Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q58. Justice
Source context
- Theme
- justice as cardinal virtue: its definition, subject, and relation to right-giving in social and moral life
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 68b, 1909-10-21Steiner places justice alongside love as a polar ideal confronting the human ego: justice is described as a 'cold' but necessary ideal that the maturing ego must cultivate, in contrast to the warmth of love.
- GA 159, 1915-01-31Steiner states that one who truly practices the virtue of justice places every thing and every being in its right position, thereby moving beyond self-enclosure into participation in the whole.
- GA 170, 1916-08-06Steiner identifies moral justice as a force that first appears on earth working inwardly against the peripheral tendency of the senses, characterizing it as a centripetal stream in human moral evolution.
- GA 329, 1919-04-02In his social threefolding lectures, Steiner assigns justice properly to the rights-state sphere, arguing that a rights-domain organized around justice as its own principle will naturally harmonize with the other two social members.
- GA 53, 1905-03-23Steiner notes that for the ancient Roman, justice was self-evident — as unquestionable as light itself — marking an earlier stage of humanity's relationship to the virtue before modern individualism complicated it.
- GA 97, 1907-01-19Steiner connects justice to the eighth Beatitude, interpreting Christ's demand that human beings pursue justice as a call to apply the standard of justice first to themselves.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VAristotle defines justice as the complete virtue directed toward another, distinguishing universal justice (lawfulness) from particular justice (fair distribution and rectification) — a structural framework Aquinas inherits and reorganizes in Q58.
- Platonic political philosophyPlato's Republic treats justice as the virtue that assigns each part of the soul and city its proper function, providing a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that justice renders to each their due (ius suum cuique).
- Roman jurisprudence (Ulpian)Aquinas builds Q58's definition directly on Ulpian's formula — justice as the constant will to render to each their right — situating scholastic moral theology within the Roman legal tradition.
Q58. Justice
Article 1
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right" [Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christo non conveniat sedere ad dexteram Dei Patris. Dextera enim et sinistra sunt differentiæ positionum corporalium. Sed nihil corporale convenit Deo, quia Deus spiritus est, ut habetur Joan., iv, 24. Ergo videtur quod Christus non sedeat ad dexteram Patris.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.2] Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si aliquis sedet ad dexteram alicujus, ille sedet ad sinistram ejus. Si ergo Christus sedet ad dexteram Patris, sequitur quod Pater sedeat ad sinistram Filii, quod est inconveniens.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.3] Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sedere et stare videntur oppositionem habere. Sed Stephanus dicit, Act., vii, 55: Ecce video cælos apertos, et Filium hominis stantem ad dexteram* A dextris virtutis Dei. Ergo videtur quod Christus non sedeat ad dexteram Patris.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.4] Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say that it is both "perpetual" and "constant."
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, omne perpetuum est constans, quia est immutabile. Superflue ergo utrumque ponitur in definitione justitiae, et perpetuum et constans.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.5] Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, reddere jus unicuique pertinet ad principem. Ergo si justitia sit unicuique jus suum tribuens, sequitur quod justitia non sit nisi in principe, quod est inconveniens.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.6] Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one his right.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.arg.6] 6. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De moribus Ecclesiæ, cap. xv, col. 1322, t. 1, quod « justitia est amor Deo tantum serviens. » Non ergo reddit unicuique quod suum est.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.co] The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (2). Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others."
Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since "what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.
Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that "justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice."
[II-II.q.58.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in nomine sessionis possumus duo intelligere: videlicet quietem, secundum illud Luc., ult., 49: Sedete hic in civitate; et etiam regiam, vel judiciariam potestatem, secundum illud Proverb., xx, 8: Rex qui sedet in solio judicii, dissipat omne malum intuitu suo. Utroque ergo modo Christo convenit sedere ad dexteram Patris: uno quidem modo, inquantum æternaliter manet incorruptibilis in beatitudine Patris, quæ ejus dextera dicitur secundum illud ps. xv, 10: Delectationes in dextera tua usque in finem. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. I De symbolo, cap. iv, col. 634, t. 6: « Sedet ad dexteram Patris. Sedere intelligite habitare, quomodo dicimus de quocumque homine: In illa patria sedit per tres annos. Sic ergo credite habitare Christum in dextera Dei Patris; beatus enim est, et ipsius beatitudinis nomen est dextera Patris. » Alio modo dicitur Christus sedere ad dexteram Dei Patris, inquantum Patri conregnat, et ab eo habet judiciariam potestatem; sicut ille qui consedet regi ad dexteram, assistit ei in regnando, et judicando. Unde Augustinus dicit in alio Serm. de symbolo, lib. II, cap. vii, col. 646, t. 6: « Ipsam dexteram intelligite potestatem, quam acceptit homo ille susceptus a Deo, ut veniat judicaturus, qui prius venerat judicandus. »
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.1] Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what one sees not."
