Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q59. Injustice
Source context
- Theme
- injustice as privation of the right order of justice, and its moral species
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 58, 1909-12-05Steiner identifies the capacity for righteous anger at injustice as a necessary precondition for developing genuine love and kindness, distinguishing morally calibrated indignation from mere passivity.
- GA 100, 1907-06-22Steiner holds that what appears as injustice from a superficial view is dissolved when karmic law is understood in its full depth, reframing the apparent disorder of unjust suffering within a larger moral order.
- GA 69a, 1913-03-03Steiner notes that the teaching of gradual atonement and purification gives meaning to social injustice and the apparent outrages of destiny, situating injustice within a redemptive spiritual framework.
- GA 63, 1913-12-04Steiner states that spiritual science calls the individual to become one who actively eliminates injustice from the world, linking moral cognition to ethical obligation.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book V) treats injustice as the contrary of justice, distinguishing particular injustice (pleonexia, taking more than one's share) from general injustice, a structural parallel to Aquinas's division in Q59.
- Platonic moral philosophyPlato in the Republic treats injustice as the disordering of the soul's parts and of the civic whole, establishing a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's account of injustice as a privation of right relation between persons.
Q59. Injustice
Article 1
[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is written (1 John 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [Vulgate: 'Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod injustitia non sit vitium speciale. Dicitur enim I Joan., Ⅲ, 4: Omne peccatum est iniquitas. Sed iniquitas videtur idem esse quod injustitia; quia justitia est æqualitas quædam, unde injustitia idem videtur esse quod inæqualitas, sive iniquitas. Ergo injustitia non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.2] Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullum speciale peccatum opponitur omnibus virtutibus. Sed injustitia opponitur omnibus virtutibus; nam quantum ad adulterium opponitur castitati, quantum ad homicidium opponitur mansuetdini, et sic de aliis. Ergo injustitia non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.3] Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will.
But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, injustitia justitiae opponitur, quae in voluntate est. Sed omne peccatum est in voluntate, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. Ita cum codicibus edit. Rom., optime; al. edit. ex Garcia: « propterea. » — Sic clarius et rectius De duab. animab., cap. x, col. 403, t. 8. Ergo injustitia non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.sc] Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod injustitia justitiae opponitur. Sed justitia est specialis virtus. Ergo injustitia est speciale vitium.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.co] Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice (58, 5,6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod injustitia est duplex: una quidem illegalis, quæ opponitur legali justitiae; et hæc quidem secundum essentiam est speciale vitium, inquantum respicit speciale objectum, scilicet bonum commune, quod contemnit; sed quantum ad intentionem est vitium generale, quia per contemptum boni communis potest homo ad omnia peccata deduci; sicut etiam omnia vitia, inquantum repugnant bono communi, injustitiae habent rationem, quasi ab injustitia derivata, sicut et supra de justitia dictum est. Alio modo dicitur injustitia secundum inæqualitatem quamdam ad alterum, prout scilicet homo vult habere plus de bonis, puta divitiis et honoribus, et minus de malis, puta laboribus et damnis; et sic injustitia habet materiam specialem, et est particulare vitium justitiae particulari oppositum.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.1] Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut justitia legalis dicitur per comparisonem ad bonum commune humanum, ita justitia divina dicitur per comparisonem ad bonum divinum, cui repugnat omne peccatum; et secundum hoc omne peccatum dicitur esse iniquitas.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.2] Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated above (58, 09, ad 2).
[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod injustitia etiam particularis opponitur indirecte omnibus virtutibus, inquantum scilicet exteriores etiam actus pertinent et ad justitiam et ad alias virtutes morales, licet diversimode, sicut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.3] The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and the same applies to injustice.
[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas, sicut et ratio, se extendit ad materiam totam moralem, id est, ad passiones et ad operationes exteriores, quæ sunt ad alterum; sed justitia perficit voluntatem solum secundum quod se extendit ad operationes quæ sunt ad alterum; et similiter injustitia.
