omnium virtutum ordinentur ad altiorem finem, id est, ad bonum commune multitudinis, quod præeminet bono unius singularis personæ. Ergo videtur quod justitia legalis essentialiter sit omnis virtus.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.arg.4] Objection 4. Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.arg.4] 4. Præterea, omne bonum partis ordinabile est ad bonum totius; unde si non ordinetur in illud, videtur esse vanum et frustra. Sed illud quod est secundum virtutem, non potest esse hujusmodi. Ergo videtur quod nullus actus possit esse alicujus virtutis, qui non pertineat ad justitiam generalem, quæ ordinat in bonum commune: et sic videtur quod justitia generalis sit idem in essentia cum omni virtute.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.sc] On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the other.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. Ⅰ, paulo ante fin., quod « multi in propriis quidem possunt virtute uti, in his autem quæ ad alterum sunt, non possunt; » et in III Polit., cap. Ⅲ, ante med., dicit quod « non est simpliciter eadem virtus boni viri et boni civis. » Sed virtus boni civis est justitia generalis, per quam aliquis ordinatur ad bonum commune. Ergo non est eadem justitia generalis cum virtute communi; sed una potest sine alia haberi.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.co] I answer that, A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by "predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general "virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (5), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.

However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.

Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod generale dicitur aliquid dupliciter : uno modo per prædicationem; sicut animal est generale ad hominem et equum, et ad alia hujusmodi; et hoc modo generale oportet quod sit idem essentialiter cum his ad quæ est generale, quia genus pertinet ad essentiam speciei et cadit in definitione ejus. Alio modo dicitur aliquid generale secundum virtutem, sicut causa universalis est generalis ad omnes suos effectus, ut sol ad omnia corpora, quæ illuminantur, vel immutantur per virtutem ipsius; et hoc modo generale non oportet quod sit idem in essentia cum his ad quæ est generale; quia non est eadem essentia causae et effectus. Hoc autem modo, secundum prædicta, justitia legalis dicitur esse virtus generalis, in quantum scilicet ordinat actus aliarum virtutum ad suum finem, quod est movere per imperium omnes alias virtutes; sicut enim charitas potest dici virtus generalis, inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum divinum, ita etiam justitia legalis, inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum commune. Sicut ergo charitas, quæ respicit bonum divinum ut proprium objectum, est quædam specialis virtus secundum suam essentiam, ita etiam justitia legalis est quædam specialis virtus secundum suam essentiam, secundum quod respicit commune bonum ut proprium objectum. Et sic est in principe principaliter et quasi architectonice, in subditis autem secundario et quasi ministrative. Potest tamen quælibet virtus, secundum quod a prædicta virtute, speciali quidem in essentia, generali autem secundum virtutem, ordinatur ad bonum commune, dici justitia legalis; et hoc modo loquendi justitia legalis est idem in essentia cum omni virtute; differt autem ratione. Et hoc modo loquitur Philosophus. Unde patet responsio ad primum et secundum.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam illa ratio secundum hunc modum procedit de justitia legali, secundum quod virtus imperata a justitia legali, justitia legalis dicitur.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.ad.4] Reply to Objection 4. Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.6.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quælibet virtus secundum propriam rationem ordinat actum suum ad proprium finem illius virtutis; quod autem ordinetur ad ulteriorem finem sive semper sive aliquando, hoc non habetur ex propria ratione; sed oportet esse aliam superiorem virtutem, a qua in illum finem ordinetur; et sic oportet esse unam virtutem superiorem, quæ ordinet omnes virtutes in bonum commune, quæ est justitia legalis, et est alia per essentiam ab omni virtute.

Article 7

[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit aliqua justitia particularis præter justitiam generalem. In virtutibus enim nihil est superfluum, sicut nec in natura. Sed justitia generalis sufficienter ordinat hominem circa omnia quæ ad alterum sunt. Ergo non est necessaria aliqua justitia particularis.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.2] Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the multitude, as shown above (A5,6). Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unum et multa non diversificant speciem virtutis. Sed justitia legalis ordinat hominem ad alterum, secundum ea quæ ad multitudinem pertinent, ut ex prædictis patet. Ergo non est alia species justitiae quæ ordinet hominem ad alterum in his quæ pertinent ad unam singularem personam.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.3] Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter unam singularem personam et multitudinem civitatis media est multitudo domestica. Si ergo est justitia alia particularis per comparisonem ad unam personam præter justitiam generalem, pari ratione debet esse alia justitiaeconomica, quæ ordinet hominem ad bonum commune unius familiæ; quod quidem non dicitur. Ergo nec aliqua particularis justitia est præter justitiam legalem.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.sc] Chrysostom in his commentary on Matthew 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."