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Damascenus dicit in IV lib. Orth. fid., cap. ii, col. 1403, t. 4, « non localem dexteram Patris dicimus; qualiter enim qui incircumscriptibilis est, localem adipiscitur dexteram? Dextera enim et sinistra eorum quae circumscribuntur, sunt. Dexteram autem Patris dicimus gloriam et honorem divinitatis. 》 Ad secundum, dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit, secundum quod sedere ad dexteram intelligitur corporaliter. Unde Augustinus dicit in quodam Sermone de symb., I, cap. iv, § 11, col. 634, t. 6: « Si carnaliter acceperimus quod Christus sedet ad dexteram Patris, ille erit ad sinistram. Ibi autem, » scilicet in æterna beatitudine, « omnis dextera est, quia nulla ibi est miseria. 》 Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Gregorius dicit in Hom. Ascens., xxix in Evang., § 7, col. 1247, t. 2, « sedere judicantis est, stare vero pugnantis vel adjuvantis. Stephanus ergo in labore certaminis positus stantem vidit, quem adjutorem habuit. Sed hunc post ascensionem Marcus sedere describit, quia post ascensionis suæ gloriam judex in fine videbitur. 》 Conclusio. — Convenit Christo ad dexteram Dei Patris sedere, inquantum æternaliter incorruptibilis manet in gloria Patris, et illi conregnans ab eo suscipit omnium judiciariam potestatem.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.2] Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod neque etiam justitia est essentialiter rectitudo, sed causaliter tantum: est enim habitus secundum quem aliquis recte operatur et vult.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.3] The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all cases.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas potest dici perpetua dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsius actus, qui perpetuo durat, et sic solius Dei voluntas est perpetua; alio modo ex parte objecti, quia scilicet aliquis vult perpetuo facere aliquid, et hoc requiritur ad rationem justitiae; non enim sufficit ad rationem justitiae quod aliquis velit ad horam in aliquo negotio servare justitiam, quia vix inventur aliquis qui velit in omnibus injuste agere; sed requiritur quod homo habeat voluntatem perpetuo et in omnibus justitiam conservandi.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.4] Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the "perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always, "constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quia « perpetuum » non accipitur secundum durationem perpetuam actus voluntatis, non superflue additur « constans, » ut sicut per hoc quod dicitur « perpetua voluntas » designatur quod aliquis gerat in proposito perpetuo justitiam conservandi; ita etiam per hoc quod dicitur « constans, » designetur quod in hoc proposito firmiter perseveret.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.5] A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of execution.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod judex reddit quod suum est per modum imperantis et dirigentis, quia judex est « justum animatum, » et princeps est « custos justi, » ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. iv et vi; sed subditi reddunt quod suum est unicuique per modum executionis.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.6] Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as stated above (Question 25, Article 1), so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due.
[II-II.q.58.a.1.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut in dilectione Dei includitur dilectio proximi, ut supra dictum est, ita etiam in hoc quod homo servit Deo, includitur quod unicuique reddat quod debet.
Article 3
[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written (Luke 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sedere ad dexteram Patris non conveniat Christo secundum quod est homo. Ut enim Damascenus dicit, lib. IV Orth. fid., cap. 11, col. 4103, t. 1, « dexteram Patris dicimus gloriam et honorem divinitatis. » Sed honor et gloria divinitatis non convenit Christo, secundum quod est homo. Ergo videtur quod Christus secundum quod homo non sedeat ad dexteram Patris.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.2] Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sedere ad dexteram regnantis subjectionem excludere videtur; quia qui sedet ad dexteram regnantis, quodammodo illi conregnat. Christus autem, secundum quod homo, est subjectus Patri, ut dicitur I ad Cor., xv. Ergo videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, non sit ad dexteram Patris.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.3] Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) [Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Rom., viii, super illud: Qui est ad dexteram Dei, exponit Glossa ord., col. 499, t. 2, id est, « aequalis Patri, in honore, quo Deus Pater est: » vel ad dexteram Patris, id est, « in potioribus bonis Dei. » Et super illud Hebr., i: Sedet ad dexteram majestatis in excelsis, Glossa, id est, « ad aequalitatem Patris super omnia, et loco, et dignitate. » Sed esse aequalem Deo non convenit Christo, secundum quod est homo; nam secundum hoc ipse dicit Joan., xiv, 28: Pater major me est. Ergo videtur quod sedere ad dexteram Patris non conveniat Christo, secundum quod homo.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.sc] Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice
[II-II.q.58.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in II Sermone de symbolo, cap. vii, col. 646, t. 6: « Ipsam dexteram intelligite potestatem quam accepit ille homo susceptus a Deo, ut veniat judicaturus, qui prius venerat judicandus. »
[II-II.q.58.a.3.co] A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man himself good" [Ethic. ii, 6, and this can be applied to justice. For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all in justice."
