Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q146. Abstinence
Source context
- Theme
- voluntary abstinence from food and drink as a virtue ordering bodily appetite toward spiritual ends
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 267Steiner states that every abstinence from a desire that leads to no longer desiring a previously desired object brings one step closer to knowledge, treating dietary abstinence as a direct instrument of esoteric development.
- GA 267Steiner notes that the lives of saints and members of religious orders furnish numerous examples of the effects of an abstinent life, with the greatest among them subsisting on fruit and bread alone.
- GA 37Steiner advises members of the Esoteric School that abstinence from meat is not required but is recommended because it promotes the achievement of the school's esoteric goals.
- GA 123, 1910-09-06Steiner observes that abstinence from meat-eating makes inner development easier by enabling greater resistance to obstacles, though he explicitly frames this as practical guidance rather than propaganda for vegetarianism.
- GA 130, 1911-01-29Steiner identifies abstinence from wine as a necessary consequence for anyone who wishes to penetrate the spiritual worlds, on the grounds that wine becomes an opponent operating within the human body itself.
- GA 90a, 1904-08-16Steiner associates the virtue of abstinence from the worldly with the second stage of devachan, linking dietary and sensory restraint to the development of devotion to the spirit.
- GA 97, 1906-04-25Steiner remarks that the theme of abstinence and temperance was becoming notably vital again in his time, indicating deep spiritual reasons behind its renewed cultural prominence.
Cross-tradition
- Stoic temperance (sophrosyne / temperantia)Stoic and Peripatetic ethics treat temperance as the rational governance of appetitive impulses, a structural parallel to Aquinas's ordering of abstinence under the cardinal virtue of temperance.
- Yoga (Hindu ascetic tradition)Classical yoga systematizes dietary and sensory restraint (ahara-niyama) as a preparatory discipline for higher states of consciousness, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's treatment of abstinence as a disposition of the body toward the good of the soul.
- Christian monastic rule (patristic and medieval)Patristic writers and the Rule of Benedict prescribe fasting and dietary restriction as instruments of compunction and contemplative readiness, structurally parallel to Aquinas's argument that abstinence disposes the soul toward virtue and prayer.
Q146. Abstinence
Article 1
[II-II.q.146.a.1.arg.1] It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power [virtute]." Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apostle says (Romans 14:17): "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink," where a gloss [Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11 observes that "justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating." Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod abstinentia non sit virtus. Dicit enim Apostolus I ad Corinth., iv, 20: Non in sermone est regnum Dei, sed in virtute. In abstinentia autem non consistit regnum Dei: dicit enim Apostolus ad Rom., xiv, 17: Non est regnum Dei esca et potus; ubi dicit Glossa, « nec in abstinendo, nec in manducando esse justitiam. » Ergo abstinentia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in X Confess., c. xxxi, § 44, col. 797, t. 1, ad Deum loquens: « Hoc me docuisti, ut quemadmodum medicamenta, sic alimenta sumpturus accedam. » Sed medicamenta moderari non pertinet ad virtutem, sed ad artem medicinæ. Ergo pari ratione moderari alimenta, quod pertinet ad abstinentiam, non est actus virtutis, sed artis.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.arg.3] Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis virtus in medio consistit, ut habetur in II Ethic., cap. vi et vii. Abstinentia autem non videtur in medio consistere, sed in defectu, cum ex subtractione nominetur. Ergo abstinentia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.arg.4] Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer," so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, nulla virtus excludit aliam. Sed abstinentia excludit patientiam: dicit enim Gregorius in Pastor., part. iii, admon. xx, col. 81, t. 3, quod « abstinentium mentes plerumque impatientia excutit a sinu tranquillitatis; » ibidem etiam dicit quod « cogitationes abstinentium nonnunquam superbiæ culpa transfigit; » et ita excludit humilitatem. Ergo abstinentia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.sc] It is written (2 Peter 1:5-6): "Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence"; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a virtue.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur II Pet., i, 5: Ministrate in fide vestra virtutem, in virtute autem scientiam, in scientia autem abstinentiam, ubi abstinentia aliis virtutibus connumeratur. Ergo abstinentia est virtus.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.co] Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we ought "to join abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod abstinentia ex suo nomine importat subtractionem ciborum. Dupliciter ergo nomen abstinentia accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod absolute ciborum subtractionem designat, et hoc modo abstinentia non designat neque virtutem, neque actum virtutis, sed quoddam indifferens; alio modo potest accipi, secundum quod est ratione regulata, et tunc significat vel habitum virtutis, vel actum. Et hoc significatur in præmissa auctoritate Petri ubi dicitur in scientia esse abstinentiam ministrandam, ut scilicet homo a cibis abstineat, prout oportet pro congruentia hominum cum quibus vivit, et personæ suæ, et pro valetudinis suæ necessitate.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.ad.1] The use of and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not [Vulgate: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'], shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod usus ciborum et eorum abstinentia secundum se considerata, non pertinent ad regnum Dei: dicit enim Apostolus I ad Corinth., vIII, 8: Esca nos non commendat Deo: neque enim si non manducaverimus deficiemus, neque si manducaverimus, abundabimus, scilicet spiritualiter. Utrumque autem eorum, secundum quod fit rationabiliter ex fide et dilectione Dei, pertinet ad regnum Dei.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.ad.2] The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain."
