Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q110. The vices opposed to truth, and first of lying
Source context
- Theme
- lying as a vice opposed to the virtue of truth-telling, with analysis of its species and moral gravity
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethics (Nicomachean Ethics IV.7)Aristotle treats truthfulness (alētheia) as a mean virtue, with boastfulness and irony as its opposed vices, providing the philosophical framework Aquinas inherits for classifying lying as a defection from the truth-telling mean.
- Augustinian moral theology (De Mendacio)Augustine's typology of eight species of lies, graded by gravity according to intention and harm, is the direct patristic source on which Aquinas draws for his threefold division of lying into officious, jocose, and pernicious.
- Jewish ethical tradition (Emet as divine attribute)In rabbinic thought the seal of the Holy One is emet (truth), and deliberate falsehood is regarded as a structural assault on the divine order, a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that lying violates the rational creature's conformity to its proper end.
Q110. The vices opposed to truth, and first of lying
Article 1
[II-II.q.110.a.1.arg.1] It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod mendacium non semper opponatur veritati. Opposita enim non possunt esse simul. Sed mendacium simul potest esse cum veritate: qui enim verum loquitur quod falsum esse credit, mentitur, ut Augustimus dicit in lib. De mendac., ciii, col. 489, t. 6. Ergo mendacium non opponitur veritati.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.arg.2] Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that "a lie is a false signification by words." Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus veritatis non solum consistit in verbis, sed etiam in factis, quia, secundum Philosophum in IV Ethic., cap. vii, secundum hanc virtutem aliquis verum dicit et in sermone, et in vita. Sed mendacium consistit solum in verbis: dicitur enim ab Augustino, lib. Contra mendacium, xii, col. 537, t. 6, quod « mendacium est falsa vocis significatio. » Sic ergo videtur quod mendacium non directe opponatur virtuti veritatis.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the "liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De mendacio, loc. cit., quod « culpa mentientis est fallendi cupiditas. » Sed hoc non opponitur veritati, sed magis benevolentia, vel justitiae. Ergo mendacium non opponitur veritati.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.sc] Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie." But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in libro De mendacio, c. iv, col. 491: « Nemo dubitet mentiri eum qui falsum enuntiat causa fallendi. Quapropter enuntiationem falsam cum voluntate ad fallendum prolatam, manifestum est esse mendacium. » Sed hoc opponitur veritati. Ergo mendacium veritati opponitur.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.co] A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above (I-II, 18, 6,7).
Now it has been said above (109, 1, ad 3) that the virtue of truth--and consequently the opposite vices--regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood--materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the "mind." Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of truth.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actus moralis ex duobus speciem sortitur, scilicet ex objecto et ex fine: nam finis est objectum voluntatis, quæ est primum movens in moralibus actibus. Potentia au- Hic D. Thomas ad mendacii formale non exigit intentionem fallendi, sed solummodo voluntatem enuntiandi falsum. Communiter auctores, sed minus recte, intentionem fallendi requirunt; nil validum, nil rationabile clarissimæ D. Thomæ expositioni in hac parte opponi potest, nisi ab hominibus vulgare præjudicium vel cæce, vel superbe accipientibus. Ego voluntatem habeo falsum enuntiandi; ergo contra veritatem dicendi; ergo mentiendi; ergo mendax ego sum. Respondeant mille et plusquam mille argutiunculis P. Henno, Layman, et alii, mens humana immobiliter, dummodo non sit corrupto, pro D. Thoma tem a voluntate mota habet suum objectum, quod est proximum objectum voluntarii actus, et se habet in actu voluntatis ad finem, sicut materiale ad formale, ut ex supra dictis patet. Dictum est autem quod virtus veritatis, et per consequens opposita vitia, in manifestatione consistit, quæ fit per aliqua signa: quæ quidem manifestatio sive enuntiatio est rationis