[II-II.q.58.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus, Super illud Matth., v: Beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt justitiam, dicit, Hom. xv, §4, col. 486, t. 11: « Justitiam autem dicit vel universalem virtutem, vel particularem, avaritiæ contrariam. »

[II-II.q.58.a.7.co] As stated above (Article 6), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, justitia legalis non est essentialiter om- In Parm. : « administrative. » — In Parm. : « habet. » — Edit. Vivès. Sunt qui putant justitiam generalem non esse specialem virtutem, sed rationem quamdam omni virtuti communem, ita quod quatenus fortitudo, v. g., movet militem ad strenue pugnandum propter honestatem propriam fortitudinis, sortiatur nomen fortitudinis; quatenus vero movet ad sic dimicandum propter bonum commune dicatur justitia generalis. Similiter de temperantia, justitia particulari et aliis virtutibus. Sed justitia gene- ralis est specialis virtus a cæteris virtutibus realiter distincta. Si dicas hanc justitiam generalem amplecti omnes virtutes, nec esse partem virtutis, sed totam et integram virtutem juxta Philosophum, V Ethic., cap. 1. — Respondetur sensum Philosophi esse quod quæcumque virtus prout a justitia generali imperatur, potest denominari justitia generalis, eo sensu quo quælibet virtus prout a charitate imperatur, potest dici quodammodo charitas, et charitatis præceptum tota lex. nis virtus; sed oportet praeter justitiam legalem, quæ ordinat hominem immediate ad bonum commune, esse alias virtutes quæ immediate ordinant hominem circa particularia bona; quæ quidem possunt esse vel ad seipsum, vel ad alteram singularem personam. Sicut ergo praeter justitiam legalem oportet esse aliquas virtutes particulares, quæ ordinent hominem in seipso, puta temperantiam et fortitudinem; ita etiam praeter justitiam legalem oportet esse particularem quamdam justitiam, quæ ordinet hominem circa ea quæ sunt ad alteram singularem personam.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.1] Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia legalis sufficienter quidem ordinat hominem in his quæ sunt ad alterum; quantum ad commune quidem bonum immediate; quantum autem ad bonum unius singularis personæ, mediate. Et ideo oportet esse aliquam particularem justitiam, quæ immediate ordinet hominem ad bonum alterius singularis personæ.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.2] The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the "few," but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the "common" good differs from the aspect of the "individual" good, even as the aspect of "whole" differs from that of "part." Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically."

[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum commune civitatis et bonum singulare unius personæ non differunt solum secundum multum et paucum, sed secundum formalem differentiam. Alia enim est ratio boni communis et boni singularis, sicut alia est ratio totius et partis. Et ideo Philosophus in I Polit., cap. 1, circa princ., dicit quod « non bene dicunt qui dicunt civitatem et domum, et alia hujusmodi, differre solum multitudine, et paucitate, et non specie. »

[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.3] The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely "of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. "domestic" justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.

[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod domestica multitudo, secundum Philosophum in I Polit., cap. 11, distinguitur secundum tres conjugationes: scilicet uxoris et viri, patris et filii, domini et servi; quarum personarum una est quasi aliquid alterius. Et ideo ad hujusmodi personas non est simpliciter justitia, sed quædam justitiae species, scilicet economica, ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. vi et ult., in fin.