[II-II.q.146.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod moderate ciborum secundum quantitatem et qualitatem pertinet ad artem medicinæ in comparatione ad valetudinem corporis; sed secundum interiores affectiones in comparatione ad bonum rationis pertinet ad abstinentiam. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. II De QQ. evang.: « Non interest omnino, scilicet ad virtutem, quid alimentorum, vel quantum quis accipiat, dummodo id faciat pro congruentia hominum cum quibus vivit, et personæ suæ, et pro suæ valetudinis necessitate; sed quanta facilitate 4 atque serenitate animi careat, cum his oportet vel necesse est carere. »
[II-II.q.146.a.1.ad.3] It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad temperantiam pertinet refrenare delectationes quæ nimis animum ad se alliciunt, sicut ad fortitudinem pertinet firmare animun contra timores a bono rationis repellentes. Et ideo sicut laus fortitudinis consistit in quodam excessu, et ex hoc denominantur omnes partes fortitudinis; ita etiam laus temperantiæ consistit in quodam defectu, et ex hoc ipsa et omnes partes ejus denominantur. Unde et abstinentia, quia est pars temperantiæ, denominatur a defectu; et tamen consistit in medio, inquantum est secundum rationem rectam.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.ad.4] Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God's glory and not one's own.
[II-II.q.146.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod illa vitia proveniunt ex abstinentia, prout non est secundum rationem rectam. Ratio enim recta facit abstinere sicut oportet, scilicet cum hilaritate mentis, et propter quodoportet, scilicet propter gloriam Dei, non propter gloriam suam.
Article 2
[II-II.q.146.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues." Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod abstinentia non sit specialis virtus. Omnis enim virtus secundum seipsam est laudabilis. Sed abstinentia non est secundum se laudabilis: dicit enim Gregorius in Pastor., part III, adm. xx, col. 82, t.3, quod « virtus abstinentia nonnisi ex aliis virtutibus commendatur. » Ergo abstinentia non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.arg.2] Further, Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus 2 dicit, De fide ad Petrum, c. xLII, tom. 6, quod abstinentia sanctorum est a cibo et potu, non quia aliqua creatura Dei sit mala, sed pro sola corporis castigatione. Hoc autem pertinet ad castitatem, ut ex ipso nomine apparet. Ergo abstinentia non est virtus specialis a castitate distincta.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.arg.3] Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Timothy 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulgate: 'are'] content." Now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut homo debet esse contentus moderato cibo, ita et moderata veste, secundum illud I Timoth., ult., 8: Habentes alimenta, et quibus tegamur, his contenti simus. In moderatione autem vestium non est aliqua specialis virtus. Ergo neque abstinentia, quæ est moderativa alimentorum.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.sc] Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Macrobius, lib. I In somn. Scip., cap. VIII, ponit abstinentiam specialem partem temperantiæ.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.co] As stated above (136, 1; 141, 3) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus moralis conservat boum rationis contra impetus passionum: et ideo ubi inventur specialis ratio qua passio abstrahit a bono rationis, ibi necesse est esse specialem virtutem. Delectationes autem ciborum natæ sunt abstrahere hominem a bono rationis, tum propter earum magnitudinem, tum etiam propter necessitatem ciborum, quibus homo indiget ad vitæ conservationem, quam maxime homo desiderat. Et ideo abstinentia est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.ad.1] Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutes oportet esse connexas, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo una virtus adjuvatur et commendatur ex alia, sicut justitia ex 1 Ita cum Mss. Nicolai, et edit. eo posteriores; al.: « severitate. » 2 Liber De fide ad Petrum, Fulgentio restituenus est; apud quem videre est col. 704. fortitudine. Et per hunc etiam modum virtus abstinentiæ commendatur ex aliis virtutibus.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.ad.2] The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod per abstinentiam corpus castigatur, non solum contra illecebram luxuriæ, sed etiam contra illecebras gulæ; quia dum homo abstinet, magis redditur fortis ad impugnationes gulæ vincendas, quæ tanto fortiores sunt quanto magis homo eis cedit. Et tamen non prohibetur abstinentiam esse specialem virtutem per hoc quod ad castitatem valet, quia una virtus ad aliam juvat.
[II-II.q.146.a.2.ad.3] The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.146.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod usus vestimentorum est introductus ab arte, usus autem ciborum a natura: et ideo magis debet esse virtus specialis circa moderationem ciborum quam circa moderationem vestimentorum.
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