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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q40. War

Source context
Theme
moral conditions and spiritual justification for waging war
Soul-faculty
Consciousness Soul

Steiner

  • GA 177, 1917-09-30Steiner observes that the destructive intensity of modern warfare vastly exceeds that of earlier centuries, situating war within the accelerating spiritual crisis of the age of the Consciousness Soul.
  • GA 173b, 1916-12-31Steiner argues that no single class or nation deliberately willed the outbreak of the First World War, implying that its causes must be traced to supersensible spiritual forces rather than to individual moral agency alone.
  • GA 270, 1924-05-31Steiner holds that the history of the World War cannot be written from the physical plane alone, since spiritual causes operating behind historical events are essential to understanding its origin and course.
  • GA 159, 1915-05-18Steiner redirects the question of war-guilt away from simple moral attribution, suggesting that the question of who could have prevented the war is more illuminating than the question of who is responsible for it.

Cross-tradition

  • Augustinian just-war doctrineAquinas's four conditions for just war — legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, and last resort — systematize Augustine's earlier reflections on the moral permissibility of violence in defence of the common good.
  • Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh al-jihad)Classical Islamic legal theory distinguishes defensive from offensive war and imposes conditions of proportionality and authorisation by legitimate authority, showing cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence on sovereign declaration and just cause.
  • Hindu Dharmashastra (kshatriya duty)The Mahabharata's framing of righteous war (dharma-yuddha) as a duty of the warrior caste, distinct from personal desire for violence, parallels Aquinas's requirement that war be waged with right intention rather than private passion.

Q40. War

Article 1

[II-II.q.40.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Matthew 26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Therefore all wars are unlawful.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod bellare semper sit peccatum. Pœna enim non infligitur nisi pro peccato. Sed bellantibus a Domino inducitur pœna, secundum illud Matth., xxvi, 52: Omnis qui acceperit gladium, gladio peribit*. Ergo omne bellum est illicitum.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.arg.2] Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Matthew 5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Romans 12:19): "Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath." Therefore war is always sinful.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quidquid contrariatur divino præcepto est peccatum. Sed bellare contrariatur divino præcepto; dicitur enim Matth., v, 39: Ego autem dico vobis, non resistere malo. Et Rom., xii, 49, dicitur: Non vos* defendentes, charissimi, sed date locum iræ. Ergo bellare semper est peccatum.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.arg.3] Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue.

But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil contrariatur actui virtutis nisi peccatum. Sed bellum contrariatur paci. Ergo bellum semper est peccatum.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.arg.4] Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, omne exercitium ad rem licitum licitum est, sicut patet in exercitiis scientiarum. Sed exercitia bellorum, quæ fiunt in torneamentis, prohibentur ab Ecclesia; quia morientes in hujusmodi tyrociniis ecclesiastica sepultura privantur. Ergo bellum videtur esse simpliciter peccatum.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.sc] Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion [Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay' [Luke 3:14. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering."

[II-II.q.40.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in Sermone de puero centurionis: « Si christiana disciplina omnia bella culparet, hoc potius consilium salutis petentibus in Evangelio diceretur ut abjicerent arma, seque militiae omnino subtraherent. Dictum est autem eis: Neminem concusseritis; sufficiat vobis stipendium vestrum. Quibus proprium stipendium sufficere præceptit, militare non prohibuit. » dicta quod seorsum alii ad alios eant. Bellum igitur est totum, pugna unius diei, præelium pars pugnæ est. Bellum antea duellum vocatum, eo quod duæ sunt partes dimicantium, vel quod alterum faciat victorem, alium victum. Postea, detracta littera d, et mutata u in b, dictum est bellum. Alii per anti-phrasim putant dictum, eo quod sit horridum. Prælia dicuntur a premendo hostis hostem, unde et præla ligna quibus uva premitur. Pugna vocata eo quod usus fuisset initio pugnis contendere, vel quia primo bellum pugnis incipiebant. Quatuor autem in bello aguntur, pugna, fuga, victoria, pax. Pacis vocabulum videtur a pacto sumptum. Posterius autem pax accipitur, fœdus primum initur. Fœdus est pax quæ fit inter dimicantes, vel a fide, vel a fæcialibus, id est sacerdotibus dictum; per ipsos enim fiebant fœdera, sicut per sæculares bella. Alii fœdera dicta esse putant a porca fœde et cru-

[II-II.q.40.a.1.co] In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Romans 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Psalm 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [The words quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu. 1): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war."