actus conferentis signum ad signatum: omnis enim representatio consistit in quadam collatione, quæ proprie pertinet ad rationem. Unde etsi bruta animalia aliquid manifestent, non tamen manifestationem intendunt; sed naturali instinctu aliquid agunt, ad quod manifestatio sequitur. Inquantum tamen hujusmodi manifestatio sive enuntiatio est actus moralis, oportet quod sit voluntarius, et ex intentione voluntatis dependens. Objectum autem proprium manifestationis sive enuntiationis est verum vel falsum. Intentio vero voluntatis inordinatæ potest ad duo ferri: quorum unum est ut falsum enuntietur; aliud est effectus proprius falsæ enuntiationis, ut scilicet aliquis fallatur. Si ergo ista tria concurrant, scilicet quod falsum sit id quod enuntiatur, et quod adsit voluntas falsum enuntiandi, et iterum intentio fallendi, tunc est falsitas materialiter, quia falsum dicitur, et formaliter propter voluntatem falsum dicendi, et effective propter voluntatem falsitatem imprimendi. Sed tamen ratio mendacii sumitur a formali falsitate, ex hoc scilicet quod aliquis habet voluntatem falsum enuntiandi; unde et mendacium nominatur ex eo quod contra mentem dicitur. Et ideo si quis falsum enuntiet, credens id esse verum, est quidem falsum materialiter, sed non formaliter, quia falsitas est præter intentionem dicentis: unde non habet perfectam rationem mendacii; id enim quod præter intentionem dicen-stabit. Cæterum ipse P. Henno concedit non requiri animum fallendi expressum et formalem, sed sufficere animum fallendi tacitum contentum in verbis quæ nata sunt in talibus vel talibus circumstantiis fallere. Mira prorsus eximii theologi ingenuitas! Nonne, absque mea intentione formali dicendi falsum, mendacium esset, ex communi interpretatione quæ animi intima ignorat, etiamsi tacitus in verbis animus fallendi includeretur? Quidquid interpretentur homines, nisi habeam intentionem formalem dicendi falsum, non mentior. tis est, per accidens est, unde non potest esse specifica differentia. Si vero aliquis formaliter falsum dicat, habens voluntatem falsum dicendi; licet sit verum id quod dicitur, inquantum tamen hujusmodi actus est voluntarius et moralis, habet per se falsitatem et per accidens veritatem: unde ad speciem mendacii pertinuit. Quod autem aliquis intendat falsitatem in opinione alterius constituere, fallendo ipsum, non pertinet ad speciem mendacii, sed ad quamdam perfectionem ipsius; sicut et in rebus naturalibus aliqid speciem sortitur si formam habeat, etiam si desit formæ effectus; sicut patet in gravi, quod violenter sursum detinetur ne descendat secundum exigentiam suæ formæ. Si ergo patet quod mendacium directe et formaliter opponitur virtuti veritatis.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.ad.1] We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod unumquodque magis judicatur secundum id quod est in eo formaliter et per se, quam secundum id quod est in eo materialiter et per accidens. Et ideo magis opponitur veritati, inquantum est virtus moralis, quod aliquis dicat verum intendens dicere falsum, quam quod dicat falsum intendens dicere verum.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.ad.2] As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a lie is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, II De doctr. christ., c. III, col. 37, t. 3, voces præcipuum locum tenent inter alia signa. Et ideo cum dicitur quod « mendacium est falsa vocis significatio, » nomine vocis intelligitur omne signum. Unde ille qui aliquod falsum nutibus significare intenderet, non esset a mendacio immunis.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.ad.3] The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to the species of its cause.
[II-II.q.110.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cupiditas fallendi pertinet ad perfectionem mendacii, non autem ad speciem ipsius, sicut nec aliquis effectus pertinet ad speciem suæ causæ.
Article 2
[II-II.q.110.a.2.arg.1] It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into "officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an "officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
[II-II.q.110.a.2.arg.2] Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie that profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the sixth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money"; the seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death"; the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body." Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is insufficient.