Article 8

[II-II.q.58.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. Because a gloss on Genesis 2:14, "The fourth river is Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia particularis non habeat mate- riam specialem. Quia super illud Gen., ii, 14: Fluvius quartus ipse est Euphrates, dicit Glossa ordin., ex August., lib. II De Gen. cont. Manich., cap. x, col. 204, t. 3: « Euphrates, frugifer, interpretatur; nec dicitur contra quos vadat, quia justitia ad omnes animæ partes pertinet. » Hoc autem non esset, si haberet materiam specialem: quia quælibet materia specialis, ad aliquam specialem potentiam pertinet. Ergo justitia particularis non habet materiam specialem. 2. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. lx1, § 4, col. 51, t. 6, quod « quatuor sunt animæ virtutes, quibus in hac vita spiritualiter vivitur, scilicet temperantia, prudentia, fortitudo et justitia; » et dicit quod quarta « est justitia, quæ per omnes diffunditur. » Ergo justitia particularis, quæ est una de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, non habet specialem materiam. 3. Praeterea, justitia dirigit hominem sufficienter in his quæ sunt ad alterum. Sed per omnia quæ sunt hujus vitæ, homo po-test ordinari ad alterum. Ergo materia justitiae est generalis, et non specialis.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.arg.3] Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.sc] The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. ii, a med., ponit justitiam particularem circa ea specialiter quæ pertinent ad communicationem vitæ.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.co] Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnia quæ-cumque rectificari possunt per rationem, sunt materia virtutis moralis, quæ definitur per rationem rectam, ut patet per Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. ii et vi. Possunt autem per rationem rectificari et interiores animæ passiones, et exteriores actiones, et res exteriores, quæ in usum hominis veniunt. Sed tamen per exteriores actiones, et per exteriores res quibus sibi invicem homines communicare possunt, attenditur ordinatio unius hominis ad alterum; secundum autem interiores passiones, consideratur rectificatio hominis in seipso. Et ideo cum justitia ordinetur ad alterum, non est circa totam materiam virtutis moralis, sed solum circa exteriores actiones et res, secundum quamdam rationem objecti specialem, prout scilicet secundum eas unus homo alteri coordinatur.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.1] It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind of diffusion.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia pertinet quidem essentialiter ad unam partem animæ in qua est sicut in subjecto, scilicet ad voluntatem, quæ quidem movet per suum imperium omnes animæ partes; et sic justitia non directe, sed quasi per quamdam redundantiam ad omnes alias animæ partes pertinet.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.2] As stated above (I-II, 61, 3,4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. On this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one man and another."

[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes cardinales dupliciter accipiuntur : uno modo secundum quod sunt speciales virtutes habentes determinatas materias; alio modo secundum quod significant quosdam generales modos virtutis; et hoc modo loquitur ibi Augustinus : dicit enim quod « prudentia est cognitio rerum appetendarum et fugiendarum; temperantia est refrenatio cupiditatis ab iis quæ temporaliter delectant; fortitudo est firmitas animi adversus ea quæ temporaliter molesta sunt; justitia est quæ per cæteras diffunditur, dilectio Dei et proximi, » quæ scilicet est communis radix totius ordinis ad alterum.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.3] A man's internal passions which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.

[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod passiones interiores quæ sunt pars materiæ moralis, secundum se non ordinantur ad alterum, quod pertinet ad specialem rationem justitiae; sed earum effectus sunt ad alterum ordinabiles, scilicet operationes exteriores. Unde non sequitur quod materia justitiae sit generalis.

Article 9

[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above [I-II, 23, 4; I-II, 31, 1; I-II, 35, 1] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the passions.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia sit circa passiones. Dicit enim Philosophus, in II Ethic., cap. 111, circa princ., quod « circa voluptates et tristitias est moralis virtus. » Voluptas autem, id est, delectatio et tristitia, sunt passiones quædam, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Ergo justitia, cum sit virtus moralis, erit circa passiones.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.2] Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the passions.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per justitiam rectificantur operationes quæ sunt ad alterum. Sed operationes hujusmodi rectificari non possunt, 1 Parm. addit: « alias. » Juxta Richardum virtus potest esse circa aliquid tripliciter : per se et primo; per se et non primo; per accidens et ex consequenti. Justitia est circa passiones tertio modo, inquantum juvat fortitudinem et temperantiam quæ sunt circa pas-nisi passiones sint rectificatæ; quia ex inordinatione passionum provenit inordinatio in prædictis operationibus : propter concupiscentiam enim venereorum proceditur ad adulterium, et propter superfluum amorem pecuniæ proceditur ad furtum. Ergo oportet quod justitia sit circa passiones.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.3] Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut justitia particularis est ad alterum, ita etiam et justitia legalis. Sed justitia legalis est circa passiones; alioquin non se extenderet ad omnes virtutes, quarum quædam sunt manifeste circa passiones. Ergo justitia est circa passiones.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. 1 et 11, quod est circa operations.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.co] The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above (I-II, 22, 3; I-II, 59, 4), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the passions.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hujus quaestionis veritas ex duobus apparet : primo quidem ex ipso subjecto justitiae, quod est voluntas; cujus motus vel actus non sunt passiones, ut supra habitum est; sed solum motus appetitus sensitivi passiones dicuntur; et ideo justitia non est circa passiones, sicut temperantia et fortitudo, quæ sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sunt circa passiones. Alio modo ex parte materiae; quia justitia est circa ea quæ sunt ad alterum, non autem per passiones exteriores immediate ad alterum ordinamur. Et ideo justitia circa passiones non est.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.1] Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions" (Ethic. i, 8).