[II-II.q.40.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad hoc quod aliquod bellum sit justum, tria requiruntur. Primo quidem auctoritas principis, cujus mandato bellum est gerendum. Non enim pertinet ad personam privatam bellum movere, quia potest jus suum in judicio superioris prosequi; similiter etiam quia convocare multitudinem, quod in bellis oportet fieri, non pertinet ad privatam personam. Cum autem cura reipublicæ commissa sit principibus, ad eos pertinet rempublicam civitatis, vel regni, seu provinciæ sibi subditæ tueri. Et sicut licite defendunt eam materiali gladio contra interiores perturbatores, dum malefactores puniunt, secundum illud Apostoli ad Rom., xiii, 4: Non sine causa gladium portat; Dei enim minister est, vindex in iram ei qui malum agit; ita etiam gladio bellico ad eos pertinet rempublicam tueri ab exterioribus hostibus. Unde et principibus dicitur in psal. Lxxxi, 4: Eripite pauperem, et egenum de manu peccatoris liberate. Unde Augustinus dicit, Contra Faustum, lib. XXII, cap. Lxxv, col. 448, t. 8: « Ordo naturalis mortalium paci accommodatus hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli auctoritas atque consilium penes principem sit. » Secundo requiritur causa justa: ut scilicet illi qui impugnantur, propter aliquam culpam impugnationem mereantur. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. VI Quæstion. in Pentat., q. x, col. 781, t. 3: « Justa bella definiri solent quæ ulciscuntur injurias, si gens, vel civitas quæ bello petenda est, vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per injurias ablatum est. » Tertio requiritur uti sit intentio bellantium recta; qua scilicet intenditur vel ut bonum promoveatur, vel ut ma- deliter occisa, cujus mors optabatur ei qui a pace resilisset. Virg.: « Et cæsa jungebant fædera porca. » Fæderis partes induciæ, quasi in dies ocia. Tullius, De offic., lib. I: « Bellum quidem ita suscipiatur, ut nil aliud nisi pax quæsita videatur. » Hæc ex Speculo doctrinali, lib. XI, cap. xxxvi. In edit. et in cod. habetur: « Augustinus dicit in sermone « De puero centurionis, » et sub eo-dem titulo referuntur Augustini verba in Decreto, XXIII, q. 1, c. « Paratus, » unde forte a D. Thoma collecta sunt. — Sed editor Decreti et Nicolaï in sua Summæ editione parisina optime notant non legi prædicta nisi in Epist. ad Marcellinum, quam videas, cap. II, § 45, col. 531, t. 2. Sic cod.; Parm.: « prosequi. Similiter etiam convocare. » In Parm.: « perturbationes. » lum vitetur. Unde dicit Augustinus in libro De verbis Domini: « Apud veros Dei cultores etiam illa bella pacata sunt, quæ non cupiditate, aut crudelitate, sed pacis studio geruntur, ut mali coerceantur, et boni subleventur. » Potest autem contingere ut si sit legitima auctoritas indicis bellum, et causa justa, nihilominus propter pravam intentionem bellum reddatur illicitum. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. XXII Contra Faustum, c. Lxxiv, col. 447, t. 8: « Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impacatus atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi, et si qua similia, hæc sunt quæ in bellis jure culpantur. »

[II-II.q.40.a.1.ad.1] As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit, lib. XXII Contra Faustum, cap. Lxx, col. 414, t. 8, « ille utitur gladio qui nulla superiore ac legitima potestate, vel jubente, vel concedente, in sanguinem ali-cujus armatur. » Qui vero ex auctoritate principis vel judicis, si sit persona privata, vel ex zelo justitiæ, quasi ex auctoritate Dei, si sit persona publica, gladio utitur, non ipse accipit gladium, sed ab alio sibi commisso utitur; unde ei pœna non debetur. Nec tamen illi etiam qui cum peccato gladio utuntur, semper gladio occiduntur; sed ipso suo gladio semper pereunt, quia pro peccato gladii æternaliter puniuntur, nisi pœniteant.

[II-II.q.40.a.1.ad.2] Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy."