[II-II.q.110.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus in lib. De mendacio, cap. XIV, col. 505, t. 6, dividit mendacium in octo partes: quorum primum est « in doctrina religionis; » secundum est, « quod nulli prosit, et obsit alicui; » tertium est, « quod prodest ita uni, ut alteri obsit; » quartum est, « quod fit sola mentiendi fallendique libidine; » quintum est, « quod fit placendi cupiditate; » sextum est, « quod nulli obest, et prodest alicui ad conservandum pecuniam; » septimum est « quod nulli obest, et prodest alicui ad vitandam mortem; » octavum, « quod nulli obest, et prodest alicui ad vitandum immunditiam corporalem. » Ergo videtur quod prima divisio mendacii sit insufficiens.
[II-II.q.110.a.2.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into "boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
[II-II.q.110.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus in IV Ethic., cap. VII, dividit mendacium in « jactantiam, » quæ verum excedit in dicendo, et « ironiam, » quæ deficit a vero in minus: quæ duo sub nullo prædictorum membrorum continentur. Ergo videtur quod divisio prædicta mendacii sit incompetens.
[II-II.q.110.a.2.sc] A gloss on Psalm 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice." The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three kinds.
[II-II.q.110.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud psal. v: Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium, dicit Glossa ord., col. 854, t. 4, quod « sunt tria genera mendaciorum: quædam enim sunt pro salute et commodo alicujus: est etiam aliud genus mendacii quod fit joco: tertium vero mendacii genus est quod fit ex malignitate. » Primum autem horum trium dicitur officiosum, secundum jocosum, tertium perniciosum. Ergo mendacium in tria prædicta dividitur.
[II-II.q.110.a.2.co] Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division of lying. On this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs to "irony." This division is an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.
Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good--either of pleasure and then it is a "jocose" lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie, whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured. On this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under "mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie, which "profits no one, and injures someone"; or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the third kind of lie, "which profits one, and injures another." Of these the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I-II, 73, 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.
After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution; and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of lying and deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying."
The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his body, and this is the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death"; or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which "saves him from unlawful defilement of his body."
Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[II-II.q.110.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod menda- 4 Ex Augustino desumpta, Enarr. in ps. v, col. 85, t. 4, ubi loquitur expresse de primis duobus mendacii generibus, de tertio vero nil dicit; sed istud ex sensu supponitur. cium tripliciter dividi potest: uno modo secundum ipsam mendacii rationem, quæ est propria et per se mendacii divisio, et secundum hoc mendacium in duo dividitur: scilicet in mendacium quod transcendit veritatem in majus, quod pertinet ad jactantiam; et in mendacium quod deficit a veritate in minus, quod pertinet ad ironiam ut patet per Philosophum in IV Ethic., cap. vii. Hæc autem divisio ideo per se est ipsius mendacii, quia mendacium, inquantum hujusmodi, opponitur veritati, ut dictum est. Veritas autem æqualitas quædam est, cui per se opponitur majus et minus. Alio modo potest dividi mendacium in quantum habet rationem culpæ secundum ea quæ aggravant vel diminuunt culpam mendacii ex parte finis intenti. Aggravat autem culpam mendacii si aliquis per mendacium intendat alterius nocumentum, quod vocatur mendacium « perniciosum; » diminuitur autem culpam mendacii, si ordinetur ad aliquod bonum, vel delectabile, et sic est mendacium « jocosum; » vel utile, et sic est mendacium «.officiosum, » sive quo intenditur juvamentum alterius, vel remotio nocumenti. Et secundum hoc dividitur mendacium in tria prædicta. Tertio modo dividitur mendacium universalius secundum ordinem ad finem, sive ex hoc addatur vel diminuatur ad culpam mendacii, sive non; et secundum hoc divisio est octo membrorum, quæ dicta est in arg. 2. In qua quidem tria prima membra continentur sub mendacio pernicioso: quod quidem fit vel contra Deum, et ad hoc pertinet primum mendacium quod est « in doctrina religionis; » vel est contra hominem, sive sola intentione nocendi alicui, et sic est mendacium secundum, quod scilicet « nulli prodest, et