Article 2
[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated above (I-II, 54, 2). Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an unjust thing.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis dicatur injustus ex hoc quod facit injustum. Habitus enim specificantur per objecta, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed proprium objectum justitiae est justum, et proprium objectum justitiae est injustum. Ergo et justus dicendus est aliquis ex hoc quod facit justum, et injustus ex hoc quod facit injustum.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. 1x, vers. fin., falsam esse opinionem quorumdam qui æstimant in potestate hominis esse ut statim faciat injustum, et quod justus non possit minus facere injustum quam injustus. Hoc autem non esset, nisi facere injustum esset proprium injusti. Ergo aliquis judicandus est injustus ex hoc quod facit injustum.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.3] Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, eodem modo se habet omnis virtus ad proprium actum, et eadem ratio est de viitiis oppositis. Sed quicumque facit aliquid intemperatum dicitur intemperatus. Ergo quicumque facit aliquid injustum dicitur injustus.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust."
[II-II.q.59.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. vi, in princ., quod « aliquis facit injustum et injustus non est. »
[II-II.q.59.a.2.co] Even as the object of justice is something equal in external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal, through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. On the latter case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without having the habit of injustice.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut objectum justitiae est aliquid æquale in rebus exterioribus, ita etiam objectum justitiae est aliquid inæquale, prout scilicet alicui attribuitur plus vel minus quam sibi competat. Ad hoc autem objectum comparatur habitus injustitiae mediante proprio actu, qui vocatur injustificatio. Potest ergo contingere quod qui facit injustum, non est injustus, dupliciter: uno modo propter defectum comparisonis operationis ad pro-secunda virtus cardinalis; sic accepta sumitur vel actualiter, et est juris alieni violatio; vel habitualiter, et est prava dispositio inclinans voluntatem ad hujusmodi violationem. Injustitia illegalis est quidem speciale vitium secundum essentiam, generale vero secundum intentionem, quia ex animo agentis potest omnibus viitiis immisceri, quatenus homo in omni peccato potest agere ex contemptu boni communis. prium objectum; quæ quidem recipit speciem et nomen a per se objecto, non autem ab objecto per accidens. In his autem quæ sunt propter finem, per se dicitur aliquid quod est intentum; per accidens autem quod est præter intentionem. Et ideo si aliquis faciat aliquid quod est injustum, non intendens injustum facere, puta cum hoc facit per ignorantiam, non existimans se injustum facere, tunc non facit injustum, per se et formaliter loquendo, sed solum per accidens, et quasi materialiter faciens id quod est injustum; unde et talis operatio non denominatur injustificatio. Alio modo potest contingere propter defectum comparationis ipsius operationis ad habitum. Potest enim injustificatio procedere quandoque quidem ex aliqua passione, puta iræ vel concupiscentiae; quandoque autem ex electione, quando scilicet ipsa injustificatio per se placet; et tunc proprie procedit ab habitu; quia unicuique habenti aliquem habitum est secundum se acceptum, quod convenit illi habitui. Facere ergo injustum ex intentione et ex electione est proprium injusti, secundum quod injustus dicitur qui habet injustitiæ habitum; sed facere injustum præter intentionem vel ex passione potest aliquis absque habitu injustitiæ.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.1] A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectum per se et formaliter acceptum specificat habitum, non autem prout accipitur materialiter et per accidens.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.2] It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).
[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est facile cuiquam facere injustum ex electione, quasi aliquid per se placens, et non propter aliud; sed hoc proprium est habentis habitum, ut ibidem Philosophus dicit.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.3] The object of temperance is not something established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. On like manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects.
[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod objectum temperantiæ, non est aliquid exterius constitutum, sicut objectum justitiæ; sed objectum temperantiæ, id est, temperatum, accipitur solum in comparatione ad ipsum hominem. Et ideo quod est per accidens et præter intentionem, non potest dici temperatum, nec materialiter, nec formaliter; et similiter neque intemperatum; et quantum ad hoc est dissimile in justitia et in aliis virtutibus moralibus; sed quantum ad com- parationem operationis ad habitum, in omnibus similiter se habet.