[II-II.q.40.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hujusmodi præcepta, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. I De serm. Domini in monte, cap. xix, col. 1258, t. 3, semper sunt servanda in præparatione animi, ut scilicet semper homo sit paratus non resistere, vel se non defendere, si opus fuerit. Sed quandoque est aliter agendum propter commune bonum, vel etiam illorum cum quibus pugnatur. Unde Augustinus dicit in Epist. cxxxviii ad Marcellinum, cap. 11, § 14, col. 531, t. 2: « Agenda sunt multa etiam cum invitis benigna quadam asperitate plectendis. Nam cui licentia ini-quitatis eripitur, utiliter vicitur: quoniam nihil est infelicius felicitate peccantium, qua pœnalis nutritur impunitas, et mala voluntas velut hostis interior, roboratur. »

[II-II.q.40.a.1.ad.3] Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came not to send upon earth" (Matthew 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace."

[II-II.q.40.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam illi qui juste bella gerunt, pacem intendunt; et ita paci non contrariantur, nisi malæ, quam Dominus non venit mittere in terram, ut dicitur Matth., x. Unde Augustinus dicit, Ad Bonifacium, epist. cxxxix, § 6, col. 856, t. 2: « Non quæritur pax, ut bellum exciteur, sed bellum geritur, ut pax acquiratur. Esto ergo bellando pacificus, ut eos quos expugnas, ad pacis utilitatem vincendo perducas. »

[II-II.q.40.a.1.ad.4] Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering. On olden times warlike exercises presented no such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or "bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [Reference incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].

[II-II.q.40.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod exercitia hominum ad res bellicas spectantia non sunt universaliter prohibita; sed inordinata exercitia, et periculosa, ex quibus occasiones et deprædationes proveniunt. Apud antiquos autem exercitationes ad bella sine hujusmodi periculis erant, et ideo vocabantur « meditationes armorum, » vel « bella sine sanguine, » ut per Hieronymum patet in quadam epist..

Article 2

[II-II.q.40.a.2.arg.1] It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. For, as stated above (Article 1), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod clericis et episcopis liceat pugnare. Bella enim intantum sunt licita et justa, ut milites laudavit, nec ipsum jussit deserere militiam. Matth., viii. Cornelius, centurio cohortis quæ dicitur Italica, laudatur in Act., x. Paulus laudat Gedeonem, Barac, Samsonem et alios, qui per fidem vicerunt regna, fortes facti sunt in bello, castra verterunt exterorum. Vide Ambrosium, lib. I De offic., cap. xl; Augustinum, ubii supra, et Epist. L ad Bonifacium comitem; Gregorium, lib. I Epist., lxxii; Bernardum, Sermone ad milites Templi, cap. iii. Ecclesia in pluribus conciliis decrevit bellum pro recuperatione Terræ sanctæ, aliaque bella approbavit. Bellum suscepit nostris etiam temporibus. Unde bellum licitum esse potest. Sed sunt conditiones, scilicet: legitima auctoritas, causa justa, recta intentio. Auctoritas requisita debet esse suprema: imperatores, reges, quidam duces, respublicæ independentes, ut veneta, helvetica, etc.; unaquæque patria suas leges ad hoc habet. Si tamen ageretur de bello defensivo, auctoritas suprema, instante periculo, non requireretur, quia cuique, etiam privato, licet vim vi repellere. Insuper, si princeps supremus sit negligens in vindicanda injuria, posset princeps inferior aut respublica dependens bellum aggressivum indicare ad vindicandam illam injuriam, per accidens, cum ex impunitate, verbi gratia, hostis audacior fieret, et inde immineret novum damnum, quia tunc censeretur aliquo modo bellum defensivum. Generaliter loquendo, causa justa indicendi bellum offensivum est unica, nempe injuria gravis illata, et non reparata, aut alio modo non reparanda. Sed plures aliæ causæ particulares sub hac unica generali continentur: 1. gravis injuria illata principi aut ejus legatis; 2. recuperatio provinciæ aut civitatis, alteriusve gravis debiti; 3. auxilium delatum hosti injusto, II Reg., viii; 4. si qui impediant ne nocentes juste puniantur, Jud., x; 5. violatio pacti gravis momenti; 6. denegatio justi tributi; 7. auxilium præstandum confæderatis justum bellum gerentibus, aut innocentibus injuste vexatis; 8. hæresis aut idololatria propriorum subditorum; 9. si infideles etiam non subditi impediant fidei prædicationem; 10. denegatio transitus innoxii.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.arg.2] Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): "As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it is lawful for bishops to fight.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.arg.3] Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according to Romans 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it.