[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non quælibet virtus moralis est circa voluptates et tristitias sicut circa materiam; nam fortitudo est circa timores et audacias; sed omnis virtus moralis ordinatur ad delectationem et tristitiam, sicut ad quosdam fines consequentes: quia, ut Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. x1, in princ., « delectatio et tristitia est finis principalis, ad quem respiientes, unumquodque hoc quidem malum, hoc. autem bonum dicimus; » et hoc modo pertinent etiam ad justitiam, quia « non est justus qui non gaudet justis operationibus, » ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. v11, a med.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.2] External operations are as it were between external things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not from the internal passions but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod operationes exteriores media sunt quodammodo inter res exteriores, quae sunt earum materia, et inter passiones exteriores, quae sunt ea-siones. Justus enim firmiter vult servare aequalitatem in operationibus ad alterum; sed videt hanc impediri per inordinationem passionum, ideoque passionum moderationem imperat, et imperando coadjuvat. rum principia. Contingit autem quandoque esse defectum in uno eorum, sine hoc quod sit defectus in alio; sicut si aliquis surripiat rem alterius non cupiditate habendi, sed voluntate nocendi; vel e converso, si aliquis alterius rem concupiscat, quam tamen surripere non velit. Rectificatio ergo operationum, secundum quod ad exteriora terminatur, pertinet ad justitiam; sed rectificatio earum, secundum quod a passionibus oriuntur, pertinet ad alias virtutes morales, quae sunt circa passiones. Unde surreptionem alienæ rei justitia impedit inquantum est contra æqualitatem in exterioribus constituentam; liberalitas vero inquantum procedit ab immoderata concupiscentia divitiarum. Sed quia operationes exteriores non habent speciem ab interioribus passionibus, sed magis a rebus exterioribus sicut ex objectis, ideo per se loquendo operationes exteriores magis sunt materia justitiæ quam aliarum virtutum moralium.

[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.3] The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v, 5).

[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod bonum commune est finis singularum personarum in communitate existentium; sicut bonum totius, finis est cujuslibet partium. Bonum autem unius personæ singularis non est finis alterius. Et ideo justitia legalis, quæ ordinatur ad bonum commune, magis se potest extendere ad interiores passiones, quibus homo aliqualiter disponitur in seipso, quam justitia particularis, quæ ordinatur ad bonum alterius singularis personæ; quam vis justitia legalis principalius se extendat ad alias virtutes quantum ad exteriores operationes earum, inquantum scilicet præcipit lex « fortis opera facere, et quæ temperati, et quæ mansueti, » ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. 11, a princ.

Article 10

[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice observes the rational and not the real mean.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod medium justitiæ non sit medium rei. Ratio enim generis salvatur in omnibus speciebus. Sed virtus moralis in II Ethic., cap. vi, definitur esse « habitus electivus in medietate existens determinata ratione quoad nos. » Ergo et in justitia est medium rationis non rei.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.2] Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in his quæ simpliciter sunt bona non est accipere superfluum et diminutum, et per consequens nec medium, sicut patet de virtutibus, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. vi, ad fin. Sed justitia est circa simpliciter bona, ut dicitur in V Ethic., c. 1, parum ante med. Ergo in justitia non est medium rei.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.3] Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in aliis virtutibus ideo dicitur esse medium rationis, et non rei, quia diversimode accipitur per comparisonem ad diversas personas; quia « quod uni est multum, alteri est parum, » ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. vi, ante med. Sed hoc etiam observatur in justitia; non enim eadem poena punitur qui percutit principem, et qui percutit privatam personam. Ergo etiam justitia non habet medium rei, sed medium rationis.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion, so that it is the real mean.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus, in II Ethic., cap. vi et vii, et lib. V, cap. 11 et iv, assignat medium justitiæ secundum proportionalitatem arithmeticam, quod est medium rei.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.co] As stated above (09; I-II, 59, 4), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard.