Article 3
[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For injustice is inequality, as stated above (Article 2). Now a man by injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another. Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis possit pati injustum volens. Injustum enim est inæquale, ut dictum est. Sed aliquis lædendo seipsum recedit ab æqualitate, sicut et lædendo alium. Ergo aliquis potest sibi ipsi facere injustum, sicut et alteri. Sed quicumque facit injustum, volens facit. Ergo aliquis volens potest pati injustum, maxime a seipso.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.2] Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice voluntarily.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus secundum legem civile punitur, nisi propter hoc quod facit aliquam injustitiam. Sed illi qui interimunt seipsos, puniuntur secundum leges civitatum in hoc quod privabantur antiquitus honore sepulturæ, ut patet per Philosophum in V Ethic. Ergo aliquis potest facere sibi ipsi injustum; et ita contingit quod aliquis injustum patiatur volens.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.3] Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus facit injustum, nisi alicui patienti injustum. Sed contingit quod aliquis faciat injustum alicui hoc volenti, puta si vendat ei rem charius quam valeat. Ergo contingit aliquem volentem injustum pati.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.sc] To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod injustum pati est oppositum ei quod est injustum facere. Sed nullus facit injustum nisi volens. Ergo per oppositum nullus patitur injustum nisi no-lens.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.co] Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him).
[II-II.q.59.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actio de sui ratione procedit ab agente; passio autem secundum propriam rationem est ab alio. Unde non potest esse idem secundum idem agens et patiens, ut dicitur in III Physic., text. 8, et in VIII, text. 40. Principium autem proprium agendi in hominibus est voluntas: et ideo illud proprie et per se Parm. addit: « sibi. » — Parm. addit: « aliquid. » Distinguendum est inter morem loquendi vulgarem et morem loquendi philosophorum. Juxta morem philosophorum « injustus » est nomen signi- homo facit quod volens facit; et e contrario illud proprie homo patitur quod præter voluntatem suam patitur: quia inquantum est volens, principium est ex ipso; et ideo inquantum est hujusmodi, magis est agens quam patiens. Dicendum est ergo quod injustum, per se et formaliter loquendo, nullus potest facere nisi volens, nec pati nisi nolens; per accidens autem, et quasi materialiter loquendo, potest aliquis id quod est de se injustum vel facere nolens, sicut cum quis præter intentionem operatur, vel pati volens, sicut cum aliquis plus alteri dat sua voluntate quam debeat.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.1] When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by another's action.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum aliquis sua voluntate dat alicui id quod ei non debet, non facit nec injustitiam nec inæqualitatem. Homo enim per suam voluntatem possidet res; et ita non est præter proportionem, si ei aliquid subtrahatur secundum propriam voluntatem, vel a seipso vel ab alio.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.2] An individual person may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person. Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Corinthians 3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."
[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliqua persona singularis potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo secundum se; et sic si sibi aliquod nocumentum inferat, potest quidem habere rationem alterius peccati, puta intemperantiæ, vel imprudentiæ, non tamen rationem injustitia; quia sicut justitia semper est ad alterum, ita et injustitia. Alio modo potest considerari aliquis homo, inquantum est aliquid civitatis, scilicet pars; vel inquantum est aliquid Dei, scilicet creatura et imago; et sic qui seipsum occidit, injuriam quidem facit, non sibi, sed civitati et Deo; et ideo punitur tam secundum legem divinam quam secundum legem humanam, sicut et de fornicatore Apostolus dicit I Cor., 17: Si quis templum Dei violaverit, disperdet⁺ ipsum Deus.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.3] Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above (Article 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above (Article 2). Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod passio est effectus actionis exterioris. In hoc autem quod est facere et pati injustum, id quod materiale est attenditur secundum id quod exterius agitur, prout in se consideratur, ut dictum est, id autem quod est ibi formale et per se, attenditur secundum voluntatem agentis et patientis, ut ex dictis patet. Di-cendum est ergo quod aliquem facere injustum et alium pati injustum, materialiter loquendo, semper se concomitantur. Sed si formaliter loquamur, facere aliquis potest injustum, intendens injustum facere; tamen alius non patietur injustum, quia volens patietur; et e converso potest aliquis pati injustum, si nolens id quod est injustum, patiatur; et tamen ille qui hoc facit ignorans, non faciet injustum formaliter, sed materialiter tantum.