But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ejusdem rationis esse videtur quod homo aliquid faciat, et quod facienti consentiat, secundum illud Rom., 1, 32: Digni sunt morte non solum qui faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. Maxime autem consentit qui ad aliquid faciendum alios inducit. Licitum autem est episcopis et clericis inducere alios ad bellandum; dicitur enim XXIII, q. vIII, c. «Hortatu, » col. 1249, quod hortatu et precibus Adriani romanæ urbis episcopi, Carolus bellum contra Longobardos suscepit. Ergo etiam eis licet pugnare.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.arg.4] Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, illud quod est secundum se honestum et meritorium, non est illicitum prælatis et clericis. Sed bellare est quando et honestum et meritorium; dicitur enim XXIII, quæst. vIII, c. «Omni timore, » col. 1248, quod «si aliquis pro veritate fidei et salvatione patriæ, ac defensione christianorum mortuus fuerit, a Deo cæleste præmium consequetur. » Ergo licitum est episcopis et clericis bellare.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.sc] It was said to Peter as representing bishops and clerics (Matthew 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulgate: 'its place'] ["Scabbard" is the reading in John 18:11."] Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Petro in persona episcoporum et clericorum dicitur Matth., XXVI, 52: Converte gladium tuum in vaginam*. Non ergo licet eis pugnare.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.co] Several things are requisite for the good of a human society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce [Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].

Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Timothy 2:4: "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." The second reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Corinthians 11:26: "As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He come." Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad bonum societatis humanæ plura sunt necessaria. Diversa autem a diversis melius et expeditius aguntur quam ab uno, ut patet per Philosophum in sua Polit., lib. I, c. 1, circa med., et quædam negotia sunt adeo sibi repugnantia, ut convenienter simul exerceri non possint; et ideo illis qui majoribus deputantur, prohibentur minora; sicut secundum leges humanas militibus, qui deputantur ad exercitia bellica, negotiationes interdicuntur, in Syntag. juris, lib. XXV, cap. xv, num. 8. Bellica autem exercitia maxime repugnant illis officiis quibus episcopi et clericii deputantur, propter duo: primo quidem generali ratione, quia bellica exercitia maximas inquietudines habent; unde multum impedunt animum a contemplatione divinorum et laude Dei, et oratione pro populo; quæ ad officium pertinent clericorum. Et ideo sicut negotiationes, propter hoc quod nimis implicant animum, interdicuntur clericis; ita et bellica exercitia, secundum illud II ad Tim., 4: Nemo militans Deo implicat se sæcu-laribus negotiis. Secundo propter specialem rationem; nam omnes clericorum ordines ordinantur ad altaris ministerium, in quo sub sacramento repræsentatur passio Christi, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xI, 26: Quotiescumque manducabitis panem hunc, et calicem bibetis, mortem Domini annuntia-bitis, donec veniat. Et ideo non competit eis occidere vel effundere sanguinem, sed magis esse paratos ad propriam sanguinis effusionem pro Christo, ut imitentur opere quod gerunt ministerio. Et propter hoc est institutum ut effundentes sanguinem etiam sine peccato sint irregulares. Nulli autem qui est deputatus ad aliquod officium licet id per quod suo officio incongruus redditur. Unde clericis non licet omnino bella gerere, quæ ordinantur ad sanguinis effusionem.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.ad.1] Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 10:4): "The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God." Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod prælati debent resistere non solum lupis, qui spiritualiter interficiunt gregem, sed etiam raptoribus et tyrannis, qui corporaliter vexant, non autem materialibus armis in propria persona utendo, sed spiritualibus, secundum illud Apostoli II ad Corinth., x, 4: Arma militiæ nostræ non carnalia sunt, sed potentia Deo; quæ quidem sunt salubres admonitiones, devotæ orationes, contra pertinaces excommunicationis sententia.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.ad.2] Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prælati et clericii ex auctoritate superioris possunt interesse bellis, non quidem ut ipsi propria manu pugnent, sed ut juste pugnantibus spiritualiter subveniant suis exhortationibus et absolutionibus, et aliis hujusmodi spiritualibus subventionibus; sicut et in veteri lege mandabatur, Josue, vi, quod sacerdotes sacris buccinis in bellis clangerent. Et ad hoc primo fuit concessum quod episcopi, vel clercici ad bella procederent; quod autem aliqui propria manu pugnent, abusionis est.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.ad.3] As stated above (23, 4, ad 2) every power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their personality.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis potentia, vel ars, vel virtus ad quam pertinet finis, habet disponere de his quæ sunt ad finem. Bella autem carnalia in populo fideli sunt referenda, sicut ad finem, ad bonum spirituale divinum, cui clercici deputantur. Et ideo ad clercicos pertinet disponere et inducere alios ad bellandum bella justa. Non enim interdicitur eis bellare quia peccatum sit, sed quia tale exercitium eorum personæ non congruit.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.ad.4] Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.