[II-II.q.58.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dic-tum est, nomine dexteræ Patris intelligitur vel ipsa gloria deitatis ipsius, vel beatitudo aeterna ejus, vel potestas judiciaria et regalis. Hæc autem præpositio « ad » quemdam accessum ad dexteram designat; in quo designatur convenientia cum quadam distinctione, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem potest esse tripli-citer: uno modo, ut sit convenientia in natura, et distinctio in persona: et sic Christus, secundum quod Filius Dei, sedet ad dexteram Patris, quia habet eamdem naturam cum Patre; unde prædicta convenientia liter Filio, sicut et Patri; et hoc est esse in aequalitate Patris. Alio modo secundum gratiam unionis, quae importat e converso distinctionem naturæ, et unitatem personæ. Et secundum hoc Christus, secundum quod homo, est Filius Dei, et per consequens sedens ad dexteram Patris; ita tamen quod ly « secundum quod » non designet conditionem naturæ, sed unitatem suppositi, ut supra expositum 4 est. Tertio modo potest prædictus accessus intelligigi secundum gratiam habitualem, quae abundantior est in Christo præ omnibus aliis creaturis, intantum quod ipsa natura humana in Christo est beatior cæteris creaturis, et super omnes alias creaturas habens regiam et judiciariam potestatem. Sic igitur sily « secundum quod » designet conditionem naturæ, Christus, secundum quod Deus, sedet ad dexteram Patris, id est, in aequalitate Patris: secundum autem quod homo, sedet ad dexteram Patris 2, in bonis paternis potioribus præ cæteris creaturis, id est, in majori beatitudine, et habens judiciariam potestatem. Si vero ly « secundum quod » designet unitatem suppositi, sic etiam secundum quod homo, sedet ad dexteram Patris, secundum aequalitatem honoris, inquantum scilicet eodem honore veneramur ipsum Filium Dei cum eadem 5 natura assumpta, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.1] When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously. Hence it is written (Wisdom 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in life."
[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod humanitas Christi secundum conditiones suæ naturæ non habet gloriaiam vel honorem deitatis, quam tamen habet ratione personæ cui unitur. Unde ibidem Damascenus subdit: « In qua » scilicet gloria deitatis, « Dei Filius existens ante sæcula, ut Deus, et Patri consubstantialis, sedet conglorificata carne ejus: adoratur enim una adoratione cum carne sua ab omni creatura. ” Ad secundum dicendum, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, subjectus est Patri, proutly « secundum quod » designat conditionem naturæ; et secundum hoc non competit ei sedere ad dexteram Patris, secundum rationem æqualitatis, secundum quod est homo. Sic autem competit ei sedere ad dexteram Patris, secundum quod per hoc designatur excellentia beatitudinis, et judiciaria potestas super omnem creaturam.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.2] Necessity is twofold. One arises from "constraint," and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a "command," or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Corinthians 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me."
[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.3] Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other men.
[II-II.q.58.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod esse in æqualitate Patris non pertinet ad ipsam naturam humanam Christi, sed solum ad personam assumentem; sed esse in potioribus bonis Dei, secundum quod importat excessum aliarum creaturarum, convenit etiam ipsi naturæ assumptæ.
Article 4
[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sedere ad dexteram Patris non sit proprium Christi. Dicit enim Apostolus, Ephes., ii, 6, quod Deus conresuscitavit nos, et consedere fecit in cælestibus in Christo Jesu. Sed resuscitari non est proprium Christi. Ergo etiam pari ratione nec sedere ad dexteram Dei in excelsis.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.2] Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. I De symbolo, cap. iv, col. 634, t. 6, « Christum sedere ad dexteram Patris, hoc est habitare in ejus beatitudine. » Sed hoc multis aliis convenit. Ergo videtur quod sedere ad dexteram Patris non sit proprium Christi.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.3] Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is "rational by participation," viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ipse dicit Apoc., iii, 24: Qui vicerit, dabo ei sedere mecum in throno meo, sicut et ego vici, et sedi cum Patre meo in throno ejus. Sed per hoc sedet Christus ad dexteram Patris quod sedet in throno ejus. Ergo etiam aliii qui vin-cunt, sedent ad dexteram Patris.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.sc] Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake."