Article 4
[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter." Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non quicumque facit injustum peccet mortaliter. Peccatum enim veniale mortali opponitur. Sed quandoque veniale peccatum est quod aliquis faciat injustum; dicit enim Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. viii, in fin., de injuste agentibus loquens: « Quæcumque non solum ignorantes, sed et propter Parm.: « principium et ex seipso. » Ita cod. Alcan. optime; Garcia ex Tarac., theologi, Nicolaï et posteriores edit.: « Et ita non est præter suam proportionem, » etc. Edit. Rom.: « Et ita non est præter proportionem, vel propositum, si ei aliquid subtrahatur, sed secundum propriam, » etc. Injustum agere aut pati sumitur materialiter vel formaliter. — Materialiter sumitur abstrahendo a voluntate tam agentis quam patientis. Formaliter sumitur attendendo voluntati agentis vel patientis; formale enim in moralibus petitur a voluntate. Solum formaliter injustum solet dici injuria. Unde quamvis pati injustum sumatur materialiter et formaliter; tamen pati injuriam solet tantum sumi formaliter. Nullus potest facere injustum per se et forma-liter loquendo, nisi volens. Nullus potest pati injustum per se et formaliter loquendo, nisi nolens. Per accidens quasi materialiter potest quasi no-lens facere injustum et pati volens. Adstipulatur conclusioni regulajuris xxvii in VI: « Scienti et consentienti non fit injuria neque dolus. » Cæterum intelligige volentem et consentien-tem tam in hac regula quam in conclusione sic ut omnino libere consentiat, nec ullo modo sit involuntarius. Unde qui necessitate solvit usuras, aut metu mortis latroni pecunias erogat, vere patitur injuriam, quia licet simpliciter velit, nollet tamen, et consensus praesens contra jus et per injuriam extorquetur. Martyres et ipse Christus erant volentes respective ad Deum, non respective ad tyrannos. ignorantiam peccant, venialia sunt. » Ergo non quicumque facit injustum, mortaliter peccat.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.2] Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, qui in aliquo parvo injustitiam facit, parum a medio declinat. Sed hoc videtur esse tolerabile et inter minima malorum computandum, ut patet per Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. ult., circa finem. Non ergo quicumque facit injustum, peccat mortaliter.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.3] Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23, and it is through being contrary thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an injustice.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, charitas est mater omnium virtutum, ex cujus contrarietate aliquod peccatum dicitur mortale. Sed non omnia peccata opposita aliis virtutibus sunt mortalia. Ergo etiam neque facere injustum semper est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.sc] Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.sc] Sed contra, quidquid est contra legem Dei est peccatum mortale. Sed quicumque facit injustum facit contra præceptum legis Dei, quia vel reducitur ad furtum, vel ad adulterium, vel ad homicidium, vel ad aliquid hujusmodi, ut ex sequentibus patebit. Ergo quicumque facit injustum peccat mortaliter.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.co] As stated above (I-II, 12, 5), when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de differentia peccatorum ageretur, peccatum mortale est quod contrariatur charitati, per quam est animæ vita. Omne autem nocumentum alteri illatum, ex se charitati repugnat, quæ movet ad volendum bonum alterius. Et ideo cum injustitia semper consistat in nocumento alterius, manifestum est quod facere injustum, ex genere suo, est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.1] This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance of particular circumstances" [Ethic. iii, 1, and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above (Article 2)
[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud verbum Philosophi intelligitur de ignorantia facti, quam ipse vocat « ignorantiam particularium circumstantiarum, » quæ meretur veniam; non autem de ignorantia juris, quæ non excusat. Qui autem ignorans facit injustum, non facit injustum nisi per accidens, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.2] He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ille qui in parvis facit injustitiam, deficit a perfecta ratione ejus quod est injustum facere, in quantum potest reputari non esse omnino contra voluntatem ejus qui hoc patitur; puta si auferat aliquis alicui unum pomum, vel aliquid tale, de quo probabile est quod ille inde non laedatur, nec ei displiceat.
[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.3] The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccata quæ sunt contra alias virtutes, non semper sunt in nocumentum alterius; sed important in ordinationem quamdam circa passiones humanas. Unde non est similis ratio.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/secunda-secundae/q059.json