On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in Metaph. x [Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4: wherefore justice observes the real mean.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, aliæ virtutes morales principaliter consistunt circa passiones; quarum rectificatio non attenditur, nisi secundum comparisonem ad ipsum hominem, cujus sunt passiones, secundum scilicet quod irascitur et concupiscit, prout debet, secundum diversas circumstantias. Et ideo medium talium virtutum non accipitur secundum proportionem unius rei ad alteram, sed solum secundum comparisonem ad ipsum virtuosum; et propter hoc in ipsis est medium solum secundum rationem quoad nos. Sed materia justitiæ est exterior operatio, secundum quod ipsa vel res cujus est usus, debitam proportionem habet ad aliam personam: et ideo medium justitiæ consistit in quadam proportionis æqualitate rei exterioris ad personam exteriorem. Æquale autem est realiter medium inter majus et minus, ut dicitur in X Metaph., text. 19; unde justitia habet medium rei.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.1] This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc medium rei est etiam medium rationis, et ideo in justitia salvatur ratio virtutis moralis.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.2] We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good simply.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum simpliciter dupliciter dicitur : uno modo quod est omnibus modis bonum, sicut virtutes sunt bonæ; et sic in his quæ sunt bona simpliciter, non est accipere medium et extrema; alio modo dicitur aliquid simpliciter bonum, quia est absolute bonum, scilicet secundum suam naturam consideratum, quamvis per abusum possit fieri malum, sicut patet de divitiis et honoribus; et in talibus potest accipi « superfluum, et diminutum, et medium, » quantum ad homines, qui possunt eis uti vel bene vel male; et sic circa simpliciter bona dicitur esse justitia.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.3] The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.

[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod injuria illata aliam proportionem habet ad principem, et aliam ad personam privatam; et ideo oportet aliter adæquare utramque injuriam per vindictam; quod pertinet ad diversitatem rei, et non solum ad diversitatem rationis.

Article 11

[II-II.q.58.a.11.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.arg.1] Ad undecimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod actus justitiae non sit reddere unicuique quod suum est. Augustinus enim, XIV De Trinit., cap. ix, col. 4046, t. 8, attribuit justitiae subvenire miseris. Sed in subveniendo miseris non tribuimus eis quæ sunt eorum, sed magis quæ sunt nostra. Ergo justitiae actus non est tribuere unicuique quod suum est.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Tullius, in lib. De offic., tit. « De justitia, » circa princ., dicit quod « beneficentia, quam benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellare licet, ad justitiam pertinet. » Sed liberalitatis est de proprio dare alicui, non de eo quod est ejus. Ergo justitiae actus non est reddere unicuique quod suum est.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each one his own.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad justitiam pertinet non solum res dispensare debito modo, sed etiam injuriosas actiones cohibere, puta homicidia, adulteria et alia hujusmodi. Sed reddere quod suum est, videtur solum ad dispensationem rerum pertinere. Ergo non sufficienter per hoc notificatur actus justitiae, quod dicitur actus ejus esse reddere unicuique quod suum est.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.sc] On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity."