[II-II.q.58.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Hebr., i, 43: Ad quem angelorum dixit aliquando: Sede a dextris meis, id est, in meis bonis potioribus, vel mihi secundum divinitatem æqualis? quasi dicat, ad nullum. Sed angeli sunt superiores aliis creaturis. Ergo multo minus nulli alii convenit sedere ad dexteram Patris quam Christo.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.co] The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.
Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in I, 81, 2. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (Article 1).
[II-II.q.58.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, Christus dicitur sedere ad dexteram Patris, inquantum secundum naturam divinam est in æqualitate Patris, secundum autem humanam naturam in excellenti possessione divinorum bonorum præ cæteris aliis creaturis. Utrumque autem soli Christo convenit. Unde nulli alii nec angelo nec homini convenit sedere ad dexteram Patris, nisi soli Christo.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.1] Since the will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia Christus est caput nostrum, illud quod collatum est Christo, est etiam nobis in ipso collatum. Et propter hoc quia ipse jam resuscitatus est, dicit Apostolus quod Deus nos quodammodo ei conresuscitavit, qui tamen in nobis ipsis nondum sumus resuscitati, sed resuscitandi, secundum illud Rom., viii, 44: Qui suscitavit Jesum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora nostra; et secundum eumdem modum Vestra. loquendi subdit Apostolus quod consedere nos fecit in cælestibus, scilicet in hoc ipso quod caput nostrum, quod est Christus, ibi sedet.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.2] The will is borne towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, and this belongs to justice.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia dextera est divina beatitudo, sedere in dextera non significat simpliciter esse in beatitudine sed habere beatitudinem cum quadam dominativa potestate, et quasi propriam et naturalem; quod soli Christo convenit; nulli autem aliii creaturæ. Potest tamen dici quod omnis sanctus qui est in beatitudine, est ad dexteram Dei constitutus: unde et dicitur Matth., xxv, 33, quod statuet oves a dextris.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.3] Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are "rational by participation," but the entire "appetitive" faculty, as stated in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of moral virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod per thronum significatur judiciaria potestas quam Christus habet a Patre; et secundum hoc dicitur sedere in throno Patris. Alii autem sancti habent eam a Christo; et secundum In hoc dicuntur in throno Christi sedere, secundum illud Matth., xix, 28: Sedebitis et vos super sedes duodecim, judicantes duodecim tribus Israel.
Article 5
[II-II.q.58.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wisdom 8:7, "She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not a general virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia non sit virtus generalis. Justi- 1 Sic cod.; in Negant Scotistæ proprium esse justitia et virtutum ipsi annexarum subjectari in voluntate, quia virtus est habitus electivus, et ipsius est rectam facere electionem. Debet ergo subjectari in ea potentia cujus est eligere: hæc autem est voluntas. Sed virtus dicitur habitus electivus dispositive, non elicitive, quatenus rectificando passiones in appetitu sensitivo disponit voluntatem ad rectam electionem. Unde virtus non necessario, quia habitus electivus est, in voluntate subjectatur. dat legi ordinanti actus omnium virtutum in bonum commune.
[II-II.q.58.a.5.arg.2] Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.5.arg.3] Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (Article 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.5.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is every virtue."
[II-II.q.58.a.5.co] Justice, as stated above (Article 2) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, 90, 2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.1] Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on (A07,12).
[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia condividitur seu connumeratur aliis virtutibus, non inquantum est generalis, sed inquantum est specialis virtus, ut infra dicetur.
[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.2] Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.
[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod temperantia et fortitudo sunt in appetitu sensitivo, id est in concupiscibili et irascibili. Hujusmodi autem vires sunt appetitivæ quorumdam bonorum particularium, sicut et sensus est particularium cognoscitivus. Sed justitia est sicut in subjecto in appetitu intellectivo, qui potest esse universalis boni, cujus intellectus est apprehensivus. Et ideo justitia magis potest esse virtus generalis quam temperantia vel fortitudo.
[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.3] Things referable to oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written (1 John 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."
[II-II.q.58.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa quæ sunt ad seipsum, sunt ordinabilia ad alterum, præcipue quantum ad bonum commune. Unde et justitia legalis, secundum quod ordinat ad bonum commune, potest dici virtus generalis; et eadem ratione injustitia potest dici peccatum commune; unde dicitur I Joan., Ⅲ, 4, quod omne peccatum est iniquitas.