[II-II.q.40.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod licet exercere bella justa sit meritorium, tamen illici- tum redditur clericis, propter hoc quod sunt ad opera magis meritoria deputati; sicut matrimonialis actus potest esse meritorius, et tamen virginitatem voventibus damnabiliis redditur propter obligationem eorum ad majus bonum.

Article 3

[II-II.q.40.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it is written (Deuteronomy 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.

[II-II.q.40.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit licitum in bellis uti insidiis. Dicitur enim Deuter., xvI, 20: Juste quod justum est exequeris*. Sed insidiæ, cum sint fraudes quædam, videntur ad injustitiam pertinere. Ergo non est utendum insidiis etiam in bellis justis. 2. Praeterea, insidiæ et fraudes fidelitati videntur opponi, sicut et mendacia. Sed quia ad omnes fidem debemus servare, nulli homini est mentiendum, ut patet per Augustinum in lib. Contra mendacium, c. xv, etc., col. 539, t. 6. Cum ergo fides hosti servanda sit, ut Augustinus dicit Ad Bonifacium, Epist. clxxxix, § 6, col. 856, t. 2, videtur quod non sit contra hostes insidiis utendum. 3. Praeterea, Matth., vii, 12, dicitur: Quæ* vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis; et hoc est observandum ad omnes proximos. Inimici autem sunt proximi. Cum ergo nullus sibi velit insidias, vel fraudes parari, videtur quod nullus ex insidiis debeat gerere bella.

[II-II.q.40.a.3.arg.2] Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.

[II-II.q.40.a.3.arg.3] Further, it is written (Matthew 7:12): "Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.

[II-II.q.40.a.3.sc] Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos): "Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Joshua 8:2).

[II-II.q.40.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in VI lib. Quæstion. in Pentat., q. x, col. 781, t. 3: « Cum justum bellum aliquis susceperit, utrum aperta pugna, utrum insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest; » et hoc probat auctoritate Domini, qui mandavit Josue ut insidias poneret habitatoribus civitatis Hai, ut habetur Josue, viii.

[II-II.q.40.a.3.co] The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose states (De Officiis i).

Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Matthew 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs." Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated in the Book on Strategy [Stratagematum i, 1 by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.

Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

[II-II.q.40.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod insidiæ ordinantur ad fallendum hostes. Dupliciter autem aliquis potest falli ex facto vel dicto alterius: uno modo ex eo quod ei dicitur falsum vel non servatur promissum; et istud semper est illicitum; et hoc modo nullus debet hostes fallere: sunt enim quædam jura bellorum et fœdera etiam inter ipsos hostes servanda, ut Ambrosius dicit in I De officiis, cap. xxix, col. 68, t. 3. Alio modo aliquis potest falli ex dicto, vel facto nostro, quia ei propositum aut intellectum non aperimus. Hoc autem semper facere non tenemur, quia etiam in doctrina sacra multa sunt occultanda, maxime infidelibus, ne irrideant, secundum illud Matth., vii, 6: Nolite dare sanctum canibus. Unde multo magis ea quæ ad impugnandum inimicos paramus, sunt eis occultanda. Unde inter. Omnibus clericis jure ecclesiastico prohibitum est propria manu bellare extra casum urgentis necessitatis. « Quicumque ex clero esse videntur, arma militaria non sumant, nec armati incedant, sed professionis suæ vocabulum religiosis moribus et religioso habitu præbeant, » cap. « Quicumque, » cau. XXIII, q. viii. Vide insuper cap. « Quicumque clericus, » et cap. « Clerici, » etc. Clericos intelligere sacris ordinibus initiatos, aut tonsura vel minoribus, si beneficium habeant; de simpliciter tonsuratis aut minoristis jura vel tacent, vel contraria consuetudine abrogantur. Nec jus autem divinum, nec jus naturale id prohibent clericis. Jonathas et Simon sacerdotes bellum gesserunt, I Machab., x, xi, xii. Si quidam SS. Patres videantur dicere militiam ex se esse clericis prohibitam, intelligendi sunt eo sensu quod natura officiorum clericorum magnum præbet fundamentum ut ab Ecclesia pugnare prohibientur. Jus autem ecclesiasticum prohibet manu propria bellare. Nam possunt clercici qui habent jurisdictionem temporalem sufficientem indicere bellum, exercitum conscribere, duces belli præficere; cap. « Episcopus, » tit. « Ne clercici et monachi, » in VI. Item clercici quicumque possunt bello interesse et hortari milites ad pugnandum fortiter, non tamen dicere: occide, macta! In casu nesessitatis, ipsum jus naturale permittit clercici sicut et aliis propria manu pugnare, ut si necessarium sit ad propriam vel proximi innocentis, praesertim patriæ, civitatis aut religionis defensionem contra injustos invasores. Item si, aliis militibus deficientibus, necessarium esset clercicos pugnare ad consequendam insignem victoriam, ex qua salus Ecclesia vel reipublicæ multum dependet. Si dicas omnes sponte militantes in bello justo, sive offensivo sive defensivo, si per seipsos mutilent aut occidant, esse irregulares, ut habetur can. « Aliquantulos, » et cap. « Petitio tua, » xxiv, tit. « De homic. » Extra. lib. V. — Respondeo non sponte militare, illos qui necessitate defendendi patriam compulsi militant, nec videtur rationi consentaneum quod lex positiva irregularitatis obstet adimpletioni præcepti naturalis: sic Joannes a S. Thoma post plures alios. Requiritur tamen inevitabilis necessitas ut clercicus militare possit, et fit irregularis etiam jubendo hunc occidi, præbendo arma ad hunc occidendum, ut communius tenetur. Irregularitatem pariter contrahunt omnes, ex delicto, militantes et quolibet modo cooperantes in bello injusto, in quo patrata sunt homicidia vel mutilationes, etiamsi per seipsos non occiderint vel mutilaverint. Est communis, et constat ex cap. « Sicut dignum, » § ultimo, tit. « De homicidio. » cætera documenta rei militaris hoc præcipue ponitur de occultandis consiliis, ne ad hostes perveniant, ut patet in lib. I Stratagematum Francorum Sexti Jul. Frontini, c. 1, et talis occultatio pertinet ad rationem insidiarum, quibus licitum est uti in bellis justis. Nec proprie hujusmodi insidiæ vocantur fraudes, nec justitiæ repugnant, nec ordinatæ voluntati. Esset enim inordinata voluntas, si aliquis vellet nihil sibi ab aliis occultari. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.

Article 4

[II-II.q.40.a.4.arg.1] It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Exodus 20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.

[II-II.q.40.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in diebus festis non liceat bellare. Festa enim sunt ordinata ad vacandum divinis; unde intelliguntur per observationem sabbati, quæ præcipitur Exod., xx. Sabbatum enim interpretatur requies. Sed bella maximam inquietudinem habent. Ergo nullo modo est in diebus festis pugnandum.

[II-II.q.40.a.4.arg.2] Further, certain persons are reproached (Isaiah 58:3) because on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it unlawful to fight on holy days.

[II-II.q.40.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Isa., lviii, reprehenduntur quidam quod in diebus jejunii repetunt debita, et committunt lites, pugno percu-tientes. Ergo multo magis in diebus festis illicitum est bellare.

[II-II.q.40.a.4.arg.3] Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed. Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal harm.

[II-II.q.40.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil est inordinate agendum ad vitandum incommodum temporale. Sed bellare in die festo hoc est secundum se inordinatum. Ergo pro nulla necessitate temporalis incommodi vitandi debet aliquis in die festo bellare.

[II-II.q.40.a.4.sc] It is written (1 Maccabees 2:41): The Jews rightly determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him."