obest alicui; » sive etiam intendatur in nocumento unius utilitas alterius, et hoc est tertium mendacium « quod uni prodest, et alteri obest. » Inter quæ tria primum est gravissimum, quia semper peccata contra Deum sunt graviora, ut supra dictum est. Secundum autem est gravius tertio quod diminuitur ex intentione utilitatis alterius. Post hæc autem tria, quæ superaddunt ad gravitatem culpæ mendacii, ponitur quartum, quod habet propriam quantitatem sine additione vel diminutione, et hoc est mendacium quod fit « ex sola mentiendi libidine, » quod procedit ex habitu: unde et Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. vii, quod « mendax, eo quod talis est secundum habitum, ipso mendacio gaudet. » Quatuor vero subsequentes modi diminuunt de culpa mendacii: nam quintum est mendacium jocosum, quod fit « placendi cupiditate; » alia vero tria continentur sub mendacio officioso, in quo intenditur quod est alteri utile; vel quantum ad res exteriores, et sic est sextum mendacium, quod « prodest alicui ad pecuniam conservandum; » vel est utile corpori, et hoc est septimum mendacium, in quo « impeditur mors hominis; » vel etiam utile est ad honestatem virtutis, et hoc est octavum mendacium, in quo « impeditur illicita pollutio corporalis. » Patet autem quod quanto bonum intentum est melius, tanto magis minuitur culpa mendacii. Et ideo si quis diligenter consideret, secundum ordinem prædictæ enumerationis, est ordo gravitatis culpæ in istis mendaciis: nam bonum utile præfertur delectabili, et vita corporalis præfertur pecuniæ, honestas autem ipsi corporali vitæ. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
Article 3
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.1] It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non omne mendacium sit peccatum. Manifestum enim est quod Evangelistæ scribendo Evangelium non pecaverunt. Videntur tamen aliquid falsum dixisse: quia verba Christi, et etiam aliorum frequenter aliter unus, et aliter retulit alius: unde videtur quod alter eorum dixerit falsum. Non ergo omne mendacium est peccatum.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.2] Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that "God built them houses" (Exodus 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus remuneratur a Deo pro peccato. Sed obstetrices Ægypti remuneratæ sunt a Deo propter mendacium: dicitur enim Exod., i, 24, quod ædificavit * illis Deus domos. Ergo mendacium non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.3] Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very holy men that they lied. Thus (Genesis 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Genesis 27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10-11) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, gesta sanctorum narratur in sacra Scriptura ad informationem vitæ humanæ. Sed de quibusdam sanctissimis viris legitur quod sunt mentiti: sicut Gen., xii et xx quod Abraham dixit de uxore sua quod soror sua esset: Jacob etiam mentitus est dicens se esse Esau; et tamen benedictionem adeptus est, ut habetur Genes., xxvii. Judith etiam commendatur, Judith, xv, quæ tamen Holoferni mentita est. Non ergo omne mendacium est peccatum.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.4] Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, minus malum est eligendum ut vitetur majus malum; sicut medicus præscindit membrum, ne corrumpatur totum corpus. Sed minus documentum est quod aliquis generet falsam opinionem in animo alicujus, quam quod aliquis occidat vel occidatur. Ergo licite potest homo mentiri, ut unum præservet ab homicidio, et alium præservet a morte.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.5] Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says (Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill." Therefore not every lie is a sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.5] 5. Præterea, mendacium est si quis non impleat quod promisit. Sed non omnia promissa sunt implenda; dicit enim Isidorus, lib. II Synonim., § 58, col. 558, t. 6: « In malis promissis rescinde fidem. » Ergo non omne mendacium est peccatum.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.6] Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): "Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.arg.6] 6. Præterea, mendacium ob hoc videtur esse peccatum, quia per ipsum homo decipit proximum: unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De mendac., c. xx, col. 516, t. 6: « Quisquis esse aliquod genus mendacii quod peccatum non sit putaverit, decipiet seipsum turpiter, cum honestum se deceptorem arbitretur aliorum. » Sed non omne mendacium est deceptionis causa, quia per mendacium jocosum nullus decipitur; non enim ad hoc dicuntur hujusmodi mendacia, ut credantur, sed propter delectationem solam; unde et hyperbolicæ locutiones quando etiam in Scriptura sacra inventur. Non ergo omne mendacium est peccatum.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.sc] It is written (Sirach 7:14): "Be not willing to make any manner of lie."