Article 7
[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular justice.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit aliqua justitia particularis præter justitiam generalem. In virtutibus enim nihil est superfluum, sicut nec in natura. Sed justitia generalis sufficienter ordinat hominem circa omnia quæ ad alterum sunt. Ergo non est necessaria aliqua justitia particularis.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.2] Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the multitude, as shown above (A5,6). Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unum et multa non diversificant speciem virtutis. Sed justitia legalis ordinat hominem ad alterum, secundum ea quæ ad multitudinem pertinent, ut ex prædictis patet. Ergo non est alia species justitiae quæ ordinet hominem ad alterum in his quæ pertinent ad unam singularem personam.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.3] Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter unam singularem personam et multitudinem civitatis media est multitudo domestica. Si ergo est justitia alia particularis per comparisonem ad unam personam præter justitiam generalem, pari ratione debet esse alia justitiaeconomica, quæ ordinet hominem ad bonum commune unius familiæ; quod quidem non dicitur. Ergo nec aliqua particularis justitia est præter justitiam legalem.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.sc] Chrysostom in his commentary on Matthew 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."
[II-II.q.58.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus, Super illud Matth., v: Beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt justitiam, dicit, Hom. xv, §4, col. 486, t. 11: « Justitiam autem dicit vel universalem virtutem, vel particularem, avaritiæ contrariam. »
[II-II.q.58.a.7.co] As stated above (Article 6), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, justitia legalis non est essentialiter om- In — In Sunt qui putant justitiam generalem non esse specialem virtutem, sed rationem quamdam omni virtuti communem, ita quod quatenus fortitudo, v. g., movet militem ad strenue pugnandum propter honestatem propriam fortitudinis, sortiatur nomen fortitudinis; quatenus vero movet ad sic dimicandum propter bonum commune dicatur justitia generalis. Similiter de temperantia, justitia particulari et aliis virtutibus. Sed justitia generalis est specialis virtus a cæteris virtutibus realiter distincta. Si dicas hanc justitiam generalem amplecti omnes virtutes, nec esse partem virtutis, sed totam et integram virtutem juxta Philosophum, V Ethic., cap. 1. — Respondetur sensum Philosophi esse quod quæcumque virtus prout a justitia generali imperatur, potest denominari justitia generalis, eo sensu quo quælibet virtus prout a charitate imperatur, potest dici quodammodo charitas, et charitatis præceptum tota lex. nis virtus; sed oportet praeter justitiam legalem, quæ ordinat hominem immediate ad bonum commune, esse alias virtutes quæ immediate ordinant hominem circa particularia bona; quæ quidem possunt esse vel ad seipsum, vel ad alteram singularem personam. Sicut ergo praeter justitiam legalem oportet esse aliquas virtutes particulares, quæ ordinent hominem in seipso, puta temperantiam et fortitudinem; ita etiam praeter justitiam legalem oportet esse particularem quamdam justitiam, quæ ordinet hominem circa ea quæ sunt ad alteram singularem personam.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.1] Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia legalis sufficienter quidem ordinat hominem in his quæ sunt ad alterum; quantum ad commune quidem bonum immediate; quantum autem ad bonum unius singularis personæ, mediate. Et ideo oportet esse aliquam particularem justitiam, quæ immediate ordinet hominem ad bonum alterius singularis personæ.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.2] The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the "few," but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the "common" good differs from the aspect of the "individual" good, even as the aspect of "whole" differs from that of "part." Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically."
[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum commune civitatis et bonum singulare unius personæ non differunt solum secundum multum et paucum, sed secundum formalem differentiam. Alia enim est ratio boni communis et boni singularis, sicut alia est ratio totius et partis. Et ideo Philosophus in I Polit., cap. 1, circa princ., dicit quod « non bene dicunt qui dicunt civitatem et domum, et alia hujusmodi, differre solum multitudine, et paucitate, et non specie. »
[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.3] The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely "of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. "domestic" justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.
[II-II.q.58.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod domestica multitudo, secundum Philosophum in I Polit., cap. 11, distinguitur secundum tres conjugationes: scilicet uxoris et viri, patris et filii, domini et servi; quarum personarum una est quasi aliquid alterius. Et ideo ad hujusmodi personas non est simpliciter justitia, sed quædam justitiae species, scilicet economica, ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. vi et ult., in fin.