[II-II.q.58.a.11.sc] Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit in I De offic., cap. xxiv, § 415, col. 62, t. 3: « Justitia est quae suum cuique tribuit, alienum non vindicat; utilitatem propriam negligit, ut communem aequitatem custodiat. »

[II-II.q.58.a.11.co] I answer that, As stated above (A8,10), the matter of justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, materia justitiae est operatio exterior, secundum quod ipsa, vel res qua per eam utimur, proportionatur alteri personæ, ad quam per justitiam ordinamur. Hoc autem dicitur esse suum unicuique personæ quod ei secundum proportionis aequalitatem debetur; et ideo proprius actus justitiae nihil aliud est quam reddere unicuique quod suum est.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with it, as we shall state further on (80, 1). Wherefore to succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitiae, cum sit virtus cardinalis, quædam aliæ virtutes secundariæ adjunguntur, sicut misericordia, liberalitas et aliæ hujusmodi virtutes, ut infra patebit. Et ideo subvenire miseris, quod pertinet ad misericordiam sive pietatem, et liberaliter benefacere, quod pertinet ad liberalitatem, per quamdam reductionem attribuitur justitiae sicut principali virtuti. Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive, and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to each one of what is his own.

[II-II.q.58.a.11.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. iv, omne superfluum in his quæ ad justitiam pertinent lucrum extenso nomine vocatur; sicut et omne quod minus est, vocatur damnum; et hoc ideo quia justitia prius est exercita, et communius exercetur in voluntariis commutationibus rerum, puta emptione et venditione, in quibus proprie hæc nomina discuntur; et exinde derivantur hæc nomina ad omnia circa quae potest esse justitia. Et eadem ratio est de hoc quod est reddere unicuique quod suum est.

Article 12

[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.1] It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod justitia non præemineat inter omnes virtutes morales. Ad justitiam enim pertinet reddere alteri quod suum est; ad liberalitatem autem pertinet de proprio dare, quod virtuosius est. Ergo liberalitas est major virtus quam justitia.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.2] Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent than justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil ornatur nisi per aliquid dignius se. Sed magnanimitas est ornamentum et justitiae et omnium virtutum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, ante med. Ergo magnanimitas est nobilior quam justitia.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.3] Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and "good," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. Ⅲ. Sed fortitudo est circa magis difficilia quam justitia, id est, circa pericula mortis, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. Ⅵ. Ergo fortitudo est nobilior justitia.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.sc] Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."

[II-II.q.58.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit in I Offic., tit. « De justitia, » in princ.: « In justitia virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua boni viri nominantur. »

[II-II.q.58.a.12.co] If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person. On this sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."

[II-II.q.58.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si loquamur de justitia legali, manifestum est quod ipsa est præclarior inter omnes virtutes morales inquantum bonum commune præeminet bono singulari unius personæ; et secundum hoc Philosophus, in V Ethic., cap. Ⅰ, ante fin., dicit quod « præclarissima virtutum videtur esse justitia, et neque est Hesperus, neque Lucifer ita admirabilis. » Sed etiam si loquimur de justitia particulari, præcellit inter alias virtutes morales duplici ratione: quarum prima potest sumi ex parte subjecti, quia scilicet est in nobiliori parte animæ, id est, in appetitu rationali, scilicet in voluntate, aliis virtutibus moralibus existentibus in appetitu sensitivo, ad quem pertinent passiones, quae sunt materia aliarum virtutum moralium. Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte objecti: nam aliæ virtutes laudantur solum secundum bonum ipsius virtuosi; justitia autem laudatur secundum quod virtuosus ad alium bene se habet; et sic justitia quodammodo est bonum alterius, ut dicitur in V Ethic., c. Ⅰ, aliquant. ante fin. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit in I Rhet., cap. Ⅰx, paulo a princ.: « Necesse est maximas virtutes esse quae sunt aliis utilissimæ: siquidem est virtus potentia benefactiva; propter hoc et fortes, et justos maxime honorant; quoniam fortitudo est utilis in bello, justitia autem et in bello et in pace. »

[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.1] Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod liberalitas etsi de suo det, tamen hoc facit, inquantum in hoc considerat proprie virtutis bonum; justitia autem dat alteri quod suum est, quasi considerans bonum commune; et præterea Ⅰ justitia observatur ad omnes; liberalitas autem ad omnes se extendere non potest; et iterum liberalitas quae de suo dat, supra justitiam fundatur, per quam conservatur unicuique quod suum est.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.2] When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod magnanimitas, quando supervenit justitiae, auget ejus bonitatem; quae tamen sine justitia nec virtutis rationem haberet.

[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.3] Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod fortitudo, etsi consistat circa difficiliora, non tamen est circa meliora, cum sit solum in bello utilis, justitia autem et in bello et in pace, sicut dictum est.

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