[II-II.q.110.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., VII, 14: Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.co] An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).
[II-II.q.110.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod est secundum se malum ex genere, nullo modo potest esse bonum et licitum: quia ad hoc quod quid sit bonum, requiritur quod omnia recte concurrant. Bonum enim est ex integra causa, malum vero est ex singularibus defectibus, ut Dionysius dicit in IV cap. De div. nom., § 30, col. 730, t. 4. Mendacium autem est malum ex genere: est enim actus cadens super in-debitam materiam. Cum enim voces naturaliter sint signa intellectuum, innaturale est et indebitum quod aliquis voce significet id quod non habet in mente. Unde Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. VII, quod « mendacium est per se pravum et fugiendum; verum autem est bonum et laudabile. » Unde omne mendacium est peccatum, sicut etiam Augustinus assertit in lib. Contra mendacium, cap. XV, col. 539, t. 6.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.1] It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident, as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or heard."
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nec in Evangelio, nec in aliqua Scriptura canonica fas est opinari aliquod falsum asseri, nec quod scriptores earum mendacium dixerint, quia periret fidei certitudo, quae auctoritati sacræ Scripturæ innititur. In hoc vero quod in Evangelio et in aliis Scripturis sacris verba aliquorum diversimode recitantur, non est mendacium. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. II De consensu Evangelistarum, c. XII, § 27, col. 1090, t. 3: « Nullo modo laborandum esse judicat qui prudenter intelligit ipsas sententias esse necessarias cognoscendæ veritati, quibuslibet verbis fuerint explicatæ. » Et in hoc apparet, ut ibidem subdit, « non debere nos arbitrari mentiri quemquam, si pluribus rem quam audierunt vel viderunt reminiscentibus, non eodem modo atque eisdem verbis eadem res fuerit indicata. »
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.2] The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Exodus 2:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie was not meritorious.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod obstetrices non sunt remuneratæ pro mendacio, sed pro timore Dei et benevolentia; ex qua processit mendacium. Unde signanter dicitur Exod., I, 21: Et quia timuerunt obstetrices Deum, xdificavit illis* domos. Mendacium vero postea sequens non fuit meritorium.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.3] In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically." As to Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said (Genesis 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.
Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in sacra Scriptura, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. De mendacio, cap. V, § 7, col. 492, t. 6, inducuntur aliquorum gesta, quasi exempla perfectæ virtutis; de quibus non est aestimandum eos fuisse mentitos. Si quæ tamen in eorum dictis appareant quæ mendacia videantur, intelligendum est ea figuraliter et prophetice dicta esse. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De mendac., loc. cit: « Credendum est illos homines qui 1 Habetur in Decret., XXII, q. iv, c. v. col. 1141. Nec Plato, nec Origenes, nec abbas Joseph, nec Cassianus voluerunt omne mendacium esse peccatum. Quibus suffragati sunt, vel suffragari videntur S. Joannes Chrysostomus, S. Hieronypropheticis temporibus digni auctoritate fuisse commemorantur, omnia quæ scripta sunt de illis prophetice gessisse atque dixisse. » Abrahamtamen, ut Augustinus dicit in QQ. super Genes., qu. xxvi, col. 554, t. 3, « dicens Saramesse suam soro-rem, veritatem voluit celari, et non mendacium dici: soror enim dicitur, quia filia patris erat. » Unde et ipse Abraham dicit, Genes., xx, 12: Vere soror mea est, filia patris mei, et non filia matris meæ, quia scilicet ex parte patris ei attinebat. Jacob vero mystice dixit se esse Esau primogenitum Isaac, quia videlicet primogenita illius de jure ei debebantur. Usus autem est hoc modo loquendi per spiritum prophetiæ ad designandum mysterium, quia videlicet minor populus, scilicet gentitilium, substituendus erat in locum primogeniti, scilicet in locum Judæorum. Quidam vero commendantur in Scriptura non propter perfectam virtutem, sed propter quamdam virtutis indolem: scilicet quia apparebat in eis aliquis laudabilis affectus, ex quo movebantur ad quædam indebita facienda; et hoc modo Judith laudatur, non quia mentita est Holopherni, sed propter affectum quem habuit ad salutem populi, pro qua periculis se exposuit: quamvis etiam dici possit quod verba ejus veritatem habent secundum aliquem mysticum intellectum.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.4] A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod mendacium non solum habet rationem peccati ex damno quod infertur proximo, sed ex sua inordinatione, ut dictum est. Non licet autem aliqua illicita inordinatione uti ad impediendum nocumenta et defectus aliorum; sicut non licet furari ad hoc quod homo eleemosynam faciat, nisi forte in casu necessitatis, in quo omnia sunt communia. Et ideo non est licitum mendacium dicere ad hoc quod aliquis alium a quocumque periculo liberet. Licet tamen veritatem occultare prudent sub aliqua dissimulatione, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De mendacio, cap. x, col. 500, t. 6.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.5] A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising--since he promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for granted--nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Corinthians 1), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod ille qui aliquid promittit, si habeat animum facendi quod promittit, non mentitur: quia non loquitur contra id quod gerit in mente; si vero non faciat quod promisit, tunc videtur infideliter agere per hoc quod animum mutat. Potest tamen excusari ex duobus: uno modo si promisit id quod manifeste est illicitum, quia promittendo peccavit, mutando autem propositum benefacit; alio modo, si sunt mutatæ conditiones personarum et negotiorum. Ut enim Seneca dicit in lib. VI De benefic., cap. xxxiv, et xxxv, ad hoc quod homo teneatur facere quod promisit, requiritur quod omnia immutata permaneant: alioquin nec fuit mendax in promittendo, quia promisit quod habebat in mente, subintellectis debitis conditionibus; nec etiam est infidelis non implendo quod promisit, quia eæ-dem conditiones non extant. Unde et Apostolus non est mentitus, qui non ivit Corinthum, quo se iturum esse promiseat, ut dicitur II ad Corinth., i, et hoc propter impedimenta quæ supervene-rant.
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.6] An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify."