Article 8
[II-II.q.58.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. Because a gloss on Genesis 2:14, "The fourth river is Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia particularis non habeat materiam specialem. Quia super illud Gen., ii, 14: Fluvius quartus ipse est Euphrates, dicit Glossa ordin., ex August., lib. II De Gen. cont. Manich., cap. x, col. 204, t. 3: « Euphrates, frugifer, interpretatur; nec dicitur contra quos vadat, quia justitia ad omnes animæ partes pertinet. » Hoc autem non esset, si haberet materiam specialem: quia quælibet materia specialis, ad aliquam specialem potentiam pertinet. Ergo justitia particularis non habet materiam specialem. 2. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. lx1, § 4, col. 51, t. 6, quod « quatuor sunt animæ virtutes, quibus in hac vita spiritualiter vivitur, scilicet temperantia, prudentia, fortitudo et justitia; » et dicit quod quarta « est justitia, quæ per omnes diffunditur. » Ergo justitia particularis, quæ est una de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, non habet specialem materiam. 3. Praeterea, justitia dirigit hominem sufficienter in his quæ sunt ad alterum. Sed per omnia quæ sunt hujus vitæ, homo po-test ordinari ad alterum. Ergo materia justitiae est generalis, et non specialis.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.arg.3] Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.sc] The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. ii, a med., ponit justitiam particularem circa ea specialiter quæ pertinent ad communicationem vitæ.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.co] Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnia quæ-cumque rectificari possunt per rationem, sunt materia virtutis moralis, quæ definitur per rationem rectam, ut patet per Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. ii et vi. Possunt autem per rationem rectificari et interiores animæ passiones, et exteriores actiones, et res exteriores, quæ in usum hominis veniunt. Sed tamen per exteriores actiones, et per exteriores res quibus sibi invicem homines communicare possunt, attenditur ordinatio unius hominis ad alterum; secundum autem interiores passiones, consideratur rectificatio hominis in seipso. Et ideo cum justitia ordinetur ad alterum, non est circa totam materiam virtutis moralis, sed solum circa exteriores actiones et res, secundum quamdam rationem objecti specialem, prout scilicet secundum eas unus homo alteri coordinatur.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.1] It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind of diffusion.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia pertinet quidem essentialiter ad unam partem animæ in qua est sicut in subjecto, scilicet ad voluntatem, quæ quidem movet per suum imperium omnes animæ partes; et sic justitia non directe, sed quasi per quamdam redundantiam ad omnes alias animæ partes pertinet.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.2] As stated above (I-II, 61, 3,4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. On this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one man and another."
[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes cardinales dupliciter accipiuntur: uno modo secundum quod sunt speciales virtutes habentes determinatas materias; alio modo secundum quod significant quosdam generales modos virtutis; et hoc modo loquitur ibi Augustinus: dicit enim quod « prudentia est cognitio rerum appetendarum et fugiendarum; temperantia est refrenatio cupiditatis ab iis quæ temporaliter delectant; fortitudo est firmitas animi adversus ea quæ temporaliter molesta sunt; justitia est quæ per cæteras diffunditur, dilectio Dei et proximi, » quæ scilicet est communis radix totius ordinis ad alterum.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.3] A man's internal passions which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
[II-II.q.58.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod passiones interiores quæ sunt pars materiæ moralis, secundum se non ordinantur ad alterum, quod pertinet ad specialem rationem justitiae; sed earum effectus sunt ad alterum ordinabiles, scilicet operationes exteriores. Unde non sequitur quod materia justitiae sit generalis.
Article 9
[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above [I-II, 23, 4; I-II, 31, 1; I-II, 35, 1] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the passions.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justitia sit circa passiones. Dicit enim Philosophus, in II Ethic., cap. 111, circa princ., quod « circa voluptates et tristitias est moralis virtus. » Voluptas autem, id est, delectatio et tristitia, sunt passiones quædam, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Ergo justitia, cum sit virtus moralis, erit circa passiones.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.2] Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the passions.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per justitiam rectificantur operationes quæ sunt ad alterum. Sed operationes hujusmodi rectificari non possunt, Juxta Richardum virtus potest esse circa aliquid tripliciter: per se et primo; per se et non primo; per accidens et ex consequenti. Justitia est circa passiones tertio modo, inquantum juvat fortitudinem et temperantiam quæ sunt circa pas-nisi passiones sint rectificatæ; quia ex inordinatione passionum provenit inordinatio in prædictis operationibus: propter concupiscentiam enim venereorum proceditur ad adulterium, et propter superfluum amorem pecuniæ proceditur ad furtum. Ergo oportet quod justitia sit circa passiones.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.3] Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut justitia particularis est ad alterum, ita etiam et justitia legalis. Sed justitia legalis est circa passiones; alioquin non se extenderet ad omnes virtutes, quarum quædam sunt manifeste circa passiones. Ergo justitia est circa passiones.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. 1 et 11, quod est circa operations.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.co] The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above (I-II, 22, 3; I-II, 59, 4), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the passions.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hujus quaestionis veritas ex duobus apparet: primo quidem ex ipso subjecto justitiae, quod est voluntas; cujus motus vel actus non sunt passiones, ut supra habitum est; sed solum motus appetitus sensitivi passiones dicuntur; et ideo justitia non est circa passiones, sicut temperantia et fortitudo, quæ sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sunt circa passiones. Alio modo ex parte materiae; quia justitia est circa ea quæ sunt ad alterum, non autem per passiones exteriores immediate ad alterum ordinamur. Et ideo justitia circa passiones non est.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.1] Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions" (Ethic. i, 8).