[II-II.q.40.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod I Machab., ii, 44, dicitur: Cogitaverunt laudabiliter Judæi dicentes: Omnis homo quicumque venerit ad nos in bello die sabbatorum, pugnemus adversus eum.

[II-II.q.40.a.4.co] The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (John 7:23): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?" Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from fighting.

However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.40.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod observatio festorum non impedit ea quæ ordinantur ad hominis salutem etiam corporalem. Unde Dominus arguit Judæos, dicens, Joan., vii, 23: Mihi indignamini, quia totum hominem sanum feci in sabbato? Et inde est quod medici licite possunt medicari homines in die festo. Multo autem magis est conservanda salus 1 Al.: « videtur esse. » Licitum est uti insidiis in bello, modo id fiat absque mendacio et violatione promissi. « Cum justum bellum quis susceperit, utrum aperta pugna, utrum insidiis vincat, ad justitiæ causam non facit. » Augustinus, q. x Sup. Josue. Israelitæ instruuntur uti insidiis adversus civitatem Haï, Jos., cap. viii. Unde licitum est uti vestibus et vexillis hostium, simulare fugam, aggredi unam partem, dum fin-gitur aggressio alterius. Sed illicitum est simulare redditionem et arma præbere quasi sese reddendo, ut facilius accedens hostis bona fide quasi victor occidatur. Hæ occisiones nefanda homicidia sunt. De insidiis autem, audi Speculum doctrinale, lib. XI, cap. lvi. « Qui rem militarem studiosius didicerunt asse-runt plura in itineribus quam in ipsa acie pericula solere contingere; nam in conflictu armati sunt omnes, et hostem comminus vident, et ad pugnandum animo veniunt præparati. In itinere minus armatus, minusque attentus est miles, et superveniente impetu vel fraude repente turbatur. Ideo omni cura providere dux debet ne profiscens patiatur incursum, vel facile ac sine damno repellat illatum. Primum itineraria omnium regionum in quibus bellum geritur, plenissime debet habere perscripta, ita ut locorum intervalla, via-rum qualitates perdiscat, per compendia, diverticula, montes, flumina ad fidem descripta consideret. Præterea sub periculo eligendum viarum duces idoneos, scientesque capere, eosque custodia mancipare, addita pœnæ ostentatione vel premii; sed et cautelæ caput est ut ea loca per quæ vel quibus itineribus sit provecturus exercitus ignorentur. Verum quia exploratores altrinsecus missi profectionem suspicionibus vel oculis deprehendunt, et interdum profugæ proditoresque non desunt, dux fidelissimos argutissimosque cum equis probatissimis mittat qui loca per quæ iter faciendum est in progressu, et a tergo, dextra lævaque perlustrent, ne aliquas adversarii molian-tur insidias. Tutius operantur exploratores noctibus quam diebus. Ne vero repentinus tumultus amplius noceat, ante commonendi sunt milites, ut parati sint animo, ut arma in manibus habeant. Præterea noscere debemus hostium consuetudinem, et utrum pedibus an equitibus, utrum numero hominum vel armorum munitione præcellant, et ordinare quod nobis utile, illis docetur adversum. » « Quis dubitet artem bellicam rebus omnibus esse potiorem, per quam libertas retinetur, et dignitas propagatur, provinciæ conservantur? Nunquam miles in acie producendus est cujus antea experimenta non cæperis. Nulla consilia meliora sunt quam illa quæ ignoraverit adversarius antequam facias. Consilium tuum cum cognoveris adversariis proditum, dispositionem mutare te convenit. Quid fieri debeat tractato cum multis, quid vero facturus sis cum paucissimis ac fide-lissimis, vel potius ipse tecum. Amplius juvat virtus quam fortitudo. Qui per dispersos suos inconsulte sequitur, quam ipse acceperat hosti vult dare victoriam. Magna dispositio est hostem fame magis urgere quam ferro. » reipublicæ, per quam impediuntur occisiones plurimorum, et innumera mala et temporalia, et spiritualia, quam salus corporalis unius hominis. Et ideo pro tuitione reipublicæ fidelium licitum est justa bella exercere in diebus festis, si tamen hoc necessitas exposcat; hoc enim esset tentare Deum, si quis imminente tali necessitate vellet a bello abstinere. Sed, necessitate cessante, non est licitum bellare in diebus festis propter rationes inductas. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.

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