[II-II.q.110.a.3.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod operatio aliqua potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo secundum seipsam; alio modo ex parte operantis. Mendacium ergo jocosum ex ipso genere operis habet rationem fallendi; quamvis ex intentione dicentis non dicatur ad fallendum nec fallat ex modo dicendi. Nec est simile de hyperbolicis aut quibuscumque figuratis locutionibus quæ in sacra Scriptura inveniuntur: quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro De mendac., cap. v, col. 492, t. 6, « quidquid figurate fit vel dicitur, non est mendacium: omnis enim enuntiatio ad id quod enuntiat referenda est: omne autem figurate aut factum aut dictum hoc enuntiat quod significat eis quibus intelligendum prolatum est. »
Article 4
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.1] It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written (Psalm 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and (Wisdom 1:11): "The mouth that belieth killeth the soul." Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod omne mendacium sit peccatum mortale. Dicitur enim in psal. v, 7: Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium; et Sap., i, 44: Os quod mentitur, occidit animam. Sed perditio et mors animæ non 1 Referuntur hæc verba in Decreto, c. xxii, q. ii, c. « Quæritur, » col. 4138, ut ex q. xxvi, Super Genesim deprompta; sed optime notat editor Decreti, caput « Quæritur, » non ex isto tan-tummodo loco, sed etiam ex aliis, scilicet XXII Contra Faustum, c. xxxiii, col. 324, t. 8, lib. Contra mendac., c. x, col. 533, t. 6, etc. confectum fuisse. est nisi per peccatum mortale. Ergo omne mendacium est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.2] Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne quod est contra præceptum Decalogi, est peccatum mortale. Sed mendacium est contra hoc præceptum Decalogi: Non falsum testimonium dices. Ergo omne mendacium est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity." Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty of iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in I De doct. christ., c. xxxvi, col. 34, t. 3: «Nemo mentiens in eo quod mentitur, servat fidem: nam hoc utique vult, ut cui mentitur, fidem sibi habeat, quam tamen ei mentiendo non servat: omnis autem fidei violator iniquus est. » Nullus autem dicitur fidei violator vel iniquus propter peccatum veniale. Ergo nullum mendacium est peccatum veniale.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.4] Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty." Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, merces æterna non perditur nisi pro peccato mortali. Sed pro mendacio perditur merces æterna commutata in temporalem: dicit enim Gregorius, lib. XVIII Moral., c. III, § 6, col. 41, t. 2, quod « in recompensatione obstetricum cognoscitur, quid mendacii culpa mereatur; nam benignitatis earum merces, quæ eis in æterna potuit vita retribui, pro admissa culpa mendacii in terrenam est recompensationem declinata. » Ergo etiam mendacium officiosum, quale fuit obstetricum, quod videtur esse levissimum, est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.5] Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.arg.5] 5. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De mendacio, c. xvii, col. 510, t. 6, «quod perfectorum præceptum est, omnino non solum non mentiri, sed nec velle mentiri. » Sed facere contra præceptum est peccatum mortale. Ergo omne mendacium perfectorum est peccatum mortale. Pari ergo ratione et quorumcumque aliorum: alioquin essent pejoris conditionis.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.sc] Augustine says on Psalm 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in psal., v, v. 7, col. 85, t. 4: «Duo sunt genera mendaciorum, in quibus non magna culpa est; sed tamen non sunt sine culpa, cum aut jocamur, aut ut prosimus mentimur. » Sed omne peccatum mortale habet gravem culpam. Ergo mendacium jocosum et officiosum non sunt peccata mortalia.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.co] A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above (24, 12; 35, 3). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.