[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non quælibet virtus moralis est circa voluptates et tristitias sicut circa materiam; nam fortitudo est circa timores et audacias; sed omnis virtus moralis ordinatur ad delectationem et tristitiam, sicut ad quosdam fines consequentes: quia, ut Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. x1, in princ., « delectatio et tristitia est finis principalis, ad quem respiientes, unumquodque hoc quidem malum, hoc. autem bonum dicimus; » et hoc modo pertinent etiam ad justitiam, quia « non est justus qui non gaudet justis operationibus, » ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. v11, a med.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.2] External operations are as it were between external things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not from the internal passions but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod operationes exteriores media sunt quodammodo inter res exteriores, quae sunt earum materia, et inter passiones exteriores, quae sunt ea-siones. Justus enim firmiter vult servare aequalitatem in operationibus ad alterum; sed videt hanc impediri per inordinationem passionum, ideoque passionum moderationem imperat, et imperando coadjuvat. rum principia. Contingit autem quandoque esse defectum in uno eorum, sine hoc quod sit defectus in alio; sicut si aliquis surripiat rem alterius non cupiditate habendi, sed voluntate nocendi; vel e converso, si aliquis alterius rem concupiscat, quam tamen surripere non velit. Rectificatio ergo operationum, secundum quod ad exteriora terminatur, pertinet ad justitiam; sed rectificatio earum, secundum quod a passionibus oriuntur, pertinet ad alias virtutes morales, quae sunt circa passiones. Unde surreptionem alienæ rei justitia impedit inquantum est contra æqualitatem in exterioribus constituentam; liberalitas vero inquantum procedit ab immoderata concupiscentia divitiarum. Sed quia operationes exteriores non habent speciem ab interioribus passionibus, sed magis a rebus exterioribus sicut ex objectis, ideo per se loquendo operationes exteriores magis sunt materia justitiæ quam aliarum virtutum moralium.
[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.3] The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v, 5).
[II-II.q.58.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod bonum commune est finis singularum personarum in communitate existentium; sicut bonum totius, finis est cujuslibet partium. Bonum autem unius personæ singularis non est finis alterius. Et ideo justitia legalis, quæ ordinatur ad bonum commune, magis se potest extendere ad interiores passiones, quibus homo aliqualiter disponitur in seipso, quam justitia particularis, quæ ordinatur ad bonum alterius singularis personæ; quam vis justitia legalis principalius se extendat ad alias virtutes quantum ad exteriores operationes earum, inquantum scilicet præcipit lex « fortis opera facere, et quæ temperati, et quæ mansueti, » ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. 11, a princ.
Article 10
[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice observes the rational and not the real mean.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod medium justitiæ non sit medium rei. Ratio enim generis salvatur in omnibus speciebus. Sed virtus moralis in II Ethic., cap. vi, definitur esse « habitus electivus in medietate existens determinata ratione quoad nos. » Ergo et in justitia est medium rationis non rei.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.2] Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in his quæ simpliciter sunt bona non est accipere superfluum et diminutum, et per consequens nec medium, sicut patet de virtutibus, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. vi, ad fin. Sed justitia est circa simpliciter bona, ut dicitur in V Ethic., c. 1, parum ante med. Ergo in justitia non est medium rei.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.3] Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in aliis virtutibus ideo dicitur esse medium rationis, et non rei, quia diversimode accipitur per comparisonem ad diversas personas; quia « quod uni est multum, alteri est parum, » ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. vi, ante med. Sed hoc etiam observatur in justitia; non enim eadem poena punitur qui percutit principem, et qui percutit privatam personam. Ergo etiam justitia non habet medium rei, sed medium rationis.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion, so that it is the real mean.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus, in II Ethic., cap. vi et vii, et lib. V, cap. 11 et iv, assignat medium justitiæ secundum proportionalitatem arithmeticam, quod est medium rei.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.co] As stated above (09; I-II, 59, 4), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard.
On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in Metaph. x [Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4: wherefore justice observes the real mean.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, aliæ virtutes morales principaliter consistunt circa passiones; quarum rectificatio non attenditur, nisi secundum comparisonem ad ipsum hominem, cujus sunt passiones, secundum scilicet quod irascitur et concupiscit, prout debet, secundum diversas circumstantias. Et ideo medium talium virtutum non accipitur secundum proportionem unius rei ad alteram, sed solum secundum comparisonem ad ipsum virtuosum; et propter hoc in ipsis est medium solum secundum rationem quoad nos. Sed materia justitiæ est exterior operatio, secundum quod ipsa vel res cujus est usus, debitam proportionem habet ad aliam personam: et ideo medium justitiæ consistit in quadam proportionis æqualitate rei exterioris ad personam exteriorem. Æquale autem est realiter medium inter majus et minus, ut dicitur in X Metaph., text. 19; unde justitia habet medium rei.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.1] This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc medium rei est etiam medium rationis, et ideo in justitia salvatur ratio virtutis moralis.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.2] We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good simply.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum simpliciter dupliciter dicitur: uno modo quod est omnibus modis bonum, sicut virtutes sunt bonæ; et sic in his quæ sunt bona simpliciter, non est accipere medium et extrema; alio modo dicitur aliquid simpliciter bonum, quia est absolute bonum, scilicet secundum suam naturam consideratum, quamvis per abusum possit fieri malum, sicut patet de divitiis et honoribus; et in talibus potest accipi « superfluum, et diminutum, et medium, » quantum ad homines, qui possunt eis uti vel bene vel male; et sic circa simpliciter bona dicitur esse justitia.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.3] The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
[II-II.q.58.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod injuria illata aliam proportionem habet ad principem, et aliam ad personam privatam; et ideo oportet aliter adæquare utramque injuriam per vindictam; quod pertinet ad diversitatem rei, et non solum ad diversitatem rationis.
Article 12
[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.1] It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod justitia non præemineat inter omnes virtutes morales. Ad justitiam enim pertinet reddere alteri quod suum est; ad liberalitatem autem pertinet de proprio dare, quod virtuosius est. Ergo liberalitas est major virtus quam justitia.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.2] Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent than justice.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil ornatur nisi per aliquid dignius se. Sed magnanimitas est ornamentum et justitiae et omnium virtutum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, ante med. Ergo magnanimitas est nobilior quam justitia.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.3] Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and "good," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. Ⅲ. Sed fortitudo est circa magis difficilia quam justitia, id est, circa pericula mortis, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. Ⅵ. Ergo fortitudo est nobilior justitia.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.sc] Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."
[II-II.q.58.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit in I Offic., tit. « De justitia, » in princ.: « In justitia virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua boni viri nominantur. »
[II-II.q.58.a.12.co] If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person. On this sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."
[II-II.q.58.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si loquamur de justitia legali, manifestum est quod ipsa est præclarior inter omnes virtutes morales inquantum bonum commune præeminet bono singulari unius personæ; et secundum hoc Philosophus, in V Ethic., cap. Ⅰ, ante fin., dicit quod « præclarissima virtutum videtur esse justitia, et neque est Hesperus, neque Lucifer ita admirabilis. » Sed etiam si loquimur de justitia particulari, præcellit inter alias virtutes morales duplici ratione: quarum prima potest sumi ex parte subjecti, quia scilicet est in nobiliori parte animæ, id est, in appetitu rationali, scilicet in voluntate, aliis virtutibus moralibus existentibus in appetitu sensitivo, ad quem pertinent passiones, quae sunt materia aliarum virtutum moralium. Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte objecti: nam aliæ virtutes laudantur solum secundum bonum ipsius virtuosi; justitia autem laudatur secundum quod virtuosus ad alium bene se habet; et sic justitia quodammodo est bonum alterius, ut dicitur in V Ethic., c. Ⅰ, aliquant. ante fin. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit in I Rhet., cap. Ⅰx, paulo a princ.: « Necesse est maximas virtutes esse quae sunt aliis utilissimæ: siquidem est virtus potentia benefactiva; propter hoc et fortes, et justos maxime honorant; quoniam fortitudo est utilis in bello, justitia autem et in bello et in pace. »
[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.1] Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod liberalitas etsi de suo det, tamen hoc facit, inquantum in hoc considerat proprie virtutis bonum; justitia autem dat alteri quod suum est, quasi considerans bonum commune; et præterea Ⅰ justitia observatur ad omnes; liberalitas autem ad omnes se extendere non potest; et iterum liberalitas quae de suo dat, supra justitiam fundatur, per quam conservatur unicuique quod suum est.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.2] When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod magnanimitas, quando supervenit justitiae, auget ejus bonitatem; quae tamen sine justitia nec virtutis rationem haberet.
[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.3] Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.58.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod fortitudo, etsi consistat circa difficiliora, non tamen est circa meliora, cum sit solum in bello utilis, justitia autem et in bello et in pace, sicut dictum est.
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