A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one's neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccatum mortale proprie est quod repugnat charitati, per quam anima vivit Deo conjuncta, ut dictum est. Potest autem mendacium contrariarii charitati tripliciter: uno modo secundum se; alio modo secundum finem intentum; tertio modo per accidens. Secundum se quidem charitati contrariatur ex ipsa falsa significatione. Quæ quidem si sit circa res divinas, contrariatur charitati Dei, cujus veritatem aliqui tali mendacio occultat vel corrumpit: unde hujusmodi mendacium non solum opponitur virtuti veritatis, sed etiam virtuti fidei et religionis; et ideo hoc mendacium est gravissimum et mortale. Si vero falsa significatio sit circa aliquid cujus cognitio pertineat ad hominis bonum, puta quæ pertineat ad perfectionem scientiæ et informationem morum; tale mendacium, inquantum infert damnum falsæ opinionis proximo, contrariatur charitati quantum ad dilectionem proximi: unde est peccatum mortale. Si vero falsa opinio ex mendacio generata sit circa aliquid de quo non referat utrum sic vel aliter cognoscatur, tunc ex tali mendacio non damnificatur proximus: sicut si quis fallatur in aliquibus particularibus contingentibus ad se non pertinentibus. Unde tale mendacium secundum se non est peccatum mortale. Ratione vero finis intenti aliquod mendacium contrariatur charitati: puta quod dicitur aut in injuriam Dei, quod semper est peccatum mortale, utpote religioni contrarium; aut in nocumentum proximi, quantum ad personam, divitias vel famam; et hoc etiam est peccatum mortale, cum nocere proximo sit peccatum mortale. Ex sola autem intentione peccati mortalis aliquis mortaliter peccat. Si vero finis intentus non sit contrarius charitati, nec mendacium secundum hanc rationem erit peccatum mortale; sicut apparet in mendacio jocoso in quo intenditur aliqua levis delectatio, et in mendacio officioso, in quo intenditur etiam utilitas proximi. Per accidens autem potest contrariarii charitati ratione scandali, vel cujuscumque damni consequentis; et sic erit etiam peccatum mortale, dum scilicet aliquis non veretur propter scandalum publice mentiri.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.1] The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Psalm 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie."
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illæ auctoritates intelliguntur de mendacio pernicioso, ut exponit Glossa super illud psal. v: Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.2] Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (44, 1, ad 3; I-II, 100, 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbor.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum omnia præcepta Decalogi ordinentur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, sicut supra dictum est, in tantum mendacium est contra præceptum Decalogi, inquantum est contra dilectionem Dei et proximi. Unde signanter prohibetur contra proximum falsum testimonium.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.3] Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it is written (1 John 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [Vulgate: 'And sin is iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam pecatum veniale largo modo potest dici iniquitas, inquantum est præter αεquitatem justitiæ: unde dicitur I Joan., III, 4: Omne peccatum est iniquitas: et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.4] The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his exposition of Isaiah 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains that God "built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod mendacium obstetricum potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo quantum ad affectum benevolentiæ in Judæos, et quantum ad reverentiam divini timoris, ex quibus commendatur in eis indoles virtutis; et sic debetur eis remuneratio αεterna: unde Hieronymus exponit $^1$ Super Isa., LXV, v. 21, col. 647, t. 4, quod « Deus αεdificavit illis domos spirituales. » Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsum exteriorem actum mendacii: quod quidem non potuerunt αεternam remunerationem mereri, sed forte aliquam remunerationem temporalem, cujus merito non repugnabat deformitas illius mendacii, sicut repugnabat merito remunerationis αεternæ. Et sic intelligenda sunt verba Gregorii, non quod per illud mendacium mererentur amittere remunerationem αεternam, quam jam ex præcedenti affectu meruerant, sicut ratio procedebat.
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.5] Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie": although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.110.a.4.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod perfectis viris omne mendacium est peccatum mortale. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur: nulla enim circumstantia aggravat in infinitum, nisi quæ transfert in aliam speciem. Circumstantia autem personæ non transfert in aliam speciem, nisi forte ratione alicu-jus annexi, puta si sit contra votum ipsius: quod non potest dici de mendacio officioso vel jocoso. Et ideo mendacium officiosum viris perfectis, nisi forte per accidens, vel jocosum non est peccatum$^2$ mortale in ratione scandali. Et ad hoc potest referri quod Augustinus dicit, « perfectis esse præceptum non solum non mentiri, sed nec velle mentiri; » quamvis hoc Augustinus non assertive, sed sub dubitatione dicat; præmittit enim: « Nisi forte ita ut perfectorum, etc. » Nec obstat quod ipsi ponuntur in statu conservandæ veritatis: quia veritatem tenentur conservare ex suo officio in judicio, vel doctrina, contra quæ si mentiantur, erit mendacium, quod est peccatum mortale; in aliis autem non oportet quod mortaliter peccent mentiendo.
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